SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: SCC03-1653
Lower Tribunal No: 5D01-3851
SHANNON NICHOLS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS
THOMAS P. HOCKMAN, Esquire
Law Offices of Hockman,
Hockman & Hockman
2670 West Fairbanks Ave.
Winter Park, FL 32789
tel(407) 647-3200
fax(407) 647-3252
Florida Bar No: 0057710
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
.....................................
iii
PREFACE TO THE REPLY ....................................... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................................. 1
ARGUMENT .................................................. 2
I. STATE FARM FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PIP STATUTES.
..............
4
II. THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PREVENT THE
OFFER OF JUDGMENT FROM APPLYING TO PIP CASES. ......... 8
III. APPLYING THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO PIP SUITS
DENIES CONSTITUTIONAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS. .......... 9
IV. STATE FARM DOES NOT SHOW HOW A PIP SUIT IS A SUIT FOR
UNDETERMINED DAMAGES AND NOT A SUIT FOR BENEFITS ... 11
V. STATE FARM FAILS TO SHOW POLICY ARGUMENTS IN
FAVOR OF APPLYING THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO PIP. ...... 12
VI. STATE FARM'S POLITICAL ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED. ........ 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.....................................
16
CERTIFICATE OF FONT ....................................... 16
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Adelman v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 805 So.2d 106 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2002)
....
12
Danis Industries v. Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc.,
645 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1994)
....................................
5 - 7
Lake Worth Physical Therapy Corp., v. Progressive Ins. Corp.,
11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 143 (15th Cir., Palm Beach County, 2004)
.........
3
Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974) .................... 9
McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Tilbury Const., Inc., 859 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) .. 8
Moore v. Allstate, 570 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1990) .......................... 11
Nichols v. State Farm, 851 So.2d 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ..... 2, 3, 7 & App. 3
Oruga Corp., Inc. v. AT&T Wireless, 712 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) .... 14
Sarkis v. Allstate Insurance Company, 863 So.2d 210 (Fla. 2003) ............. 9
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. DeSalvo, 748 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1999) .............. 6 - 8
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Fass, 243 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
....
12
Tran v. State Farm, 860 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
................
2, 3
U.S. Security Insurance v. Cahuasqui, 760 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000),
review dismissed as improvidently granted, 796 So.2d 531 (Fla. 2001)
............... 1 - 3, 7, 8, 10,11, 13
Rules
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 (f)(2)
.......................................
14
iv
Statutes
F.S. § 57.105(1)
................................................
8
F.S. § 57.105(6)
................................................
8
F.S. § 627.428
............................................
4 - 7, 9
F.S. § 627.736
................................................
12
F.S. § 627.736(4)(b)
............................................
15
F.S. § 627.736(8) ........................................... 4, 5, 9
F.S. § 768.71(1) ................................................ 4
F.S. § 768.71(3) ................................................ 4
F.S. § 768.79 ........................................ 1, 4, 6, 10, 11
F.S. Annotated § 768.79 ......................................... 10
Laws
General Laws 86 -160, § 58 ....................................... 10
Other Sources
Proposals for Settlement in PIP Cases:
Should U.S. Security Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui be Overturned?,
by Robert N. Heath, Jr. The Florida Bar Journal, April 2001, at 41.
...................... 13 & App. 1
Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Bill: CS/SB 1202
Sponsor: Banking and Insurance Committee and Senator Alexander
April 7, 2003
........................................
15 & App. 2
1
PREFACE TO THE REPLY
Petitioner
= Appellant = Plaintiff = insured = Shannon Nichols
Respondent
= Appellee = Defendant = insurer = State Farm
For brevity, Nichols uses the name of the statute "offer of judgment" in this
Reply Brief and in the Nichols Initial Brief for F.S. § 768.79. State Farm has
chosen to use the name of the rule "proposal for settlement" in its Answer Brief.
Any distinction between them is not significant to this appeal. Both terms are
distinct from an "offer to settle" or "offer of settlement," which predates both the
statute and the rule, and is sometimes confused with them.
State Farm has added a statement of the case and facts to its Answer Brief
which argues disputed facts. No corrections are made here or supplemented as the
disputed facts are not about the issue of law that is to be reviewed.
The Initial Brief of Shannon Nichols and the Brief of Amicus Curia of the
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers are collectively referred to as "the Initial Briefs,"
even though the Amicus Curia does not file a reply brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
State Farm cites to the instant case as precedent to itself, and has made no
attempt to explain the logical problems of the Cahuasqui case that the instant case
was decided on. State Farm has not attempted to distinguish the dissents, and has
1
U.S. Security Insurance v. Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
review dismissed as improvidently granted, 796 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2001).
2
lumped them into a narrow argument. State Farm ignores the language and case
law regarding the conflict of the statutes by just saying since the offer of judgment
applies to "any" civil suit for damages, there can be no conflict, without proving
that the word "any" in the offer of judgment trumps the same word "any" in the
conflicting statutes.
State Farm does not respond to the case law or policy arguments presented.
State Farm's response to the constitutional argument relies on a case decided
before the offer of judgment existed to suggest that it was approved by this Court.
State Farm asks this Court to provide it political relief which the Legislature
refused to provide.
ARGUMENT
The Answer Brief of State Farm is not responsive to the Briefs of Nichols or
the Academy. State Farm cites to the decision below, also to Tran v. State Farm,
860 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) case, and to the Cahuasqui
1
case in an
attempt to provide precedent by pulling itself up by its own bootstraps. No
additional reasoning was provided by the Nichols v. State Farm, 851 So.2d 742
(Fla. 5th DCA 2003) majority opinion below or in the Tran opinion. No attempt
2
Separately, another court has felt bound by the precedential holding of
Cahuasqui, but has copied the instant certified question to this Court in recognition
of the dissents of Cahuasqui and the instant case. "In recognizing that the Nichols
and Cahuasqui case were decided in split opinion, this Court follows suit of those
two opinions and certifies the following question of great public importance: ...."
Lake Worth Physical Therapy Corp., v. Progressive Insurance Corporation, 11 Fla.
L. Weekly Supp. 143 (15th Cir., Palm Beach County, 2003).
3
was made to explain the convoluted rationalization of Cahuasqui, and neither
majority opinion attempted to distinguish the dissents. State Farm's Answer simply
quotes portions of the majority opinion of Cahuasqui and heaps praise on it without
providing substantive support, through logic or caselaw, while heaping derision
upon the dissent of Judge Sawaya in Nichols and ignoring the dissent of Judge
Fisher in Cahuasqui. The Answer fails to admit that the opinion in Tran v. State
Farm certified the same certified question to this court even though it followed the
other previous districts.
2
State Farm only parroted the dicta in the Cahuasqui case, without giving
caselaw examples of parallel reasoning and did not attempt to explain the
inscrutable statement in that case "[t]his rule that the inclusion of one means the
exclusion of another, however, does not mean that the application of one precludes
the additional application of another." Cahuasqui 760 So. 2d at 1105. One can not
tell if the 3rd District Court majority tried to divine a distinction between "inclusion"
4
and "application," or between "exclusion" and "additional application," or if it
merely picked the result it wanted and wrote a justification for the novel result. If a
major change in the law is going to be made, and there is no clear reasoning that is
easy to follow, it should be done by the legislature.
I.
STATE FARM FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PIP STATUTES.
State Farm ignores the other 4 statutes that conflict with the offer of
judgment statute for the payment of fees in a PIP suit. The statutes are:
§627.428 - one way street for attorneys fees in a first party action,
§627.736(8) - attorneys fees issues in a PIP suit shall use the one way street
§768.71(1) - the offer of judgment is only available for actions for damages
§768.71(3) - the offer of judgment will lose every conflict with other statutes
The limiting statute, F.S. § 768.71(3) prevents the application of the offer of
judgment if it "is in conflict with any other provision of the Florida Statutes, such
other provisions shall apply."
The offer of judgment has never won a conflict with any other statute
before. State Farm fails to respond to the law, reasoning, and case law of conflict,
and has failed to show why PIP law is the one instance where the limiting statute
does not prevent application of the offer of judgment. State Farm just challenges
5
that a conflict even exists. However, as the statutes deal with a litigant’s right to a
fee award after a PIP trial, conflict exists.
State Farm's argument begins and ends at just quoting that the offer of
judgment statute reads that it applies to "any" civil action, but State Farm has
provided no other statute, reasoning, or case to prove why the word "any" in the
offer of judgment statute is somehow more powerful than the same word in the
limiting statute. The word "any" is also used in the one-way street statute, F.S. §
627.428. The word "any" is again used in F.S. § 627.736(8) which applies the one-
way street "[w]ith respect to any dispute under" PIP. Also, State Farm does not
answer the argument in the Amicus Brief that the language of F.S. § 626.736(8) is
the mandatory "shall apply" the one-way street statute, which would exclude a
choice of other statutes.
Judge Sawaya's dissent and both of the Initial Briefs gave five cases in which
the offer of judgment's limiting statute prevented it from applying to other statutes.
State Farm has not distinguished these cases and has not provided harmonizing
interpretations.
State Farm attempts to use two cases that referred to the one way street to
support its argument, but those were cases about mitigation of fees, not entitlement
to fees. Danis Industries Corp. v. Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc., 645 So.
6
420 (Fla. 1994) is cited in both Initial Briefs, regarding this Court's recognition that
the one way street runs one way. State Farm makes the naked assertion that Danis
and the later Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. DeSalvo, 748 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1999) "destroys"
the reasoning of the Initial Briefs, but does not state how it "destroys" it. The offer
of judgment is never even mentioned in Danis. In Danis, a subcontractor prevailed
on only a portion of its claims against a surety, and even though it lost on the rest
of the claims, the subcontractor was still entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
Danis, 645 So. 2d at 421. There had been no offer of judgment served on the
subcontractor by the surety.
State Farm also seriously misstates DeSalvo. Wholly by advocate’s fiat,
State Farm, on page 18 of its Answer, tells this Court that, in DeSalvo, “More
generally, the issue was how does F.S. § 768.79, which applies to all civil actions
for money damages, interact with the one way attorneys’ fees provision of F.S. §
627.428 in first party insurance disputes?” This is fantasy, as the opinion does not
even mention F.S. § 768.79.
The crux of State Farm's argument is that since an insurer can offer to settle
a lawsuit, therefore, the offer of judgment statute must also be applicable.
However, insurance companies and sureties were able to settle cases long before
the offer of judgment statute existed, and they may still offer to settle cases without
7
using the offer of judgment statute.
The Cahuasqui majority referred to DeSalvo’s use of one sentence from
Danis to support its assertion that F.S. § 627.428 interacts with the offer of
judgment statute, to wit: “the failure to recover more than an offer of settlement
does not mean that an insured that is awarded some recovery is precluded from
being awarded any portion of their attorney’s fees and costs.” Cahuasqui, 760 So.
2d at 1106. Neither the Cahuasqui majority, nor State Farm explain how this
sentence supports their position since by its plain language it only refers to
insured’s receiving attorney’s fees, not insurers, and not to the offer of judgment.
State Farm attempts to use Danis to harmonize the offer of judgment statute
and the one way street statute. That is not just wrong, but bizarrely wrong. State
Farm gives a summary of the Danis opinion, but it only proves the position of
Nichols, that the one-way street precludes an insurer or surety from getting fees
from the insured. The offer of judgment statute was not involved or even
mentioned anywhere in Danis. Cahuasqui erroneously used the Supreme Court
case of DeSalvo as showing that the offer of judgment interacted with the one-way
street statute. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d 1101, 1106 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2000). But, nowhere in the DeSalvo cite or reasoning is the offer of judgment
referred to. It was a question of what is or is not a prevailing party. DeSalvo
8
straightened out the misinterpretations of Danis, but, now the Cahuasqui court has
misinterpreted DeSalvo as well. Cahuasqui has been used by one court to reiterate
that the one-way street for fees is inviolate, even counter to the fee statute F.S.
§57.105(6), which also applied "to any contract." McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Tilbury
Const., Inc., 859 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st 2004).
State Farm complains that without the law of Cahuasqui, it can't use the offer
of judgment to scare PIP plaintiffs out of the courthouse. But, State Farm can still
limit its exposure to fees by using the traditional method for first party suits; by
offering to settle without using the offer of judgment. As for State Farm's
complaint that it needs the offer of judgment to protect itself from suits without
merit, F.S. 57.105(1) exists for that purpose. To protect itself in the future, State
Farm can deal fairly with its customers. In the instant case, allowing Shannon
Nichols to reschedule the examination with their doctor certainly would have been a
better way.
II.
THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PREVENT THE
OFFER OF JUDGMENT FROM APPLYING TO PIP CASES.
State Farm had no answer to the case law examples of statutory
construction, In fact, of the more than fifty cases cited in Judge Sawaya's dissent,
the Nichols Initial Brief, and the Academy's Amicus Brief, State Farm mentions
9
about five.
Fee shifting, as it runs counter to the common law and policy of Florida
must be narrowly construed. In Sarkis v. Allstate, 863 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2003),after
an exhaustive review of the offer of judgment statute and its corresponding rule,
this Court found that since there was no provision for adding a multiplier to the
attorneys fees in an Un-Insured Motorist case for a successful plaintiff, none could
be added. Likewise, since there is no provision for an insurance company to get
attorneys fees from its first party insured in the one-way street statute, none can be
added.
III. APPLYING THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO PIP SUITS
DENIES CONSTITUTIONAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS.
The No-Fault law, standing alone, is unconstitutional because of the
elimination of the traditional right to sue for injury in tort. It is only the exchange of
this right for the benefit for the almost automatic payment of PIP benefits that
allows No-Fault to survive constitutional muster.
State Farm's constitutional argument is out of time sequence. The Answer
argues that since Lasky v. State Farm, 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), which held the PIP
statute to be constitutional, is absent "any reference to the attorney's fee provisions
of § 627.428 or 627.736(8) or their (alleged) importance to the Act's
10
constitutionality" it must be okay. But the Lasky opinion was rendered in 1974.
F.S. § 768.79 was not made a law until 1986, twelve years later, with § 58, General
Laws Ch. 86-160. (Florida Statutes Annotated §768.79, Derivation).
State Farm argues: "Indeed, an insured can always avoid liability for the
insurer's attorneys' fees by accepting the insurer's proposal for settlement."
(Answer of Respondent, State Farm, pg 38, topic V). State Farm reasons that
since the insured can get into the courthouse, that it has not closed the courthouse
doors to the insured, even though the insured has to run back out after the offer of
judgment to safeguard his property.
State Farm's Answer on page 43 calls the Initial Brief of Nichols "extremely
misleading" for referring to the Senate Staff Analysis that questioned the
constitutional viability of altering the one way street in PIP. Nichols quoted the
Staff Analysis, gave the cite, and included the internet location for rapid review. It
is now attached as an appendix in its entirety.
State Farm's unsupported testimony of how it "usually" settles PIP cases is
just vouching for itself. State Farm makes the unsupported statement that the offer
of judgment has absolutely no impact on the insurance companies decision to pay
suits. This is as unsupported as the Cahuasqui majority's novel finding that the
offer of judgment has no impact on the filing of a suit. The remainder of this part
3
As to the statements of Nichols's attorney’s fee expert, his statements were
related to the fact that State Farm was asking for fees he considered "hugely
puffed" or "churned" on a case that would have been easy to take to trial early, and
that State Farm refused to provide any requested production as to actual payment
received, as opposed to that just billed to State Farm. (R. 385 - 387).
4
This is another flaw in majority opinion of Cahuasqui. The Third District assumes
that since Fla. Stat. 768.79 is applicable to a first party UM action, is it equally
applicable to first party PIP action. The flaw of this analysis assumes that both
actions seek damages and thus they are subject to Section 768.79. Cahuasqui,760
So.2d at 1106.
11
of the Answer is non-legal characterizations as to the motivations of other persons,
and self serving statements unsupported by fact, case or testimony.
3
IV.
STATE FARM DOES NOT SHOW HOW A PIP SUIT IS A SUIT FOR
UNDETERMINED DAMAGES AND NOT A SUIT FOR BENEFITS.
State Farm's Answer shows that it does not understand the difference
between a suit for undetermined damages and a suit to determine rights. In the
instant case, the rights are the benefits of the personal injury protection policy.
The instant suit could have been brought as a declaratory action to determine
the right to statutory benefits. The sole question for the jury was whether Shannon
Nichols unreasonably refused to attend State Farm's examination.
State Farm’s reliance on Moore v. Allstate Insurance Co., 570 S0.2d (Fla
1990) is misplaced because Moore was a UM suit. To compare a UM action with
a PIP suit is like comparing apples to oranges.
4
Although the insured in a UM
12
action must prove coverage, Adelman v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 805 So.2d
106, 110 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2002), once this burden is met, the action becomes a tort
action where the insured must prove liability and damages. See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins, Co. v. Fass, 243 So.2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 1971): (“The proof of
[the] tort claim against uninsured motorist proceeds with the same burdens of proof
as if it were filed as an action in tort.”)(alteration in original). A PIP suit, however,
is an action to enforce the security promised to all Floridians by the Legislature
under Fla. Stat. 627.736.
V. STATE FARM FAILS TO SHOW POLICY ARGUMENTS IN
FAVOR OF APPLYING THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO PIP.
State Farm lumps all the policy arguments of the dissents and the Briefs into
a simple set of arguments that it assigns to Judge Sawaya. (Answer Brief p. 26).
State Farm works hard to mock the opinion of Judge Sawaya but provides no legal
response.
State Farm acknowledges the situation where a victorious PIP plaintiff's
judgment would not rise to 75% of the offer of judgment, but then states that it
would be an extremely rare occurrence. In a footnote, the appellate attorney for
State Farm tries to testify that he had never seen such occur in 8 years of PIP suits.
This is de hors the record, but it is an admission that State Farm does not make
5
Robert N. Heath, Jr., submitting on behalf of the Trial Lawyers Section,
Proposals for Settlement in PIP Cases: Should U.S. Security Ins. Co. v.
Cahuasqui be Overturned?, The Florida Bar Journal, April 2001, at 41.
Appendix tab 1.
13
reasonable offers of judgment in an attempt to settle a PIP lawsuit, but only bad
faith, trivial offers for the purpose of getting to use the threat of attorney's fees. In
fact, State Farm had a motive to cut off her treatment as soon as possible, because
it did not want to pay for treatment to build a case against itself for her Un-Insured
Motorist case.
The Cahuasqui majority’s statement: "[w]e find that the application of the
offer of judgment statute to PIP actions does nothing to alter this "reasonable
alternative," because the statue has no deterrent effect on the filing of PIP suits",
is a finding of a fact fashioned out of whole cloth, without any supporting
testimony or empirical evidence. It was procedurally improper and it has been
publicly questioned as bizarre: "However, if the claimant is out of work or makes
only minimum wage, the risk of having to potentially pay thousands of dollars in
attorneys' fees, however small that risk might be, would be truly terrifying."
5
Separately, State Farm does not respond to other arguments in the dissents
and Briefs regarding the problems with applying the offer of judgment to PIP suits,
including that it would provide a windfall to insurance companies that had already
6
John C. Davis, Offers of Judgment and Tenders of Relief before Class
Certification, When is it Permissible to Pick Off the Class Representative?, The
Florida Bar Journal, November 2002, at 10.
14
been paid by premiums for their attorney’s fees, and that it would unlevel the
playing field.
If Cahuasqui is allowed to stand, it will reverberate through other areas, such
as workers compensation and sureties for construction subcontractors.
The recommendations of the "Grand Jury," were used as justification for the
changes made to the PIP law in 2003. No change was made to the one way street.
State Farm now asks this Court to make changes that the Legislature did not make.
The Answer refers to Oruga Corporation, Inc. v. AT&T Wireless, 712 So.
2d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) to suggest that courts must follow the letter of the law
even though it leads to an obviously unjust result when applied to a new area.
Thus, it aligns itself with a case that guarded the special protection that is provided
to those who commit mass fraud. The Oruga problem was later corrected.
6
In
Oruga, the district court reluctantly applied the offer of judgment to Mr. Ruiz,
because it was afraid that protecting the class representative from such threats was
beyond its power. Id. at 1143. This Court later altered the Proposal for Settlement
Rule in a way which prevents another Oruga injustice, now an offer of judgment
7
Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Bill: CS/SB 1202, Sponsor:
Florida Banking and Insurance Committee and Senator Alexander, April 7, 2003
Appendix tab 2.
15
does not run until after the class has been certified. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 (f)(2).
To answer the question certified here in the affirmative is to render the No-
Fault plan not only a No-Pay plan, but also, a We-Dare-You- To-Sue-Us plan.
VI.
STATE FARM'S POLITICAL ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED.
State Farm makes a political argument of fraud, but there is no question of
fraud here. There was no dispute over the fact that Shannon Nichols was getting an
ultrasound examination the same morning that she was scheduled for the F.S. §
627.736(4)(b) examination by State Farm's chosen doctor. Regarding its
arguments about fraud by a medical provider, State Farm's wants to make innocent
insureds suffer for the actions of the sometimes wealthy health care provider, out
of sympathy for the much more wealthy insurance company.
State Farm's reference to, and inclusion of, the Grand Jury report is a red
herring. Even when the language conflict of the statutes was going to be removed
by the bill, the Legislative Summary still warned about the constitutional problem
that would still remain based on access to the courts.
7
16
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy hereof has been furnished to Ken Hazouri, Esq., of
deBeubien, Knight, Simmons, Mantazaris & Neal, 332 N. Magnolia Ave., Orlando,
FL, 32802, tel. 422-2454, fx 849-1845 and Philip D. Parrish, Esq., Two Datran
Center, Suite 1705, 9130 South Dadeland Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33156, tel.
305-670-5550, fx 305-670-5552, by_____ this___day of ______, 2004.
_________________________________________
THOMAS P. HOCKMAN, ESQ., FBN: 0057710
Law Offices of Hockman, Hockman & Hockman
2670 West Fairbanks Ave., Winter Park, FL 32789
(407) 647-3200 Attorneys for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF FONT
I certify that this brief is submitted in Times New Roman 14-point font,
which is proportionately spaced, and complies with the font requirements of Fla. R.
App. P. Rule 9.210.
_________________________________________
THOMAS P. HOCKMAN, ESQ.
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: SC03-1653
Lower Tribunal No: 5D01-3851
SHANNON NICHOLS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
APPENDIX
TO
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS
THOMAS P. HOCKMAN, Esquire
Law Offices of Hockman,
Hockman & Hockman
2670 West Fairbanks Ave.
Winter Park, FL 32789
tel(407) 647-3200
fax(407) 647-3252
Florida Bar No: 0057710
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
INDEX
TAB
Proposals for Settlement in PIP Cases: Should
U.S. Security Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui be Overturned?
By Robert N. Heath, Jr., Florida Bar Journal,
April 2001, p. 39
................................................
1
Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement
Bill: CS/SB 1202
Sponsor: Banking and Insurance Committee and
Senator Alexander
April 7, 2003 ................................................... 2
Nichols v. State Farm, 851 So.2d 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
(the opinion below) ............................................. 3
