I
PAY
FEBRUARY 2017
The High Cost of Jailing
Texans for Fines & Fees
OR
STAY
REPORT TEAM
TEXAS APPLESEED
Deborah Fowler Executive Director
Mary Mergler Director, Criminal Justice Project
Kelli Johnson Communications Director
Yamanda Wright Director of Research
Alexis McLauchlan Intern
TEXAS FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT
Rebecca Bernhardt Executive Director
Emily Gerrick Staff Attorney
Tricia Forbes Deputy Director
Susanne Pringle Legal Director
ABOUT TEXAS APPLESEED
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social and economic justice for all
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other professionals to identify practical
solutions to difcult systemic problems.
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ABOUT TEXAS FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT
The Texas Fair Defense Project’s
mission is to ght for a criminal
justice system that respects the rights
of low-income Texans. We envision
a new system of justice that is fair,
compassionate and respectful.
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Suite 108
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www.fairdefense.org
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@FairDefense
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
01 INTRODUCTION 01
02 AN INESCAPABLE CYCLE OF DEBT & JAIL 04
03 COSTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 29
04 RECOMMENDATIONS 36
01
Across Texas, local and state leaders are realizing that the use of jail time for
fine-only offenses is costly, counterproductive, a threat to public safety and a violation
of Texans’ fundamental legal rights.
For low-income Texans, a ticket for a minor offense like speeding, jaywalking, or having a broken
headlight can lead to devastating consequences for the individual, as well as that person’s family
and community. If someone is unable to pay a ticket right away, the cost compounds over time, often
resulting in more tickets, nes and fees. Failing to pay or to appear in court can lead to an arrest
warrant and jail time.
Current practices often result in the suspension of, and inability to renew, driver’s licenses, as well as
the inability to register vehicles. They also result in millions of arrest warrants being issued annually.
When people are picked up on a warrant for failure to pay tickets, nes and fees, they are often booked
into jail and made to pay off their debt with jail credit, usually at a rate of $50 to $100 a day.
1
These
practices are widespread – over 230,000 Texans are unable to renew expired licenses until their nes
and fees are paid off,
2
and about 1 in 8 ne-only misdemeanor cases are paid off in whole or in part
with jail credit.
3
Low-income Texans are being set up to fail by the way nes and fees are handled, and they are often
driven deeper into poverty. Suspending a person’s driver’s license makes it illegal to drive to work;
issuing an arrest warrant can make it nearly impossible for to nd employment; and sending that
person to jail can lead to the loss of a job and housing. The public’s safety is harmed when low-risk
people languish in jail. This system hurts Texas families and drains our public resources at great
expense to taxpayers.
In many cases, the current system also violates state and federal law. The United States Supreme Court
has held that incarcerating somebody because of unpaid nes or fees without a hearing to determine if
they are actually able to pay the nes and fees violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of
the 14th Amendment.
4
Texas state statute also makes clear that a person cannot be jailed for unpaid
nes when the nonpayment was due to indigence.
5
1 Tex. Code of Crim. ProC. Ann. art. 45.048(2) (West 2015).
2 EmailfromPamelaHarden,Tex.Dep’t.ofPub.Safety,toSushmaSmith,ChiefofSta,OceofTex.SenatorJosé
Rodríguez,(Nov.9,2016)(onlewithauthors).
3 offiCe of CourT AdminisTrATion, AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl rePorT for The TexAs JudiCiAry: FY 2015 at Detail-45,48 (2016) (hereinafter
AnnualStatisticalReport)available at http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1308021/2015-ar-statistical-print.pdf.
4 See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1982).
5 Tex. Code of Crim. ProC. Ann. art. 45.046(a) (West 2015).
01 Introduction
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE >
02
While some courts feel intense pressure to attempt to increase collection rates by threatening
people with incarceration, others have been successful without using jail time as a punishment
for failure to pay. Most notably, the San Antonio Municipal Court stopped ordering people to lay
out nes in jail in 2007. It found that court revenue did not decrease as a result, nor was there a
noticeable change in driver behavior in the city.
6
Many low-income Texans are never able to escape the cycle of debt caused by our municipal and
justice courts’ ticketing systems and will spend years accumulating nes that force them in and
out of jail. This report offers recommendations for ending the practice of jailing people for ne-
only offenses and creating a better system that holds people accountable while saving money,
increasing public safety and treating all Texans fairly.
What are fine-only offenses?
Texas’ 928 municipal courts and 807 justice courts (sometimes called Justice of the Peace or JP courts)
7
handle
more than 7 million new criminal cases each year.
8
The criminal cases in these courts are the lowest level of misdemeanors under Texas law, by statute punishable
by a ne alone and no jail sentence.
9
These include most trafc offenses, city ordinance violations, other Class C
misdemeanors, and criminal parking violations.
10
• Trafc offenses include moving violations such as speeding, running a red light, or failure to yield. They
also include other violations like driving with an invalid license or without a license, driving with defective
equipment, failure to maintain nancial responsibility (i.e., no insurance), or having an expired registration.
• Non-trafc Class C misdemeanors are violations of state law that are punishable by a ne up to $500, such
as public intoxication, theft of something valued less than $100, disorderly conduct, and parent contributing
to nonattendance (truancy).
6 JazmineUlloa,The Price They Pay, AusTin AmeriCAn-sTATesmAn(May20,2016)(“’Contrarytofears,therewerenospikesin
traccrimes,andthecitydidnotloserevenue,’[SanAntonioMunicipalCourtPresidingJudgeJohn]Bullsaid.”).
7 AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl rePorT, supra note 3, at vi.
8 Id. at Detail-45, 48.
9 Id. at vi.
10 ClassCmisdemeanorsaredenedasviolationspunishedbyaneofnomorethan$500,orasanyoensepunishable
byanealone.Certaintracoensesarene-onlymisdemeanors,andarepunishedbyaneofnogreaterthan$200.
Parkingviolationsareoftendierent,inthatmostparkingtickets(butnotall)arecivilratherthancriminalviolations,
similartoredlightcameraviolations.Tex. Gov’T Code Ann. § 29.003 (West 2015); See, e.g.,CollegeStation,Tex.,Trac
CodeSec.10-4C.2(b)(ii)(2016).
03
• City ordinance violations include all sorts of regulations on conduct within city limits, including animal-
related violations (e.g., leash laws); health and safety ordinances (e.g., no running water in a residence, food
safety regulations at a restaurant); and ordinances typically targeting the homeless population (e.g., no
camping in the city limits, no sitting or lying down, and no solicitation or panhandling).
For purposes of this report, we will use the term “ne-only offense” to include all criminal offenses punishable by
a ne alone over which the municipal and justice courts have jurisdiction.
The following chart demonstrates the breakdown of the types of criminal cases handled by Texas municipal and
justice courts.
11
More than three-fourths of these are trafc violations.
11 AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl rePorT, supranote3,atStatewide-11.
04
A. HOW DOES ONE TICKET LEAD TO MORE TICKETS, FINES AND FEES?
02 an inescapable
cycle of debt and jail
05
When low-income people receive a trafc ticket, the initial ne amount for that ticket is only a
portion of what they may ultimately owe. There are also court costs in addition to the ne that
courts automatically assess in every case, which typically range from $60 to $110.
12
Courts assess more fees for people who fail to pay their tickets immediately. For example, if
a person is placed on a payment plan, there will be a $25 payment plan fee for each ticket, in
addition to transaction fees that many courts charge each time a payment is made.
13
People are
also charged $30 when a hold is placed on their licenses and $20 when a hold is placed on their
registration due to unpaid nes.
14
To release those holds, people must pay the fees on each ticket
that led to a hold.
Failure to appear in court or pay a ticket often leads a court to issue an arrest warrant, which adds
a $50 warrant fee to the original ticket.
15
In addition, local governments sometimes contract with
private collection agencies or law rms to collect outstanding balances, and these agencies charge
another fee of up to 30 percent of the amount owed when collecting the debt.
16
For a person who fails to appear in court or cannot pay off their ticket when it is due, this means
that a single ticket with a ne amount of $100 can easily more than quadruple when court costs
and fees are attached.
Fine (e.g., failure to maintain a single lane) $ 100.00
Court Costs $ 103.00
Check Return Fee $ 30.00
Payment Plan Fee $ 25.00
License Renewal Suspension Fee $ 30.00
Capias Pro Fine Warrant Fee $ 50.00
Scofaw Registration Renewal Fee $ 20.00
Collection Fee (30%) X 1.30
TOTAL $ 465.40
12 Filing Fees and Court Costs, Tex. JudiCiAl BrAnCh, http://www.txcourts.gov/publications-training/publications/ling-fees-
courts-costs/(lastvisitedSept.9,2016).
13 Tex. loC. Gov’T Code Ann. § 133.103(2) (West 2015).
14 Tex. TrAnsP. Code Ann. § 706.006 (West 2015); § 502.010(f).
15 Tex. Gov’T Code Ann.§102.021(3)(B).
16 Tex. Code Crim. ProC. Ann. art. 103.0031(3)(b).
06
In addition to extra fees, lower income people tend to receive more tickets due to their poverty and
inability to pay. Most jurisdictions put holds on delinquent persons’ licenses and car registrations
until they can clear their tickets. Also, nearly 1.4 million Texans have license suspensions
resulting from unpaid Driver Responsibility Program surcharges, many if not most of which stem
from low-level trafc offenses.
17
When people with license holds or suspensions lose their ability
to register their vehicle, the car becomes a moving target for more stops and tickets. Once these
drivers are pulled over, they will most likely receive at least three tickets for that one stop: one
for not having a valid license, one for expired registration, and one for driving without insurance
(since it is very difcult to get insurance if you do not have a valid license).
This vicious cycle of more frequent stops resulting in multiple tickets may be amplied if the
driver misses a court date. If someone fails to appear in court, many jurisdictions enter a Failure to
Appear charge (an additional Class C offense) for each existing ticket, turning three tickets from a
single stop into six tickets. This is especially likely to happen when people already have warrants
for prior unpaid tickets and are afraid that they will be arrested if they appear in court for the new
tickets.
When the number of tickets someone has multiplies, so do the associated fees. A person who
needs a payment plan for six tickets will owe an additional $150 in payment plan fees instead of
$25, and if that same person misses a payment, there will be a $50 warrant fee per ticket, totaling
an extra $300. Each unpaid ticket will also put an additional hold on the person’s license and
registration, with a $30 fee per license hold ($180 total) and a $20 fee per registration hold ($120
total). It is easy to see how debt accumulates quickly from just one trafc stop, trapping people in a
cycle of debt they cannot escape.
B. HOW DO FINE-ONLY OFFENSES LEAD TO ARREST WARRANTS?
Fine-only offenses can lead to arrest warrants in two situations: rst, when a person fails to show
up for a court date; and second, when a person fails to satisfy nes or fees.
1) FAILURE TO APPEAR WARRANTS
The rst kind of warrant that can lead to arrest for nes and fees is a warrant for Failure to Appear.
Most often, people are charged with a ne-only offense when they receive a ticket written by a
law enforcement ofcer. The ticket instructs them to pay the ne and court costs, or alternatively,
to appear in court on or by a certain date. Only people who cannot pay immediately or want to
contest the ticket must show up in court.
17 Email from Pamela Harden, supra note 2.
07
There are several compelling reasons low-income Texans do not show up for their court dates:
• Lack of transportation: Many people lack adequate transportation to get to court. They
may also have received the ticket while traveling and cannot afford to travel back to that
jurisdiction to appear in court.
• Employment: Low-income Texans often work in jobs that lack the exibility to allow
them to take time off during the workday to appear at the court at a specic time for their
hearing.
• Lack of understanding of the court system: People who lose their original ticket also
lose the instructions for when and where to appear. They often lack the understanding
to navigate a complicated court system. With no central statewide database to look up
trafc tickets, people may not be able to determine which local court to call to nd out
when and where to appear.
• Fear of arrest: People with warrants for old unpaid tickets are understandably afraid to
appear in court because they might be arrested on the spot, knowing a jail stay would
cause them to lose their job or ability to care for their children. Even many of those
without warrants may fear coming to court for an initial appearance, believing that their
inability to pay the ticket will lead to their being jailed.
18
“Almost everyone I see in jail tells me that they are in the jail due to fear of coming to court.
They fear an approaching police officer at the door ready to arrest them because they
either do not have the money to pay a fine or they failed to appear on a charge.”
– Hon. Ed Spillane, Presiding Judge, College Station Municipal Court and Past President,
Texas Municipal Courts Association
19
The failure to appear in court is a separate crime,
20
so it often leads to another ne-only charge
for which a person will owe additional nes and court costs. When charging an individual with a
Failure to Appear offense, the court typically issues a warrant for the person’s arrest.
18 Basedondozensofinterviewsbyauthorswithindividualswhofailedtoappearforcourtinne-onlycases.
19 Hon.EdSpillane,Op-Ed.,Courts as a Safe Haven: A Positive ‘Ferguson Eect,’ AusTin AmeriCAn-sTATesmAn (Sep. 16, 2016).
20 Tex. PenAl Code Ann. § 38.10 (West 2015).
08
In 2015, Texas municipal courts issued about 1.74 million warrants in ne-only misdemeanor
cases, most commonly for failure to appear in court.
21
Texas justice courts issued approximately
411,000 such warrants.
22
This does not include capias pro ne warrants issued specically for
failure to pay nes.
People who are the subject of a Failure to Appear warrant are at risk of being arrested in some
courts if they voluntarily appear in court to take care of their tickets. Other courts may not arrest
people who come in, but they may still refuse to clear the warrant or set a hearing with a judge
until the person pays some sum of money.
23
This means that people are not even able to see a
judge to negotiate alternative sentences since they cannot afford the amount of money required
to clear the warrant.
2) CAPIAS PRO FINE WARRANTS
The second type of warrant that leads to arrest and jail time in these cases is called a capias pro
ne warrant (commonly called capias warrants) – a specic type of warrant issued for people who
have not paid a ne by its due date.
24
Most people do make their initial court date, but when people
plead guilty or are found guilty, a judge is not required to ask if they can afford the ne and court
costs being imposed.
25
Low-income people often leave court owing amounts they can never pay,
and not knowing what their options are if they cannot pay. Alternatively, the judge may tell them
to talk to the court staff if they cannot pay immediately, only to have the court staff put them on a
payment plan they still cannot afford.
26
When a person fails to pay nes, in full or according to payment plan terms, or if a person fails
to complete community service in the time ordered, the court typically orders a capias pro ne
warrant. In 2015, Texas municipal courts issued approximately 688,000 capias pro ne warrants
in ne-only misdemeanor cases. The justice courts issued approximately 66,000 capias pro
ne warrants.
27
Both capias and Failure to Appear warrants show up on background checks. Anyone with such a
warrant who gets stopped by law enforcement can be immediately taken to jail and booked while
waiting to see a judge. Given the millions of warrants that are issued by municipal and justice
courts annually, hundreds of thousands of Texans are living with an active warrant for their arrest
and are subject to being booked in jail at any time for ne-only offenses.
21 AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl rePorT, supra note 3, at Detail-48, 45.
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., Municipal Court and Trac Ticket Information, CiTy of PAsAdenA, TexAs,http://www.ci.pasadena.tx.us/default.
aspx?name=courts(lastvisitedSept.8,2016)(outliningtherequirementthatpersonsagainstwhomwarrantshave
beenissuedand“wishingtopleadnotguiltywillberequiredtopostabondtosecureatrialdate.”).
24 Tex. Code Crim. ProC. Ann. art. 45.045.
25 Id. at art. 45.041.
26 Basedonauthors’interviewsandcourtobservations.
27 AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl rePorT, supra note 3, at Detail-48, 45.
09
Warrants Issued by Municipal and Justice Courts
in Fine-Only Misdemeanor Cases, 2015
Fine-Only
Misdemeanor
Warrants
Capias Pro Fine
Warrants in Fine-Only
Cases
Total Warrants in
Fine-Only Cases
Municipal Courts 1,738,385 688,328 2,426,713
Justice Courts 411,273 65,718 476,991
Total 2,149,658 754,046 2,903,704
Texas municipal and justice courts issued more than 2.9 million warrants in ne-only cases
in 2015. By contrast, the total number of warrants issued for Class A and B misdemeanors and
felonies during the same time period was approximately 129,000. This means more than 95 percent
of all arrest warrants issued in the state last year were for ne-only misdemeanor offenses.
One reason for the huge number of capias warrants is the underutilization of alternative
sentences. If a court determines that a defendant is unable to pay, it is required by law to consider
alternatives to immediate full payment, such as:
• Deferral of full payment.
• A payment plan.
• Community service.
• Full or partial waivers of nes and costs.
28
Unfortunately, despite the legal requirements, many courts do not offer these alternatives.
29
In
addition, courts that do offer payment plans or community service often make those options
inaccessible to many people, and very few courts waive a signicant amount of nes and costs
(as described below). Courts also make it difcult or impossible for people without proper
28 Tex. Code Crim. ProC. Ann. art. 45.0491; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
29 See, e.g., Payment Plans, CArrollTon muniCiPAl CourT,http://www.cityofcarrollton.com/departments/departments-g-p/
municipal-court/payment-plans(lastvisitedSept.13,2016)(“CarrolltonMunicipalCourtdoesnotprovidepayment
plansforpayingjudgments(nes).Judgmentsmustbepaidonorbeforetheduedate.Non-paymentorinsucient
paymentwillresultinawarrantbeingissuedforyourarrest.”);Payment Plan Application, Wood CounTy,http://www.
mywoodcounty.com/users/0012/docs/Payment%20Plan.pdf(lastvisitedSept.13,2016)(“YouwillhaveONEMONTH
fromthedateoftheapplicationtopaytheremainderdueonyourne.TherewillbeNOEXTENSIONOFTIME
GRANTED.Don’taskforone.”)(emphasisinoriginal).
10
identication or adequate information about their income and expenses to qualify.
30
Many courts
also condition entering a payment plan on a large down payment.
31
For example, the Dallas
Municipal Court requires a 30 percent down payment up front, while the Burleson Municipal
Court requires a payment of “$125 or 20 percent, whichever is greater, for the initial payment at the
time of the request.”
32
The monthly payments ordered with payment plans may not be affordable either. In addition
to the various fees already covered, some courts require minimum payments of $100 or more a
month.
33
The Kyle Municipal Court and Dallas Municipal Court both require complete payment of
the assessed amount within three months, even on a payment plan.
34
Wood County offers only 30
days for payment and warns individuals not to call the court to ask for more time.
35
Courts vastly underutilize community service as an alternative to payment as well. For example,
the El Paso Municipal Court did not start offering community service options to adults until
after an exposé on the court’s illegal practices was published by BuzzFeed News.
36
Likewise, the
Amarillo Municipal Court only offers community service to juveniles.
37
Many other sizable cities
– including Richardson, Allen, Longview, Duncanville and Sherman – self-reported to the Ofce of
Court Administration that community service credit was not used to satisfy nes in a single case
30 See, e.g., Time Payment Plans, CiTy of Burleson, TexAs,https://burlesontx.com/555/Time-Payment-Plans(last
visitedSept.13,2016)(allowingonlystate-issueddriver’slicensesandidenticationcards);JudgeWayneL.Mack,
MontgomeryCountyJusticeCourtIndigencyApplication,available at http://www.mctx.org/courts/justices_of_the_
peace/justice_of_the_peace_pct_1/docs/Online_Payment_Plan_Docs.pdf(lastvisitedSept.13,2016)(allowingstate-
issueddriver’slicensesandidenticationcards,schoolidenticationcards,andbirthcerticates);Extension to Pay
Fine, CiTy of Keene, available at https://keenetx.com/departments/municipal-court(lastvisitedSept.13,2016)(allowing
onlystate-issueddriver’slicensesandidenticationcards).
31 See, e.g., Time Payment Plans, supra note 30 (notingthatpeopleapplyingforpaymentplansmust“[p]ay$125or20%,
whicheverisgreater,fortheinitialpaymentatthetimeofrequest”);FAQ for Extensions and Payment Plans, Wise CounTy,
http://www.co.wise.tx.us/jp1/payment_options.htm(lastvisitedSept.13,2016)(requiringa“signicantpayment”before
entering into a payment plan; Payment Plan Application, Wood CounTy, supranote29(dictatingthatdefendantsmust
payallcourtcostsattimeofapplication);Extension to Pay Fine, PlAno muniCiPAl CourT,https://www.plano.gov/367/
Extension-to-Pay-Fine (last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (screenshotonle,requiring$100downforeachticket).
32 Time Payment Plans, supra note 31; Court and Detention Services, CiTy of dAllAs, http://dallascityhall.com/
departments/courtdetentionservices/pages/payment-plan.aspx(lastvisitedSept.8,2016).
33 Payment Information, GrAnd PrAirie muniCiPAl CourT,http://www.gptx.org/city-government/city-departments/municipal-
court/payment-information(lastvisitedSept.13,2016)(listingminimummonthlypaymentamountsthatincreaseas
thetotalamountowedincreases);Payment Options, CiTy of irvinG,http://cityorving.org/329/Payment-Options(last
visitedSept.13,2016)(requiringaminimummonthlypaymentof$100).
34 Payment Plan, CiTy of dAllAs,http://dallascityhall.com/departments/courtdetentionservices/pages/payment-plan.aspx
(lastvisitedSept.14,2016)(allowingamaximumof90daystomakeallpayments);Fines/Court Costs, CiTy of Kyle,
http://www.cityofkyle.com/municipalcourt/nes-court-costs(lastvisitedSept.14,2016)(allowingamaximumofthree
monthstomakeallpayments).
35 Plea and Personal Data Form for Adavit of Indigency and/or Application for Payment of Courts Costs, Fines &
Fees, Wood CounTy JusTiCe of The PeACe CourT ComPliAnCe And ColleCTions, available athttp://www.mywoodcounty.com/
users/0012/docs/Payment%20Plan.pdf.
36 Kendall Taggart & Alex Campbell, Their Crime: Being Poor. Their Sentence: Jail., Buzzfeed(Oct.7,2015),available at
https://www.buzzfeed.com/kendalltaggart/in-texas-its-a-crime-to-be-poor?.
37 SecondAmendedClassActionComplaintat7,McKee v. Amarillo,No.2:16-cv-00009-J,page7(N.D.Tex.Apr.4,2016).
11
in 2015.
38
In fact, approximately 2 out of 5 Texas municipal courts reported zero cases resolved
through community service in 2015.
39
Another quarter of all municipal courts reported 10 or fewer
total cases resolved through community service during the entire year.
40
Statewide, community
service was only used to resolve nes and costs in 1.3 percent of all municipal and justice court
criminal cases in which nes or costs are typically assessed.
41
Courts that do offer community service options rarely publicize that on their websites or notices,
and the community service that is offered can be too onerous to complete.
42
People who are offered
community service are required by statute to be given at least $6.25 per hour credit, though in
some places $12.50 per hour credit is typical. Because of the low credit rate and high amounts
owed, people are often ordered to perform hundreds of hours of community service to resolve their
nes and costs. For many single parents and homeless people who accumulate tickets, performing
these hours can be a near-impossible task.
43
Courts’ nal option – waiver or reduction of nes due to indigency – is rarely used. Fines were
waived and reduced in less than 1 percent of all cases statewide in 2015. About 3 in 5 municipal
courts (i.e., 594 courts) reported zero waivers in 2015, meaning they did not elect to waive or reduce
nes or costs for indigency a single time over the course of a year.
38 AnnualStatisticalDetailReports,MunicipalCourts,AdditionalActivitybyCity,OceofCourtAdministration,FY2015,
available athttp://www.txcourts.gov/statistics/annual-statistical-reports/2015/.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. See also offiCe of CourT AdminisTrATion, AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl deTAil rePorTs, JusTiCe CourTs, AddiTionAl ACTiviTy By CounTy, fy
2015, available athttp://www.txcourts.gov/statistics/annual-statistical-reports/2015/.
42 See, e.g., Citation Disposition Options, CiTy of lAredo muniCiPAl CourT,http://www.cityoaredo.com/Municipal_Court/
Citation_Disposition.htm(lastvisitedSept.14,2016).Also,theCityofAustinregularlyoerscommunityservice.
However,whenitissuesawarrantforfailuretopay,thewarrantdoesnotmentioncommunityserviceasanoption.
Instead,itsimplystatesthatthepersonmustpaywhatisowedtoclearthewarrantandlistsdierentwaystheticket
canbepaid.
43 Complaint at 9, Harris v. City of Austin,No.A-15-CA-956-SS,2016U.S.Dist.LEXIS33694(W.D.Tex.2016).
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE >
12
Enforcement Programs
When someone has not paid a ticket, courts often try to enforce payment through one of the following programs.
DPS FAILURE TO APPEAR/FAILURE TO PAY PROGRAM
One common enforcement mechanism that municipal and justice courts utilize prohibits people from renewing
their driver’s licenses until nes are paid in full. Under the statutory “Failure to Appear/Failure to Pay” Program
administered by the Department of Public Safety (DPS), if a person misses a court date or a scheduled payment,
the court may suspend license renewal indenitely until all nes and costs are paid.
44
Once people are referred
to the Failure to Appear/Pay Program, they must resolve the total amount owed before the hold is lifted, meaning
that their license remains suspended even if they begin to successfully make payments according to a payment
plan. Over 230,000 Texans are currently unable to drive legally under the program and will not be able to renew
their licenses until they satisfy their tickets.
45
DRIVER RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM
In addition to the Failure to Appear/Pay Program, the Texas Legislature created the Driver Responsibility Program
(DRP) in 2003 in an effort to generate additional revenue for the state from certain trafc offenses.
46
This program
allows DPS to charge additional surcharges to individuals for certain trafc offenses, independent of nes and
fees imposed by the court. When drivers fail to pay the surcharges, their licenses are automatically suspended.
47
Surcharges can be assessed in two ways: through a points system and through a convictions system.
48
Under the
DRP points-based system, drivers receive two points for a trafc violation and three points for a trafc violation
involving a crash. Once a driver receives six points (i.e., usually two or three tickets) in a three-year period, DPS
will assess a $100 surcharge annually for three years and an additional $25 for each additional point.
49
Under the
conviction-based system, surcharges apply automatically upon conviction of certain offenses. Some of these
offenses involve driving while intoxicated, but by far the most common offenses under this system are actually
driving with an invalid license, driving without a license and driving without insurance.
50
Surcharges for these low-
level offenses range from $100 to $250 annually.
51
44 Tex. TrAnsP. Code Ann. § 521.201(7)(8).
45 Email from Pamela Harden, supra note 2.
46 Tex. TrAnsP. Code Ann. § 708.
47 Id. at § 708.152.
48 Id. at § 708.053.
49 Id. at § 708.054.
50 Email from Pamela Harden, supra note 2. See alsoEmailfromPamelaHarden,Tex.Dep’t.ofPub.Safety,toJessica
Schleifer,LegislativeDirector,OceofTex.SenatorRodneyEllis(July21,2015).
51 Tex. TrAnsP. Code Ann. §§ 708.104, 708.103.
13
Unlike the Failure to Appear/Pay Program, the DRP does have an indigency program that grants relief to drivers at
or below 125 percent of the poverty guidelines.
52
But the application process is difcult to navigate and not widely
advertised, so most people do not know about it. Because nearly 1.4 million people have lost their licenses under
the DRP,
53
the DRP has come under scrutiny in recent years.
54
However, funds collected from the program are
directed toward trauma centers, making it politically challenging to amend or discontinue it.
SCOFFLAW PROGRAM
Counties and municipalities can also choose to participate in the “Scofaw Program.” This program, outlined in
the Transportation Code, allows a municipal or justice court to deny people the ability to apply for or renew motor
vehicle registrations with the county if they miss a court date or a scheduled payment.
55
As of September 2015,
there were 370,197 holds on vehicle registrations due to the Scofaw Program. Like the Failure to Appear/Pay
Program, the holds generally will not be lifted until all nes and costs are paid in full.
These enforcement mechanisms are particularly harmful for people who still need to drive. Without valid
registration, their vehicles are moving targets for police ofcers, and they are more likely to get pulled over,
perpetuating the cycle of debt.
C. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIVING WITH A WARRANT?
Individuals living with warrants are often fearful of going to court. They may also be reluctant to
call the police during an emergency or report a more serious crime out of fear of being arrested.
In addition, many employers will not hire somebody with an active warrant, even if it is for a
minor ticket such as a moving violation. One Houston mother the authors spoke with was making
$9 per hour at a call center, but had the opportunity to obtain a job at a big-box retailer earning
$14 per hour – a raise that would have helped her family tremendously. The potential employer
only required that she clear the ne-only arrest warrant related to nonpayment of nes for a
Parent Contributing to Nonattendance ticket that appeared during a background check. She could
not afford to clear the warrant, so she lost the better employment opportunity. As a result, she also
lost her housing, forcing her and her children to move in with a family member.
52 Tex. TrAnsP. Code Ann. § 708.158.
53 Email from Pamela Harden, supra note 2.
54 See, e.g.,EvaHershaw,Lawmakers Call for End to Controversial Driver Responsibility Program, Tex. TriBune (Apr. 30,
2015).
55 Tex. TrAnsP. Code Ann. §§ 502.010, 502.011, 702.003; sCofflAW CenTrAlized ColleCTions,https://texasscoaw.com/(last
visited Sept. 8, 2016).
14
Furthermore, people with arrest warrants who do not have identication cards, which are
necessary for many job applications, cannot go to the DPS to apply for one because of the
imminent risk of being arrested. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that people with
active warrants in ne-only cases are more likely to lose their jobs. They cannot drive to work
without running the risk of being arrested, and most low-income Texans do not live within a
reasonable public transit commute distance from local employers.
56
During warrant roundups,
jurisdictions publicize efforts to arrest people with warrants in ne-only cases. This includes
arresting individuals at their place of employment.
57
D. HOW DO TICKETS LEAD TO JAIL?
Every year, thousands of Texans are jailed because they are unable to pay ne-only misdemeanor
tickets. How is it that crimes that are only punishable by a ne lead to jail time?
When people are arrested on a warrant for a ne-only offense, they are typically booked into the
local county or city jail. After booking, the law requires that they be brought before a judge. In
Texas’ biggest cities, the amount of time waiting to see a judge can be as short as a few hours; in
some rural parts of the state, the wait may be as long as two days.
58
Upon seeing a judge, a number of things may happen. A judge can discuss the reasons for
nonpayment and release an individual, generally after revising their payment plan terms or
ordering that they complete an alternative sentence, like community service. However, some
judges will ask people how much money they have on them; if it is a signicant amount, they
will tell the person to pay that amount as a “bond” and appear at a later court date.
Judges may also order people to stay in jail as a way to pay their remaining nes and costs, often
referred to “laying out” or “sitting out” nes. People who are sentenced, or “committed,” to jail to
lay out nes and costs must be given credit towards the amount owed at a rate of $50 per night,
though judges in some courts routinely grant more dollar credit than this. By law, judges must
56 Texasgenerallylacksanadequatepublictransportationinfrastructure,eveninitsdenselypopulatedurbanareas.In
majorcitieslikeHouston,AustinandSanAntonio,fewerthan35percentofresidentslivewithina90-minutepublic
transportationrideofmostjobs.Asaresult,manylow-incomeTexanswholosetheirlicensesforfailingtopaytheir
nesorfeesmustcontinuetodriveinordertowork.See Adie Tomer, Where the Jobs Are: Employer Access to Labor
by Transit, The BrooKinGs insTiTuTe 9 (2012), available athttps://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11-
transit-labor-tomer-full-paper.pdf.Inruralareas,publictransportationisevenlessavailable.
57 E.g., Warrant Roundup, The CiTy of Greenville, Tx, http://www.ci.greenville.tx.us/581/Warrant-Round-Up(lastvisitedSept.
8, 2016).
58 Tex. Code. Crim. ProC. Ann.art.45.045.Inthecaseofacapiaswarrant,thepersonmustbebroughtbeforeajudgewho
issuedthewarrantorajudgeinthesamecourtbytherstbusinessdayfollowingdefendant’sarrest,thoughsome
courtsconatethiswithatypicalmagistrationpursuanttoTex.CodeofCrim.Proc.Ann.art.15.17.Lengthofwaiting
timecitedisalsobasedontheauthors’interviewswithindividualswhowerejailedforne-onlyoenses.
15
determine that nonpayment was willful, meaning it was not due to inability to pay, before
committing people to more jail time. But in reality, this determination rarely happens.
59
Sometimes, by either local policy or mistake, people do not see a judge at all after they are arrested.
Instead, they are simply detained on the capias warrant until the nes and costs are paid off with
jail credit. In these cases, the capias warrant functions as a commitment order, even though the
law does not allow this.
60
Whether people are sentenced by a judge to lay out their nes or booked on a capias warrant
without ever seeing a judge, they often do not know how long they will be held in jail and must
rely on correctional ofcers to look up their release date on the jail’s computer system. This
even occurs when people are arrested on both ne-only offense warrants and on higher-level
misdemeanor charges. Defendants usually receive court-appointed defense attorneys for those
higher-level charges. But the defense attorneys often do not understand that their clients are
also being held on ne-only misdemeanor tickets. After a few days in jail, defense attorneys may
advise their clients to take a plea deal for time-served on the higher offense, assuring them that
they can get out that same day. Individuals will then call a friend or family member to come pick
them up, only to be told by a correctional ofcer hours later that they will in fact be held for days,
weeks, or months longer on their Class C nes.
61
1) HOW MANY PEOPLE GO TO JAIL FOR FINE-ONLY OFFENSES?
Based on data courts report annually to the Texas Ofce of Court Administration, nes in over
677,000 cases were satised through jail credit in 2015: 547,244 municipal court cases and 129,938
justice court cases.
62
This means that 1 in 8 municipal and justice court cases in which nes or
costs are typically assessed were resolved through jail credit. In comparison, less than 1 in 100 of
these cases are resolved through full or partial waiver of nes or costs.
63
However, jail credit numbers only tell part of the story of jailing practices for municipal and justice
courts.
64
We were able to collect data from a geographically diverse sample of seven populous
59 Theauthorshaverepresentedandinterviewedmanydefendantsjailedforne-onlyoensesacrossthestate,allof
whomwerejailedwithoutanabilitytopayhearing.
60 OneoftheauthorshasinterviewedpeopledetainedfordayswithoutseeingajudgeforticketsoutofBastropMunicipal
Court,JeersonCountyJusticeCourtandBeaumontMunicipalCourt.Oneofthosepeopletoldtheauthorthathehad
alreadyturnedhimselfinthepreviousmonthtositouthistickets;becausehedidnotseeajudgewhenhewasarrested
thesecondtime,hecouldnotexplainthathehadalreadysatisedhisticketdebtsinthepreviousmonth.
61 Basedonauthors’interviewsandcourtobservations.
62 AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl rePorT, supra note 3, at Detail 45, 48.
63 Id.
64 Id. First,numbersrepresentthenumberofcasesresolvedthroughjailcredit,notthenumberofindividualswhosatised
nesthroughjailcredit.Additionally,whenindividualsarearrested,theyarebookedinjailbasedonalloutstanding
oenses.Soanindividualwhoisarrestedforamoreseriousoense(likeaClassAorBmisdemeanor,orevenafelony)
maygetjailcreditforanyexistingne-onlywarrantswhileinjailforthemoreseriouscharges.Finally,thejailcredit
numbersdonotdistinguishbetweencasesinwhichpeopleweregivenjailcreditforthetimetheywaitedtoseeajudge,
andthosewhowereactuallysentencedbyajudgetojailfornotpayingtheirnes.
16
counties and to identify individuals booked in jail in those counties for ne-only offenses alone.
65
The results are an undercount of the individuals detained in these counties on ne-only offenses,
because they do not include those held on ne-only offenses who also had more serious charges.
Still, it is a helpful snapshot of the population of people detained on ne-only offenses in Texas.
People Booked into TExas Jails for Fine-Only Misdemeanors, 2014
66
County Population
Total Fine-Only Jail
Bookings
Fine-Only Bookings Per
1000 Citizens
El Paso 833,487 5,756 6.9
Hidalgo 831,073 922 1.1
Jefferson 252,235 5,399 21.4
Lubbock 293,974 365* 1.2
McLennan 243,441 2,924 12.0
Travis 1,151,145 7,170 6.2
Williamson 489,250 1,716 3.5
Total 4,094,605 24,252 5.9
* LUBBOCK COUNTY’S TOTAL JAIL BOOKINGS ONLY ACCOUNT FOR THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE
CATEGORIZED AS “LAYING OUT MUNICIPAL FINE” (I.E., SENTENCED TO JAIL BY THE MUNICIPAL COURT), SO NOT
ALL INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE BOOKED ON A FINE-ONLY WARRANT OR WARRANTLESS CLASS C ARREST ARE
NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THIS NUMBER.
For 2014, the most recent year for which we have complete data, there were 24,252 individuals
booked into county jail in seven of Texas’ largest counties for ne-only offenses alone. These
counties represented 4.1 million people, about 15 percent of the total state population. Bookings
for ne-only offenses alone constituted anywhere from 2 percent to 50 percent of all jail bookings,
differing dramatically based on the jurisdiction.
65 Thesevencountieswereselectedbecauseoftheirpopulationaswellastheirabilitytoprovidehigh-quality,electronic
datafromwhichtheauthorscouldreadilyidentifythoseindividualsbookedintojailforne-onlyoenses.
66 AllofthedataanalysiscompletedforthisreportisonTexasAppleseed’swebsite,available atwww.texasappleseed.
org/pay-or-stay.
17
Municipal Jails
The county-level jail booking data does not include people held in city jails. In many counties, city police
departments operate jails that are completely separate from the county jail. These city jails house people booked
only on ne-only warrants from the city’s municipal court, as well as people charged with more serious offenses
who are awaiting transport to the county jail. Because city jails have no statewide oversight, it is difcult to
identify all of them.
We were, however, able to identify a number of city jails in Texas’ largest counties and request their booking
records for 2012 through mid-2015. For example, in 2013, there were 26,313 individuals held in the City of
Houston Jail and another 2,045 held in the McAllen City Jail for ne-only offenses alone. The existence of the
McAllen City Jail, located in Hidalgo County, to house people for ne-only offenses also helps to explain why
Hidalgo County’s jail bookings are lower than counties of similar size in the data we analyzed.
Other city jails to which we sent open records requests did not provide electronic data. For those jails, we have
estimates based on a manual count of individuals booked in a single month.
67
Jail
July Snapshot of
Fine-Only Bookings
Annual Estimate of
Fine-Only Bookings
Arlington City Jail 316 3,792 (2015)
Harlingen City Jail 59 708 (2014)
Euless City Jail 222 2,664 (2014)
North Richland Hills City Jail 86 1,032 (2014)
Total 683 8,196
These numbers suggest that in a single year, roughly 8,000 additional people were booked in these four city jails
for ne-only offenses, along with the roughly 28,000 booked in the Houston and McAllen city jails. Ultimately,
there are tens of thousands of people who are booked in city jails for ne-only offenses and not accounted for
in the county jail data.
67 Forthesecityjails,theauthorsreviewedthepaperorelectronicrecordsforJuly2014or2015(dependingonwhich
yearcitylawenforcementwasabletoprovide)andidentiedthoseindividualsduringthemonthofJulywhowere
bookedonne-onlyoensesalone.Inseveralcountyjails,Julywasthemonthwhenanaveragenumberofoenders
werebooked,whichiswhywechosethatmonth.TheauthorsthenmultipliedtheJulycountby12foraroughestimate
ofthenumberofpeoplethatparticularcityjailwasbookingonne-onlyoensesaloneannually.
18
2) HOW LONG DO PEOPLE STAY IN JAIL?
How long people stay in jail depends on the jurisdiction, as well as whether they are booked
and released after seeing a judge or sentenced by a judge to lay out their nes. The data show
that a majority of people who were booked in these seven county jails on a ne-only offense
were released within a day or less, meaning they were likely released after seeing a judge.
68
Nonetheless, there are thousands of people in these counties who remained in jail for much
longer than a day. In 2014, the most recent year for which we have complete data, there were
3,974 ne-only jail bookings lasting longer than two days across these seven counties alone.
Bookings Into Jail for Fine-only
Offenses lasting > 2 days, 2014
Number of Individuals
In Jail > 2 Days
Percent of Fine-Only Jail
Bookings >2 Days
El Paso 845 13.4%
Hidalgo 447 24.9%
Jefferson 1,759 25.8%
Lubbock 39 10.5%
McLennan 239 6.3%
Travis 221 2.3%
Williamson 424 23.5%
Total 3,974 11.4%
In addition, hundreds of people stayed for much lengthier periods of time for ne-only offenses.
For example, in 2014, there were 638 jail bookings in these seven counties lasting more than 10
continuous days in jail for ne-only offenses.
68 Seeadditionaldataavailableatwww.texasappleseed.org/pay-or-stay.
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3) WHO GOES TO JAIL FOR FAILING TO PAY TICKETS?
It is often vulnerable people – including single parents with few economic resources, homeless
people, and people with unstable housing – who go to jail for ne-only offenses. In addition, a
disproportionate number of African Americans and a signicant number of women, juveniles and
elderly individuals are jailed for ne-only offenses.
African Americans are notably overrepresented in the ne-only jail bookings compared to their
representation in the general population. The following chart shows the percentage of people of
various races booked in 2014 in ve counties that provided data on the race of individuals booked
for ne-only offenses, followed in parentheses by the percentage of that race represented in the
county’s general population.
69
Fine-only Jail Bookings By Race, 2014
69 Notethatracewasnotrecordedforeveryoenderineachcounty.Thefollowingpercentagesarebasedonindividuals
forwhomracewasreported.Twoofthesevencountiesprovidednodataontheraceofindividualsbooked.
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In the six of seven counties that provided data on gender, the people booked for ne-only charges
were more likely to be male than female, yet each county still jailed a signicant percentage of
women for these charges. This is consistent with national data showing a large increase in the
jailing of women in recent years for non-violent offenses.
70
Fine-only Jail Bookings By Gender, 2014
Male Female
El Paso 75.8% 24.2%
Hidalgo 85.7% 14.3%
Jefferson 72.5% 27.5%
Lubbock 60.0% 40.0%
Travis 78.1% 21.9%
Williamson 72.7% 27.3%
70 ElizabethSwavola,KristineRiley&RamSubramanian,Overlooked: Women and Jails in an Era of Reform, verA insTiTuTe
of JusTiCe, 6 (2016), available at https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/overlooked-
women-and-jails-report/legacy_downloads/overlooked-women-in-jails-report-web.pdf.
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22
Ashley Willis, AUSTIN
Willis was a 26-year-old single mother of a 6-year-old girl and a 4-month-old boy. Even though she worked full time,
she and her children lived below the poverty line and received food stamps.
In July of 2015, she was arrested for unpaid tickets while washing her car at the park. She had been making
sporadic payments on her tickets when she could. Even though she had not been able to complete the community
service she had been given, she was not aware she had warrants. She was frantic with worry about leaving her
children, but the arresting ofcers told her she would probably be released within 24 hours. They let her make
calls to set up temporary child care arrangements and tell her boss she would be missing a day of work.
They then took her to the Travis County Jail, where she saw a magistrate judge. Though she begged the judge to
release her on a payment plan so she could care for her children, he jailed her for 21 days for failing to complete
community service. Willis explained that her only option had been making payments when she could, because
caring for her children prevented her from doing community service.
Willis was then transferred to another Travis County facility in Del Valle. She was not given an opportunity to
make any calls, so she was unable to tell her boss she would be gone longer than expected or tell her landlord
she would be late with rent. She could not even nd out where her children were. Luckily, the Texas Fair Defense
Project was able to secure her release after only a week. If she had been kept the full 21 days, she would have lost
her job, her housing and possibly even her children.
Approximately two-thirds of jail bookings for ne-only offenses in the six counties that provided
age or date of birth data are individuals ranging in age from 18 to 35. Still, a wide range of ages is
represented. More than 200 individuals booked in adult county jails on ne-only offenses in these
seven counties in 2014 were 17 years old. This is particularly concerning given what the research
says about the dangers of 17-year-olds being held in adult jails, in terms of physical assault, sexual
assault and suicide risk.
71
These 17-year-olds are supposed to be housed separately from older
inmates, pursuant to the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act, but some Texas jails have failed to
comply with this law.
72
Additionally, almost 5 percent of individuals booked for ne-only offenses
(i.e., 1,146 individuals) were over age 55. This elderly population is also particularly vulnerable to
victimization by other inmates and more prone to suicide in jail.
73
71 See MicheleDeitch,et.al,Seventeen, Going on Eighteen: An Operational Fiscal Analysis of a Proposal to Raise the Age
of Juvenile Jurisdiction in Texas, Am. J. Crim. l., Vol. 40:1 at 13-14 (2012), available at http://ajclonline.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/40-1-Deitch.pdf.
72 See St.JohnBarned-Smith,Stuck in Limbo: Feds Say Jails Need Separate Housing for Youngest Inmates, housTon
ChroniCle(Jul.1,2016).
73 SeeRobynnKuhlmann&RickRuddell,Elderly Jail Inmates: Problems, Prevalence, and Public Health, CAl. J. of heAlTh
PromoTion, Vol. 3:2 at 56-57 (2005) available at http://cjhp.fullerton.edu/Volume3_2005/Issue2/49-60-kuhlmann.pdf.
23
2014 Fine-Only Jail Bookings – By Age
<18 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-64 65+
El Paso 53 2,320 1,865 877 444 173 35
Percent of
bookings
0.9% 40.3% 32.4% 15.2% 7.7% 3.0% 0.6%
Jefferson 91 1,556 1,933 887 645 294 35
Percent of
bookings
1.7% 28.6% 35.5% 16.3% 11.9% 5.4% 0.6%
Lubbock 1 140 105 61 39 18 1
Percent of
bookings
0.3% 38.4% 28.8% 16.7% 10.7% 4.9% 0.3%
McLennan 12 968 997 555 309 90 17
Percent of
bookings
0.4% 32.8% 33.8% 18.8% 10.5% 3.1% 0.6%
Travis 17 2,269 2,270 1,257 971 372 56
Percent of
bookings
0.2% 31.6% 31.7% 17.5% 13.5% 5.2% 0.8%
Williamson 30 682 557 293 152 44 10
Percent of
bookings
1.7% 36.8% 32.4% 17.1% 8.8% 2.6% 0.6%
Total 204 7,885 7,727 3,930 2,560 991 154
Percent Total 0.9% 33.6% 32.9% 16.8% 10.9% 4.2% 0.7%
By reviewing the offenses that most often lead to jail booking, we nd further evidence that
low-income Texans are those most often jailed for ne-only offenses. In Hidalgo, Jefferson,
Lubbock, McLennan and Williamson Counties, over 25 percent of arrests for ne-only offenses
involved poverty-related trafc offenses, like driving on a suspended license or having an expired
inspection sticker. As discussed previously, lower income drivers commonly accumulate such
tickets after their inability to pay nes for a prior ticket causes them to receive holds on their
licenses and registrations. In Jefferson, McLennan, Lubbock and Williamson Counties, another
large percentage of people were arrested for missing their court date on a previous ne-only ticket.
The fact that these crimes are driving jail bookings is compelling evidence that people are being
booked in jail who are unable to pay nes.
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE >
24
Furthermore, those booked in jail for ne-only offenses are not usually chronic scofaws who
have accumulated large numbers of tickets. On average, people who were arrested and booked into
jail in the six counties that provided data did not have more than two ne-only charges pending
against them when they were booked.
Charges Represented IN Class C Jail Bookings, 2014
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25
26
27
E. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF JAIL TIME?
Even when people are jailed for only a day or two, their lives can be completely upended. Arrest
and booking often occur unexpectedly because of a trafc stop, so people are not able to tell their
employers that they need to take time off. As a result, many lose their jobs while in jail, seriously
hindering their ability to earn a living. People’s cars are often impounded when they are arrested
during a trafc stop, requiring them to pay several hundred dollars to get their cars back; those
who cannot pay may lose their transportation. People in jail at the beginning of the month may
miss rent payments and face eviction by the time they are released. And the impact on children
can be profound when their primary caretaker is taken away for even a brief period. In some cases,
children of single parents may end up in foster care.
Jail stays also present health and safety concerns for people who are incarcerated. People
jailed for ne-only offenses may be housed alongside people who were arrested for more serious,
violent offenses; cases of violence against fellow inmates in jails are well documented.
74
Further,
even short jail stays can cause existing physical health conditions to worsen, particularly when
people do not have access to previously prescribed medications, and can exacerbate mental
health issues. All of these consequences point to the fact that jail should be reserved for those
individuals who pose a threat to public safety — not those whose only offense is failing to pay
a ne.
Lionel S. Edwards, GALVESTON
Lionel S. Edwards was arrested on Feb. 6, 2008, on warrants for three unpaid trafc tickets. He owed a total of
$1,209. During the booking process at the Galveston County Jail, he was found asleep on a cell oor. Jail staff
noted that Edwards seemed to have had a seizure. Their response was to provide him a mattress “to avoid any
injury should there be a recurrence of the seizure.” In the next hour and a half, an ofcer saw Edwards pacing,
moaning and moving from the mattress to the oor. Eventually, the ofcer noticed that he was not moving, and
asked an EMT to go into his cell to check on him. When the EMT got to the cell, Edwards had no pulse and was
not breathing. Jail staff called 911, but efforts to revive him were unsuccessful. Edwards was 23 years old.
75
74 JamesPinkerton&AnitaHassan,Inmate dies after Harris County jailhouse beating, housTon ChroniCle (Apr. 13, 2016).
75 TexasJusticeInitiative,JailCustodyDeathDataSet,available athttp://texasjusticeinitiative.org/jail-custody/(last
visitedJan.9,2017).
28
Daniel McDonald, Beaumont
Daniel McDonald (name altered for privacy) is a 23-year-old plumber from Beaumont who lived with his girlfriend
and their two daughters, a 4-year-old and a 3-month-old. McDonald had received several trafc tickets, including
many for driving without a license, which he could not obtain due to nancial holds. When McDonald went to court
to take care of his tickets, the judge refused to give him community service even though McDonald lived below the
poverty line. Instead, the judge put him on a payment plan for $50 a month.
McDonald managed to keep up with the payment plan for only three months before he fell behind. Capias
warrants were issued, and on Aug. 12, 2015, Williams was arrested. He was booked into the Jefferson County Jail
but did not see a judge. Nobody told him how long he would be in jail. His 4-year-old daughter’s very rst day of
school was on Aug. 24, and he had promised he would walk her to class. Williams was not released until Aug. 27.
His home was robbed while he was in jail, and he blamed himself for being gone.
MARK CONWAY, Waco
Mark Conway (name altered for privacy) started getting tickets when he was around 15 years old despite the
fact that he did not yet have a license, because he often drove his father around to prevent him from drinking and
driving. Conway is now 41. But because of his unpaid tickets for driving without a license, he is still unable to get
a driver’s license.
Conway received ve trafc tickets from Waco over a decade ago and has been to jail more than 20 times for
those tickets. He still owes thousands of dollars due to all the nes and fees that have compounded over time.
One ticket for driving without a license was set at $200 in 2003. It has since ballooned to over $700.
In September 2016, Conway found himself sitting in a holding cell for 36 hours before a judge informed him via
video that he would remain in jail for another month because of the unpaid tickets. The judge did not give Conway
a chance to speak. As a result, he could not tell the judge that he had gone to court to take care of his tickets
several times, only to be turned away because he could not make the required down payment of $200 per ticket
to get on a payment plan. Conway alsohad not been offered a chance to perform community service. At the time
of his arrest, his monthly income was less than $400, and he was still making back payments on child support for
his daughter, who has passed away.
Conway served 11 days in jail before attorneys from TFDP found him and secured his release. He lost his job
while he was in jail and is still looking for work.
29
A. Public Safety Implications
There is no public safety value in putting people in jail because they cannot afford to pay their
tickets. They are low-risk defendants whose underlying crime was intended to be punished by
only a ne.
In fact, jail time for low-risk individuals may actually increase the likelihood that they commit
future crimes. A study funded by the Houston-based Laura & John Arnold Foundation examined
outcomes of individuals held for short periods before trial in Kentucky jails. The study found
that low-risk defendants who were held at least two to three days were almost 40 percent more
likely to commit a new crime before trial than low-risk defendants held no more than twenty-four
hours.
76
The longer low-risk defendants were held, the more likely they were to reoffend.
77
One
possible explanation for this effect is the negative inuence of being housed in close quarters
with higher-risk offenders. Another explanation is the stress and alienation of losing housing,
employment and community ties through prolonged detention. Whatever the reason, research
demonstrates that jailing people for nothing more than failing to pay nes and fees actually harms
public safety.
78
Additionally, in most places, when a police ofcer makes an arrest, the ofcer must transport the
individual to the jail, wait while the individual is booked, and then travel back to the ofcer’s patrol
area — a process that can take several hours. Every hour that it takes for a police ofcer to stop,
arrest and book a person due to warrants for unpaid nes is time that ofcer is not devoting to
more serious public safety concerns. While trafc law enforcement is vitally important to public
safety, debt collection is not.
76 ChristopherT.Lowenkamp,Ph.D. et al., The Hidden Cost of Pretrial Detention,LJAF3(2013),available at http://www.
arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf.
77 Id.
78 Id.
03 costs of the
current system
30
B. Fiscal Implications
1) REVENUE FROM FINES AND FEES
Texas’ busiest criminal courts play a complicated role in the system, having been delegated two
inconsistent jobs. While they are tasked with keeping our streets safe, they also collect revenue
for state and local governments. The tension in the system does not go unnoticed by judges,
local administrators and law enforcement. People in these positions are often frustrated by the
expectation that they act as debt collectors.
Municipal and justice courts raise almost a billion dollars a year from the collection of nes and
court costs in ne-only cases. Data from the Ofce of Court Administration shows that Texas
municipal courts collected $696.5 million in nes and court costs in FY 2015. Of that, they remitted
$236 million to the state government.
79
Justice courts raise less revenue than municipal courts,
but they still raised $302.6 million in nes and court costs, remitting $96.8 million to the state.
80
Texas law prohibits any local government from requiring or suggesting to a justice or municipal
court judge that the judge is expected to collect a certain amount of money in a specic time
frame.
81
Nonetheless, many judges do feel pressure, whether direct or indirect, to raise revenue.
A presiding judge from a large Texas city who wished to remain anonymous indicated that she
faces this pressure. One city council member repeatedly threatened to replace her if she did not
meet projected revenue goals. In a widely reported story, a municipal court judge in the small town
of Calvert resigned over similar pressure. He publicly objected to the constant pressure from city
ofcials to collect on speeding tickets, calling the city’s municipal court a “cash cow.”
82
A recent
presentation by the Dallas assistant city manager to the Dallas City Council expressed concerns
about the Dallas Municipal Court’s “low collection rates.” The presentation highlighted Dallas’
“low revenue per case average” as compared to other similarly sized and neighboring cities.
83
Likewise, a report to the Fort Worth City Council by city auditors expressed concern that the city
was not “maximizing revenue potential” through its municipal court.
84
These presentations were
void of any discussion about the impact of court nes and costs on people who are unable to pay
and the goal of equal justice for all residents. They send a clear message that some city ofcials
care most about the bottom line.
79 AnnuAl sTATisTiCAl rePorT, supra note 3, at Detail-48.
80 Id. at Detail-45.
81 Tex. TrAnsP. Code Ann. § 720.002.
82 ByronHarris,Judge Says He Quit Over Speeding Ticket Quota, WfAA(June3,2015,2:28AM),available at http://
legacy.wfaa.com/story/news/local/investigates/2015/06/02/former-judge-says-he-quit-because-of-speeding-ticket-
quota/28367771/.
83 MemorandumfromtheCityofDallasonTheDallasMunicipalCourtSystem:AnOverview59(July27,2012),available
at http://www3.dallascityhall.com/council_Briengs/Briengs0812/DallasMunicipalCourtSystemOverview_080112.pdf.
84 City of Fort Worth Department of Internal Audit,: Municipal Court Cash Collections and Non-Cash Ticket Dispositions
Audit (2014), available at http://fortworthtexas.gov/uploadedFiles/Internal_Audit/141219-municipalcourtaudit.pdf.
31
Additional pressure to generate revenue comes from state government. The State of Texas
received $333 million in court costs stemming from ne-only offenses in 2015. Though in
theory these costs go to reimburse the government for the cost of prosecuting the tickets, “court
administrators speculate that 1 in every 3 dollars gets diverted towards projects that have nothing
to do with the court system.”
85
Nearly every legislative session, state representatives add or try to
add additional court costs to fund various programs.
When the goal of raising revenue becomes a court’s priority, justice suffers. Courts that prioritize
generating revenue have little incentive to order community service or other alternatives that
provide no money to the government, and may avoid waiving or reducing nes and costs in
appropriate cases. On the other hand, they do have an incentive to impose additional fees on
defendants and to encourage the ling of additional charges when defendants fail to appear so
that more nes are collected. Courts may also see the threat of jail as a useful tool to encourage
payment.
2) COSTS TO TAXPAYERS
Any nancial benet of current practices must be weighed against the costs those practices
impose, both on governments and individuals. Right now, the collection of nes places a hefty
burden on local police departments and sheriffs’ departments to use their resources to locate,
arrest and jail those who do not – and in many cases cannot – pay nes. This shift of law
enforcement resources away from more serious crimes can have a negative effect on public safety,
while taxpayers foot the bill for unnecessary jail stays.
Additionally, the proliferation of arrest warrants and tens of thousands of jail stays leads to a loss
of employment and employment opportunities, which both stunts the economy and drives more
people to rely on public benets to survive.
85 EricDexheimer,Hard-up Defendants Pay as State Siphons Court Fees for Unrelated Uses, AusTin-Am. sTATesmAn (Mar. 3,
2012).
32
C. A Better, More Cost-Effective Way
The City of San Antonio’s decade-long experiment with ending jail commitments for nonpayment
demonstrates that jail commitments are not necessary to collect revenue. In 2007, Bexar County
faced a major overcrowding problem in its jail. San Antonio’s Presiding Municipal Court Judge
John Bull, along with county and city ofcials, decided that the San Antonio Municipal Court
would stop sentencing people to sit out their unpaid nes in jail for ne-only offenses in order
to address the overcrowding problem.
86
Almost a decade later, the San Antonio Municipal Court
continues to follow this policy.
87
Not only has San Antonio’s approach saved money through the avoided jail stays, it has not
reduced the court’s revenue – a strong indicator of compliance with its judgments. Rather,
as shown in the chart on the next page, the city’s greatest increase in revenue occurred in the
years immediately following the decision to end jail commitments. Four years after ending jail
commitments, San Antonio Municipal Court revenue was up 74 percent. This increase partly
tracks a statewide trend of increasing revenue and increasing amounts collected per case due to
escalating court costs. But statewide revenue did not increase nearly as much during the period;
it went up only 10 percent in that time. Asked about the increase, Judge Bull hypothesized that
taking away jail as a sentencing option encouraged judges to work more closely with defendants
to develop individualized sentences that they were able to complete.
“Before 2007, jail had been an easy, even if counterproductive, alternative for judges who
were dealing with defendants who struggled to pay their fines. When jail was no longer
an option, more judges began making a concerted effort to use the alternative sentences
available to them to resolve cases – alternatives like payment plans, partial payment
and community service. And at least partly as a result of this, revenue shot up.”
88
— Hon. John Bull, Presiding Judge, San Antonio Municipal Court
86 Ulloa, supra note 6.
87 SeeMunicipalCourtBriengontheU.S.DepartmentofJustice’sLettertoCourts,PresentedbyHon.JohnBull,
PresidingJudge,totheCriminalJustice,PublicSafetyandServicesCommitteeoftheSanAntonioCityCouncil,File
No. 16-2898 (May 4, 2016), available at https://sanantonio.legistar.com/Calendar.aspx.
88 InterviewwithHonorableJohnBull,PresidingJudge,SanAntonioMunicipalCourt,Jul.1,2016.
33
TOTAL REVENUE COLLECTED, 2001–2015
D. Legal Costs & Implications
Although the U.S. Supreme Court held over 40 years ago that jailing a person for inability to pay
a misdemeanor ne is unconstitutional, courts throughout Texas continue to jail people who are
unable to pay the nes and accumulated fees. So long as Texas courts continue to violate the clear,
long-standing constitutional rights of defendants, the local governments, local ofcials and judges
will continue to face the threat of litigation and all the costs associated with it.
In 1970, the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Illinois that an individual’s prison sentence could
not be extended as payment for the ne that is owed.
89
The court reasoned that incarcerating
people who cannot afford to pay nes and fees “exposes only indigent defendants to the risk of
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum,” amounting to “an impermissible discrimination”
against poor people.
90
One year later, in Tate v. Short,
91
the Court heard a case in which an indigent man owed money to
the Houston Municipal Court for trafc tickets. Unable to pay the tickets, Preston Tate had been
conned to a municipal prison farm and made to work off his trafc nes at a rate of $5 a day.
89 Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970).
90 Williams, 399 U.S. at 242.
91 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
34
Relying on its reasoning in Williams, the court held that Tate’s “imprisonment for nonpayment
constitutes precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination since, like Williams, [Tate] was
subjected to imprisonment solely because of his indigency.”
92
The court made it clear that indigent
people must be offered alternatives to payment in full or imprisonment, such as payment plans,
community service, and the reduction of nes and fees.
93
In 1983, the Court held in Bearden v. Georgia that courts could not revoke probation or parole solely
because a person could not afford to pay nes and costs.
94
The court claried that due process
required that the court inquire into a person’s reasons for not paying the ne or fee before any
imprisonment.
95
While Tate was pending at the U.S. Supreme Court, the Texas Legislature made changes to state
law so that when the case was remanded back to state court, Texas statute would comply with
the requirements of the U.S. Constitution.
96
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure now allows
municipal and justice courts to jail people who fail to pay nes and costs, but only after the judge
holds a hearing and makes a written determination that either:
• The person is not indigent and failed to make a good faith effort to discharge the nes
and costs.
• The person is indigent, failed to complete community service, and was able to perform
the ordered community service without undue hardship.
97
Despite the clear Supreme Court precedent and unequivocal state law requirement that a written
determination be made, some courts are not following the law. For example, the authors reviewed
the case les of 50 individuals who had been committed to jail by the Houston Municipal Court
and did not nd a single written determination that any individual was able to pay their nes prior
to jail commitment. At least half of these individuals had addresses listed as “homeless” in court
records — compelling evidence that they should have been found unable to pay their nes had an
ability to pay hearing actually been conducted. Similarly, reporters from BuzzFeed reviewed 100
case les from the El Paso Municipal Court and did not nd a written determination in any of
92 Id. at 397-98.
93 Id. at 399-400.
94 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1982).
95 Id. at 668. See also LetterfromVanitaGupta,PrincipalDeputyAssistantAtt’yGen.,CivilRightsDivision&LisaFoster,
Director,OceforAccesstoJustice,U.S.Dept.ofJustice,Mar.14,2016,available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/
le/832461/download(explainingthat“tocomplywith[Bearden’s]constitutionalguarantee,stateandlocalcourtsmust
inquireastoaperson’sabilitytopaypriortoimposingincarcerationfornonpayment”)[hereinafter“DOJDearColleague
Letter”].
96 Tex. Code of Crim. ProC.art.45.046,asamendedbyActs1971,62ndLeg.,p.2991,ch.987,Sec.7,e.June15,1971.
97 Tex. Code Crim. ProC. Ann. art. 45.046(a).
35
them.
98
In fact, in their review of les in 20 Texas municipal and justice courts, the reporters found
that nine courts lacked documentation of ability to pay hearings.
99
Texas courts’ current practice of jailing people for failure to pay nes in ne-only cases
violates another constitutional right as well – the right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth and
14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Although municipal and justice courts in Texas do
jail people for failure to pay nes and costs, these courts do not provide defendants with the
opportunity to request appointment of defense counsel in ne-only cases. In fact, the authors of
this report know of no court in Texas that provides appointed counsel to individuals in ne-only
cases. Yet, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that indigent defendants cannot
be imprisoned for any criminal offense unless they have been provided with the opportunity
to have counsel appointed at the trial stage of their case.
100
If Texas courts are going to jail
individuals, the Constitution requires that counsel be appointed to defendants who cannot afford
to hire their own.
In order to avoid violating the constitutional rights of Texans, the practices of Texas courts must
change. Courts must provide counsel to defendants if they continue to use jail time to satisfy nes,
and they must ensure that no person is jailed when their reason for nonpayment was indigence.
So long as courts continue to violate these constitutional rights, local governments, ofcials and
judges face liability for such violations and are forced to spend considerable amounts of time and
money defending against the litigation and paying resulting judgments.
98 Taggart & Campbell, supra note 36.
99 Id.
100 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972). See also DOJDearColleagueLetter(“TheSixthAmendmentrequiresthat
adefendantbeprovidedtherighttocounselinanycriminalproceedingresultinginincarceration”).
36
The good news is that the Texas Legislature and municipal and justice courts can x the problems
associated with ne-only cases. Modest changes to state law would make huge strides toward
justice for all in ne-only criminal cases. These recommendations have very little, if any, cost to
state or local governments, and in some cases would present signicant cost savings. They would
also empower courts to hold individuals accountable, allowing them to resolve the nes and costs
they owe quickly and without the unnecessary use of arrest warrants or jail sentences.
1. End the use of jail commitments for ne-only offenses.
Ordering defendants to jail to pay off nes and fees is an unnecessarily harsh, counterproductive
punishment that wastes taxpayer dollars and unfairly discriminates against those without the
means to pay. Additionally, jailing individuals without the appointment of counsel violates their
constitutional rights, exposing city and county ofcials to liability.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should amend Article 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
governs municipal and justice courts, to remove the authority of judges to sentence defendants to jail for
nonpayment of nes or not completing community service. Until the law is changed, city councils should
end jail commitments through ordinances governing their municipal courts, a policy that not only promotes
justice but also has the added benet of limiting their liability for constitutional violations.
2. Require judges at sentencing to determine a person’s ability to pay and
to immediately consider alternatives to full payment.
Currently, state law does not require judges to inquire about a person’s ability to pay nes and fees
until they are considering committing someone to jail. If judges determined defendants’ ability
to pay nes and costs at sentencing and used that knowledge to tailor the defendants’ sentences,
defendants would not leave court with a ne amount they had no hope of paying. Instead,
defendants could receive individualized sentences that they could complete.
Additionally, judges should have guidance for determining who has no ability or a limited ability
to pay nes and court costs. The Texas Judicial Council has adopted guidelines for the Collection
04 Recommendations
37
Improvement Program (CIP), a state-run collections program. According to those guidelines, CIP
staff must refer a case back to the judge to consider alternative sentencing if:
• A person’s income is at or below 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines;
• A person receives income-based government assistance (e.g., food stamps, WIC,
Medicaid, etc.); or
• A person is legally mandated to attend school full-time due to age.
The same standard would be appropriate for municipal and justice court judges to use at
sentencing to determine who should be presumed unable to pay nes and costs.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should further amend Article 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to require judges to make an ability to pay inquiry at sentencing and implement standards for determining
ability to pay. State law should also require judges to consider at sentencing alternatives for people who do
not have the ability to pay in full or in part. Until the law is changed, justices of the peace and the presiding
judge of each municipal court should establish internal policies stating that they will conduct ability to pay
inquiries at the beginning of each case, immediately consider alternatives in appropriate cases, and oer
aordable payment plans.
3. Expand the ability of courts to resolve nes and costs
through community service.
Community service should be made more widely available to any defendant who wishes to
complete it. Judges should be required to ask at sentencing if defendants want to resolve their
nes and fees through community service, and should allow anyone to select this option.
Judges should also have broader discretion to order community service anywhere they determine
it is appropriate, including local schools, neighborhood-based organizations that are not formal
nonprots, and religious institutions – not just governmental entities and nonprots, as is
currently provided by law. This change would empower judges to allow parents to work at their
child’s school or work from home, for example, to fulll their community service obligations.
Finally, people should be given dollar credit for community service at a rate that sets them up for
success rather than failure. Right now, judges are only required to give credit at $6.25 per hour.
A rate of $20 per hour would be more appropriate, since that is the approximate median hourly
income in Texas.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should amend Article 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
allow community service in any case in which the defendant elects it. The Code should also be amended to
allow more options for community service and to provide a higher rate of credit. Meanwhile, judges should
grant a more reasonable credit rate for community service when they do order it, since they already have the
authority to grant credit at any rate above $6.25 per hour.
38
4. Expand the use of waivers and ticket reductions.
Indigency waivers are drastically underused in municipal and justice courts. While 1 in 8 cases are
satised each year by jail credit, less than 1 percent of cases involve a full or partial waiver of nes
and costs.
Texas law currently allows the waiver of nes and costs only after the defendant defaults in
payment. This is a waste of time and resources for the courts, forcing low-income defendants
to fail to satisfy the court’s initial orders and receive warrants for nonpayment before they can
receive sentences that are truly tailored to their circumstances.
Furthermore, costs and fees stemming from ne-only offenses should be waived for all indigent
defendants. Unlike nes, costs and fees are nonpunitive in nature, and it does not make sense
to assess them against indigent people who must take out predatory loans or forgo paying their
utilities in order to pay them.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should amend Article 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to allow courts to waive and reduce nes and costs at any point in the process. There should also be a
mandatory waiver of costs and fees, which are nonpunitive in nature, for all indigent defendants.
5. Reduce reliance on arrest warrants.
Unless a justice or municipal court has already documented an individual’s ability to pay, the
court should be required to order the person to appear for a hearing before issuing a capias pro ne
warrant. The notice of the hearing should contain information about available alternatives if the
defendant is unable to pay. This additional step, called a show cause hearing, would require that
individuals appear before the judge, giving them an opportunity to explain why they haven’t paid.
This hearing would also give the judge an opportunity to develop an alternative sentence, thereby
reducing the number of capias warrants issued.
Additionally, changes in procedure could reduce the number of Failure to Appear warrants.
Information should accompany a ticket or summons for a ne-only offense that explains in plain
language a person’s options if he is unable to pay the ne in full. Also, before issuing a warrant for
a defendant’s failure to appear in court on a ne-only criminal charge, the court should provide
notice to the defendant of information such as:
• A future date at which she can speak with a judge.
• The court’s name and location.
• The availability of alternative sentences for defendants unable to pay the amount owed.
39
Courts should also be safe havens so that people are not afraid to come to court to resolve warrants
and unpaid nes. People should be allowed to come to court at any point in a case to speak to
a judge, revise payment plan terms, or otherwise attempt to resolve their unpaid nes and fees
without any threat of arrest or jail on a ne-only charge.
Finally, people who contact the court to resolve their warrants and unpaid nes should be allowed
to set a hearing without paying any money. Requiring a defendant to pay before they can see a
judge makes it unnecessarily difcult for a person who is trying to comply with the law. Similarly,
those people arrested and booked on a ne-only offense who are waiting to see a judge should be
released on a personal recognizance bond if they will not see a judge within eight hours. Holding
people who pose no public safety risk for long periods of time is a waste of jail resources and a
threat to public safety.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should amend the Code of Criminal Procedure to require a show
cause hearing before a capias warrant is issued and a notice of hearing and alternative sentences before
a Failure to Appear warrant is issued; make courts safe havens by prohibiting arrest on a ne-only charge
of someone who voluntarily showed up to court; prohibit requiring payment of money to set a hearing; and
providing for jail release within eight hours for any ne-only booking.
In the meantime, judges should make it a policy to set a show cause hearing before issuing a capias
warrant. They should also make an attempt to contact the defendant before issuing a Failure to Appear
warrant. Courts should establish walk-in dockets at convenient times and locations for anyone to come
discuss problems they are having with making payments. Finally, courts should post notices online and in
written materials stating that people will not be arrested on ne-only warrants for coming to court to resolve
their cases.
6. Eliminate unfair fees.
Current law should be claried to give judges the discretion to waive or reduce nes or fees for
anyone who cannot pay the total amount owed at any point in the life of a case. Additionally, the
multiple fees now allowed by law should only be applied once per defendant rather than to every
ticket, while other fees need to be eliminated entirely.
• The time payment fee of $25, charged only to people who need more than 30 days to pay
their nes, should be eliminated entirely, along with the transaction fees that people pay
for every payment during a payment plan.
• The Failure to Appear/Pay fee ($30) and Scofaw fee ($20) should only be charged by one
court to one defendant a single time, even if the defendant has multiple cases.
• The $50 warrant fee should only be charged when a defendant is actually arrested, and
only one warrant fee should be allowed per arrest (rather than $50 for each warrant).
40
None of these fees should be charged to people who have been determined unable to pay, and
judges should have the authority to waive any of them in the interest of justice.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should amend the Code of Criminal Procedure to grant judges
the power to waive or reduce nes, costs, and fees at any time and amend the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Local Government Code and Transportation Code to eliminate certain fees and make other fees inapplicable
to people who are unable to pay.
7. Reduce the number of unlicensed drivers.
State law should be changed to reduce the number of people who have invalid licenses and
expired registrations. They often accumulate crippling debt because they must drive to work and
complete other tasks necessary to survival.
• People who have been determined unable to pay nes and costs should not be placed
in the county’s Scofaw Program (prohibiting renewal of car registration) or the DPS’s
Failure to Appear/Pay Program (prohibiting driver’s license renewal).
• People who have been prohibited from renewing their licenses or registrations for more
than two years should be granted amnesty and removed from these programs.
• Municipal judges should have the authority to grant occupational driver’s licenses, which
allow people to drive to work while their licenses are suspended.
• Finally, the Driver Responsibility Program (DRP) should be eliminated entirely. It
perpetuates the cycle of debt and serves no valid purpose. Until the program is
eliminated, courts should be required to notify DPS within ve days when a person has
been determined unable to pay nes and costs in a case where surcharges apply
so that surcharges can be waived.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should amend the Transportation Code to modify these programs
accordingly and eliminate the DRP entirely. In the meantime, cities and counties should modify the
interlocal agreements related to the Scoaw Program to exempt certain defendants who are unable to
pay nes and fees. In addition, courts should forward any determination that a defendant meets the DRP
indigency standard to DPS in a case where surcharges apply.
41
8. Limit private collection agencies.
Private collection agencies are currently permitted to collect nes and fees in ne-only cases even
when people have not yet seen a judge or even entered a plea. This denies individuals due process
protections they should have in any criminal prosecution. The law should be changed to prevent
the collection of any amount in cases where an individual has not yet appeared before a judge.
Cases should only be referred to private collection agencies after the court’s collection efforts
have been exhausted. Private collection agencies should also be prohibited from charging fees of
more than 5 percent of the total amount of debt owed to the court, and should be required to end
collection efforts after a certain period of time (e.g., two years).
In addition, courts should be prohibited from sharing with private collection agencies the
information of people who have no ability to pay. Finally, if a person noties a collection agency
that he is unable to pay the amount owed, the collection agency should be required to end
collection attempts and to notify the court.
How to Accomplish This: The legislature should amend the Local Government Code that governs activities
of private collection agencies. In the meantime, cities and counties should modify their agreements with
private collection agencies to ensure that no cases involving people who are unable to pay are referred to
the agency. The agreements should also be modied to require an agency to refer cases back to the court
when an individual cannot pay.