AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 1-1
MISSION COMMAND
14 August 2023
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1,
Mission Command
Table of Contents
MISSION COMMAND IN THE AIR FORCE .................................................................... 1
WHAT MISSION COMMAND IS .................................................................................. 1
THE PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND ............................................................. 8
WHAT MISSION COMMAND IS NOT ....................................................................... 13
THE FIVE Cs OF MISSION COMMAND ................................................................... 15
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 17
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 18
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
FOREWORD
This Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) clarifies current operational doctrine by
providing further detail regarding the Airman’s perspective on mission command. The
achievement of joint force objectives with airpower relies on the ability to mass,
coordinate, and synchronize air operations with a globally informed, theater-wide
perspective. The application of mission command in the US Air Force (USAF) is distinct
from the other services. This AFDP presents mission command through the Airman’s
perspective.
Though the USAF doctrine has historically focused on decentralized execution, the
operational environment the last few decades have instead typified centralization at all
levels. While USAF doctrine unwaveringly espoused the strengths and advantages of
decentralization throughout this period, many elements of USAF architecture have deeply
embraced centralization. However, future contested, degraded, or operationally limited
environments may impede these efficiencies, necessitating a pivot towards
decentralization.
This doctrine publication is a step in that direction. However, doctrine is only a single
piece of the DOTMLPF-P framework.
1
Achieving the vision set forward by the adoption
of mission command requires comprehensive action. Actualizing mission command in the
USAF will require additional planned, anticipated, and yet unknown changes in USAF
organizational structures, training approaches, materiel acquisitions, leadership and
education models, and personnel and manpower perspectives. This AFDP informs the
impetus for these changes but can only come to life by Airmen embracing the principles
described herein and applying them at all levels and in all aspects across the Service.
1
Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
1
MISSION COMMAND IN THE AIR FORCE
WHAT MISSION COMMAND IS
Mission command is a philosophy of leadership that empowers Airmen to operate
in uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing environments through trust, shared
awareness, and understanding of commander’s intent. The hallmark of mission com-
mand is decentralized execution through the delegation of authority to empower
subordinate decision-making and enable flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness in the
accomplishment of commander’s intent. In practice, mission command should provide
Airmen with the freedom of action needed to exploit rapidly developing opportunities and
succeed. Airmen should be trained to plan and execute operations in a distributed and
decentralized manner and execute missions when isolated from higher-level decision
makers. Airmen at all levels should be comfortable making decisions and operating based
on commander’s intent and the principles of mission command.
A mission command philosophy is not unique to the USAF. However, because of
airpower’s inherent attributes, the way the USAF applies mission command has distinct
characteristics. According to Air Force Doctrine Publication 1 (AFDP 1), The Air Force,
Centralized Command—Distributed Control—Decentralized Execution (CC-DC-DE)
is the method by which Airmen execute mission command.
The term “mission command” has been used for many years to describe an approach to
command and control (C2) built on decentralized execution by trusted, competent, and
properly resourced commanders. The origin of the approach began with Helmuth von
Moltke under the term “weisungen” (roughly translated as “orders” or “instructions”).
Moltke recognized the evolving character of war had greatly increased the “fog and
friction” elements, preventing centrally controlled and overly detailed command. His ap-
proach dictated an overarching commander’s intent but refrained from restricting
subordinate commanders to a single approach. His quote, “Provide subordinates only that
information that they cannot determine on their own,” remains excellent guidance on how
to craft a commander’s intent statement. As warfare became increasingly complex, this
approach continued to evolve into a philosophy governing C2 at all echelons focused on
decentralized execution at the lowest practical level.
For the USAF, mission command provides a framework for the continued evolution of
decentralized operations that originated during World War II when the allocation of air
assets shifted from the practice of piece-meal “penny packeting” towards operations
guided by the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution (CC-DE). The
THE DUAL NATURE OF MISSION COMMAND TERMINOLOGY
Mission command refers to the effective execution of decentralized
operations within the framework of CC-DC-DE AND to the philosophical,
organizational, and cultural elements that must be in place to do so. When
discussing mission command, Airmen should clarify which aspect of mission
command is being discussed.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
2
fundamental truth that underpinned that shift remains true today: to fully capitalize
airpower’s advantages (speed, range, flexibility, and lethality), authority should be
delegated to subordinate commanders and decision makers. Doing so requires mutual
trust and enables further advantage through initiative and tactical flexibility. To achieve
this aim despite the anticipated challenges posed by future contested, degraded, or
operationally limited environments, fully embracing mission command is the next logical
step.
First and foremost, the adoption of mission command requires a Service culture
that embraces and embodies mission command’s principles. Further, mission
command provides a unifying framework for the development of new operating concepts,
organizational approaches, and materiel solutions to enable the USAF’s historic
decentralized approach. Evolving USAF organizational structures and processes focused
on the distribution of control will ensure Airmen are prepared to continue operations in a
decentralized manner despite the fog and friction anticipated in denied operating
environments.
Historic Precedent and Model for Mission Command
During World War II, General George C. Kenney commanded the air forces in the
Southwest Pacific Theater under General
Douglas
MacArthur. Facing the challenge
of distance and poor communications, General Kenney implemented a novel
command structure by establishing air task forces capable of independent
operations
. Air task forces
were built around a core command, usually a bomber
wing, complete with a permanent operational planning staff. They were
complemented by a rotation of supporting
Army
Air Force, Navy, and Marine air units.
General
Kenney exercised centralized control by a
ssigning units, missions, and
areas of responsibility to the air task forces, but let task force commanders handle
the detailed operational planning.
He empowered his air commanders to the lowest
practical level. He picked competent combat commanders whom he trusted and
turned them loose under his general guidance. He issued periodic mission
-
type
orders to these commanders and only tasked them for detailed special missions by
exception.
General Kenney’s innovative employment of air task forces as well as th
e
philosophy and methods used in doing so show the historical precedent for mission
command in air operations and serve
s as a model for doing so in the future.
--Derived from: Michael E. Fischer. Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air
Operations: The Empowerment of Air Leadership.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MISSION COMMAND AND CENTRALIZED
COMMAND — DISTRIBUTED CONTROL — DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
To better understand each aspect of CC-DC-DE, it is helpful to first examine the terms
command, control, and C2, and to detail the unique considerations that result from the
operational context within which they are used. The joint definitions of these terms are:
2
Command: The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises
over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.
Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations
to accomplish assigned missions. Inherent in command is the authority a military
commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including authority to assign
missions and accountability for their successful completion. Command is exercised in
both the administrative and operational branches of the chain of command; however,
the specific authorities differ.
3
Within the operational branch, the authority to conduct
military operations is derived from combatant command (COCOM) authority. COCOM
is vested only in commanders of combatant commands (CCMDs)
4
and cannot be
delegated. With the exception of COCOM, commanders have the discretion to
delegate all or some of the authorities inherent in their specified command
relationships.
5
Control: Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander
over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.
Further, to control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a
commander’s command authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders
and staffs identify and assess requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts.
Control provides the means for commanders to maintain freedom of action, delegate
authority, direct operations from any location, and integrate and synchronize actions.
6
C2: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
C2 is a function and the activities through which a commander exercises authority.
While numerous actions involved in the conduct of C2 activities are commonly referred
to as control, they should be understood apart from the command authority required
to conduct them.
This overarching operational context guides the USAF’s execution of mission command
through the framework of Centralized Command—Distributed Control—Decentralized
Execution. The delegation of authority to subordinate commanders who are capable and
resourced to plan, coordinate, execute, and assess operations within an acceptable level
2
Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force.
3
For additional information, see JP 1, Volume 2.
4
Or as otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
5
JP 1, Volume 2.
6
JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
4
of risk is the hallmark of successful distributed control. Likewise, the empowerment of
subordinate decision-making guided by clear understanding of commander’s intent and
guidance on risk tolerance is the hallmark of successful decentralized execution.
Centralized command gives the commander the responsibility and authority for
planning, directing, and coordinating a military operation. Centralized command is
best accomplished by an Airman at the functional component commander level who
maintains a broad focus on the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives.
Airpower’s ability to generate global or theater-wide effects makes centralized
command paramount. It is the foundational principle that describes the air component
commander’s requirement to balance the overall air effort against JFC priorities.
Centralized command provides the framework for the development and delivery of all-
domain effects requiring broad perspective, coordination, and reach. Centralized
command promotes effectiveness and preserves flexibility and versatility at the
operational level while supporting the joint principle of unity of command.
7
Distributed control enables commanders to delegate authorities for planning,
coordination, execution, and assessment activities to dispersed locations to achieve
an effective span of control and maintain the initiative, particularly in contested
environments.
The benefits inherent in distributed control are maximized when clearly communicated
commander’s intent guides subordinate actions. Distributed control allows
subordinate commanders to respond to changes in the operational environment and
exploit emergent opportunities. Operations in contested environments may
necessitate a greater degree of distributed control but bring increased risks of
unintended consequences without an accurate understanding of overall mission
context and evolving circumstances. Commanders should empower subordinates at
the lowest capable level.
Commanders enable decentralized execution by empowering subordinate decision-
making to enable flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness in mission accomplishment.
Decentralized execution is the fundamental characteristic of operations guided by a
mission command philosophy. The imperative for decentralized execution stems from
the premise that decisions regarding tactical employment are optimized when made
by those closest to the fight. Airpower’s lethality is maximized by tactically proficient
Airmen armed with clear commander’s intent and a shared understanding of an
operation’s purpose and wider operational and strategic context. History shows the
rapidity of action generated by decentralized execution is the surest method to operate
inside the enemy’s decision cycle. Decentralized execution promotes effectiveness
and resilience at the tactical level.
7
JP 3-0.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
5
MISSION COMMAND IN OPERATIONS
Fidelity of decision, speed of response, and effectiveness of action are all tied to the
amount of risk commanders are willing to accept. Consequently, commanders relentlessly
pursue information in the hope that their decisions will be more timely, accurate,
advantageous, and risk worthy. However, the challenges and constraints of future
operating environments will limit the senior commander’s ability to gather the information
required to direct operations from a centralized position. For effective operations in the
face of anticipated challenges, commanders must accept increased levels of risk in the
distribution of control and execution of missions. In such environments, the risk of inaction
and retention of control is often greater than the risk of pushing command and execution
decisions to lower, appropriate levels.
Commander’s Intent. Execution of CC-DC-DE hinges on subordinates' understanding
of the commander's guidance and intent. Commanders direct “what” and “why”;
subordinate commanders devise “how.” Subordinate commanders should be
appropriately resourced, empowered, and provided with guidance and intent that directs
what to do (i.e., outcome), why do it (i.e., the purpose), and general guidelines for the
activity (e.g., constraints, restraints, and command relationships). Commander’s intent
. NATO Southern Command
nce to conduct close air support (CAS)
-10s arrived on-
-130 gunship. Although NATO aircraft were ready to act, t
while attempting to
through
In the ensuing hours, many French soldiers were injured.
difficulty reacquiring the targets added further delays
ing in cancellation of the mission.
s how
--
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
6
should nest and align with the higher commander’s guidance. To the degree practical,
subordinate commanders should have wide latitude to accomplish their missions,
enabling them to creatively adapt their capabilities and talents to the task at hand.
Subordinate commanders should exercise disciplined initiative and tailor their actions to
conform with and assist in achieving the issuing commander’s wider purpose.
Delegation of Authority. Distributed control is dynamic and provides operations with the
agility, responsiveness, and resiliency required to continue air operations despite
adversary efforts to deny or degrade communications.
8
Through distributed control,
subordinate commanders have the authorities and means necessary to plan, coordinate,
execute, and assess assigned or directed operations within their span of control. Such
authorities may be temporary, enduring, or conditions based.
Adaptive and Responsive C2. C2 activities center on planning, coordinating, executing,
and assessing operations and missions. These activities involve decision making,
outlining objectives, monitoring and assessing the operational environment, anticipating
changes, planning, adapting the approach, and verifying and correcting activities to meet
commander’s intent. Co-location of commander, staff, or C2 activities is not assumed or
inherently necessary. Though it may increase C2 infrastructure and capability
requirements, dispersal of C2 activities is often desirable to reduce vulnerability. C2
processes and architectures that allow for rapid and seamless transition of authority up
and down the chain as conditions dictate are critical.
Shared Understanding of Risk. It is imperative that commanders clearly communicate
risk tolerance to subordinates. Traditional red-line approaches to the amount of risk a
trusted subordinate can accept may inhibit flexibility and reduce the subordinate’s ability
to react to changing circumstances in a timely and effective manner. However,
subordinates cannot accept risk beyond that which the superior commander allows. In
some cases, it may be appropriate for superior commanders to accept risk on
behalf of subordinate commanders. This shared understanding between commanders
and subordinates regarding risk tolerance enables flexibility and prevents recklessness.
8
See discussion on page 11 regarding the specification of authorities within mission type orders.
Responsibility and Accountability—The Proper Link to Support Mission
Command
Connected to the imperative of risk acceptance, the link between responsibility and
accountability cannot be indiscriminate. Commanders are accountable for the
responsibilities they have been assigned. However, commanders held accountable for
elements reasonably beyond their control are encouraged to protect themselves from
subordinate failures by centralizing
and withholding authority—
all antithetical to the
flexibility, rapidity of action, and innovation required to overcome a determined and
capable enemy. Though this dynamic plays out between an individual commander and
subordinates, commanders should be mindful that such effects can ripple across their
command and may have a far wider chilling and deadening effect.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
7
Matching Authorities with Responsibility. Mission command requires leaders to
ensure subordinates are provided and aware of the authority they possess in the execu-
tion of their responsibilities outlined in the commander’s intent. Failure to provide a sub-
ordinate with sufficient authority to act may inadvertently encourage them to operate
beyond restraints. Alternatively, providing a subordinate with authority that exceeds
situation or mission requirements may result in chaotic, uncoordinated operations.
Commanders should ensure they provide sufficient authority to allow for creativity in
execution amid evolving circumstances. Providing authority that only allows a single
course of action reduces subordinate flexibility. A balance is necessary, and the appropri-
ate match of authority and responsibility should be a focal point for the superior
commander.
Risk, Means, and Resources. Resource availability and risk frequently share an inverse
relationship. Though risk-to-force and risk-to-mission may be reduced by increasing re-
sources, the ability for senior commanders and echelons to do so should not be assumed.
Operational restraints and constraints will likely limit resource availability. As resources
diminish, commanders should expect the amount of risk they must accept to accomplish
the mission will increase.
In response, application of mission command encourages creativity, inventiveness, and
initiative, all of which are paramount to manage risk effectively in a resource constrained
environment. In some cases, it may be possible to shift risk in one area to one where it
can be more easily mitigated. For example, a commander tasked with, but lacking the full
contingent required to establish an airbase, may employ multi-capable Airmen to divert
available resources from less essential base functions towards those deemed more
important, thereby reducing the risk to more critical aspects.
Mission Command and Future Operating Concepts
Mission command is the guiding principle that fosters the development and execution
of organizational and structural concepts aimed at empowering the creativity and
init
iative required to operate in future contested, degraded, or
operationally limited
environments. For example, AFDN 1
-21, Agile Combat Employment (ACE),
identifies
mission command as a key enabler.
ACE
—a scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines
to increase
survivability while generating combat power
—is
driven by the threat and necessitated
by
contested, degraded, or operationally-limited environments.
The movement or
relocation of forces in an operational environment is a complex undertaking that is
likely to require coordination and support across units and commands. Further, force
elements conducting ACE should be expected to lose connectivity with operational
C2. Necessary command relationships, authorities, and responsibilities should be
iden
tified and established through distributed control in advance of operations.
Armed
with shared understanding, subordinates can make effective decisions consistent with
commander’s intent
to protect and preserve the force and generate combat power
even if they have lost contact with higher echelons.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
8
THE PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND
Though applicable to all aspects of service, the principles of mission command dictate
the actions required of commanders and Airmen responsible for the application of a
mission command philosophy in the conduct of operations. The principles are to provide
clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, exercise disciplined
initiative, build teams through mutual trust, accept prudent risk, and use MTOs
when appropriate.
These principles must be ingrained in Service culture. They must permeate the Service’s
identity and shape how Airmen view themselves and airpower’s role in achieving our
nation’s military and national security objectives. For success in future conflicts, it is
imperative that leaders at all levels across the Service inculcate these principles into
leadership and command philosophies. Though operationally focused, they must shape,
inform, and guide action and thought in all Service endeavors.
PROVIDE CLEAR COMMANDER’S INTENT
Commander’s intent is a clear and concise statement that frames the operation’s purpose,
its desired end state, and what must be accomplished—not how—to achieve success. It
is nested within higher echelon commander’s intent and guidance with an awareness of
the larger operational and strategic context. It provides guidance to subordinates outlining
expectations, constraints/restraints, risks, and mission purpose. Ideally, commander’s
intent should be focused on only what the subordinate needs to accomplish their goals.
It should not include what the subordinate can figure out on their own. Greater
competence and trust enable more concise commander’s intent.
Commander’s intent is not static. Commanders and subordinates should be mindful of
the need for continual feedback and refinement of intent as operations progress.
Commanders should anticipate communication challenges in a contested, degraded, or
operationally limited environment. Clear, consistent, and thorough communication in
advance of operations ensures subordinate flexibility required to adapt when feedback
loops are disrupted.
CREATE SHARED UNDERSTANDING
Shared understanding equips commanders at all levels with the insight and foresight
needed to make effective decisions and manage associated risks. Shared understanding
includes a common awareness and comprehension of the operational environment, the
organization’s competence, the limits of its organic capabilities, and its ability to
accomplish the mission. Commanders should ensure all participants under their control
understand the mission, their capabilities, and their role in achieving mission success.
Commanders and subordinates are equally responsible for creating shared
understanding. Clear communication and timely two-way feedback ensure accurate
shared understanding despite the challenges inherent in dynamic and volatile operational
environments.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
9
EXERCISE DISCIPLINED INITIATIVE
Disciplined initiative is the proactive application of inventiveness and creativity when
existing orders no longer fit the situation or when unforeseen threats or opportunities
arise. It must be informed by a shared understanding of mission objectives, desired
effects, overall commander’s intent, and the broader operational and strategic context.
Empowering subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative, informed by shared
understanding, allows Airmen to operate with greater freedom while still enabling
the high-level of coordination and synchronization required to employ airpower.
Exercising disciplined initiative requires competent, empowered Airmen who continually
seek a shared understanding of their environment and their place in the operational and
strategic context.
Exercising disciplined initiative provides rigidity within commander’s intent, yet retains
flexibility and responsiveness required to gain operational and tactical advantage in an
adverse environment. Commander’s intent outlines the parameters and boundaries under
which a subordinate may operate. Within those boundaries, the empowered subordinate
executes actions to achieve the goals of that mission. This freedom is not given lightly
and requires subordinates to be competent, capable, and possess a thorough
understanding of the operational environment.
BUILD TEAMS THROUGH MUTUAL TRUST
Mutual trust is shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners that
demonstrates reliability and competence to carry out the mission. Importantly, trust can-
not be dictated; it must be earned and built over time through shared experiences.
Competence and integrity are the bedrock of trust. Shared experiences that showcase
these traits build confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners. Failure
on its own cannot be the nemesis of trust. However, leaders should recognize that
incompetence, dishonesty, and pridefulness quickly erode trust.
Effective teams do not form spontaneously; they develop through deliberate effort.
Commanders and leaders should act proactively to create opportunities conducive to the
construction of team building and the establishment of trust between team members.
Trust requires leaders to place an emphasis on the team, on internal and external
collaboration, and on fostering an unwavering dedication to team values and principles.
ACCEPT PRUDENT RISK
All military operations contain uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and often volatile
elements. The complexity of the operational environment and the imperative to delegate
authority demands skillful risk assessment. Commanders must analyze risks in
collaboration with their subordinates to balance the tension between protecting the force
and accepting and managing the risks inherent in mission accomplishment.
Risk tolerance is a derivative of competence. The ability to assess and mitigate risk
increases through training, mentoring, education, and experience. It is imperative for
leaders to build and strengthen their own abilities and that of their subordinates charged
with executing the mission.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
10
Determining whether risk is prudent or not requires an awareness of the wider strategic
and operational environment and a thorough understanding of the associated rewards or
payoffs related to the proposed course of action. Even a minor risk may be unacceptable
for a reward of questionable value. However, an extreme risk may be tolerable or required
to achieve vital tactical, operational, or strategic objectives.
Lastly, as the nature of risk varies at each echelon of command, it is important for
commanders to accurately communicate what constitutes risk at their level. Failure to do
so may lead a subordinate to mistakenly accept unwarranted risk with wider, strategic
consequences not discernable at their level. Subordinate levels of leadership have a
responsibility to frequently balance and communicate risk related to the actions being
taken. Open lines of communication through all levels are directly tied to the success of
creating a shared understanding.
“Go Help Americans”
Following flight operations the night of 10 September 2001,
Lieutenant General (ret.) Marshall “Brad” Webb, then a
Lieutenant Colonel and 20th Special Operations Squadron’s
operations officer, awoke to
the news of ongoing terrorist
attacks. On temporary duty with seven MH
-53 PAVE LOW
helicopters at locations on the eastern seaboard, Lt Col
Webb immediately called the command post at Hurlburt
Field, Florida for guidance. He was directed to “get his
aircr
aft airborne as soon as possible and fly to McGuire
AFB, New Jersey” and report to 21st
Air Force. For the next
seven days, Webb and his crews acted strictly on verbal
orders from the AF/DO passed through
the 21st Air Force
chain of command
--three simple words--“go help Americans!”
Understanding his brief, but unequivocally clear commander’s intent, Webb and his
crews began flying life
-
saving missions into ground zero at the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon without requiring nor requesting additional guidance from higher
headquarters. In coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
urban search and rescue task forces, Webb’s crews flew almost non
-
stop to support
medical teams and rescue operations, often into areas where residual dust and
concrete particulates in the air prevented the flight of police and civilian helicopters.
Though extremely fatigued and dogged by numerous challenges, they overcame
adversity, performed their mission, and achieved commander’s intent. The actions of
Lt C
ol Webb and his crews exemplify mission command.
--Derived from: Darrell D. Whitcomb. “
On a Steel Horse I Ride: A History of the
MH-53 Pave Low Helicopters in War and Peace,” Air University Press.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
11
USE MISSION-TYPE ORDERS WHEN APPROPRIATE
MTOs focus on the purpose of the operation rather than details
of how to perform assigned tasks. MTOs are a technique for
writing orders, not a type of order. Commanders delegate
decisions to subordinates wherever possible, empowering
subordinate initiative to make decisions based on commander’s
guidance rather than constant communications. Subordinates’
understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of
command is essential to mission command.
9
MTOs should empower subordinates with the greatest
possible freedom of action within the guidelines of
commander’s intent.
MTOs are most applicable and effective when there is a reasonable expectation that
the assumptions captured in commander’s intent will remain valid during execution.
MTOs specify authorities that may be enduring, temporary, or conditions-based
depending on the mission or environment.
MTOs should be based on higher-level headquarters priorities and intent and nested
within the five-paragraph order format, which can be adapted and applied to peer and
lower echelons. Planning orders (PLANORDs), operation orders (OPORDs), the joint
air operation plan (JAOP), and the air operations directive (AOD) may serve as
foundational documents for issuing MTOs.
10
On its own, the use of MTOs does not constitute application of a mission command
philosophy. However, MTOs are a tool practitioners of mission command use to
provide commander’s intent and facilitate desired goals of the operation.
Orders can be both verbal and written. A properly formulated (constructed) order
should state the mission, task organization, commander’s intent, and concept of the op-
eration. The level of detail is situationally dependent but should address the minimum
necessary for the subordinate to understand its purpose (why). Not every order requires
an MTO, but a commander should consider the template as a reference to ensure
appropriate information is relayed when giving verbal orders.
9
JP 3-0.
10
According to AFDP 1, The Air Force, the USAF Modified Five-Paragraph Order format consists of the
following sections: 1. Situation; 2. Mission; 3. Execution; 4. Force Sustainment; 5. Command, Signal, and
Communications.
USAF Modified
Five-Paragraph Order
Format (JP 5-0)
1. Situation
2. Mission
3. Execution
4. Force Sustainment
5. Command, Signal
and Communications
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
12
JOINT TASK FORCE PROVEN FORCE
During the Gulf War of 1990
-1991, US Air Forces Europe (USAFE)
aircraft were deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey in the event
approval from the Turkish government was secured to base
operations there. These forc
es were commanded by Brigadier
General Lee A. Downer and organized to form the
7440th Composite
Wing
(Provisional)—the combat arm of Joint Task Force Proven
Force
. The wing was staffed sufficiently to support a combat plans and a comba
t
operations
division and was constituted by a variety of airframes capable of strike,
suppression of enemy air defenses, electronic warfare, surveillance and
reconnaissance, counterair, refueling, and rescue. Resourced with the necessary
organic capabiliti
es, the wing was able to
launch its own strike packages without
assistance from US Air Forces Central (CENTAF).
Turkish approval to conduct operations from Incirlik was not assured
and only
received after Operation
DESERT STORM had begun. As such, the 7440
th
did not
factor heavily into coalition air planning. Instead, CENTAF provided the wing a
mission
-type order (MTO)
to open a second Iraqi front whenever possible. The
order included three broad tasks: 1) deny sanctuary to the Iraqi Air Force by
attacking Iraq’s northern air bases; 2) tie down Iraqi ground forces near the Turkish
border; and 3) attack nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities in northern Iraq.
Because some of the wing’s aircraft lacked the range to attack south of Baghdad,
the wing was assigned a large area of responsibility in northern Iraq. This effectively
gave the wing a de facto “route package.” However, CENTAF retained authority
over the wing’s operational plans as well as the authority to task the wing by
exception.
With a
n MTO
, General Downer operated in accordance with commander’s intent,
but the method of accomplishing his three broad tasks was left to him. Attacks were
planned four to seven days in advance. The wing issued its squadrons
MTOs
and
allowed mission commanders to build strike packages. The 7440th produced its
own ATO and flew 50
–60 combat sorties per day in two or three waves at
General
Downer’s discretion. CENTAF occasionally tasked the wing by exception;
otherwise, General Horner empowered General Downer to effectively “fight” with
his wing.
--Derived from the Gulf War Air Power Survey
and a thesis presented to the
USAF’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies by Major Michael E. Fischer.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
13
WHAT MISSION COMMAND IS NOT
Mission command is a new concept and term in USAF lexicon. It is important to minimize
any confusion on its meaning and application. As such, it is equally important to articulate
what mission command is not.
Mission Command…
Is not delegation of a higher commander’s position or permission to execute their
responsibilities. Authorities can be delegated through proper channels; responsibility
cannot be delegated. The decentralized nature of mission command and delegation
of approval levels require that subordinate commanders understand applicable laws,
policies, and directives.
Is not a command authority. The philosophy of mission command does not grant
subordinates authority to execute missions or make decisions outside of their
commander’s legal authorities. In many cases, the authorities to make certain
operational decisions remain with the JFC or combatant commander (CCDR) unless
specifically delegated in an operation order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO).
Is not approval to ignore established doctrinal practices and tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs). Mission command is not a license to ignore commander’s intent
or take unauthorized or unnecessary risk.
Is not achieved without developing a command climate of mutual trust. Without an
established trust, staffs may be inclined to implement more reporting and control
measures in an attempt to fully monitor, track, and control operations. An unprepared
staff may not be capable of operating within a mission command construct of trust,
shared understanding, intent, and empowerment.
Is not approval to distribute control to an incapable or inappropriate level. Control
inherently implies the ability to plan, coordinate, execute, and assess air operations
as part of a joint force. When considering the complexity and lethality of USAF
operations, the lowest reasonable level to which control might be distributed is an
echelon with the capacity to exercise control authority through adequate staff,
expertise, resources, and communications.
Is not applied in all situations. Certain missions and operations are not suited to a
decentralized approach. Decentralized execution encourages initiative and requires
acceptance of prudent risk. The potential for mistakes makes it an improbable
candidate for missions where consistency and uniformity are required traits (e.g.,
nuclear operations and certain offensive cyber or space operations). Similarly,
commanders may elect to retain authorities or impose restraints to:
 reduce strategic risk;
 preserve resources;
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
14
or when:
 subordinates lack the ability, knowledge, information, or awareness needed
to make decisions.
Though it may be necessary, retention of authority restrains flexibility, initiative, and
responsiveness and may increase tactical risk in rapidly changing situations or when
the information flow is interrupted.
Is not simply the result of issuing mission-type orders (MTO). MTOs are a
tool/technique for transmitting intent to a subordinate commander.
Mission command does not alter the inherent authorities, responsibilities, or functions of
command. However, mission command changes the character of command from
hierarchical, subservient, and directive, to reciprocal and implicitly collaborative.
Distribution of control does not dilute the authority of the commander; rather it proliferates
Strategic Air Command in Vietnam—A Death Grip on Control
Some missions necessitate strict compliance with detailed orders or procedures.
Conversely, some missions equally necessitate flexibility
and
freedom to rapidly adjust
and adapt.
A sobering
example of the danger of retained authority and undue restraint
ca
n be seen in the 24 B-
52s shot down or damaged during Operation Linebacker II
over
North Vietnam.
Strategic Air Command (SAC) was structured to fight a nuclear conflict at a moment’s
notice
. The “SAC Way” was characterized by massed expertise at SAC Headq
uarters
and
highly disciplined aircrew that unquestioningly followed top-down guidance
.
Headquarters
issued strict orders and crews executed missions only as planned
.
Though
such rigidity is paramount for controlling nuclear weapons, this approach
proved f
atal for SAC bombers over North Vietnam.
For Linebacker II, SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, planned the bulk of the B-
52 missions.
In doing so, SAC planners failed to adapt nuclear procedures and
tactics
to account for the mission’s nature and the
threat environment. SAC directed B-
52
formations
to attack Hanoi from the same direction, altitude, and exit routes
on
successive attacks
. Further, crews were restricted
from performing defensive
maneuvers on bomb runs
,
were directed when, and if, they were allowed to jam North
Vietnamese surface
-to-air missile radars and were told how to execute tactical
details
such as
the bank angle for turns after releasing weapons. T
hough crews knew these
directives contributed to losses,
SAC was unwilling to take input from crews returning
from missions.
Instead, combat experience and lessons learned were disregarded
.
Had
SAC allowed mission planners at Guam or Thailand to plan the missions
and
granted
crews the flexibility to control decisions, aircraft and aircrew lives
may have
been saved
.
--
Summary and excerpts from Marshall L. Michel,
The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle
.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
15
that authority across a command, empowering subordinate commanders to exercise
initiative while imploring them to judge performance by the degree to which actions align
with commander’s intent.
THE FIVE Cs OF MISSION COMMAND
While the principles of mission command dictate the actions necessary to apply a mission
command philosophy; character, competence, capability, and cohesion constitute the
individual and organizational attributes commanders should foster and reinforce to build
the individual and organizational capacity required to establish and support a mission
command culture.
11
Character. Mutual respect and trust—the bedrock of a mission command culture—
are built by Airmen of good character. The character of Airman is built on embodiment
of the Air Force core values. Organizations build upon that foundation through training,
discipline, and mentorship aimed at reinforcing desired traits.
Competence. Competence is proficiency in the performance of duties. A mission
command culture cannot exist in an organization whose members do not value and
display a commitment to tactical, technical, and intellectual self-improvement.
Competent commanders, subordinates, and teams are the foundation of a culture that
supports mission command and must be deliberately developed through education,
training, and experience. Consistently observed competence builds trust. Mindful of
the limitations of formal education and training, commanders should seek and create
opportunities for subordinates to develop and increase competency by exercising
disciplined initiative.
Capability. Within this context, the term capability centers on the intra-organizational
mechanisms that drive how a unit functions. It includes an organization’s framework,
processes, procedures, feedback mechanisms, and systems of reward that must
function holistically to establish a mission command culture. For mission command to
be successful, an organization’s structure must be aligned with the principles of
mission command. Complex bureaucracies, isolation from external entities, stifled
autonomy, and ignorance of organizational values are detrimental to the application
of mission command.
Cohesion. Cohesion is paramount to the success of mission command as it directly
affects the ability of that organization to build mutual trust and respect. Commonly
referred to as “unity” or “esprit de corps,” unit cohesion facilitates open communication
between subordinates and supervisors. Together, cohesion and open communication
buttress commander’s intent synergistically. Though cohesion is evident as an
organizational attribute, its foundation is built on relationships between individuals.
This individual focus differentiates cohesion from mutual trust as it includes the
element of morale. This results in transcendence from a unit that exhibits mere trust
to one characterized by genuine camaraderie and formation of a collective identity.
11
Derived from academic and sister Service literature regarding the cultural attributes of mission
command. Though similar, the five Cs have been refined to reflect the Airman’s perspective.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
16
Cohesion directly translates to an organization’s resilience, enabling it to recover and
regroup in the face of adversity.
Capacity. Encompassing the attributes above, capacity is a measure or degree to
which an individual or organization is able, has the potential, or has demonstrated the
ability to operate according to the principles of mission command. Capacity is
enhanced through training that empowers subordinates to act according to the
principles of mission command.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
17
CONCLUSION
Mission Command is the Air Force’s philosophy of leadership. In the star below, the blue
field symbolizes the attributes of the mission command culture. The five points of the star
identify the principles and encompass the actions and daily practices of mission command
leadership. Together, the embodiment of the mission command culture, the practice of its
principles, and guidance provided by commander’s intent enables the execution of
operations through the framework of CC-DC-DE that allows the USAF to fly, fight, and
win now and into the future.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 1-1, Mission Command
18
REFERENCES
All websites accessed 20 July 2023.
Doctrine can be accessed through links provided at: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/
US AIR FORCE DOCTRINE: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/
AFDP 1, The Air Force
AFDN 1-21, Agile Combat Employment
Mission-Type Order Training Tools
JOINT DOCTRINE
Joint Electronic Library (JEL): https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/
JEL+: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2
DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting
JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force
JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations
DOCTRINE FROM OTHER SERVICES
US Army: https://usacac.army.mil/core-functions/doctrine
ADP 6-0, Mission Command
MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS
Bucknam, Col. Mark A., "Responsibility of Command: How UN and NATO
Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia." Air University Press, 2003.
Fischer, Michael E., Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations: The Empowerment
of Air Leadership. Air University Press, 1995.
Grant, Rebecca., Penny Packets, Then and Now. Air & Space Forces Magazine,
2010.
Michel, Marshall L., The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle.
Encounter Books, 2002.
Mulgund, Sandeep, “Evolving the Command and Control of Airpower,” Wild Blue
Yonder, 21 April 2021.
Mulgund, Sandeep, “Driving Change In The Presentation and Employment of
Airpower,” Wild Blue Yonder. 3 February 2023.
Whitcomb, Darrel D., “On a Steel Horse I Ride: A History of the MH-53 Pave Low
Helicopters in War and Peace,” Air University Press, 2012.