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Dissolution of Marriage in Connecticut
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................... 3
Part A. Dissolution of Marriage – ........................................................................ 5
Section 1: Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Legal Separation ........................ 5
Section 1.1: No Fault Grounds ........................................................................... 6
Section 1.2: Fault Grounds .............................................................................. 12
Table 1: Fault and Financial Awards ............................................................... 16
Section 1.2a: Adultery .................................................................................... 17
Section 1.2b: Fraudulent Contract .................................................................... 21
Section 1.2c: Willful Desertion ......................................................................... 25
Table 2: Constructive Desertion .................................................................... 29
Section 1.2d: Seven Years’ Absence ................................................................. 30
Section 1.2e: Habitual Intemperance ................................................................ 32
Section 1.2f: Intolerable Cruelty ...................................................................... 36
Section 1.2g: Imprisonment / Infamous Crime .................................................. 40
Section 1.2h: Confinement / Mental Illness ....................................................... 43
Section 1.3: Multiple Grounds .......................................................................... 45
Section 1.4: Defenses ..................................................................................... 47
Section 2: Procedures ..................................................................................... 51
Table 3: Parenting Education Program ........................................................... 57
Section 2.1: Jurisdiction .................................................................................. 60
Table 4: Domicile ........................................................................................ 67
Section 2.2: Process ....................................................................................... 68
Section 2.3: Parties ........................................................................................ 72
Section 3: Pleadings, Motions, and Forms .......................................................... 77
Part B. Nonadversarial Dissolution of Marriage ................................................... 78
Table 5: Excerpts from the Public Hearing Testimony of Conn. Public Act 17-47 .. 80
Note: If you are looking for information about how to file for divorce, please see the
Connecticut Judicial Branch web page on Divorce, Custody, and Visitation.
Prepared by Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court Operations,
Judge Support Services, Law Library Services Unit
lawlibrarians@jud.ct.gov
2024 Edition
Dissolution of Marriage - 2
Connecticut Judicial Branch Family Forms & Information
Divorce, Custody, and Visitation
Information (CT Judicial Branch)
The Pathways Process in Your Divorce,
Custody or Visitation Case
Family Law Forms (Full List)
Responding to a Divorce
Divorce Forms
File for Custody or Visitation (or both)
Divorce with an Agreement (or “waive 90”)
File for a Motion for Modification
Divorce without an Agreement
File for a Motion for Contempt
Nonadversarial (simplified or
“non-ad”) Divorce
File for a Restraining Order
What to Expect on Your Resolution Plan
Date (PDF)
Family Publications (CT Judicial Branch)
These guides are provided with the understanding that they represent only a
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and currency of any resource cited in this research guide.
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References to online legal research databases refer to in-library use of these databases.
Remote access is not available.
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Dissolution of Marriage - 3
Introduction
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
Part A. Dissolution of Marriages
• “By contrast, ‘[t]he purpose of a dissolution action is to sever the marital
relationship, to fix the rights of the parties with respect to alimony and child
support…to divide the marital estate…and to consider custody issues.’ . . .
Bouchard v. Sundberg, 80 Conn. App, 180, 189, 834 A.2d 744 (2003).”
Kimberly C. v. Anthony C., 179 Conn. App. 856, 863, 179 A.3d 856 (2018).
• “‘A dissolution of a marriage is essentially an equitable action.’ Id., 302
[Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 301, 580 A.2d 1212, cert. denied, 217
Conn. 803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990)]. Here, because the plaintiff’s cause of
action sought only a dissolution of her marriage, together with alimony and
an equitable division of property, her cause of action is essentially equitable,
for which the defendant has no right to a trial by jury.” Emerick v. Emerick,
170 Conn. App. 368, 386, 154 A.3d 1069 (2017).
• “The trial court found that the plaintiff’s transactions violated those
[automatic] orders but did not hold the plaintiff in contempt because the
court concluded the violations were not wilful. Nevertheless, because the
transactions had caused a significant loss to the marital estate, the court
considered that loss when it distributed the marital property between the
parties, awarding a greater than even distribution to the defendant.”
O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 85, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017).
• “A marriage is dissolved only by (1) the death of one of the parties or (2) a
decree of annulment or dissolution of marriage by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(a) (2023)
• “We recognize that an annulment and a dissolution of marriage differ
fundamentally. An annulment renders the marriage void ab initio [from the
beginning] while a dissolution is based upon a valid marriage which
terminates as of the date of the judgment of dissolution.” Durham v. Miceli,
15 Conn. App. 96, 543 A.2d 286 (1988).
• “‘Marriage’ means the legal union of two persons.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-
20(4) (2023)
• Proceeding to judgment on case management date when defendant
has not appeared.
“If the defendant has not filed an appearance by the case management date,
the plaintiff may appear and proceed to judgment on the case management
date without further notice to the defendant, provided the plaintiff has
complied with the provisions of Section 25-30.” Connecticut Practice Book §
25-50(c) (2024).
• Waiver of Service of Process
“Any person entitled to service of process of a summons and complaint that
commences an action for an annulment, a dissolution of marriage, a
dissolution of a civil union or a legal separation may waive such service by (1)
executing a written waiver of service on a form prescribed by the Office of the
Chief Court Administrator, and (2) filing an appearance with the court. Upon
filing of both the waiver of service and the appearance of the person waiving
Dissolution of Marriage - 4
such service, the action shall proceed as consistent with the provisions of this
chapter.” Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-45(b) (2023)
Form JD-FM-249. Certification of Waiver of Service of Process- Divorce,
Legal Separation, Annulment
Part B. Nonadversarial Dissolution of Marriages
• “Two years ago, I came before this Committee and asked for your support of
a similarly titled bill that established a simplified dissolution of marriage for
parties who agreed to the dissolution and who met certain criteria, as well as
allowed other parties with an agreement to obtain a divorce in nearly a
quarter of the time that it would ordinarily require. Thanks to your leadership
on the issue, the bill passed, and as a result, one in six of all dissolutions
subsequently filed have taken advantage of this new law, resulting in
thousands of litigants moving on with their lives more quickly, and without
the time and expense of numerous court hearings.”
Substitute H.B. 7196. 2017 Sess., Judiciary Committee Public Hearing, March
6, 2017, Testimony of the Honorable Elizabeth A. Bozzuto, Chief
Administrative Judge for Family Matters—State of Connecticut Judicial Branch.
• “This act creates an expedited court process that allows a judge to enter a
divorce decree without a hearing for certain nonadversarial divorce
actions. Among other things, it:
1. allows parties to a marriage to file a notarized joint petition to begin
the divorce process if, among other things, (a) they have not been
married for more than eight years [now nine years], (b) they have no
children or real property, (c) at least one party is a Connecticut
resident, (d) the total combined net fair market value of all property
owned by either party is less than $35,000 [now $80,000], and (e)
neither party has a defined benefit pension plan;”
Summary for Public Act No. 15-7 (Effective October 1, 2015)
“This act makes changes in the conditions for nonadversarial divorce actions.
In so doing, it extends this divorce option to certain parties who (1) have been
married for nine years or less instead of eight years or less and (2) own
property with a total combined net fair market value less than $80,000 instead
of less than $35,000. The law limits this divorce option to parties who do not
have a defined benefit pension plan. The act defines a ‘defined benefit pension
plan’ expressly for the purpose of nonadversarial divorce actions. Additionally,
under the act, if a judge terminates a nonadversarial divorce action and places
the matter on the Superior Court's regular family docket, the parties do not
have to pay any new filing fees, file a complaint, or serve process.” Summary
for Public Act 17-47 (Effective October 1, 2017).
Dissolution of Marriage - 5
Part A. Dissolution of Marriage –
Section 1: Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
or Legal Separation
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
• “A decree of dissolution of a marriage or a decree of legal separation shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred:
(1) The marriage has broken down irretrievably;
(2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous
period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of
the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be
reconciled;
(3) adultery;
(4) fraudulent contract;
(5) willful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty;
(6) seven years’ absence, during all of which period the absent party has not
been heard from;
(7) habitual intemperance;
(8) intolerable cruelty;
(9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous
crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by
imprisonment for a period in excess of one year;
(10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or
institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period
totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of
the complaint.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(c) (2023)
Dissolution of Marriage - 6
Section 1.1: No Fault Grounds
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Bibliographic resources relating to a no fault dissolution of
marriage (divorce) commenced after October 1, 1997.
DEFINITIONS:
• No fault divorce: “A decree of dissolution of a marriage .
. . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following
causes has occurred: (1) the marriage has broken down
irretrievably; (2) the parties have lived apart by reason of
incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the
eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the
complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that
they will be reconciled . . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(c)
(2023)
• “The determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage
is irretrievable is a question of fact to be determined by the
trial court.” Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611,
614, 496 A.2d 210 (1985).
• “The absence of objective guidelines does not mean an
abdication of judicial function, nor does it signal, as the
defendant argues, that a court determining whether a
marriage has in fact irretrievably broken down is acting
purely ministerially or is granting a divorce ‘upon demand.’
It does, however, sustain the trial court’s conclusion that
the defendant’s decision to rearrange his business ventures
after the initiation of divorce proceedings does not
necessarily repair the rupture in the marital relationship
that had previously occurred.” Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254,
255-256, 423 A.2d 895 (1979).
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
Chapter 815j. Dissolution of Marriage, Legal Separation
and Annulment
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
§ 46b-51. Stipulation of parties and finding of
irretrievable breakdown.
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Dissolution of Marriage - 7
CASES:
• Nietupski v. Del Castillo, 196 Conn. App. 31, 38-39, 228 A.
3d 1053 (2020). “‘…[Section] 46b-40(c)(1) is a valid and
neutral law of general applicability. The statute does not in
any manner infringe on the defendant's right to exercise his
religious beliefs merely because it permits the plaintiff to
obtain a divorce from him against his wishes.’”
• Kimberly C. v. Anthony C., 179 Conn. App. 856, 860, 182
A.3d 106 (2018). “The plaintiff testified that the defendant
had physically, verbally, and sexually abused her during
the course of the marriage. The defendant denied all
allegations of abuse….the court issued its written
memorandum for decision, in which it found that neither
the plaintiff nor defendant were credible witnesses and
made no finding that the defendant had abused the
plaintiff. The court found both parties responsible for the
breakdown of the marriage.”
• Joseph v. Glasgow, Superior Court, Judicial District of
Danbury at Danbury, No. DBD-FA-175010651-S (Jan. 25,
2018) (2018 WL 1137537) (2018 Conn. Super. LEXIS
200). “There are ten possible grounds for the granting of
a dissolution of marriage in Connecticut. Those grounds are
listed by General Statutes § 46b–40(c). The ‘no-fault
divorce’ ground is set forth in § 46b–40(c)(1): The
marriage has broken down irretrievably. The word
‘irretrievably’ is not defined in the statute. The Connecticut
Supreme Court has consistently declined to impose
guidelines for an inquiry into ‘irretrievability’ because of the
recognition that such an inquiry by the trial court is
necessarily individualized and particularized for each case.
Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255, 423 A.2d 895 (1979). The
complaint in this matter relies upon irretrievable
breakdown as the sole ground for dissolving the parties'
marriage. ‘The determination of whether a breakdown of a
marriage is irretrievable is a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court.’ Eversman v. Eversman, 4
Conn. App. 611, 614, 496 A.2d 210 (1985), cert. denied
197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985). ‘Since it is the
marriage as a whole which is at issue, any evidence which
bears upon the viability of the marriage is admissible,
whether it be classified as objective or subjective.’ Id.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)”
---
“The plaintiff was, however, unwilling to testify that the
marriage had broken down irretrievably….Near the end of
the trial, the court told the parties the court was doubtful
as to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The
court invited either party to provide additional testimony
specifically as to the issue of the irretrievability of the
marital breakdown. The plaintiff chose to remain silent.
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Dissolution of Marriage - 8
…When the court invited each party to speak to the
question of irretrievability near the end of the trial, the
defendant stated: ‘I do not wish to remain married.’ He
avoided speaking to the question of irretrievability. In light
of the parties' testimony and the reluctance of both to
assert the marriage cannot be saved, the court cannot find
the parties' marriage has broken irretrievably.”
---
“The marriage of the parties is not dissolved. They are not
declared to be single and unmarried. This case is
dismissed.”
• Barcelo v. Barcelo, 158 Conn. App. 201, 205-206, 118
A.3d 657 (2015). “Ultimately, all things considered…the
cause of the breakdown of the parties’ marriage was their
irreconcilable differences stemming from their respective
extramarital affair(s) and their difficulty in being intimate
with each other.”
• Brody v. Brody, 315 Conn. 300, 307, 105 A.3d 887 (2015).
“In a second passage, the trial court stated that ‘[t]he
marriage between the parties has broken down
irretrievably, in large part because of the defendant’s
dishonesty, probable infidelity and his increasingly abusive
behavior towards the plaintiff.’ Later, in a third passage,
the trial court ‘[found] that the defendant [was]
responsible for the breakdown of the marriage for conduct
described herein.’”
• Embriano v. Embriano, Superior Court, Judicial District of
Hartford at Hartford, No. FA06-4023849-S (Mar. 24, 2008)
(2008 WL 962887) (2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 704). “By
complaint dated June 5, 2006, the plaintiff-husband
commenced this action seeking a dissolution of marriage
on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown and other
relief.”
---
“The court has considered all of the factors set out in
Connecticut General Statutes Sections 46b-81, 46b-82,
46b-62 and other pertinent statutes, earnings and earning
capacity differentials, causes for the breakdown of the
marriage and the consequences of the financial orders set
forth below.”
• Evans v. Taylor, 67 Conn. App. 108, 115, 786 A.2d 525
(2001). “On the basis of the record, we conclude that the
court could reasonably have found that the defendant had
failed to establish her claim of intolerable cruelty, and
therefore it was not clearly erroneous for the court to
reject intolerable cruelty as a ground for dissolution and
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Dissolution of Marriage - 9
instead grant the dissolution of the marriage on the ground
of irretrievable breakdown.”
• Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 614, 496 A.2d
210 (1985). “The determination of whether a breakdown of
a marriage is irretrievable is a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court . . . . The fact that the
defendant maintains hope for reconciliation will not support
a finding that there are prospects for a reconciliation. . . .
A difference, to be irreconcilable, need not necessarily be
so viewed by both parties.”
• Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 659-660, 462 A.2d 1031
(1983). “Section 46b-51 allows the court to avoid
specifying fault for the breakdown of the marriage and
allows the parties to avoid calling friends or relatives to
testify as to the reasons for the breakdown. Under the
appropriate circumstances the record need not contain
information which would invade the privacy of the parties
and their families. The statute offers the parties an
opportunity to keep their conduct from being heard by the
public or discovered in the future by their children.”
• Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 572, 427 A.2d 406
(1980). “No-fault divorce does not mean that the causes of
a marital breakup are always irrelevant, but it does mean
that determining cause is not crucial to the judicial
administration of matrimonial matters.”
• Gluck v. Gluck, 181 Conn. 225, 227, 435 A.2d 35 (1980).
“Next, the defendant asserts that General Statutes 46b-
40(c), to the extent that it authorizes the dissolution of a
marriage if the marriage has broken down irretrievably, is
vague, nullifies the other grounds for dissolution, prevents
defenses and impairs the obligation of contracts, all in
violation of constitutional strictures. The vagueness issue
was resolved in Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255-56, 423
A.2d 895 (1979); what was said there need not be
repeated here. The gravamen of the unparticularized claim
that irretrievable breakdown nullifies the other grounds for
dissolution set forth in 46b-40(c) and prevents defenses
appears to be that the legislature has sanctioned divorce
on demand. This claim too was rejected in Joy v. Joy,
supra. The notion that allowing marital dissolutions based
on irretrievable breakdown impairs the obligation of
contracts within the meaning of article one, § 10 of the
United States constitution is bankrupt. Marriage is not a
contract within the meaning of this clause of the
constitution. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210, 8 S.Ct.
723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888).”
• Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 423 A.2d 895 (1979). “The
main issue on this appeal is the constitutionality of General
Statutes §46-32 (Rev. to 1977) (now § 46b-40) insofar as
it authorizes, in subsection (c), a decree of dissolution of
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Dissolution of Marriage - 10
marriage ‘upon a finding that ... [a] marriage has broken
down irretrievably.’” (p. 255)
“The defendant claims that § 46-32(c) is unconstitutional
unless this court imposes judicial standards or guidelines to
limit discretionary fact-finding by the trial courts of this
state. We disagree. At least since Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190, 210-14, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888), it has been
clear that the legislature has plenary power to determine
the circumstances under which a marital relationship is
created and terminated . . . . The legislature could
rationally conclude that public policy requires an
accommodation to the unfortunate reality that a marital
relationship may terminate in fact without regard to the
fault of either marital partner, and that such a relationship
should therefore be dissoluble in law upon a judicial
determination of irretrievable breakdown. Courts in other
jurisdictions with similar statutes have unanimously upheld
the constitutionality of no-fault divorce.” (p. 256)
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
#12. Causes for divorce in general
#34. Inability to live together
#36. Voluntary separation
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 7. Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
§ 7.01 Grounds for dissolution—No fault
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
12. Causes for divorce in general
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
2. No-Fault Grounds; Breakdown of Marriage
§§ 22-24
3. Voluntary Separation
§§ 25-33
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
A. In General
§§ 27. Elimination of Fault as Necessary for Divorce
B. No-Fault Divorce
1. Irretievable Breakdown of Marriage;
Irreconcilable Differences; Incompatibility
§§ 28-32
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Dissolution of Marriage - 11
2. Separation or Living Apart
§§ 33-38
• 55 ALR 3d 581, Validity, Construction, and Effect of “No-
Fault” Divorce Statute Providing for Dissolution of Marriage
Upon Finding that Relationship is No Longer Viable, by Jack
W. Shaw, Jr., J.D., Thomson West, 1974 (also available on
Westlaw).
• 19 POF 2d 221, Dissolution of Marriage on Statutory
Ground of Incompatibility, by James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr.,
J.D., Thomson West, 1979 (also available on Westlaw).
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
Incompatability
• No-Fault Divorce
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• A Practical Guide to Divorce in Connecticut, Hon. Barry F.
Armata and Campbell D. Barrett, editors, Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, 2013, with 2018 supplement.
• Divorce in Connecticut: The Legal Process, Your Rights, and
What to Expect, by Renee C. Bauer, Addicus Books, 2014.
1.3 Is Connecticut a “no-fault” state or do I need
grounds for a divorce?
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.1 Basis for divorce established by statute
§ 15.2 Breakdown of marriage relationship
§ 15.3 Constitutionality of no-fault law
§ 15.4 Other grounds for dissolution
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.05 Pleading Irretrievable Breakdown
LAW REVIEWS:
• Robert M. McAnernery and Samuel V. Schoonmaker, III,
Connecticut’s New Approach To Marriage Dissolution, 47
Connecticut Bar Journal 375 (1973).
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libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
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cited or to search for
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Dissolution of Marriage - 12
Section 1.2: Fault Grounds
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage
(divorce) based upon fault grounds.
DEFINITIONS:
• Fault grounds: “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . .
. shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following
causes has occurred. . .(3) adultery; (4) fraudulent
contract; (5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect
of duty; (6) seven years’ absence, during all of which
period the absent party has not been heard from; (7)
habitual intemperance; (8) intolerable cruelty; (9)
sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any
infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and
punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one
year; (10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or
other similar institution or institutions, because of mental
illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five
years within the period of six years next preceding the
date of the complaint.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(c)
(2023)
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASE LAW:
• Al-Fikey v. Obaiah, 196 Conn. App. 13, 19, 228 A.3d 668
(2020). “The defendant first claims that the trial court
erroneously concluded that he was at fault for the
breakdown of the marriage. We disagree. A trial court's
finding of fault in a dissolution action is reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. See Emerick v. Emerick, supra,
170 Conn. App. 383 n.11; see also Jewett v. Jewett, 265
Conn. 669, 692-93, 830 A.2d 193 (2003). Our review of
the extensive record before the trial court reveals that
there was sufficient evidence to support its finding that the
defendant was at fault for the irretrievable breakdown of
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update them to
ensure they are still
good law. You can
contact your local
law librarian to learn
about updating
cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 13
the marriage. For example, in the summer of 2009, the
defendant abruptly left the marital home with little
explanation and moved to Canada to live with his mother.
He ultimately returned to the United States, but lived
separately from the plaintiff and their children. The court's
finding of fault was not clearly erroneous.”
• Brody v. Brody, 315 Conn. 300, 308, 105 A.3d 887 (2015).
“We agree with the plaintiff's broader view of the trial
court's judgment—namely, that it actually dissolved this
marriage due to irreconcilable differences, fueled in large
part by the defendant's persistent lack of trustworthiness .
. . ”
• Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 278, 460 A.2d 1260
(1983). “Although, because of their clandestine nature,
adulterous acts are usually proved by circumstantial
evidence . . . the circumstances must be such as to lead
the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just person to
the conclusion of guilt . . . . The adulterous relationship
must be established by a fair preponderance of the
evidence.”
• Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 573, 427 A.2d 406
(1980). “In the text of the statutes, the criteria relating to
the ‘the causes for the . . . dissolution of marriage’ is only
one item in an extensive list of criteria that the trial court
is directed to take into account.”
• Alden v. Alden, 21 Conn. Supp. 301, 304, 154 A.2d 522
(1959). “The desertion for three years which constitutes a
ground for divorce under our statute involves the
coexistence of the following four conditions: (1) cessation
from cohabitation, (2) an intention on the part of the
absenting party not to resume it, (3) the absence of the
other party’s consent, and (4) the absence of justification.”
• Vendetto v. Vendetto, 115 Conn. 303, 305, 161 A. 392
(1932). “The plaintiff’s ground of divorce was the fraud of
the defendant in entering into the marriage contract
knowing her epileptic condition, and yet, in order to induce
marriage, concealing the fact from the plaintiff.”
• Kinsley v. Kinsley, 110 Conn. 695, 695-696, 147 A. 907
(1929). “The cumulative effect of the defendant’s acts and
conduct as recited in the report of the committee may well
have been held to have been so cruel as to have destroyed
the public and personal objects of matrimony, past
rehabilitation, and rendered a continuance of the marriage
relation unbearable—beyond reasonable endurance—and
therefore intolerable within the meaning we have given it
in the ground for divorce, ‘intolerable cruelty.’”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 14
#12-#38. Causes for divorce in general
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 7. Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
§ 7.02 Fault and cause of breakdown
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
## 12-38
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
§§ 34-106. Fault Grounds
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
C. Cruelty
§§ 39-64
D. Desertion or Abandonment
§§ 65-78
E. Personal Indignities
§§ 79-86
F. Other Particular Grounds
§§ 87-99
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• A Practical Guide to Divorce in Connecticut, Hon. Barry F.
Armata and Campbell D. Barrett, editors, Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, 2013, with 2018 supplement.
• Divorce in Connecticut: The Legal Process, Your Rights, and
What to Expect, by Renee C. Bauer, Addicus Books, 2014.
1.3 Is Connecticut a “no-fault” state or do I need grounds
for a divorce?
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.1 Basis for divorce established by statute
§ 15.2 Breakdown of marriage relationship
§ 15.5 Separation for 18 months
§ 15.6 Adultery
§ 15.7. Fraudulent contract
§ 15.8. Willful desertion for one year
§ 15.9. Continuous absence for seven years
§ 15.10. Habitual intemperance
§ 15.11. Intolerable cruelty
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 15
§ 15.12. Imprisonment; life sentence or commission of
infamous crime
§ 15.13. Five-year confinement for mental illness
§ 15.14. Defenses
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
You can contact us
or visit our catalog
to determine which
of our law libraries
own the treatises
cited.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 16
Table 1: Fault and Financial Awards
Fault and Financial Awards
Assignment
of property
“As we stated in Christoni v. Christoni, 156 Conn. 628, 629, 239
A.2d 533, on the issue of choosing between alternative grounds for
granting a divorce: ‘Where more than one ground for a divorce is
claimed and one alleged ground is proved, it is immaterial whether
or not the additional statutory ground or grounds may also exist.’
The fault of a party in causing a marital dissolution is material,
however, to the issue of an assignment of property ancillary to the
marital dissolution.” Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 180 Conn. 212,
214 fn. 2, 429 A.2d 463 (1980).
Irretrievable
breakdown
“The contention of the defendant, therefore, that a determination of
irretrievable breakdown precludes the court from considering the
causes of the dissolution in making financial awards is erroneous.”
Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 660, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983).
Factors
“In the text of the statutes, the criterion relating to the ‘the causes
for the . . . dissolution of marriage’ is only one item in an extensive
list of criteria that the trial court is directed to take into account.”
Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 573, 427 A.2d 406 (1980).
Contribution
“We disagree with the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court, in making
its award of alimony and its assignment of property, gave inordinate
weight to the cause of the breakdown. There is no provision in the
governing statutes requiring that awards of alimony be distributed
equally between the parties . . . . The trial court structured the
division of property in a way which returned to the defendant his
contribution to the marriage.” Carter v. Carter, 8 Conn. App. 356,
359, 512 A.2d 979 (1986).
Misconduct
“While alimony, in whatever form, or an assignment of property is
not to be considered either as a reward for virtue or as a
punishment for wrongdoing, a spouse whose conduct has
contributed substantially to the breakdown of the marriage should
not expect to receive financial kudos for his or her misconduct.
Moreover, in considering the gravity of such misconduct it is entirely
proper for the court to assess the impact of the errant spouse’s
conduct on the other spouse. Because in making its assignment of
property the trial court had a reasonable basis for its disposition we
see no reason for disturbing the result.” Robinson v. Robinson, 187
Conn. 70, 72, 444 A.2d 234 (1982).
Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them.
Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can contact your local law
librarian to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 17
Section 1.2a: Adultery
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage
(divorce) based upon the grounds of adultery.
DEFINITIONS:
• Adultery “means voluntary sexual intercourse between a
married person and a person other than such person’s
spouse.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(f) (2023)
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
(c) “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes
has occurred . . . (3) adultery . . . .”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Brody v. Brody, 315 Conn. 300, 105 A.3d 887 (2015).
“Upon closer examination, we are unpersuaded by the
defendant’s argument that the four relevant passages from
the trial court’s memorandum of decision show it made a
conclusive finding of infidelity which, in turn, affected its
alimony award.” (p. 308)
“Upon a full review of the memorandum, the fleeting
mentions of infidelity are eclipsed by the trial court’s flood
of findings that the defendant acted dishonestly….This
rampant dishonesty was identified by the trial court as a
driving cause of the marital breakdown….Indeed, the trial
court expressly dissolved the marriage because it had
broken down irretrievably, and not because of adultery.”
(p. 310)
• Olson v. Olson, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford,
No. FA09-4044103 (Oct. 22, 2010) (2010 WL 4517444)
(2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2700). “Beginning with the
question of whether adultery is the cause of the marital
breakdown, the court concludes from the evidence
presented at trial that sexual relations between the
defendant and Ms. Jenkins did not occur until several
months after the plaintiff filed this action for the dissolution
of her marriage. Therefore, the court finds that ‘adultery’
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website.
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 18
as defined by our dissolution statutes did not occur until
after the breakdown of the marriage. Although adultery
was not pleaded as the grounds for dissolution in this case,
the causes for the breakdown of the marriage are properly
considered by courts in the context of an allegation and
finding of irretrievable breakdown and may be considered
in the courts’ equitable division of marital assets.
Therefore, in determining the causes of the breakdown of a
marriage, the court is not limited to proof by a
preponderance of evidence of the statutory causes of
action for dissolution, enumerated in General Statutes §
46b-40, such as proof of sexual intercourse.”
• Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 278, 460 A.2d 1260
(1983). “Adultery as a ground for dissolution under
General Statutes § 46b-40 requires proof that the other
spouse has engaged in extramarital sexual relations.
Brodsky v. Brodsky, 153 Conn. 299, 300, 216 A.2d 180
(1966). Although, because of their clandestine nature,
adulterous acts are usually proved by circumstantial
evidence; Zeiner v. Zeiner, 120 Conn. 161, 165, 179 A.
644 (1935); the circumstances must be such as to lead the
guarded discretion of a reasonable and just person to the
conclusion of guilt. Brodsky v. Brodsky, supra,
301; Zeiner v. Zeiner, supra; Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn. 273,
275, 114 A. 126 (1921). The adulterous relationship must
be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Brodsky v. Brodsky, supra, 301. ‘[I]n weighing the
evidence of adultery, the court should exercise great care
to see that it is not imposed upon through the intense
interest of the parties to color the facts; it should not see
evil where the circumstances may reasonably lend
themselves to an innocent interpretation, nor, on the other
hand, should it refuse to reach that conclusion which the
sound and unprejudiced judgment should lead
to.’ Neff v. Neff, supra, 276. Adultery will not be inferred
from circumstantial evidence unless there is both an
opportunity and an adulterous disposition.
Eberhard v. Eberhard, 4 N.J. 535, 73 A.2d 554 (1950); 24
Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation § 393; Clark,
Domestic Relations § 12.3, p. 330. Moreover, the existence
of both the opportunity and the inclination without more
does not necessarily compel a conclusion that adultery has
occurred. See Antonata v. Antonata, 85 Conn. 390, 393,
82 A. 967 (1912).”
• Beede v. Beede, 186 Conn. 191, 196, 440 A.2d 283
(1982). “There is nothing in the record to support the
defendant’s claim that the court acted punitively in making
its award by focusing on the defendant’s adultery as the
cause of the dissolution.”
• Brodsky v. Brodsky, 153 Conn. 299, 300, 216 A.2d 180
(1966). “Adultery, as a ground for divorce or legal
separation under General Statutes §§ 46-13 or 46-29,
requires proof that the other spouse has engaged in
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 19
extramarital sexual relations. 27A C.J.S., Divorce, § 21; 17
Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 34; see Schilcher v.
Schilcher, 124 Conn. 445, 200 A. 351; Torlonia v. Torlonia,
108 Conn. 292, 302, 142 A. 843; Dennis v. Dennis, 68
Conn. 186, 195, 36 A. 34; Trubee v. Trubee, 41 Conn. 36,
40. A principal claim of error in the present case is that the
plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant committed
adultery with Barbara Jean Miles. Although the proof will be
circumstantial in nearly every case, the plaintiff must
nonetheless prove the adulterous relationship by a fair
preponderance of the evidence. Zeiner v. Zeiner, 120
Conn. 161, 165, 179 A. 644. The circumstances must be
such as to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and
just man to the conclusion of guilt. Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn.
273, 275, 114 A. 126.”
• Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn. 273, 276, 114 A. 126 (1921). “…in
weighing the evidence of adultery, the court should
exercise great care to see that it is not imposed upon
through the intense interest of the parties to color the
facts; it should not see evil where the circumstances may
reasonably lend themselves to an innocent interpretation,
nor, on the other hand, should it refuse to reach that
conclusion which the sound and unprejudiced judgment
should lead to.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
#26. Adultery
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 7. Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
§ 7.02 Fault and cause of breakdown
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
26. Adultery
IV. Proceedings
J. Evidence
2. Admissibility
115. Adultery
3. Weight and Sufficiency
129. Adultery
(1) Degree of proof
(2) Certainty and definiteness of evidence
as to time and place
(5) Credibility of witnesses testifying to acts
of adultery
(9) Circumstantial evidence
(16) Suspicious and incriminating
circumstances conjunctively proving offense
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 20
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
4. Cruelty
d. Adultery as Constituting Cruelty
§ 45. Adultery constituting cruelty as ground
for divorce, generally
§ 46. Accusations of adultery or infidelity
constituting cruelty as ground for divorce
5. Adultery
§ 56. Adultery as ground for divorce,
Generally
§ 57. Requirement of intent
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
F. Other Particular Grounds
§ 87. Adultery
• 49 POF 3d 277 Proof of Adultery as Grounds for Dissolution
of Marriage, Thomson West, 1998 (Also available on
Westlaw).
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• A Practical Guide to Divorce in Connecticut, Hon. Barry F.
Armata and Campbell D. Barrett, editors, Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, 2013, with 2018 supplement.
• Divorce in Connecticut: The Legal Process, Your Rights,
and What to Expect, by Renee C. Bauer, Addicus Books,
2014.
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.6. Adultery
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.07. Defining Adultery
LAW REVIEWS:
• Victor M. Gordon, Adultery As A Ground For Divorce In
Connecticut, 23 Connecticut Bar Journal 315 (1949).
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Public access to law
review databases is
available on-site at
each of our law
libraries.
Dissolution of Marriage - 21
Section 1.2b: Fraudulent Contract
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of fraudulent
contract.
DEFINITIONS:
• Fraudulent contract: “There must be a deception in
respect to some fact whose existence or nonexistence may
affect in some certain way the very essence of the
marriage relation, resulting in a lawful marriage which
practically operates as a fraud upon the deceived spouse;
and the existence or nonexistence of the fact thus
concealed or misrepresented must operate, as between
parties to the marriage, to prevent some essential purpose
of marriage and work a practical destruction of that
relation.” Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 261, 61 A. 604
(1905).
• “All the grounds of divorce specified, except fraudulent
contract, are of such a nature that they can come into
existence only after the marriage. While fraudulent conduct
of a certain kind will render a marriage voidable, such
fraud differs from that which vitiates ordinary contracts in
that the party defrauded may not at his own election avoid
the marriage, but it is held to be voidable only by a decree
of the court.” Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 196, 175 A.
574 (1934).
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes
has occurred . . . (4) fraudulent contract . . . .”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Ngo v. Lee, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at
Hartford, No. HHD-FA16-6064836-S (Nov. 21, 2016) (2016
WL 7444006) (2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2881) “‘Fraud, to
vitiate a marriage contract, must relate to the very essence
of the marriage relation. . . A misrepresentation, made
through honest error and with a bona fide belief in its
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website.
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Dissolution of Marriage - 22
truth, is not fraudulent. This is obviously so, when the
representation was made without knowledge or culpable
ignorance of its falsity, and the belief in its truth was based
upon adequate grounds. To constitute fraud by
nondisclosure or suppression, there must be a failure to
disclose known facts, and, as well, a request or an occasion
or circumstance which imposes a duty to speak.’ (Citations
omitted.) Behrmann v. Behrmann, 110 Conn. 443, 445-46,
148 A. 363, (1930).”
• Dasilva v. Dasilva, Superior Court, Judicial District of New
Haven at New Haven, No. FA02-0470290-S (Apr. 21, 2003)
(2003 WL 21037549) (2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1229).
“What amounts to ‘fraudulent contract,’ as that term is
used in our divorce statute, and to that or other equivalent
language, as used in the law, written or unwritten,
elsewhere, to express a recognized condition justifying the
annulment or dissolution of a marriage, has been much
discussed, but no satisfactory and comprehensive definition
applicable to all situations has been arrived at or attempted
to be arrived at. Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242 (1905).
It is certain, however, that wherever there is a fraud on the
part of one of the parties amounting to a fraud in the
essentialia of the marriage relation, or as in Gould v.
Gould, supra, page 261-62, whenever there is a deception
in respect to some fact whose existence or nonexistence
may affect in some certain way the very essence of the
marriage relation, resulting in a lawful marriage which
practically operates as a fraud upon the deceived spouse,
and the existence or nonexistence of the fact thus
concealed or misrepresented must operate, as between the
parties to the marriage, to prevent some essential purpose
of marriage and work a practical destruction of that
relation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)
• Gordon v. Gordon, 11 Conn. Sup. 302 (1942). “In order to
make out fraudulent contract as a ground for divorce the
facts misrepresented or concealed must be such as to go to
the very essence of the marriage.”
• McCurry v. McCurry, 126 Conn. 175, 177, 10 A.2d 365
(1939). “The referee refused specifically to find that the
defendant entered into the marriage with the concealed
intent not to consummate it or to have children and found
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that allegation of the
complaint. The existence of such an intent would be a
question of fact; and we cannot hold that no other
conclusion was reasonably possible than that she had that
intent when she was married.”
• Horowitz v. Horowitz, 6 Conn. Sup. 14, 16 (1938). “The
false representation of a woman that she is pregnant by
the man who is thereby induced to marry her is not the
representation of a fact which if it does not exist prevents
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 23
some essential purpose of marriage and works a practical
destruction of the relationship.”
• Wetstine v. Wetstine, 114 Conn. 7, 12, 157 A. 418 (1931).
“Misrepresentations by the defendant as to her age, her
name, and her nationality would not furnish a sufficient
basis to dissolve a consummated marriage on that ground.”
• Lyman v. Lyman, 90 Conn. 399, 403, 97 A. 312 (1916).
“In consonance with this principle, the courts are practically
agreed in holding that antenuptial pregnancy by another
man, if concealed by the wife from the husband, who was
himself innocent of improper relations with her, is a fraud
upon him justifying a divorce or annulment of the
marriage, as the appropriate remedy in the jurisdiction
may be.”
• Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 250, 61 A. 604 (1905).
“Such a fraud is accomplished whenever a person enters
into that contract knowing that he is incapable of sexual
intercourse, and yet, in order to induce the marriage,
designedly and deceitfully concealing that fact from the
other party, who is ignorant of it and has no reason to
suppose it to exist.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
#14. Grounds existing at time of marriage
#18. Fraud or duress in procuring marriage
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 18. Miscellaneous
§ 18.07 Fraud
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
18. Fraud or duress in procuring marriage
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
12. Grounds Existing at or Before Marriage
b. Fraud
§ 98. Generally
§ 99. Premarital unchasity
§ 100. Pregnancy at time of marriage
§ 101. —Effect of husband’s guilt or
knowledge
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 24
F. Other Particular Grounds
§ 90. Fraud
• 65 ALR2d 776, Annotation, What Constitutes Impotency as
Ground for Divorce (1959) (Also available on Westlaw).
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
§ 15.7. Fraudulent contract
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.08. Defining Fraudulent Contract
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 25
Section 1.2c: Willful Desertion
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of willful
desertion for one year with total neglect of duty.
DEFINITIONS:
• Willful desertion: ‘“the wilful absenting of one party to the
marriage contract from the society of the other, coupled with
the intention on the part of the absenting party to live apart,
in spite of the wish of the other, and not to return to
cohabitation.”’ Casale v. Casale, 138 Conn. 490, 492, 86
A.2d 568 (1952).
• “The elements of a cause of action on the grounds of
desertion are (1) cessation from cohabitation; (2) an
intention on the part of the absenting party not to resume it;
(3) the absence of the other party’s consent; and (4)
absence of justification.” Gannon v. Gannon, 130 Conn. 449,
450, 35 A.2d 204 (1943).
• “When our legislature, in 1843, adopted as grounds of
divorce a vinculo, ‘habitual intemperance’ and ‘intolerable
cruelty,’ it used these words with their ordinary meaning, but
with special reference to what had been since 1639 our
settled policy in respect to divorce; i.e., marriage is a life
status and should never be dissolved, unless one of the
parties is guilty of conduct which in itself is a practical
annulling and repudiation of the marriage covenant. Willful
desertion for such a length of time as the statute says
shall conclusively prove a permanent abandonment
and repudiation of all marital rights and duties, had
been a ground for divorce. Following this analogy the
legislature, in 1843, made grounds of divorce: intemperance
so long continued that the fixed habit renders the party
incapable of performing the duties of the marriage relation;
and cruelty of such a nature as to be intolerable, and to
render a continuance of the relation by the suffering victim
impracticable.” Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn. 420, 426-
427, 39 A. 516 (1898). (Emphasis added.)
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40. Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
(c) “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has
occurred:. . .(5) wilful desertion for one year with total
neglect of duty;”
(e) “In an action for dissolution of a marriage or a legal
separation on the ground of willful desertion for one year,
with total neglect of duty, the furnishing of financial
support shall not disprove total neglect of duty, in the
absence of other evidence.”
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website to
confirm that you are
using the most up-
to-date statutes.
Dissolution of Marriage - 26
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint or
Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• deCossy v. deCossy, 172 Conn. 202, 203, 374 A,2d 182
(1977). “The plaintiff, Edwin deCossy, filed this divorce action
against the defendant, Dorothy deCossy, on November 9,
1972, alleging that the defendant had been guilty of
intolerable cruelty toward the plaintiff. The defendant filed a
cross-complaint alleging that the plaintiff was guilty of
intolerable cruelty and that he had deserted her.
The marriage was dissolved…on the basis of the plaintiff’s
fwilful desertion of the defendant wife.”
• Toth v. Toth, 23 Conn. Sup. 161, 164, 178 A.2d 542 (1962).
“Nevertheless, there is no question of the validity of the
ground of constructive desertion where the facts of the same
fit in with the definition of wilful desertion . . . found in
Connecticut cases in construing our statute.”
• Schick v. Schick, 17 Conn. Sup. 232, 233 (1951). “Desertion
requires not only separation for the requisite period of three
years but also an intent, persisting throughout that entire
period, not to resume the marriage relationship. Separation
alone is not the equivalent of desertion.”
• McDonnell v. McDonnell, 14 Conn. Sup. 123, 129 (1946).
“For all of the reasons discussed, the conclusions are reached
that there is a clear distinction between the duty of a
husband to support his wife and that to cohabit with her; that
desertion as a ground for divorce in this state is concerned
only with the cessation of cohabitation; that the phrase ‘with
total neglect of duty’ refers only to refusal to cohabit and
makes it manifest that such default, to provide a cause for
divorce, must be intentional, complete and continuous
throughout the prescribed three-year period; and that
neglect to cohabit is a breach of the marriage contract, while
the failure of a husband to support his wife is a violation of a
duty annexed by law to the marital status, and neither, in
itself, includes the other.”
• Baccash v. Baccash, 11 Conn. Sup. 387, 388-389 (1942).
“Desertion involves the co-existence of the following
conditions: (1) Cessation from cohabitation, (2) an intention
on the part of the absenting party not to resume it, (3) the
absence of the other party’s consent, and (4) the absence of
justification….From the above and all of the other evidence in
the case it is found that the plaintiff has failed to properly
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 27
establish any one of the essential conditions necessary to
constitute desertion on the part of the defendant.”
• McCurry v. McCurry, 126 Conn. 175, 178, 10 A.2d 365
(1939). “By the weight of authority refusal of marital
intercourse is not in itself desertion; but becomes so only
when coupled with a substantial abandonment of other
marital duties.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS
• Divorce
II. Grounds
#37 Desertion or absence
(15) Obstinate, willful, or causeless separation
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2022.
Chapter 7. Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
§ 7.03 Willful desertion for one year
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
37. Desertion or absence
IV. Proceedings
J. Evidence
2. Admissibility
119. Desertion
3. Weight and sufficiency
133. Desertion or absence
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West, 2018
(Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
6. Desertion and Abandonment
A. General Considerations
§§ 58-67
B. Justification for Separation; Constructive
Desertion or Abandonment
§§ 68-76
C. Offer of Reconciliation
§§ 77-80
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
D. Desertion or Abandonment
§§ 65-78
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
Abandonment of persons
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• Divorce in Connecticut: The Legal Process, Your Rights, and
What to Expect, by Renee C. Bauer, Addicus Books, 2014.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update them to
ensure they are still
good law. You can
contact your local
law librarian to learn
about updating
cases.
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 28
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.8 Willful desertion for one year
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a Dissolution
of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.09 Defining Willful Desertion for One Year with Total
Neglect of Duty
[1] Defining the Requirements of Willful Deseertion
[2] Defining Total Neglect of Duty
[3] Asserting Lack of Consent
[4] Defining Justification
[5] Defining Constructive Desertion
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 29
Table 2: Constructive Desertion
Constructive Desertion
Connecticut
Superior
Court
“In other jurisdictions it is almost universally held that conduct on the
part of one spouse which reasonably forces the other spouse to leave
the home constitutes desertion by the first spouse as a ground for
divorce, and this is generally held to be true whether the misconduct
was indulged in with the specific intent of forcing the other spouse to
leave the home or not.” Finn v. Finn, 13 Conn. Supp. 169, 170
(1944).
“It must therefore be concluded that in this State, as well as in other
jurisdictions, constructive desertion is desertion within the meaning of
that term as used in the divorce statute and that where a wife
separates from her husband for adequate cause and he, for a period
of three years thereafter, shows no indication of a purpose to change
the course of conduct which has justified the separation, then she is
entitled to a divorce on the ground of desertion.” Finn v. Finn, 13
Conn. Supp. 169, 170-171 (1944).
Connecticut
Supreme
Court
“According to the rule as it has been stated in jurisdictions where it
has been adopted, where a spouse intentionally brings the
cohabitation to an end by misconduct which renders the continuance
of marital relations so unbearable that the other leaves the family
home, the former is the deserter and the latter may obtain a divorce
on that ground.” Lindquist v. Lindquist, 137 Conn. 165, 169, 75 A.2d
397 (1950).
“Where the rule has been adopted, serious misconduct upon the part
of the offending spouse is held essential to its application. In no event
could misconduct of an offending husband be held to afford a basis
for a decree on the ground of constructive desertion unless it was so
improper as to defeat the essential purposes of the marriage relation
or give the wife good reason to believe that cohabitation could no
longer be continued with due regard to her health or safety or
otherwise render continued cohabitation intolerable.” Lindquist v.
Lindquist, 137 Conn. 165, 169, 75 A.2d 397 (1950).
Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them.
Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can contact your local law
librarian to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 30
Section 1.2d: Seven Years’ Absence
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of seven years’
absence, during all of which period the absent party has not
been heard from.
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes
has occurred; . . . (6) seven years’ absence, during all of
which period the absent party has not been heard from;”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Cikora v. Cikora, 133 Conn. 456, 52 A.2d 310 (1947). “This
action for divorce was brought on two grounds: desertion,
and seven years’ absence, during all of which period the
absent party had not been heard from.” (p. 457)
“Even where a defendant has gone to parts unknown, very
likely outside the State, it may well be that publication in
the place of the former marital residence is the form of
notice most apt to bring the pendency of the action to his
attention, because of the likelihood that there will be
relatives or friends there who have means of
communicating information to him directly or indirectly. The
trial court was in error in striking the case from the docket
on the ground that it was without jurisdiction to try the
case.” (p. 462)
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
#37. Desertion or absence
DIGESTS:
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
37. Desertion or absence
IV. Proceedings
J. Evidence
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 31
2. Admissibility
119. Desertion
3. Weight and sufficiency
133. Desertion or absence
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West, 2018
(Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
6. Desertion and Abandonment
A. General Considerations
§§ 58-67
B. Justification for Separation; Constructive
Desertion or Abandonment
§§ 68-76
C. Offer of Reconciliation
§§ 77-80
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
D. Desertion or Abandonment
§§ 65-78
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.9 Continuous absence for seven years
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.10 Pleading Seven Years’ Absence During All of
Which Absent Party Has Not Been Heard From
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 32
Section 1.2e: Habitual Intemperance
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon grounds of habitual
intemperance.
DEFINITIONS:
• “When our legislature, in 1843, adopted as grounds of
divorce a vinculo, ‘habitual intemperance’ and
‘intolerable cruelty,’ it used these words with their ordinary
meaning, but with special reference to what had been since
1639 our settled policy in respect to divorce; i.e., marriage
is a life status and should never be dissolved, unless one of
the parties is guilty of conduct which in itself is a practical
annulling and repudiation of the marriage covenant. Wilful
desertion for such a length of time as the statute says shall
conclusively prove a permanent abandonment and
repudiation of all marital rights and duties, had been a
ground for divorce. Following this analogy the legislature, in
1843, made grounds of divorce: intemperance so long
continued that the fixed habit renders the party
incapable of performing the duties of the marriage
relation; and cruelty of such a nature as to be intolerable,
and to render a continuance of the relation by the suffering
victim impracticable.” Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn.
420, 426-427, 39 A. 516 (1898). (Emphasis added.)
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes
has occurred; . . . (7) habitual intemperance;.”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Troy v. Troy, Superior Court, Judicial District of Litchfield,
No. FA08-4007537-S (Feb. 7, 2012) (2012 WL 670594)
(2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 353). “Although the court
believes that the parties loved each other and had many
happy times together, it is clear that the marriage has
broken down irretrievably and that the defendant’s drinking
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website.
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Dissolution of Marriage - 33
during the later years of the marriage was the major factor
causing the breakdown. Whether the defendant’s alcoholism
amounted to habitual intemperance was not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. The court will dissolve the
marriage based upon irretrievable breakdown.”
• Dyke v. Dyke, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-
Norwalk at Stamford, No. FA01-0187101-S (Feb. 10, 2005)
(2005 WL 590465) (2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 329). “Very
little was offered by either party regarding the imbibing
habits of the defendant in his use of alcoholic beverage.
There was no claim that it interfered with his ability to work
as was required by ‘habitual intemperance’ (Sec. 46b-40(c)
(7)).”
• Welch v. Welch, Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland
at Rockville, No. FA00-0072505-S (May 17, 2002) (2002
WL 1332028) (2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1820). “The case
law regarding what facts the court must find in order to
conclude that a divorce should be granted on the grounds
of habitual intemperance are sparse. However, in Dennis v.
Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 192-194 (1896), the court held that
in order to establish habitual intemperance as a grounds for
a divorce, it must be established that the habit was so
gross or so long continued as to produce suffering or want
in the family. Excessive indulgence in alcohol is not
sufficient.”
• Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 13 Conn. Sup. 270, 271 (1945). “He
also frequently indulged to excess in alcoholic liquor. This
indulgence, however, was not such as to cause any want to
the family or suffering …. For that reason his habitual
intemperance was not such as to provide a ground for
divorce independently ….”
• Fagan v. Fagan, 131 Conn. 688, 689, 42 A.2d 41 (1945).
“A detailed rehearsal of the marital difficulties of these
parties would serve no useful purpose. The trial court
concluded that the plaintiff was both intolerably cruel and
habitually intemperate to the point that the public and
personal objects of matrimony have been destroyed beyond
rehabilitation, and that the custody of the minor child of the
marriage should be awarded to the defendant.”
• Hickey v. Hickey, 8 Conn. Supp. 445, 446 (1940). “In order
to constitute it a ground for divorce, habitual intemperance
must be such that it produces at least some substantial
suffering and does material harm to the marriage
relationship.”
• Purcell v. Purcell, 101 Conn. 422, 425, 126 A. 353 (1924).
“The subordinate facts found as to intoxication, as set forth
in the statement of facts, do not disclose that the
defendant’s use of intoxicants was so gross as to produce
want or suffering in the family, either objective or
subjective, to a degree which could not reasonably be
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 34
fborne, or which disqualified the defendant from attending
to his business; under these circumstances, the conclusion
that the subordinate facts did not establish habitual
intemperance, cannot be held to be illegal or illogical.”
• Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 192, 36 A. 34 (1896).
“Habitual intemperance as a cause for which a divorce
might be granted, was first named in this State by a statute
enacted in 1843, where it was coupled with intolerable
cruelty. Precisely what constitutes habitual intemperance
within the meaning of that statute, it is not easy to define.
It may however be safely assumed that the purpose of the
Act was not primarily to promote temperance or to reform
the offender, but to preserve the peace, comfort, safety,
happiness and prosperity, of the non-offending party, and
of the family of which they are together the members and
parents.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
#22. Habitual drunkenness
#27 Cruelty
(15) Habitual drunkenness or use of opiates or
narcotics as cruelty
DIGESTS:
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
22. Habitual drunkenness
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West, 2018
(Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
8. Habitual Drunkenness or Drug Addiction
§§ 83-86
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
E. Personal Indignities
2. Particular Acts, Conduct, and Conditions as
Personal Indignities
§ 84. Drunkenness and Use of Drugs Constituting
Personal Indignity as Ground for Divorce
F. Other Particular Grounds
2. Personal Infirmities
§ 96. Habitual drunkenness as Ground for
Divorce
• 101 ALR 6th 455, What Amounts to Habitual Intemperance,
Drunkenness, Excessive Drug Use, and the Like within
Statute relating to Substantive Grounds for Divorce,
Marjorie A. Shields, J.D., Thomson West, 2015 (Also
available on Westlaw).
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 35
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
Alcoholics and alcoholism
Habitual intemperance
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.10 Habitual intemperance
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.11 Pleading Habitual Intemperance
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 36
Section 1.2f: Intolerable Cruelty
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of intolerable
cruelty.
DEFINITIONS:
• Intolerable cruelty: “The term ‘intolerable cruelty’ as
used in our statute involves two distinct elements, and the
acts which are claimed to constitute it must be, either
singly or in combination, not only cruel but intolerable.”
Swist v. Swist, 107 Conn. 484, 489 (1928).
• “Incompatibility of personalities is not and has never been
a ground for divorce in Connecticut. Under our law,
married persons are expected to accept the ordinary
vicissitudes of marriage caused by unwise mating,
unhappy situations, unruly tempers and common quarrels
or marital wranglings. To constitute intolerable cruelty, the
consequences must be serious.” Nowak v. Nowak, 23
Conn. Sup. 495, 497, 185 A.2d 83 (1962).
• “When our legislature, in 1843, adopted as grounds of
divorce a vinculo, ‘habitual intemperance’ and ‘intolerable
cruelty,’ it used these words with their ordinary meaning,
but with special reference to what had been since 1639 our
settled policy in respect to divorce; i.e., marriage is a life
status and should never be dissolved, unless one of the
parties is guilty of conduct which in itself is a practical
annulling and repudiation of the marriage covenant. Willful
desertion for such a length of time as the statute says shall
conclusively prove a permanent abandonment and
repudiation of all marital rights and duties, had been a
ground for divorce. Following this analogy the legislature,
in 1843, made grounds of divorce: intemperance so long
continued that the fixed habit renders the party incapable
of performing the duties of the marriage relation; and
cruelty of such a nature as to be intolerable, and to
render a continuance of the relation by the suffering
victim impracticable.” Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70
Conn. 420, 426-427, 39 A. 516 (1898). (Emphasis added.)
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes
has occurred; . . .(8) intolerable cruelty;”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website.
Dissolution of Marriage - 37
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Evans v. Taylor, 67 Conn. App. 108, 115, 786 A.2d 525
(2001). “In its memorandum of decision, the court noted,
on the basis of the testimony of the parties, that the
marriage of the parties was troubled from the start and
that each party believed that he or she was mistreated by
the other. It also noted that although the defendant
claimed that the plaintiff’s treatment of her over the course
of their seven year marriage was intolerable, she tolerated
it by not moving from the marital home until her husband
filed an action for dissolution, despite the fact that she had
the financial means to do so. Finally, the court noted that
some of the difficulties in what was a stormy marriage,
arose from the verbal abuse by the defendant toward the
plaintiff. On the basis of those observations, the court
stated that the defendant failed to prove her claim of
intolerable cruelty.”
• Mailly v. Mailly, 13 Conn. App. 185, 188, 535 A.2d 385
(1988). “The state trial referee rendered judgment after a
fully contested hearing. He found that the defendant had
been guilty of intolerable cruelty to the plaintiff in several
respects, that these acts of cruelty rendered the
continuation of any relationship between the parties
impossible and that they forced the plaintiff to leave the
defendant to live with her daughter.”
• Garrison v. Garrison, 190 Conn. 173, 180, 460 A.2d 945
(1983). “The trial court’s finding that the behavior of the
defendant constituted a continuing course of conduct is
clearly supported by the record. In cases like the one
before us, it would be archaic and absurd to hold that the
plaintiff was under an obligation to be beaten more often in
order to establish a continuing course of conduct. The facts
found indicate that the defendant’s attitude toward the
plaintiff had become indifferent and uncaring for months
before the striking incidents. He was at times openly
hostile and cruel, as when he confronted the plaintiff with
his own adultery. He had struck her twice, for no apparent
reason. In this atmosphere, a person in the plaintiff’s
position could reasonably believe that the physical abuse
would either continue or escalate. It would thereafter be
reasonable to consider that the continuation of the marital
relationship would be unbearable. The trial court did not
err, but reasonably concluded that the defendant’s actions
constituted intolerable cruelty.”
• Sarafin v. Sarafin, 28 Conn. Supp. 24, 27, 247 A.2d 500
(1968). “However, much as the plaintiff may now be
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
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are still good law.
You can contact your
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Dissolution of Marriage - 38
incompatible with the defendant in interests, desires and
attitudes, and the court fully recognizes this to be the
case, such incompatibility is not a ground for divorce under
the law of this state. Proof is lacking that the conduct of
the defendant was intended by him to be cruel, or that its
character was such that this court can reasonably infer
that it was intended to be cruel. This is a situation where
the defendant himself is intolerable and unbearable to the
plaintiff, but it cannot reasonably be found that it was his
conduct toward her which rendered continuance of their
marital relationship unbearable.
In her brief, the plaintiff makes reference to the difficult
situation which will ensue if a divorce is not granted. This
is not a permissible argument and cannot be given any
consideration. The court is bound to decide this case, as
any other case, upon the facts and the law, without regard
to any other considerations which are not material or
relevant to the issues.”
• Richards v. Richards, 153 Conn. 407, 409, 216 A.2d 822
(1966). “Whether intolerable cruelty exists or not in a
particular case is ordinarily a conclusion of fact for the trier
to draw. Where not so drawn, it is only in exceptionally
aggravated cases, where the mere statement of the
evidential facts demonstrates the intolerable character of
the defendant’s alleged cruelty, that this court is warranted
in treating that fact as established.”
• Nowak v. Nowak, 23 Conn. Sup. 495, 498, 185 A.2d 83
(1962). “Our courts have never adopted the policy, which
some jurisdictions have followed, ‘of comparative guilt.’”
• Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 144 Conn. 568, 568-569, 135
A.2d 736 (1957). “There must be not only proof of acts of
cruelty on the part of the defendant but also proof that in
their cumulative effect upon the plaintiff they are
intolerable in the sense of rendering the continuance of
marital relation unbearable.”
• Vanguilder v. Vanguilder, 100 Conn. 1, 3, 122 A. 719
(1923). “It is enough to repeat that, as the phrase imports,
intolerable cruelty has a subjective as well as an objective
significance. There must not only be proof of acts of cruelty
on the part of the defendant, but proof that in their
cumulative effect upon the plaintiff they are intolerable in
the sense of rendering the continuance of the marital
relation unbearable by him.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
27. Cruelty
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
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learn about the tools
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update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 39
Chapter 7. Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
§ 7.04 Intolerable cruelty
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
27. Cruelty
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce or Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
4. Cruelty
A. In General
§§ 34-38
B. Physical Violence or Threat of Violence
§§ 39-42
C. Mental Cruelty
§§ 43-44
D. Adultery as Constituting Cruelty
§§ 45-46
E. Sexual Matters
§§ 47-49
F. Specific Acts or Conduct
§§ 50-55
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
C. Cruelty
1. In General
§§ 39-47
2. Specific Types of Behavior as Cruelty
§§ 48-64
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
Cruelty
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.11 Intolerable cruelty
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.12 Defining Intolerable Cruelty
LAW REVIEWS:
• Victor M. Gordon, Intolerable Cruelty As A Ground For
Divorce In Connecticut, 21 Connecticut Bar Journal 64
(1947).
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
You can contact us
or visit our catalog
to determine which
of our law libraries
own the treatises
cited.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Public access to law
review databases is
available on-site at
each of our law
libraries.
Dissolution of Marriage - 40
Section 1.2g: Imprisonment / Infamous Crime
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon grounds of sentence to
imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous
crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable
by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year.
DEFINITIONS:
• “. . . the three essentials to a divorce upon this ground
are: (1) the commission by the defendant of an infamous
crime, (2) involving a violation of conjugal duty, and (3)
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.” Swanson
v. Swanson, 128 Conn. 128, 129, 20 A.2d 617 (1941).
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes
has occurred; . . .(9) sentence to imprisonment for life
or the commission of any infamous crime involving a
violation of conjugal duty and punishable by
imprisonment for a period in excess of one year;”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Mezrioui v. Mezrioui, Superior Court, Judicial District of
Tolland, No. FA13-4019233-S (March 17, 2014) (2014 WL
1395073) (2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 611). “Mr. Mezrioui
has been incarcerated…since February 2012. He pled guilty
to risk of injury to a minor, and sexual assault of his step-
granddaughter, age 14, a child the parties had cared for
since infancy. A permanent protective order was issued by
the criminal court in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant
violated the protective order while incarcerated. The
criminal court ordered the defendant to have no contact
with anyone 16 years old or younger…”
-----
“Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-40(9)
imprisonment for an infamous crime involving a violation of
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
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learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 41
conjugal duty and intolerable cruelty pursuant to
Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-40c(8) the court finds
the defendant solely at fault for the breakdown of the
marriage.”
• Cugini v. Cugini, 13 Conn. App. 632, 636, 538 A.2d 1060
(1988). “The defendant also claims an abuse of discretion
by the trial court in permitting an amendment to the
complaint to allege as an additional ground for dissolution
that he had been convicted of an infamous crime. This is
one of the grounds upon which dissolution may be sought;
General Statutes 46b-40(c)(9); and, in any event, it was
not the ground upon which dissolution was granted in this
case.”
• Sweet v. Sweet, 21 Conn. Supp. 198, 202, 151 A.2d 350
(1957). “From the broad range of the crime as above
described, it is apparent that while there might be acts
which would violate the statute and at the same time be a
violation of conjugal duty, it is, nevertheless, equally true
that there might be many violations of the statute which
would not amount to a violation of conjugal duty. In fact,
acts which might impair the morals of a child as alleged in
the information here involved would not necessarily be acts
in violation of conjugal duty.”
• Donovan v. Donovan, 14 Conn. Sup. 429, 430 (1947). “. . .
the conviction of an indecent assault upon a minor female
is conviction of an infamous crime involving breaching of
conjugal duty.”
• Swanson v. Swanson, 128 Conn. 128, 130, 20 A.2d 617
(1941). “It is our conclusion therefore, that the
defendant’s conviction of assault with intent to commit
rape established the commission by him of an infamous
crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison . . . .”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
19. Personal infirmities and conditions arising after
marriage
24. - Conviction and imprisonment for crime
DIGESTS:
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
24. Conviction and imprisonment for crime
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
7. Conviction of Crime
§§ 81-82
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 42
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
F. Other Particular Grounds
1. In General
§ 88. Conviction of crime
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
§ 15.12 Imprisonment; life sentence or commission of
infamous crime
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.13 Defining Life Imprisonment or Commission of
an Infamous Crime
[1] Defining Life Imprisonment
[2] Determining What constitutes an Infamous
Crime Involving a Violation of Conjugal duty –
Factors
[3] Defining Infamous Crime
[4] Defining Violation of Conjugal Duty
[5] Providing Proof of Conviction
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at all
law library locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use. Remote
access is not available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 43
Section 1.2h: Confinement / Mental Illness
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon grounds of legal
confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar
institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at
least an accumulated period totaling five years within the
period of six years next preceding the date of the
complaint.
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be
granted upon a finding that one of the following causes
has occurred; . . . (10) legal confinement in a hospital
or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions,
because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated
period totaling five years within the period of six years
next preceding the date of the complaint.”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Henin v. Henin, 26 Conn. App. 386, 391, 601 A.2d 550
(1992). “Having reviewed the record and the evidence in
this case, we find ample support for the court’s conclusion
that the defendant’s [mental] illness and refusal to seek
treatment caused the breakdown. We further conclude, on
the basis of the record, that the court’s finding about the
cause of the breakdown did not improperly infect the
financial awards.”
• Parker v. Parker, 16 Conn. Supp. 128, 130 (1949). “…it is
doubtful whether the plaintiff has established the ground
for divorce upon which he relies. The statute (§ 7327)
requires ‘legal confinement, because of incurable mental
illness, for at least five years next preceding the date of
the complaint.’ There has been no actual confinement of
the defendant for five years prior to February 13, 1948,
when this action was commenced.”
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website to
confirm that you are
using the most up-
to-date statutes.
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 44
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
Grounds
19. Personal infirmities and conditions arising after
marriage
23. - Insanity or other mental incompetency
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 7. Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
§ 7.05 Mental Illness
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
23. Insanity or other mental incompetency
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
B. Grounds
12. Grounds Exisiting at or Before Marriage
C. Insanity or Mental Capacity
§§ 102-106
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
II. Grounds for Divorce; Fault and No-Fault Divorce
F. Other Particular Grounds
1. In General
§ 99. Insanity or other mental incompetency
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of Marriage in General
§ 15.13 Five-Year confinement for mental illness
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a
Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.14 Pleading Legal Confinement in a Hospital
Because of Mental Illness, for at Least Five Years
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 45
Section 1.3: Multiple Grounds
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of
marriage (divorce) based upon multiple grounds.
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
COURT RULES:
Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint
or Application
§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of
Marriage or Civil Union
§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by
Defendant
§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint
CASELAW:
• Mezrioui v. Mezrioui, Superior Court, Judicial District of
Tolland, No. FA13-4019233-S (March 17, 2014) (2014 WL
1395073) (2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 611). “Pursuant to
Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-40[c](9) imprisonment
for an infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty
and intolerable cruelty pursuant to Connecticut General
Statutes § 46b-40c(8) the court finds the defendant solely at
fault for the breakdown of the marriage.”
• Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 660, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983).
“The contention of the defendant, therefore, that a
determination of irretrievable breakdown precludes the court
from considering the causes of the dissolution in making
financial awards is erroneous.”
• Gluck v. Gluck, 181 Conn. 225, 227, 435 A.2d 35 (1980).
“Next, the defendant asserts that General Statutes 46b-40
(c), to the extent that it authorizes the dissolution of a
marriage if the marriage has broken down irretrievably . . .
nullifies the other grounds for dissolution . . . . The
gravamen of the unparticularized claim that irretrievable
breakdown nullifies the other grounds for dissolution set
forth in 46b-40 (c) and prevents defenses appears to be that
the legislature has sanctioned divorce on demand. This claim
too was rejected in Joy v. Joy . . . .”
• Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255, 423 A.2d 895 (1979). “The
absence of objective guidelines does not mean an abdication
of judicial function, nor does it signal, as the defendant
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 46
argues, that a court determining whether a marriage has in
fact irretrievably broken down is acting purely ministerially
or is granting a divorce ‘upon demand.’ It does, however,
sustain the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s
decision to rearrange his business ventures after the
initiation of divorce proceedings does not necessarily repair
the rupture in the marital relationship that had previously
occurred.”
• Edge v. Commissioner Of Welfare, 34 Conn. Supp. 284, 286,
388 A.2d 1193 (1978). “ . . . although fault need not be
established in dissolution of marriage actions, fault can still
be an element to be raised in dissolution actions for
purposes of establishing the support obligation of either
spouse to the other.”
• Christoni v. Christoni, 156 Conn. 628, 629, 239 A.2d 533
(1968). “Where more than one ground for a divorce is
claimed and one alleged ground is proved, it is immaterial
whether or not an additional statutory ground or grounds
may also exist.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
II. Grounds
##12-38
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 7. Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
§ 7.02: Fault and cause of breakdown
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
II. Grounds
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general
§ 15.4 Other grounds for dissolution
• Divorce in Connecticut: The Legal Process, Your Rights, and
What to Expect, by Renee C. Bauer, Addicus Books, 2014.
1.3 Is Connecticut a “no-fault” state or do I need grounds
for a divorce?
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a Dissolution
of Marriage and Legal Separation
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 47
Section 1.4: Defenses
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to defenses to
grounds for dissolution of marriage (divorce)
DEFINITIONS:
• Comity: "[C]omity is a flexible doctrine, the application of
which rests in the discretion of the state where
enforcement of a foreign order is sought." Walzer v.
Walzer, 173 Conn. 62, 70, 376 A.2d 414 (1977).
• “The defenses of recrimination and condonation have been
abolished.” Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 157, 440 A.2d
878 (1981).
• Condonation: “the principle relied upon means only that
an aggrieved spouse actually forgives and forgets.” Toolan
v. Toolan, 15 Conn. Supp. 277, 277 (1948).
• Recrimination “is generally defined as a rule or doctrine
which precludes one spouse from obtaining a divorce from
the other, where the spouse seeking the divorce has
himself or herself been guilty of conduct which would
entitle the opposite spouse to a divorce.” Courson v.
Courson, 117 A.2d 850, 851, 208 Md. 171 (1955).
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-40(c). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal
separation; annulment.
§ 46b-52. Recrimination and condonation abolished.
“The defenses of recrimination and condonation to any
action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation
are abolished.”
CASELAW:
• Nietupski v. Del Castillo, 196 Conn. App. 31, 37, 228 A. 3d
1053 (2020). “We first consider the plaintiff's claim that
the court violated the free exercise clause of the first
amendment to the United States constitution by rendering
a judgment of marital dissolution pursuant to § 46b-
40(c)(1). That contention is without merit.
In his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff alleges that
‘[c]ivil laws granting divorce ... are morally wrong because
the state therein usurps an authority to which it has no
right whatsoever. It is obvious that the state unlawfully
invades an area of religious liberty in which it has no
competence when it claims the power to dissolve a
marriage lawfully contracted by two baptized persons such
contract is a sacrament. Marriage belongs to God.’ By
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website to
confirm that you are
using the most up-
to-date statutes.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 48
dissolving the parties' marriage, the plaintiff argues, the
court violated his right to free exercise of religion.
The plaintiff has provided no legal authority that
substantiates his bald assertion. In his principal appellate
brief, the plaintiff alleges that he sought a judgment of
legal separation because ‘divorce is [a] great offense’ to his
religious beliefs. No such allegation was contained in his
operative complaint or advanced at trial. Moreover, the
record plainly indicates that, following the commencement
of the plaintiff's action, the defendant filed a cross
complaint, in which she sought a judgment of dissolution
pursuant to § 46b-40(c)(1).
This court previously has rejected a first amendment
challenge in such circumstances. As we explained: ‘The
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes). ... [Section] 46b-40(c)(1) is a valid and
neutral law of general applicability. The statute does not in
any manner infringe on the defendant's right to exercise
his religious beliefs merely because it permits the plaintiff
to obtain a divorce from him against his wishes.’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 45, 844 A.2d 855
(2004), rev'd in part on other grounds, 276 Conn. 377,
886 A.2d 391 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S.
Ct. 2296, 164 L. Ed. 815 (2006); see also Joy v. Joy, 178
Conn. 254, 256, 423 A.2d 895 (1979) (upholding
constitutionality of § 46b-40(c)(1) generally). This court
thus concluded that the rendering of a judgment of
dissolution pursuant to § 46b-40(c)(1) ‘does not violate [a
party's] right to exercise his religious beliefs.’
Grimm v. Grimm, supra, at 46. In light of that precedent,
the plaintiff's claim fails.”
• St. Denis-Lima v. St. Denis, 190 Conn. App. 296, 212 A.3d
242 (2019). “Thereafter, on June 13, 2017, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that
the certified copies of the dissolution proceedings from
Brazil by and between the parties implicated the principle
of comity. Furthermore, the court noted that (1) the
evidence submitted supported the finding that the
marriage of the parties was dissolved by a decree of the
court in Brazil on May 16, 2016, and that the decree was
made final by an order of the court by way of the
registration of the decree on July 6, 2016; (2) the
plaintiff's appeal from the decree was dismissed; (3) both
parties submitted themselves to the court in Brazil and
were represented by counsel throughout the proceedings;
(4) as part of the decree, the parties were awarded joint
custody and certain parenting rights, and support orders
were issued; and (5) although the parties continue to
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Dissolution of Marriage - 49
litigate, inter alia, alimony, property, custody, and
visitation issues in Brazil, those issues did not affect the
finality of the Brazilian decree dissolving the marriage.”
• Ribeiro v. Riberio, Superior Court, Judicial District of New
Haven, No. FA08-4009313-S (Jan. 7, 2011) (2011 WL
383981) (2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS). ”In his motion to
open judgment, the defendant claims that reasonable
cause exists for his non-appearance due to his mistaken
belief that a foreign court had exclusive jurisdiction. The
defendant further alleges that he has a defense to the
action and should be allowed to submit evidence relating to
the grounds for dissolution…”
“The court does not credit the husband’s testimony that he
was advised that Portugal had exclusive jurisdiction of
dissolution proceedings but does find credible his testimony
that he mistakenly believed that to be the case. The
defendant has also persuaded this court that he has a
defense to the portion of the complaint that alleged willful
desertion.”
• Dervin v. Dervin, 27 Conn. Sup. 459, 462 (1968). “That a
person having property is incapable of managing his affairs
and has a conservator appointed to do so in their behalf
does not warrant a finding or interpretation in and of itself
that such person is insane. What was said in the Dochelli
[v. Dochelli] case, supra, [125 Conn. 468,] 470, applies
with even greater force: ‘This does not connote insanity in
the narrower sense and will not avail as a defense.’”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
III. Defenses
38.5. In general
39. Nonexistence or invalidity of marriage
40. Agreements for separation
41. Mistake of law
42. Mistake of fact
43. Insanity
44. Drunkenness
45. Connivance
46. Provocation
47. Condonation
52. Recrimination
56. Collusion
DIGESTS:
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
III. Defenses
38.5–56
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
C. Defenses in Divorce Actions
§§ 107-169
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cases, it is important
to update the cases
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them. Updating case
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Dissolution of Marriage - 50
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
III. Defenses; Circumstances Precluding Divorce
§§ 100-140
• 13 ALR 3d 1419, Domestic Recognition of Divorce Decree
Obtained in Foreign Country and Attacked for Lack of
Domicile or Jurisdiction of Parties, Thomson West, 1967
(Also available on Westlaw).
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
• Defenses
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general
§ 15.2. Breakdown of marriage relationship
§ 15.14. Defenses
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.03 CHECKLIST: Asserting Grounds for a Dissolution
of Marriage and Legal Separation
§ 3.15 Asserting Defenses to Ground for Dissolution
[1] Asserting Condonation and Recrimination
[2] Asserting Provocation
[3] Asserting Justification
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 51
Section 2: Procedures
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Selected bibliographic resources relating to procedures in a
dissolution of marriage (divorce) commenced after October
1, 1997.
DEFINITIONS:
• Jurisdiction: “The Superior Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all complaints seeking a decree of
annulment, dissolution of a marriage or legal separation.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-42 (2023)
COURT
INFORMATION:
• Divorce, Custody, and Visitation, Connecticut Judicial
Branch
PUBLIC ACTS:
• Public Act No. 23-46, Sec. 4 “Generally eliminates the 90-
day waiting period for non-contested divorce or legal
separation proceedings” from Summary for Public Act No.
23-46 (January Regular Session) (Effective October 1,
2023)
• Public Act No. 18-14, Sec. 1 “requires the plaintiff to serve
the defendant a blank appearance form with the complaint”
from Summary for Public Act No. 18-14 (Effective October
1, 2018)
• Waiver of service of process of summons and complaint
under section 46b-45(b).
“Any person entitled to service of process of a summons and
complaint that commences an action for an annulment, a
dissolution of marriage, a dissolution of civil union or a legal
separation may waive such service by (1) executing a
written waiver of service on a form prescribed by the Office
of the Chief Court Administrator, and (2) filing an
appearance with the court. Upon filing of both the waiver of
service and the appearance of the person waiving such
service, the action shall proceed as consistent with the
provisions of this chapter.” Public Act No. 17-47, Sec. 3
(June 2017 Spec. Sess.) (Effective October 1, 2017)
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat (2023)
Chapter 815j. Dissolution of Marriage, Legal Separation
and Annulment
§ 46b-44. Residency requirement.
§ 46b-45. Service and filing of complaint and
appearance. Waiver of service.
§ 46b-46. Notice to nonresident party. Jurisdiction over
nonresident for alimony and support.
§ 46b-53. Conciliation procedures; privileged
communications. (2024 Supplement)
§ 46b-67. Waiting period. Filing of motion to waive
waiting period; nonappearing defendant.
Effect of decree. (2024 Supplement)
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website to
confirm that you are
using the most up-
to-date statutes.
Dissolution of Marriage - 52
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment
§ 25-3. Action for Custody of Minor Child
§ 25-5. Automatic Orders upon Service of Complaint or
Application
§ 25-11. Order of Pleadings
§ 25-28. Order of Notice
§ 25-30. [Sworn] Statements to be filed
§ 25-49. Definitions [Uncontested Matter, Financial
Disputes and Parenting Disputes]
§ 25-50. Case Management
§ 25-51. When Motion for Default for Failure to Appear
Does Not Apply
§ 25-52. Failure to Appear for Scheduled Disposition
§ 25-57. Affidavit concerning Children
§ 25-58. Reports of Dissolution of Marriage or Civil
Union and Annulment
CASELAW:
• O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 101-102, 161 A.3d 1236
(2017). “We therefore conclude that, although the trial
court could not punish the plaintiff because it had not
found him in contempt, the court nevertheless properly
determined that it could compensate the defendant for any
losses caused by the plaintiff’s violations of the automatic
orders. The plaintiff’s transactions--in which he sold and
exchanged stock shares and options for cash—plainly
violated the automatic orders, which expressly provide
that, while the dissolution proceedings are pending, no
party shall ‘sell, transfer, [or] exchange’ any property
without permission from the other party or the court.
Practice Book § 25-5 (b) (1). The automatic orders are
intended to ‘keep the financial situation of the parties at a
status quo during the pendency of the dissolution action’
Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 232, 116 A.3d 297
(2015).”
• Grant v. Grant, 171 Conn. App. 851, 158 A.3d 19 (2017).
“In light of these legal principles, it is clear that a violation
of the court’s automatic orders will not arise when
expenditures are used for customary and usual expenses.”
(p. 860)
“There was evidence submitted at trial which established
that at the time the defendant depleted his retirement
account . . . he had been unemployed . . . and did not
have a substantial source of income. The plaintiff resided
in the marital property, which was in the process of being
foreclosed, and, with the exception of the defendant’s
retirement account, he had minimal assets available to use
for customary and usual household expenses and
reasonable attorney fees. In light of the evidence and
testimony as to the defendant’s unemployment status and
minimal available income and assets, with the exception of
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
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Dissolution of Marriage - 53
his retirement account, ‘it is not clear how [he] could have
paid [his] own living and legal expenses independently.’
Traystman v. Traystman, 141 Conn. App. 789, 800-801,
62 A.3d 1149 (2013).
‘As is often stated, we do not reverse the factual findings
of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous and find
no support in the evidence.’ (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Szynkowicz v. Szynkowicz,
supra, 140 Conn. App. 542. Under the circumstances of
this case, the court's finding the defendant in contempt for
violating the automatic orders was clearly erroneous
because the evidence at trial suggested that the defendant
spent money from his retirement account for customary
and usual household expenses. The court failed to identify
any expenditures that violated the automatic orders in its
articulation. See Practice Book § 25-5(b). The court,
therefore, abused its discretion with respect to this claim.”
(pp. 862-863)
• Emerick v. Emerick, 170 Conn. App. 368, 386, 154 A.3d
1069 (2017). “The defendant next claims that the court
erred in denying his request for a jury trial. It is well
settled, however, that ‘there is no right to a jury trial in an
equitable action…. Whether the right to a jury trial attaches
in an action presenting both legal and equitable issues
depends on the relative importance of the two types of
claims….In an action that is essentially equitable, the court
may determine incidental issues of fact without a jury.’
Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 302, 580 A.2d 1212,
cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990). ‘A
dissolution of a marriage is essentially an equitable action.’
Id., 302. Here, because the plaintiff's cause of action
sought only a dissolution of her marriage, together with
alimony and an equitable division of property, her cause of
action is essentially equitable, for which the defendant has
no right to a trial by jury. Accordingly, the defendant's
claim lacks merit.”
• Keller v. Keller, 158 Conn. App. 538, 119 A.3d 1213
(2015). “In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff,
Beth Keller, appeals from an order of contempt entered
against her by the trial court in the course of the
proceedings dissolving her marriage to the defendant,
Richard Keller.” (p. 539)
“The court found the plaintiff in contempt both for failing to
provide the defendant with her new address, and failing to
give the defendant sufficient details and contact
information for a trip that she took with the children to
California.” (p. 542)
• Barcelo v. Barcelo, 158 Conn. App. 201, 204, 118 A.3d 657
(2015). “We reverse all of the court’s financial orders in
the judgment of dissolution…on the basis of our conclusion
that the court erred by (1) ordering the defendant, by way
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cases, it is important
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Dissolution of Marriage - 54
of a supplemental child support order, to pay the plaintiff
15 percent of his future bonus income, (2) failing to
provide notice to the parties, prior to rendering its
judgment of dissolution, that it would not reserve
jurisdiction to enter postsecondary educational support
orders for the parties’ minor children, and (3) ordering the
parties to submit to arbitration to resolve any future
disputes over distribution of their personal property.”
• Chambers v. Stewart, Superior Court, Judicial District of
Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. CV09-5012130-S,
(Jan. 20, 2012) (53 Conn. L. Rptr. 315) (2012 WL 432552)
(2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 186). “Plaintiff has a three-
count complaint which alleges that two mortgages which
the defendant holds on the plaintiff’s home are invalid
because they violate the automatic orders (hereafter
‘orders’) which were entered at the commencement of the
dissolution action between the plaintiff and his former
spouse and were in effect at the time the mortgages were
given.” (p. 315)
---
“There is nothing in either the Rule (Rule 25-5) or in Form
JD-FM-158 which expressly imposes a duty on third parties
to take notice of or abide by the prohibitions contained in
the rule. It is undeniable that the Judges of the Superior
Court could easily have added language to the rule to
indicate that the automatic order was indeed intended to
be binding on third parties. Provencher v. Enfield, 284
Conn. at 785, supra. In fact, a contrary intention appears
from the fact that that the rule making authority has
chosen the remedy of a contempt proceeding as a means
of enforcement and have said so in bold upper case letters.
Thus, it is fair to infer that the automatic order was
designed for no other purpose than to control the conduct
of the parties during the pendency of the action.” (p. 317)
• Parotta v. Parotta, 119 Conn. App. 472, 988 A.2d 383
(2010). “. . . (T)he court . . . heard argument on the
defendant’s motion to transfer and, treating it as a motion
for modification of the automatic orders, ordered the sum
of the $100,000 to be wired from a brokerage account in
the defendant’s name directly to the account of his criminal
defense attorney, to be used for legal fees and expert
witness fees in conjunction with the pending criminal
charges. The court also ordered that no portion of those
funds could be used for the posting of the defendant’s bail
or bond. Finally, the court indicated that the $100,000 sum
would be considered a draw against the defendant’s share
of the equitable distribution of property at the time of the
final hearing in the dissolution action. This appeal
followed.” (p. 475)
“Our Supreme Court has . . . determined that certain
interlocutory orders may be treated as final judgments for
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Dissolution of Marriage - 55
purposes of appeal. State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31,
463 A.2d 566 (1983). ‘An otherwise interlocutory order is
appealable in two circumstances: (1) where the order or
action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or
(2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the
parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.’ Id.
When the plaintiff filed this appeal, the court had not
rendered judgment on her complaint for dissolution or the
defendant's cross complaint. Nor had the court assigned to
either party any part of the estate of the other as the court
is permitted to do, by statute, only at the time of the final
hearing. We must, therefore, determine whether the
court's order modifying the automatic orders to give the
defendant permission to expend funds in his own name,
although interlocutory, is a final judgment for purposes of
appeal. The plaintiff contends that there is an appealable
final judgment pursuant to the second prong of Curcio. We
are not persuaded. (pp. 475-476)
“Finally, we are further persuaded that the court's order
did not constitute an appealable final judgment in light of
the decisional law regarding temporary injunctions. We
believe that the automatic orders in marital dissolution
judgments are most akin to temporary injunctions on the
basis that they represent a temporary restraint on the use
of or alienation of one’s assets pending full adjudication on
conjunction with a final hearing.” (p. 482)
“As in the case of a temporary injunction, the purpose of
the automatic orders in marital dissolution cases is simply
to maintain the status quo while the action is pending.
And, as a permanent injunction typically encompasses the
relief sought or granted by the temporary injunction, a
dissolution judgment similarly assigns, to one party or the
other, the property that was subject to the injunctive effect
of the automatic orders.” (p. 483)
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
IV. Proceedings
57-187
DIGESTS:
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
IV. Proceedings
A. Jurisdiction
B. Venue
C. Time for Proceeding
D. Parties
E. Process or Notice
F. Appearance
G. Abatement and Revival
H. Incidental Proceedings
I. Pleading
J. Evidence
K. Dismissal
Once you have
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cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
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Dissolution of Marriage - 56
L. Trial or Hearing
M. New Trial
N. Judgment or Decree
O. Appeal
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
D. Practice and Procedure in Divorce Actions
§§ 170-355
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
IV. Proceedings, Trial, and Judgment
§§ 141-459
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 16. Jurisdiction
Chapter 17. Parties
Chapter 18. Process
Chapter 19. Pleadings
• Friendly Divorce Guidebook for Connecticut, 2d ed., by
Barbara Kahn Stark, LawFirst Publishing, 2003.
Chapter 6. Getting divorced: procedures and paperwork
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 3. Dissolution of Marriage and Legal Separation
Chapter 4. Pretrial Pleadings and Discovery
LAW REVIEWS:
Samuel V. Schoonmaker, How the Judiciary Has Driven
Systemic Innovation During the Pandemic, 55 Family Law
Quarterly 87 (2021-2022).
See section C. The First Demonstration State, p. 111 et
seq for discussion of Connecticut’s adoption of the
pathways process for family cases
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Public access to law
review databases is
available on-site at
each of our law
libraries.
Dissolution of Marriage - 57
Table 3: Parenting Education Program
Parenting Education Program
STATUTE:
• Title 46b. Family Law
Chapter 815j. Dissolution of Marriage, Legal Separation and
Annulment
46b-69b. Parenting education program
Authority:
“The Judicial Department shall establish a parenting
education program for parties involved in any action
before the Superior Court under section 46b-1, except
actions brought under section 46b-15 and chapter 815t.”
Definition and Description:
“For the purposes of this section, ‘parenting education
program’ means a course designed by the Judicial
Department to educate persons, including unmarried
parents, on the impact on children of the restructuring of
families. The course shall include, but not be limited to,
information on the developmental stages of children,
adjustment of children to parental separation, dispute
resolution and conflict management, guidelines for
visitation, stress reduction in children and cooperative
parenting.”
Exceptions:
“The court shall order any party to an action specified in
subsection (a) of this section to participate in such
program whenever a minor child is involved in such
action unless (1) the parties agree, subject to the
approval of the court, not to participate in such program,
(2) the court, on motion, determines that participation is
not deemed necessary, or (3) the parties select and
participate in a comparable parenting education
program.”
Family Support Magistrate:
“A family support magistrate may order parties involved
in any action before the Family Support Magistrate
Division to participate in such parenting education
program, upon a finding that such participation is
necessary and provided both parties are present when
such order is issued.”
Completion:
“No party shall be required to participate in such
program more than once. A party shall be deemed to
have satisfactorily completed such program upon
certification by the service provider of the program.
Dissolution of Marriage - 58
(c) The Judicial Department shall, by contract with
service providers, make available the parenting
education program and shall certify to the court the
results of each party's participation in the program.”
Fees:
“Any person who is ordered to participate in a parenting
education program shall pay directly to the service
provider a participation fee, except that no person may
be excluded from such program for inability to pay such
fee. Any contract entered into between the Judicial
Department and the service provider pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section shall include a fee schedule
and provisions requiring service providers to allow
persons who are indigent or unable to pay to participate
in such program and shall provide that all costs of such
program shall be covered by the revenue generated from
participants' fees. The total cost for such program shall
not exceed two hundred dollars per person. Such
amount shall be indexed annually to reflect the rate of
inflation.
Time:
“The program shall not exceed a total of ten hours.”
Domestic Violence:
“Any service provider under contract with the Judicial
Department pursuant to this section shall provide safety
and security for participants in the program, including
victims of family violence.”
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-5(a)(5). “The parties shall participate in the
parenting education program within sixty days of the
return day or within sixty days from the filing of the
application.”
CASE LAW:
• Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 289 Conn. 362, 957 A.2d 821
(2008). “The defendant claims that § 46b-69b is facially
unconstitutional because it violates his right to substantive
due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States constitution. The defendant contends that the
statute unconstitutionally infringes on a parent's right to
exercise care, custody and control over his or her child
because, absent a showing of harm to the child or parental
unfitness, the state does not have a compelling interest to
issue an automatic order for the parties to attend the
parenting education program. The trial court observed that,
consistent with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence,
a parent's interest in making decisions concerning the care,
custody and control of his or her child is a fundamental right.
The trial court concluded, however, that ‘[o]n its face, the
language of the statute fails to implicate the care, custody or
control that a parent exercises over a child.’ Despite this
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website to
confirm that you are
using the most up-
to-date statutes.
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 59
conclusion, the trial court nonetheless applied strict scrutiny
and held that the statute was constitutional. The trial court
concluded that the statute was narrowly tailored, in that it
applies only to parents with minor children who are parties
to four specified family law actions; see Practice Book § 25-
5(a); and that the statute achieved a compelling state
interest by aiming to maintain familial harmony through a
difficult transition.” (pp. 371-372)
“It is clear from the text of the statute that the purpose of
the course is to educate parents and provide them with
information aimed at lessening the adverse impact on
children that may result from the restructuring of the family.
As the trial court concluded, ‘[o]n its face, the language of
the statute fails to implicate the care, custody or control
that a parent exercises over a child.’ We agree. The course
merely provides information to parents regarding the effects
of family restructuring on children. Although the legislature
intended to provide useful educational material, what
parents choose to do with the information is entirely up to
them. Parents can choose to apply the skills gleaned from
the course or parents can choose the opposite — that is, to
ignore the information and to decline to use it in their
familial interactions. There is no legal requirement for
parents to use the information in exercising care, custody
and control over their children.” (p. 380)
“Moreover, the education program does not involve the
children themselves. There is no requirement that the
children attend any of the presentations. The statute does
not authorize the providers to enter the home. Nor does the
statute authorize the providers to interview or counsel the
children.” (p. 381)
PUBLICATIONS:
• JDP-FM-151. Parenting Education Programs: List of Approved
Programs, Instructions to Participants, Program Explanation,
Program Costs (rev. 3/24)
TREATISES:
• Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms.
Chapter 42. Child Custody and Visitation
§ 42:50. Parenting-education program
§ 42:51. – Form
• A Practical Guide to Divorce in Connecticut, Hon. Barry F.
Armata and Campbell D. Barrett, editors, Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, 2013, with 2018 supplement.
Chapter 8. Issues Relating to Children: Jurisdiction, Child
Custody, Visitation, and Other Issues
§ 8.4 Child Custody and Visitation
§ 8.4.1 Parent Education
FORMS:
• JD-FM-149. Parenting Education Program - Order, Certificate
and Results (rev. 11/12)
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
You can contact us
or visit our catalog
to determine which
of our law libraries
own the treatises
cited.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Please visit the
Official Court
Webforms page for
the current forms.
Dissolution of Marriage - 60
Section 2.1: Jurisdiction
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Bibliographic resources relating to the residency
requirement for:
• filing a complaint for dissolution of marriage
• issuing a decree dissolving a marriage
SEE ALSO:
• Pleadings and Motion Practice in Connecticut Family
Matters
Sec. 3. Motion to Dismiss
DEFINITIONS:
• Jurisdiction: “Jurisdiction is the power in a court to hear
and determine the cause of action presented to it.
Jurisdiction must exist in three particulars: the subject
matter of the case, the parties, and the process.” Brown v.
Cato, 147 Conn. 418, 422, 162 A.2d 175 (1960).
• Domicil: “‘To constitute domicil[e], the residence at the
place chosen for the domicil[e] must be actual, and to the
fact of residence there must be added the intention of
remaining permanently; and that place is the domicil[e] of
the person in which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation,
not for a mere temporary or special purpose, but with the
present intention of making it his home.... [T]his intention
must be to make a home in fact, and not an intention to
acquire a domicil[e].... Moreover, [a] person may have ...
only one domicil[e] at any one time.... [A] former
domicil[e] persists until a new one is acquired.... Therefore
proof of the acquisition of a new domicil[e] of choice is not
complete without evidence of an abandonment of the
old.... [O]ur review of a question of subject matter
jurisdiction is a matter of law over which our review is
plenary....’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Juma v. Aomo, 143 Conn. App.
51, 56-60, 68 A.3d 148 (2013).” St. Denis-Lima v. St.
Denis, 190 Conn. App. 296, 309-310, 212 A.3d 242
(2019).
• Residence: “while domicil is essential to ‘final jurisdiction,’
residence alone provides jurisdiction for the filing of a
dissolution complaint.” Sauter v. Sauter, 4 Conn. App. 581,
582, 495 A.2d 1116 (1985).
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-44. Residency requirement
“(a) A complaint for dissolution of a marriage or for
legal separation may be filed at any time after either
party has established residence in this state.
“(b) Temporary relief pursuant to the complaint may
be granted in accordance with sections 46b-56 and
46b-83 at any time after either party has established
residence in this state.
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website to
confirm that you are
using the most up-
to-date statutes.
Dissolution of Marriage - 61
“(c) A decree dissolving a marriage or granting a legal
separation may be entered if: (1) One of the parties
to the marriage has been a resident of this state for
at least the twelve months next preceding the date of
the filing of the complaint or next preceding the date
of the decree; or (2) one of the parties was domiciled
in this state at the time of the marriage and returned
to this state with the intention of permanently
remaining before the filing of the complaint; or (3)
the cause for the dissolution of the marriage arose
after either party moved into this state.
“(d) For the purposes of this section, any person who
has served or is serving with the armed forces, as
defined by section 27-103, or the merchant marine,
and who was a resident of this state at the time of his
or her entry shall be deemed to have continuously
resided in this state during the time he or she has
served or is serving with the armed forces or
merchant marine.”
CASELAW:
• Altraide v. Altraide, 153 Conn. App. 327, 330 n.2, 101
A.3d 317 (2014). “The defendant also argues that the
court lacked jurisdiction over this case because a prior
divorce action had been filed in Nigeria. The test for
jurisdiction over marital actions is domicile. Litvaitis v.
Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 545, 295 A.2d 519 (1972). The
record confirms, based on the testimony of the plaintiff and
the defendant, that both parties were residents of
Connecticut for twelve months prior to the filing of the
complaint. Jurisdiction in this state is therefore proper.”
• Juma v. Aomo, 143 Conn. App. 51, 57-58, 68 A.3d 148
(2013). "‘With regard to whether a court has jurisdiction,
“[t]he traditional requisite for subject matter jurisdiction in
matrimonial proceedings has been domicil.... Regardless of
its validity in the nation awarding it, the courts of this
country will not generally recognize a judgment of divorce
rendered by the courts of a foreign nation as valid to
terminate the existence of a marriage unless, by the
standards of the jurisdiction in which recognition is
sought, at least one of the spouses was a good faith
domiciliary in the foreign nation at the time the decree was
rendered.” ... Id. at 545-46.
‘To constitute domicil, the residence at the place chosen
for the domicil must be actual, and to the fact of residence
there must be added the intention of remaining
permanently; and that place is the domicil of the person in
which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a
mere temporary or special purpose, but with the present
intention of making it his home....’ Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn.
440, 445–46, 58 A.2d 523 (1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 674, 69
S.Ct. 751, 93 L.Ed. 957 (1949). ‘[T]his intention must be
to make a home in fact, and not an intention to acquire a
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 62
domicil.’ . . .Id., 447. ‘Where . . . it becomes highly
advantageous to the claimant temporarily to feign an
intention to become a resident for only a brief time, in
order to accomplish other ends, his claim of intention will
be scrutinized and weighted like any other evidence in the
light of his conduct and all the circumstances surronding
it.’ Id., 448. Moreover, ‘[a] person may have ... only one
domicil at any one time.’ Smith v. Smith, 174 Conn. 434,
439, 389 A.2d 756 (1978). ‘[A] former domicil persists
until a new one is acquired.... Therefore proof of the
acquisition of a new domicil of choice is not complete
without evidence of an abandonment of the old.’ ... Rice v.
Rice, supra, 134 Conn. at 446.”
• Zitkene v. Zitkus, 140 Conn. App. 856, 866, 60 A.3d 322
(2013). “Our Supreme Court likewise has explained that
‘judgments of courts of foreign countries are recognized in
the United States because of the comity due to the courts
and judgments of one nation from another. Such
recognition is granted to foreign judgments with due
regard to international duty and convenience, on the one
hand, and to rights of citizens of the United States and
others under the protection of its laws, on the other hand.
This principle is frequently applied in divorce cases; a
decree of divorce granted in one country by a court having
jurisdiction to do so will be given full force and effect in
another country by comity.... The principle of comity,
however, has several important exceptions and
qualifications. A decree of divorce will not be recognized by
comity where it was obtained by a procedure which denies
due process of law in the real sense of the term, or was
obtained by fraud, or where the divorce offends the public
policy of the state in which recognition is sought, or where
the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.’ Litvaitis v. Litvaitis,
162 Conn. 540, 544-45, 295 A.2d 519 (1972).
With respect to establishing the jurisdiction of the foreign
court, ‘courts of this country will not generally recognize a
judgment of divorce granted by a court of another country
unless, by the standards of the jurisdiction in which
recognition is sought, at least one of the spouses was a
good faith domiciliary in the foreign nation at the time the
decree was rendered.’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Bruneau v. Bruneau, 3 Conn. App. 453, 455, 489
A.2d 1049 (1985). It is undisputed that the plaintiff was
domiciled in Lithuania at the time that the Kaunas City
District Court rendered judgment dissolving their marriage,
that both parties appeared before that court and that both
parties agreed to the settlement agreement submitted
thereto. On that basis, the trial court determined that the
Kaunas City District Court ‘had jurisdiction to enter the
divorce decree.’ The plaintiff does not argue otherwise in
this appeal.”
• Jungnelius v. Jungnelius, 133 Conn. App. 250, 35 A.3d 359
(2012). Residency Requirement to Establish Subject Matter
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 63
Jurisdiction. “…our Supreme Court precedent only requires
the plaintiff to establish that for the twelve months before
the date the complaint was filed …that either she or the
defendant were domiciled in Connecticut with substantially
continuous residence. (p. 258)
• “Our Supreme Court discussed the elements of domicile in
Adame v. Adame, 154 Conn. 389, 225 A.2d 188 (1966). In
that case, the court wrote: ‘The requisites of domicile are
actual residence coupled with the intention of permanently
remaining…The intention is a fact which must be found by
the court….and the intention must be to make a home at
the moment, not to make a home in the future. . . We
discussed the concept of domicile at length in McDonald v.
Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn 169, 132 A. 902 [1926],
where we noted that a domicile once acquired continues
until another is established and that [t]he law does not
permit one to abandon, nor recognize an abandonment of,
a domicile until another has been established.’” (p. 259)
• Charles v. Charles, 243 Conn. 255, 256, 701 A.2d 650
(1997). “The sole issue on appeal is whether the Superior
Court has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-44 (c) (1), over a dissolution of marriage
action brought by an individual who is not a resident of
Connecticut against a member of the Mashantucket Pequot
Indian Tribe (tribe) who resides on the tribe’s reservation
in Ledyard. We answer this question in the affirmative.”
• Sauter v. Sauter, 4 Conn. App. 581, 582, 495 A.2d 1116
(1985). “The plaintiff initially argues that the court erred in
dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because it should not have considered the question of
domicil until trial. On the basis of LaBow v. LaBow, 171
Conn. 433, 370 A.2d 990 (1976), he argues that while
domicil is essential to ‘final jurisdiction,’ residence alone
provides jurisdiction for the filing of a dissolution
complaint. We agree.”
“The pendency of an action in one state is not a ground for
abatement of a later action in another state.” (p. 584)
“In the interests of judicial economy, a court may, in the
exercise of its discretion, order that the second action be
stayed during the pendency of the first action, even though
the actions are pending in different jurisdictions.” (pp.
584-585)
• Taylor v. Taylor, 168 Conn. 619, 620-621, 362 A.2d 795
(1975). “. . . the burden of proving an allegation of lack of
jurisdiction . . . falls upon the party making that claim . . .”
• Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588, 595, 316 A.2d 379
(1972). “Obviously, even if canon law should deny the
authority of the state to dissolve a marriage, religious
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 64
doctrine could not nullify the decrees of our courts. U.S.
Const., amend. 1, 14.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
IV. Proceedings
(A) Jurisdiction
57-65
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 4. Jurisdiction and service
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
IV. Proceedings
A. Jurisdiction
57. Courts invested with jurisdiction
58. Jurisdiction of cause of action
59. – In general
60. – Place of marriage
61. – Place of occurrence of cause for divorce
62. – Domicile or residence of parties
63. – Separate domicile
64. – Acquisition of domicile for purpose of divorce
65. Jurisdiction of the person
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
D. Practice and Procedure in Divorce Actions
1. Jurisdiction in Divorce Actions
§§ 170-196
• 25 Am Jur 2d Domicil, Thomson West, 2014 (Also available
on Westlaw).
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
IV. Proceedings, Trial, and Judgment
B. Jurisdiction and Venue
§§ 146-168
• 28 CJS Domicile, Thomson West, 2019 (Also available on
Westlaw).
• 73 ALR 3d 431, Validity and Construction of Statutory
Provision Relating to Jurisdiction of Court for Purpose of
Divorce for Servicemen, by James O. Pearson, Jr., J.D.,
Thomson West, 1976 (Also available on Westlaw).
• 51 ALR 3d 223, What Constitutes Residence or Domicil
Within State by Citizen of Another Country for Purpose of
Jurisdiction in Divorce, by Emile F. Short, LL.B., LL.M.,
Barrister-at-Law, Lincoln’s Inn, Thomson West, 1973 (Also
available on Westlaw).
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 65
• 13 ALR 3d 1419, Domestic Recognition of Divorce Decree
Obtained in Foreign Country and Attacked for Lack of
Domicile or Jurisdiction of Parties, Thomson West, 1967
(Also available on Westlaw).
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
Jurisdiction
Residence or domicile
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• ALI Restatement of the Law Conflict of Laws, 2d
Chapter 3. Judicial jurisdiction
Topic 3. Jurisdiction over status
Title B. Jurisdiction for divorce
• Divorce in Connecticut: The Legal Process, Your Rights, and
What to Expect, by Renee C. Bauer, Addicus Books, 2014.
Chapter 1. Understanding the Divorce Process
• A Practical Guide to Divorce in Connecticut, Hon. Barry F.
Armata and Campbell D. Barrett, editors, Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, 2013, with 2018 supplement.
• 2 Stephenson’s Connecticut Civil Procedure, 3d ed., by
Renée Bevacqua Bollier and Susan V. Busby, Atlantic Law
Book Company, 2002, with 2003 supplement.
Chapter 20. Family law procedures
§ 243. Exclusive jurisdiction of superior court; Venue
§ 244. Jurisdiction required for dissolution; Domicile
§ 245. Residence requirements
§ 246. Exceptions to residence requirements
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 16. Jurisdiction
• Friendly Divorce Guidebook for Connecticut, 2d ed., by
Barbara Kahn Stark, LawFirst Publishing, 2003.
Chapter 6. Getting divorced: procedures and paperwork
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction
• The Military Divorce Handbook: A Practical Guide to
Representing Military Personnel and Their Families, 3d ed.,
by Mark E. Sullivan, American Bar Association, 2019.
Chapter 6. Divorce
LAW REVIEWS:
• Frank S. Berall, Domicile, Residence and Citizenship, 82
Connecticut Bar Journal 249 (2008).
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Public access to law
review databases is
available on-site at
each of our law
libraries.
Dissolution of Marriage - 66
• Robert M. McAnerney and Samuel V. Schoonmaker, III,
Connecticut’s New Approach to Marriage Dissolution, 47
Connecticut Bar Journal 375 (1973).
Dissolution of Marriage - 67
Table 4: Domicile
Domicile
Leaving
“When the parties left this State with the intention of never
returning, their domicile in Connecticut was not thereby changed.
The former domicile persists until a new one is acquired.” Mills v.
Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 617-618, 617, 179 A. 5 (1935).
Abandonment
“The law does not permit one to abandon, nor recognize an
abandonment of, a domicil until another has been established.”
McDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn. 169, 177, 132 A. 902
(1926).
Compared to
address
“An ‘address’ is not domicil, and a person may have
simultaneously two or more residence addresses but only one
domicil at any one time.” Taylor v. Taylor, 168 Conn. 619, 621,
362 A.2d 795 (1975).
Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them.
Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can contact your local law
librarian to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 68
Section 2.2: Process
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Bibliographic sources relating to the procedures for service
of process in an action for dissolution of marriage.
DEFINITIONS:
• Process: “shall be a writ of summons or attachment,
describing the parties, the court to which it is returnable
and the time and place of appearance, and shall be
accompanied by the plaintiff’s complaint.” Connecticut
Practice Book § 8-1(a) (2024).
• Manner of service: “Except as otherwise provided,
process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a true
and attested copy of it, including the declaration or
complaint, with the defendant, or at his usual place of
abode, in this state.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57(a) (2023)
• Usual place of abode: “It is clear that one’s ‘usual place
of abode’ is in the place where he would most likely have
knowledge of service of process . . . . Its chief purpose is
to ensure actual notice to the defendant that the action is
pending . . . . The usual place of abode is generally
considered to be the place where the person is living at the
time of service . . . . It is not necessarily his domicil . . .
and a person may have more than one usual place of
abode . . . . In the final analysis, the determination of
one’s usual place of abode is a question of fact and the
court may consider various circumstances.” Plonski v.
Halloran, 36 Conn. Supp. 335, 335-336, 420 A.2d 117
(1980).
• Long arm statute (domestic relations): Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 46b-46 (2023)
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-45. Service and filing of complaint and
appearance. Waiver of service.
§ 46b-46. Notice to nonresident party. Jurisdiction over
nonresident for alimony and support.
§ 52-46. Time for service.
§ 52-46a. Return of process.
§ 52-48. Return day of process.
§ 52-50. Persons to whom process shall be directed.
(2024 Supplement)
§ 52-54. Service of summons.
§ 52-57. Manner of service upon individuals,
municipalities, corporations, partnerships and voluntary
associations.
§ 52-123. Circumstantial defects not to abate
pleadings.
PUBLIC ACT:
• Public Act No. 17-47 - An Act Concerning Nonadversarial
Dissolution Of Marriage (Effective October 1, 2017)
Summary for Public Act 17-47
Dissolution of Marriage - 69
Waiver of service of process of summons and
complaint under section 46b-45(b).
“Any person entitled to service of process of a summons
and complaint that commences an action for an
annulment, a dissolution of marriage, a dissolution of
civil union or a legal separation may waive such service
by (1) executing a written waiver of service on a form
prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court
Administrator, and (2) filing an appearance with the
court. Upon filing of both the waiver of service and the
appearance of the person waiving such service, the
action shall proceed as consistent with the provisions of
this chapter.” Public Act No. 17-47, Sec. 3 (June 2017
Spec. Sess.) (Effective October 1, 2017)
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 8. Commencement of Action
§ 8-1. Process
§ 8-2. Waiver of Court Fees and Costs
Chapter 10. Pleadings
§ 10-12. Service of Pleading and Other Papers;
Responsibility of Counsel or Self-Represented
Party: Documents and Persons to be Served
§ 10-13. —Method of Service
§ 10-14. —Proof of Service
§ 10-15 —Numerous Defendants
§ 10-16. —Several Parties Represented by One
Attorney
§ 10-17. —Service by Indifferent Person
Chapter 11. Motions, Requests, Orders of Notice, and Short
Calendar
§ 11-4. Applications for Orders of Notice
§ 11-5. Subsequent Orders of Notice; Continuance
§ 11-6. Notice by Publication
§ 11-7. Attestation; Publication; Proof of Compliance
§ 11-8. Orders of Notice Directed outside of the United
States of America
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-5. Automatic Orders upon Service of Complaint or
Application
§ 25-23. Motions, Requests, Orders of Notice, and
Short Calendar
§ 25-28. Order of Notice
CASELAW:
• Coppola v. Coppola, 243 Conn. 657, 666, 707 A.2d 281
(1998). “Allowing an amendment of the return date under
the circumstances of the present case does not render §
52-46a meaningless. A return date may be amended but it
still must comply with the time limitations set forth in §
52-48 (b). Section 52-48 (b) requires that ‘[a]ll process
shall be made returnable not later than two months after
the date of the process . . . .’ Section 52-48 (b), therefore,
with its two month limit, circumscribes the extent to which
a return date may be amended.”
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update them to
ensure they are still
good law. You can
contact your local
law librarian to learn
about updating
cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 70
• Cato v. Cato, 226 Conn. 1, 626 A.2d 734 (1993). “The sole
issue in this appeal is whether an order of notice is
necessary to meet the jurisdictional requirements of
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 46b-46, the domestic
relations long-arm statute.” (p. 2)
“We conclude that in a case such as this, where service of
process can be accomplished by the most reliable means—
that is, in-hand service of process by a process server in
accordance with 52-57a—an order of notice is not required
pursuant to 46b-46.” (p. 9)
• Babouder v. Abdennur, 41 Conn. Supp. 258, 262, 566 A2d
457(1989). “In Connecticut, as in other states, the court
will not exercise jurisdiction in a civil case which is based
upon service of process on a defendant who has been
decoyed, enticed or induced to come within the court’s
jurisdiction by any false representation, deceitful
contrivance or wrongful device for which the plaintiff is
responsible . . . . This rule does not apply, however, when
the defendant enters the state on his own, even if the
plaintiff and his agents then engage in trickery to make
service of process.”
• Gluck v. Gluck, 181 Conn. 225, 226, 435 A.2d 35 (1980).
“In particular, she [the defendant] claims that abode
service is constitutionally deficient within the context of a
dissolution proceeding. We disagree.”
• Smith v. Smith, 150 Conn. 15, 20, 183 A.2d 848 (1962).
“Abode service is only a step removed from manual service
and serves the same dual function of conferring jurisdiction
and giving notice.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Process #1 et seq.
• Divorce
IV. Proceedings
(E) Process or Notice
76-80
DIGESTS:
• Connecticut Family Law Citations: A Reference Guide to
Connecticut Family Law Decisions, by Monika D. Young,
LexisNexis, 2023.
Chapter 4. Jurisdiction and service
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
IV. Proceedings
C. Time for proceeding
E. Process or notice
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
D. Practice and Procedure in Divorce Actions
1. Jurisdiction in Divorce Actions
§ 173. Service and notice requirements
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 71
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
IV. Proceedings, Trial, and Judgment
C. Parties and Process
2. Process, Notice and Appearance
§§ 177-192
• 72 CJS Process, Thomson West, 2018 (Also available on
Westlaw).
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
Process and service of process and papers
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 2 Stephenson’s Connecticut Civil Procedure, 3d ed., by
Renée Bevacqua Bollier and Susan V. Busby, Atlantic Law
Book Company, 2002, with 2003 supplement.
Chapter 20. Family law procedures
§ 248. Service of process
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 18. Process
• Friendly Divorce Guidebook for Connecticut, 2d ed., by
Barbara Kahn Stark, LawFirst Publishing, 2003.
Chapter 6. Getting divorced: procedures and paperwork
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction
Part IV. Effectuating Service of Process
§ 2.09. Checklist: Effectuating Service of Process
§ 2.10. Serving Process to Effectuate Jurisdiction
§ 2.11. Serving Process on Residents of
Connecticut
§ 2.12. Serving Process on Non-Residents of
Connecticut
§ 2.15. Serving Process – Who is Authorized
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 72
Section 2.3: Parties
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Bibliographic resources relating to proper or necessary
parties to an action for dissolution of marriage in
Connecticut and third party intervention.
STATUTES:
• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-43. Capacity of minor to prosecute or defend.
§ 46b-54. (Formerly Sec. 46-43). Appointment of
counsel or guardian ad litem for a minor child. Duties.
Best interests of the child.
§ 46b-55. (Formerly Sec. 46-63). Attorney General as
party to action.
§ 46b-57. Third party intervention re custody of minor
children. Preference of child.
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 9. Parties
§ 9-1. Continuance for Absent or Nonresident
Defendant
§ 9-3. Joinder of Parties and Actions; Interested
Persons as Plaintiffs
§ 9-4. — Joinder of Plaintiffs in One Action
§ 9-5. — Consolidation of Actions
§ 9-10. — Orders to Ensure Adequate Representation
§ 9-18. Addition or Substitution of Parties; Additional
Parties Summoned in by Court
§ 9-19. — Nonjoinder and Misjoinder of Parties
§ 9-22. — Motion to Cite in New Parties
§ 9-24. Change of Name by Minor Children
Chapter 10. Pleadings
§ 10-12. Service of the Pleading and Other Papers;
Responsibility of Counsel or Self-Represented
Party; Documents and Persons to Be Served
§ 10-13. — Method of Service
§ 10-14. — Proof of Service
§ 10-15. — Numerous Defendants
§ 10-16. — Several Parties Represented by One
Attorney
§ 10-17. — Service by Indifferent Person
CASELAW:
• Luster v. Luster, 128 Conn. App. 259, 273-275, 17 A.3d
1068 (2011). “In determining whether the conservators in
this case have the authority to maintain a dissolution
action on behalf of the defendant, we are mindful of the
importance of the right of access to our courts, a right
shared by all people, including those declared legally
incompetent.” (p. 270)
“General Statutes § 45a-650 (k) very clearly states: ‘[a]
conserved person shall retain all rights and authority not
expressly assigned to a conservator.’ (Emphasis added.)
You can visit your
local law library or
search the most
recent statutes and
public acts on the
Connecticut General
Assembly website to
confirm that you are
using the most up-
to-date statutes.
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update them to
ensure they are still
good law. You can
contact your local
law librarian to learn
about updating
cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 73
Additionally, although a conserved person retains all of his
or her unassigned rights and authority; see General
Statutes § 45a-650(k); there has been created a common-
law rule that a conserved person, like a minor, does not
have the legal capacity to bring a civil action in his or her
own name, but must do so through a properly appointed
representative, except in limited circumstances. See
Lesnewski v. Redvers, 276 Conn. 526, 530, 886 A.2d 1207
(2005); Cottrell v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra,
175 Conn. 261; Newman v. Newman, supra, 35 Conn. App.
451.” (p. 273)
“Given that a conserved person, except in limited
circumstances, may bring a civil action only through a
properly appointed representative, such as a conservator,
and that an action for dissolution of marriage is a civil
action, combined with the conserved person’s retention of
all rights and authority not specifically assigned, we
conclude that a conservator may bring a civil action for
dissolution of marriage on behalf of the conserved person.”
(p.274-275)
• Manndorf v. Dax, 13 Conn. App. 282, 287, 535 A.2d 1324
(1988). “Although interested in the defendant’s marriage
to the husband, the plaintiff, as a nonparty to that
marriage, had no right to maintain an action for its
annulment.”
• Derderian v. Derderian, 3 Conn. App. 522, 526-527, 490
A.2d 1008 (1985). “Other jurisdictions have upheld
judgments in dissolution of marriage actions which
potentially disturb the interests of those not parties to a
dissolution action by construing the judgments as
determinative of the right, title and interest in the property
of the husband and wife, assuming that the property is an
asset of the marital estate….
A judgment in a dissolution of marriage action may,
therefore, contain the judicial seeds of the divestment of a
claimed interest in realty belonging to those other than the
parties to the action. If a judgment in a dissolution of
marriage action is subsequently, collaterally attacked by a
third person who took his interest after it or after another
earlier aborted action between the same marital parties
was pending, knowing of the pendency of those actions,
and who could have, but did not intervene in those actions,
the judgment will nevertheless stand.
In the present action, a precise, underlying debt of the
brother to the defendant [his sister] had been determined
in the second dissolution of marriage action. That debt was
the award of the marital home to the defendant. Since
there was an established debt at the time of the present
partition action, the brother was not an indispensable party
in the action.”
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 74
• Vanderlip v. Vanderlip, 1 Conn. App. 158, 159, 468 A.2d
1253 (1984). “In this case, we cannot believe that the
defendant was harmed by the refusal of the court to permit
a continuance. On the day following the order to proceed
immediately to trial, the defendant appeared. The usual
order of trial was revamped in her favor. She was present
at all relevant times. Under these circumstances, we are
not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion.”
• Sands v. Sands, 188 Conn. 98, 105, 448 A.2d 822 (1982).
“Drawing a distinction between a situation where a party
has actually received or is receiving state welfare benefits
and a situation where a party has merely applied for those
benefits would impinge on the discretion of the trial court
to fashion a remedy that is just and equitable. It is obvious
that the defendant applied for state welfare benefits with
the expectation of having her application approved. In
addition, there was testimony that the defendant had
already received benefits from the city of Meriden. The trial
court could not ignore the fact that the state had a definite
and imminent interest in this matter. Under these
circumstances, the trial court clearly acted within its
discretion in awarding $1 per year alimony in order to
protect a valid state interest.”
• Salvio v. Salvio, 186 Conn. 311, 324, 441 A.2d 190
(1982). “Since Gerald and Deborah [the children] had
acquired no legal interest in the funds on deposit, they
were not necessary parties for the purpose of establishing
the trial court’s jurisdiction over those accounts.”
• Manter v. Manter, 185 Conn. 502, 503, 441 A.2d 146
(1981). “The issue in this case is whether a divorced
adoptive father who has permitted his former wife's second
husband to adopt his children may, more than a year
following the latter's divorce, intervene to regain custody of
the children. The appellant's motion to intervene was
denied by the trial court, and he appeals from that denial.
Prospective third party intervenor Allan Dexter Coombs
married Brenda Mae Coombs in March, 1961. The couple
then adopted two minor children, Donald Allan and Heather
Eleanor. After the Coombs' divorce in July, 1974, Brenda
Coombs married John P. Manter in February, 1975, using
thereafter the name of Bonnie Manter. Because of the
Manter marriage, Allan Coombs consented to the
termination of his parental rights and the adoption of
Donald and Heather by John Manter; the termination and
adoption agreements were ordered by Probate Court
decree on September 9, 1975. After two years of marriage
Bonnie and John Manter were divorced on January 18,
1978, with Bonnie Manter retaining custody of both
children. The divorce decree was modified on April 6, 1978,
to deny John Manter visitation rights. To date he has not
challenged that denial or the custody decision.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Dissolution of Marriage - 75
Seeking custody or visitation rights, Allan Coombs moved
on February 13, 1979, to intervene in the divorce action of
Manter v. Manter under General Statutes 46b-57, which
permits interested third parties to intervene in custody
controversies before the Superior Court. At a preliminary
hearing the trial court on April 2 granted Coombs standing
for the expressly limited purpose of a visitation study by
the family relations office. By supplemental order dated
October 1, 1979, the court denied the motion to intervene
on the dual grounds that no present dispute was then
before the court and no facts were presented to qualify
Coombs as an interested party under 46b-57. Coombs now
appeals from that denial of his motion to intervene.”
WEST KEY
NUMBERS:
• Divorce
IV. Proceedings
(D) Parties
§§ 70-74
DIGESTS:
• ALR Digest
Divorce
IV. Proceedings
(D) Parties
§§ 70-74
• West’s Connecticut Digest
Divorce
IV. Proceedings
D. Parties
§§ 70-74
ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Thomson West,
2018 (Also available on Westlaw).
I. Divorce and Separation Proceedings
D. Practice and Procedure in Divorce Actions
2. Parties in Divorce Actions
§§ 197-215
• 27A CJS Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on
Westlaw).
IV. Proceedings, Trial, and Judgment
C. Parties and Process
1. In General
§§ 169-176
ALR INDEX:
• Divorce and Separation
Third persons
TEXTS &
TREATISES:
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with
Forms, 3rd ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson
West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on
Westlaw).
Chapter 17. Parties
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise
Truax, editor, 2024 ed., LexisNexis.
Once you have
identified useful
cases, it is important
to update the cases
before you rely on
them. Updating case
law means checking
to see if the cases
are still good law.
You can contact your
local law librarian to
learn about the tools
available to you to
update cases.
Encyclopedias and
ALRs are available in
print at some law
library locations and
accessible online at
all law library
locations.
Online databases are
available for
in-library use.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 76
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction
Part VI. Determining the Parties to Dissolution,
Paternity and Custody Actions
§ 2.22. Checklist: Determining the Parties to
Dissolution, Paternity and Custody Actions
§ 2.23. Establishing Standing
§ 2.24. Bringing a Dissolution Action by Spouses or
a Paternity Action by a Parent
§ 2.25. Bringing a Dissolution Action by Native
American Tribe Members
§ 2.27. Bringing a Dissolution on Behalf of
Incompetent Persons
§ 2.28. Making the Attorney General or Town Clerk
a Party
§ 2.29. Evaluating the Necessity of Joinder and
Third Parties in Dissolution Actions
Each of our law
libraries own the
Connecticut treatises
cited. You can
contact us or visit
our catalog to
determine which of
our law libraries own
the other treatises
cited or to search for
more treatises.
References to online
databases refer to
in-library use of
these databases.
Remote access is not
available.
Dissolution of Marriage - 77
Section 3: Pleadings, Motions, and Forms
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
• See our research guide on Pleadings and Motion Practice in Family Matters.
• Connecticut Judicial Branch Family Court Forms:
Divorce, Custody, and Visitation Information
(CT Judicial Branch)
What to Expect on Your Resolution
Plan Date (PDF)
Family Law Forms (Full List)
Responding to a Divorce
Divorce Forms
File for Custody or Visitation (or
both)
Divorce with an Agreement (or “waive 90”)
File for a Motion for Modification
Divorce without an Agreement
File for a Motion for Contempt
Nonadversarial (simplified or
“non-ad”) Divorce
File for a Restraining Order
• Library of Connecticut Family Law Forms, 2d ed., by Amy Calvo MacNamara,
Aidan R. Welsh, and Cynthia Coulter George, Eds., 2014, Connecticut Law
Tribune.
• 7 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with Forms, 3rd ed., by
Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 2010, Thomson West, with 2022-2023 supplement (also
available on Westlaw).
• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise Truax, editor, 2024
ed., LexisNexis. Chapter 20. Forms
Dissolution of Marriage - 78
Part B. Nonadversarial
Dissolution of Marriage
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE:
• Bibliographic resources relating to nonadversarial
dissolutions of marriage
DEFINITIONS:
• Effect of Decree of Dissolution of Marriage: “The
decree of dissolution of marriage shall give the parties the
status of unmarried persons and they may marry again.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-44c(b) (2023).
• “‘defined benefit pension plan’ means
a pension plan in which an employer promises to pay a
specified monthly benefit upon an employee's retirement
that is predetermined by a formula based on the employee's
earnings history and tenure of service.” Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 46b-44a(b) (2023).
STATUTES:
Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)
§ 46b-44a. Filing of joint petition for nonadversarial
dissolution of marriage. Procedure. (2024 Supplement)
§ 46b-44b. Revocation of joint petition for nonadversarial
dissolution of marriage. Effect.
§ 46b-44c. Disposition of nonadversarial dissolution of
marriage; entry of decree of dissolution of marriage.
§ 46b-44d. Review of settlement agreement in
nonadversarial dissolution of marriage. Appearance of
parties required; exceptions. Matters placed on the
regular family docket.
PUBLIC ACTS:
• Public Act No. 19-64 - An Act Concerning Court
Operations. See section 2. (Effective October 1, 2019)
Summary for Public Act 19-64
• Public Act No. 17-47 - An Act Concerning Nonadversarial
Dissolution Of Marriage (Effective October 1, 2017)
Summary for Public Act 17-47
• Public Act No. 15-7 - An Act Concerning a Nonadversarial
Dissolution of Marriage (Effective October 1, 2015)
Summary for Public Act No. 15-7
LEGISLATIVE:
• Public Act No. 17-47
Substitute for Raised House Bill No. 7196: Bill Status
(2017)
Office of Legislative Research Bill Analysis, House Bill
7196 (2017)
Judiciary Committee Joint Favorable Report, House Bill
7196 (2017)
Dissolution of Marriage - 79
Substitute for Raised House Bill No. 7196 Public Hearing
Testimony (2017)
• Michele Kirby, Connecticut’s Expedited Divorce Processes,
Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative
Research, OLR Research Report 2016-R-0213 (October 5,
2016).
• Public Act No. 15-7
Raised Senate Bill No. 1029: Bill Status (2015)
Office of Legislative Research Bill Analysis, Senate Bill
1029. An Act Concerning a Nonadversarial Dissolution of
Marriage (2015)
Judiciary Committee Joint Favorable Report, Senate Bill
1029 (2015)
Raised Senate Bill No. 1029 Public Hearing Testimony
(2015)
COURT RULES:
• Connecticut Practice Book (2024)
Chapter 3. Appearances
§ 3-1. Appearance for Plaintiff on Writ or Complaint in
Civil and Family Cases
§ 3-2. Time to File Appearance
§ 3-3. Form and Signing of Appearance
§ 3-4. Filing Appearance
§ 3-5. Service of Appearances on Other Parties
Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters
§ 25-5B. Automatic Orders upon Filing of Joint Petition—
Nonadversarial Divorce
FORMS:
• Nonadversarial (simplified or “non-ad”) Divorce
(Connecticut Judicial Branch)
LAW REVIEWS:
• Hon. Lynda B. Munro (Ret.), Johanna S. Katz, and Meghan
M. Sweeney, Administrative Divorce Trends and
Implications, 50 Fam. L.Q. 427 (2016-2017)
Amendments to the
Practice Book (Court
Rules) are published
in the Connecticut
Law Journal and
posted online.
Official Judicial
Branch forms are
frequently updated.
Please visit the
Official Court
Webforms page for
the current forms.
Public access to law
review databases is
available on-site at
each of our law
libraries.
Dissolution of Marriage - 80
Table 5: Excerpts from the Public Hearing Testimony of Conn. Public
Act 17-47
The Connecticut General Assembly
Judiciary Committee Public Hearing
March 6, 2017
Testimony of the Honorable Elizabeth A. Bozzuto,
Chief Administrative Judge for Family Matters
Connecticut Judicial Branch
Background:
“Two years ago, I came before this Committee and asked for
your support of a similarly titled bill that established a
simplified dissolution of marriage for parties who agreed to the
dissolution and who met certain criteria, as well as allowed
other parties with an agreement to obtain a divorce in nearly a
quarter of the time that it would ordinarily require. Thanks to
your leadership on the issue, the bill passed, and as a result,
one in six of all dissolutions subsequently filed have taken
advantage of this new law, resulting in thousands of litigants
moving on with their lives more quickly, and without the time
and expense of numerous court hearings.”
Benefits to the
Parties:
“The bill before you expands upon the original criteria of our
nonadversarial dissolution so that more parties can take
advantage of the simplified process, as well as makes
additional changes to our dissolution framework, all with one
central goal in mind: to allow parties to move expeditiously and
efficiently through the dissolution process.”
Changes to
Dissolution
Framework:
“Section 1 of the bill amends the existing nonadversarial
process, whereby parties obtain a divorce without appearing
before a judge, if they meet specific criteria.”
“The two criteria that would change include:1) instead of a
couple having been married eight years or less to qualify, we
propose increasing this to nine years, and 2) the asset ceiling
would increase from $35,000 to $80,000. We believe these two
changes would significantly expand the pool of divorcing
couples who would qualify for this process.”
“Section 2 of the bill makes a technical change… This section
would simply clarify that if the court places the matter on the
regular family docket, neither party shall pay a new filing fee or
be responsible for serving one another.”