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Is ‘Conspiracy Theory’ Harmful? A Reply to Foster and Ichikawa

Scott Hill, University of Innsbruck, [email protected]

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Hill, Scott. 2023. “Is ‘Conspiracy Theory’ Harmful? A Reply to Foster and Ichikawa.” Social

Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (9): 27–31. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-86M.

12 (9): 27–30. 2023.

https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-86M

Some terms are harmful. Take slurs. The use of slurs can promote and sustain connections

between concepts and stereotypes that harm innocent people. A slur for African Americans,

for example, may be harmful even if that slur does not license strict entailments from the use

of that term to particular stereotypes. The widespread use of the slur is consistent with users

of the slur having an African American friend. And it is consistent with the existence of

African Americans who are not in the extension of that slur. Nonetheless, the term may still

be very harmful because the concept users associate with that term is tightly, if not infallibly,

linked to the relevant stereotypes.

Jen Foster and Jonathan Ichikawa (2023; hereafter ‘F&I’) extend this observation to a wide

range of terms and concepts beyond slurs. One innovation of their view includes the

introduction of degrees of association a concept might have with various stereotypes.

Sometimes, in the literature on conspiracy theories, for example, opponents of the pejorative

account of conspiracy theories suggest that there is an implausibly tight connection between

the use of ‘conspiracy theory’ and various stereotypes that lead to harms. F&I point out that

the connection isn’t as strict as such proponents sometimes suggest. Nevertheless, F&I

argue that the point of such contributors may be more plausibly developed in a different

way.

F&I show that strict entailment is not necessary for there to be an interestingly tight

connection between a term and its associated stereotypes. Just as a slur for African

Americans may be tightly linked to various harmful stereotypes even if it does not strictly

logically entail those stereotypes, it may nevertheless be tightly enough connected to the

stereotypes to do real harm. And in the same way, F&I argue, stereotypes associated with

‘conspiracy theory’ are in some ways quite tight even if they do not strictly entail the relevant

stereotypes.

I will begin by summarizing the observations F&I cite in favor of the claim that ‘conspiracy

theory’ as it is ordinarily used is harmful.

I will then argue that the hypothesis that

‘conspiracy theory’ is instead beneficial is able to explain the relevant observations at least as

well as the hypothesis that it is harmful. Finally, since ‘conspiracy theory’ is just one of the

many topics F&I address in their fascinating paper, I explain why I think focus on

‘conspiracy theory’ in particular is worthy of sustained reflection and discussion in its own

right even if I am in agreement with many of F&I’s other ideas.

The Evidence that ‘Conspiracy Theory’ is Harmful

The view F&I advocate is that given the ordinary use of ‘conspiracy theory’, being a theory

that merely posits a conspiracy is tightly conceptually linked to being a conspiracy theory.

And being a conspiracy theory is tightly conceptually linked to being false, crazy, or

unbelievable. And so, given the way in which ‘conspiracy theory’ is ordinarily used, the

stereotypes associated with merely believing a conspiracy occurred will cause one's views to

F&I frame the discussion as about concepts rather than terms. But I follow the general convention in the

literature of talking about terms.

S. Hill

be prematurely dismissed. F&I cite two sources of evidence in support of the claim that

merely positing a conspiracy is tightly conceptually linked with being a conspiracy theory.

First, they note that in an NPR segment the term ‘conspiracy’ is used to talk about

stereotypical conspiracies. Second, they note that some dictionaries define ‘conspiracy

theory’ in such a way that being a theory that posits a mere conspiracy is sufficient to count

as a conspiracy theory.

Regarding the NPR interview. F&I note that the subtitle of the interview is ‘the Psychology

Behind Conspiracies’. The interview primarily concerns QAnon. In the interview, the term

‘conspiracy’ is used to talk about conspiracy theories. A former QAnon member is said to

have once believed conspiracies and asked about his experiences. Listeners are invited to call

in with their stories about themselves or loved ones' experiences with conspiracies. As F&I

note, no one calls in to talk about the conspiracy by Barack Obama that led to the death of

Osama Bin Laden or the conspiracy by American Rebels that led to the writing of the

Declaration of Independence. All the examples callers brought up were all about

stereotypical conspiracy theories such as QAnon. As F&I put it:

We see similarly tight conceptual connections along these lines in colloquial

discussions involving conspiracy theories. To take but one recent example,

on January 18, 2021, a National Public Radio segment about “the psychology

behind conspiracies,” motivated primarily by discussions of QAnon,

repeatedly demonstrated the assumption that accepting a “conspiracy” ipso

facto amounts to conspiracy theory and its associated irrationality. For

example, it featured an interview with a self-described former conspiracy

theorist; the interviewer introduced him by pointing out that he “used to

believe in some conspiracies,” then asked what had changed. Later in the

program, the host asked listeners “if any of you know anyone who believed

in a conspiracy.” No one called in describing the al-Qaeda’s conspiracy that

led to 9/11, or the American revolutionaries’ conspiracy that led to the

Declaration of Independence (18)!

I do not think that this is evidence that mere conspiracies are tightly linked with conspiracy

theories by ordinary speakers. Adapting an example from M. Giulia Napolitano and Kevin

Reuter (2023; hereafter N&R), consider the term ‘cloud computing’. N&R use the example

to make a point about the perils of inferring the meaning of a term by breaking the term

down into smaller terms and combining the meaning of the smaller terms as a way of

discovering what the larger term means. So, for example, the way to find out what ‘cloud

computing’ means is not to take the word ‘cloud’ and its meaning and then put it together

with the word ‘computing’ and its meaning. Similarly, the way to figure out what ‘conspiracy

theory’ means is not to first consider the meaning of ‘conspiracy’, then the meaning of

‘theory’, and then to put the two meanings together.

I think we can appropriate N&R’s ‘cloud computing’ example in a way that will help us

understand the NPR example. Imagine Google recently developed a new and especially

interesting cloud computing system. Imagine NPR conducted an interview with someone

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who had worked with Google’s new system. Imagine that the subtitle of the segment was

‘Google’s New Cloud’. And imagine that ‘cloud’ was frequently used in the interview to talk

about cloud computing. Imagine listeners were asked to call in and describe their experiences

with clouds during the interview. Finally, imagine that all of the people who call in talk about

examples of cloud computing. No one calls in and says: ‘I recently observed a cloud

hovering over Google’s headquarters.’ No one calls in and says: ‘There is a cloud over my

house right now’ or ‘Once I saw a storm cloud.’ Everyone who calls in instead says things

like ‘My wife is a tech wiz and works with the cloud at her company.’ Or, ‘I have

reservations about using my office’s cloud. I feel like it infringes on my privacy.’ If this were

to happen, it would not provide evidence that the concept ordinary speakers associate with

‘cloud computing’ is tightly connected with stereotypes about actual clouds. It would instead

provide evidence that ordinary speakers understand these to be quite different things. There

might be some contexts in which ‘cloud’ is used as shorthand for ‘cloud computing’. But in

such contexts, every competent user of English knows that it is cloud computing rather than

the disjunction of clouds and cloud computing that is being talked about.

In the same way, it seems to me that F&I’s example may be accommodated by the view that

the concept associated with ‘conspiracy theory’ is not tightly linked to merely positing a

conspiracy in the minds of ordinary English speakers. The hypothesis that these concepts are

tightly linked predicts that many callers would bring up things like the role of Al Qaeda in

9/11 or the role of American Revolutionaries in producing the Declaration of

Independence. The hypothesis that they are not so tightly linked predicts F&I’s observation

that listeners only bring up stereotypical conspiracy theories like QAnon and never bring up

mere conspiracies like the conspiracy of American Rebels to produce the Declaration of

Independence.

There is a second piece of evidence F&I cite in favor of the claim that ‘conspiracy theory’ is

tightly connected with merely positing a mere conspiracy. They point out that some

dictionaries define ‘conspiracy theory’ in a way that includes many reasonable conspiracies in

its extension. As F&I put it:

It’s not impossible to posit a conspiracy while disclaiming the label

‘conspiracy theory,’ but doing so, we think, would require special pleading.

One might attempt to define ‘conspiracy theory’ by building irrationality in

by definition — effectively attempting to deny the input rule above, insisting

that one can only describe something as a conspiracy theory if it is an

unsubstantiated theory positing a conspiracy. But many dictionaries actually

encode the simpler definition; here is Merriam-Webster’s: “a theory that

explains an event or set of circumstances as the result of a secret plot by

usually powerful conspirators” (18).

I do not think the fact that some dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster (MW) define a word in

such a way that the word has an extension implies that ordinary use of that word has that

extension. To reframe an example that I developed (Hill 2022), consider MW’s definition of

‘poison’: ‘A poison is a substance that through its chemical action usually kills, injures, or

S. Hill

impairs an organism.’ Notice that this definition implies that some bombs are poisons.

Imagine a substance that through its chemical action explodes when it touches an organism.

It is a bomb rather than a poison. But it is a substance that through its chemical action

usually kills, injures, or impairs an organism. So, the MW definition implies that it is a bomb.

However, that is not evidence that the extension of ‘poison’ as it is ordinarily used includes

bombs. And it is not evidence that the concept ordinary users associate with ‘poison’ is

tightly connected to stereotypes about bombs. Everyone knows they are different.

I think the lesson of the MW example is this: people are bad at coming up with definitions

that match the extension of the words they use. They often do not realize how widely the

extension of their definitions would, if widely adopted, make the words. And such mistaken

definitions come radically apart from the extension of the words as they are actually used.

Why Care About ‘Conspiracy Theory’ In Particular?

Above, I addressed just one of the many valuable points made by F&I. The overall view they

defend could be true even if I am right that F&I are mistaken about ‘conspiracy theory’. For

this reason, one might wonder why I would focus on what F&I say about ‘conspiracy theory’

in particular. When I look at the philosophical literature on conspiracy theories, I often find

myself unmoved by examples in which the pejorative use of ‘conspiracy theory’ is alleged to

be harmful. But when I see the examples in which conspiracy theories do real harm, I am

much more convinced. Quassim Cassam (2019) and Neil Levy (2021) discuss examples in

which conspiracy theories do real harm. They discuss examples in which people have died

because of conspiracy theories. Cassam discusses an example in which conspiracy theories

about AIDS led South African President Thabo Mbeki to delay the use of aid in the form of

medication for HIV in South Africa causing numerous deaths. Levy discusses an example in

which conspiracy theories about the ability of alcohol to cure COVID-19 led to numerous

deaths in Iran. I find the harm in these examples easy to spot. I think that this is evidence

that the term ‘conspiracy theory’ is working just as it should. It is useful for individuals and

groups to be able to label ideas as preposterous. The term ‘conspiracy theory’ is one way to

exercise that ability.

Acknowledgements

Work on this paper was funded as part of the Euregio Interregional Project Network IPN

175 “Resilient Beliefs: Religion and Beyond”.

References

Cassam, Quassim. 2019. Conspiracy Theories. Polity.

Foster, Jen and Jonathan Ichikawa. 2023. “Normative Inference Tickets.” Episteme 1–27.

doi: 10.1017/epi.2023.43.

Hill, Scott. 2022. “Substantive Disagreement in the Le Monde Debate and Beyond: Replies to

Duetz and Dentith, Basham, and Hewitt.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective

11 (11): 18-25.

12 (9): 27–30. 2023.

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Levy, Neil. 2021. Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People. Oxford University Press

Napolitano, M. Giulia and Kevin Reuter. 2023. “What is a Conspiracy Theory?” Erkenntnis

88: 2035–2062.