HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE POLICY ON UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT TO NON-UNITED NATIONS SECURITY FORCES

Note

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply the

expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning

the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the

delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

All worldwide rights reserved

Cover images: UN Photo/OHCHR and UN Photo/Tim McKulka

This Guidance Note has not been formally edited, with the exception of the text of the “Human rights

due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces”

(A/67/775 – S/2013/110), in Annex IV.

Cover image: UN Photo/Tim McKulka

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .................................................................................................... 6

I. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................... 7

II. COMMUNICATION OF THE POLICY .................................................................................... 12

III. RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATORY MEASURES ........................................................ 15

IV. MONITORING FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................ 30

V. PROCEDURES FOR INTERVENTION .................................................................................. 34

ANNEX I: RISK ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE ...................................................................................... 35

ANNEX II: SAMPLE LETTER TO COMMUNICATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE

POLICY TO NATIONAL AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. 38

ANNEX III: GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (GPRAF) ........... 40

ANNEX IV: HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE POLICY ON UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT TO

NON-UNITED NATIONS SECURITY FORCES .................................................................................. 43

CASEVAC

Casualty Evacuation

GPRAF

General and preliminary risk assessment framework

Humanitarian Coordinator

Human rights

HRDDP

Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

M&E

Monitoring and evaluation

MARA

Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements

MEDEVAC

Medical Evacuation

MONUSCO

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo

MRM

Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism

OCHA

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

ONUCI

United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire

Resident Coordinator

SRSG

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

United Nations

UNCT

United Nations country team

UNMISS

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

This Guidance Note was developed as a follow up to Secretary-General (SG) decision

2012/14 and in response to a need identified during the review of implementation of the

Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) conducted in 2012. The October 2012

Update to the Policy Committee by the HRDDP Review Group states that “there is also

a need for additional system-wide guidance to support implementation, which should

be flexible and complementary to guidance specific to each United Nations (UN) entity.

The Review Group should support this aim by developing a framework for

implementation of the policy at country level under the leadership and coordination of

the most senior UN official in-country (Special Representative of the Secretary-General

(SRSG) or Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC)) as well as a

guidance note, including models of risk assessments, monitoring frameworks, and

procedures for intervention. […The] guidance will be flexible and take into account the

different contexts in which the policy may be implemented as well as the specific

mandate of the UN entity concerned” and will be complementary to any specific internal

guidance that may be established by UN entities that provide support to non-UN

security forces. During the second review of the policy in October 2013, the Review

Group decided that the HRDDP Guidance Note should be finalized and disseminated

as a matter of priority.

The Guidance Note was developed by the Review Group building on experience to

date on the application of the HRDDP in different countries and contexts. The text of

the policy, which is mandatory, is attached to the note. The Guidance Note should be

read in conjunction with the policy and provides clarification on some aspects of the

policy, a suggested framework for implementation at country level suited to various

settings as well as examples and templates.

For the purpose of this note, the following terms should be understood as explained

below:

 “HRDDP” or “policy”: Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to

non-UN security forces;

 “Support” is understood to mean any of the following activities:

a. training, mentoring, advisory services, capacity- and institution-building

and other forms of technical cooperation for the purpose of enhancing

the operational capabilities of non-UN security forces;

b. ad hoc or programmatic support to civilian or military authorities directly

responsible for the management, administration or command and

control of non-UN security forces;

c. financial support, including payment of salaries, bursaries, allowances

and expenses, whatever the source of the funds;

d. strategic or tactical logistical support to operations in the field conducted

by non-UN security forces;

e. operational support to action in the field conducted by non-UN security

forces, including fire support, strategic or tactical planning; and/or

f. joint operations conducted by UN forces and non-UN security forces.

 “Recipient” or “Beneficiaries” is understood as non-UN security forces

(national or regional) receiving UN support.

 “UN entity” means UN peacekeeping operation, special political mission, any

United Nations office, agency, fund and programme.

 “Grave violations” refers to the actions defined under paragraph 12 of the

policy.

Regardless of any precise analysis of the scope of application of the policy to UN

activities in the country, all UN field presences engaged to some extent with national or

regional security forces are encouraged to implement the initial phases of HRDDP (see

below, Communication and Risk Assessment). In so doing, the preventive aspect of the

HRDDP will be maximized, and the need to apply the policy in its entirety in specific

cases or situations may be reduced.

Communication and Risk Assessment should start as soon as one or more UN entities

in a country contemplate providing support to non-UN security forces.

The scope of application of the policy raises mainly two questions:

(1) Whether support is provided to security forces as defined by the policy

The policy provides for a clear definition of national (or state) security forces and

regional peacekeeping forces, to which it applies. UN peacekeeping forces, private

security companies or non-State armed groups are excluded from the policy.

A “common sense” approach is advisable when UN entities analyse the scope of

application of the policy with regard to support recipients, including in order to avoid

sending the wrong signals to the recipients of support. For example, although not

explicitly mentioned in the policy, the UN support provided to prison or correction

officers falls within the HRDDP scope of application, in view of the nature of their

functions and keeping in mind the objectives of the HRDDP.

(2) Whether the type of support provided – or planned to be provided – falls

under any of the categories specified in the policy.

The text of the policy refers to a large variety of support and only provides for a limited

number of exceptions.

The text as well as the objectives of the policy make it clear that the latter applies to

most forms of UN support and exceptions should therefore be interpreted

restrictively. Moreover, similar to what was mentioned in relation to the first question,

it is important for UN entities not to send the wrong signals by, for example, implying

that grave violations committed by recipients of some forms of UN support not strictly

covered by the policy might be “acceptable”. Finally, it is important to note that the

exceptions relate only to the scope of application of the policy. Violations committed by

security forces in the specific contexts referred to by the exceptions continue to be

addressed by the UN system through other mechanisms and processes.

Implementation of the policy at country level involves four consecutive

phases:

1. Communication of the policy to national authorities and other external partners;

2. Risk assessment and, if relevant, mitigating measures;

3. Monitoring;

4. Intervention when grave violations are committed.

While these four phases are consecutive, one does not necessarily end when the next

phase starts. For example, the communication phase may or, depending on

circumstances, should continue throughout the support. The risk assessment should be

an ongoing exercise; it should be updated regularly on the basis of new circumstances,

cases or measures taken by security forces receiving support. If grave violations are

reported under phase III (monitoring framework) and trigger an intervention under

phase IV, monitoring (phase III) will need to resume to ascertain if and when support

could be resumed.

UN entities have primary responsibility for disseminating the policy within their own

structure and applying it in relevant forms of support that they provide. At the same

time, many UN entities in the field as well as at headquarters have emphasized, as

does the policy, the important role of the most senior UN official in-country (SRSG, RC,

HC) in policy implementation, including in order to ensure that the policy is applied in a

consistent and coherent manner by all relevant UN entities in the country. This role

primarily includes:

 leading the first phase of implementation of the policy, namely communication

to relevant state authorities and other external partners, and respond to

possible questions about the policy’s scope of application;

 initiating and coordinating United Nations Country Team (UNCT) efforts to

promote consistency in the implementation of the policy across the UN-system,

including by developing a common general and preliminary risk assessment for

all national security forces, as appropriate (see box on GPRAF in Chapter III);

If the risk assessment concludes to a high probability of recipient security forces’ committing the types of violations

envisaged under the HRDDP, the next step would be intervention (phase IV).

 providing support to UN entities, and ensuring coordinated action, in the

intervention phase, when grave violations have been committed and have not

been appropriately addressed, or when support should be suspended or

withdrawn, including by taking, as appropriate, a leading role in communicating

with relevant authorities.

Some peacekeeping missions have established HRDDP task forces or working groups,

which analyse requests for support and make recommendations to the mission

leadership in accordance with HRDDP requirements. When they include

representatives of various UN entities, these HRDDP bodies can also play an important

role in coordinating the HRDDP process for the entire UN-system at country level. The

issue of coordination among UN entities in-country regarding HRDDP implementation

is addressed throughout this Guidance Note.

As indicated by the policy, the implementation framework to be established by UN

entities providing support to non-UN security forces includes “general operational

guidance […] on implementation of the policy”. Such internal procedures are aimed at

regulating most aspects addressed in the Guidance Note. They have already been

established by some UN entities at headquarters and field levels and have proved to

be essential to ensure policy implementation by making the process more predictable.

At the field level, a number of peacekeeping and special political missions have

adopted Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for HRDDP implementation. In most

cases, only the relevant missions are bound by the SOPs, and not the UNCTs.

However, experience to date suggests that it is preferable for all UN entities present in-

country to adopt the same SOP, if necessary in addition to any internal regulation, and

the policy encourages this approach as well. The HRDDP Task Force or Working

Group established under such a joint or common SOP could thus include members of

both the UNCT and the mission, therefore ensuring that all UN perspectives (human

rights, humanitarian, and development) are considered in taking HRDDP-related

decisions.

The policy does not indicate whether UN entities should devote specific or additional

resources and staff for the implementation of the HRDDP. It is for UN entities to assess

whether HRDDP activities can be carried out within existing resources or not. In many

cases, these tasks will be carried out within existing resources and capacity, including

because relevant dedicated capacity is in place (e.g. HR components of peacekeeping

or special political missions) and because certain HRDDP tasks are already carried out

for other purposes (e.g. monitoring of security forces). In some cases however,

especially whenever there is no UN human rights capacity present in the country or

related mechanisms (for example MRM, MARA) which could carry out these tasks, the

UN entity may have to consider devoting additional resources or reorganize existing

ones.

ACTIONS to be taken AT THE OUTSET and on a

CONTINUED basis

COMMUNICATION

→ Initial/formal communication on HRDDP by SRSG/RC/HC

→ Continued communication by UN entities with national authorities, other Member

States, civil society/NGOs

MAPPING/ANALYSIS/SOP/ESTABLISHMENT OF HRDDP MONITORING

At UNCT level

→ Conduct a mapping of existing/planned UN support to non-UN security forces in-

country (optional but recommended)

→ Conduct a General and Preliminary Risk Assessment of all national security

forces (optional but recommended)

→ Identify “HRDDP monitoring” capacity for UN-system in-country

At UN entity level

→ Establish a “procedure for intervention” or SOP

→ Establish HRDDP monitoring mechanism

ACTIONS to be taken when SUPPORT is

REQUESTED/PLANNED/ONGOING

SUPPORT IS REQUESTED/PLANNED/ONGOING

→ Ensure adequate information is available on the support requested/planned

→ Analyse scope of application of the HRDDP regarding support

RISK ASSESSMENT AND IDENTIFICATION OF MITIGATORY MEASURES

→ Conduct Risk Assessment

→ Identify Mitigatory Measures (if relevant)

→ Communicate decision on support to recipient/national authorities

→ Integrate HRDDP elements of support (mitigatory measures) in a written/formal

document (MoU, letter, handover certificate, project document)

HRDDP MONITORING

→ Monitor recipient’s behaviour on grave violations and responses

→ Communicate regularly with recipient on human rights related issues, including

cases of violations

→ Adapt risk assessment and mitigatory measures if necessary

ACTIONS

for grave

violations

IF GRAVE VIOLATIONS ARE COMMITTED

→ Intervene with recipient to bring violations to an end

→ (when relevant) Notify recipient of suspension/interruption of support

In all countries where the UN system is currently engaged – or likely to be engaged – in

any form of support to non-UN security forces,

the most senior UN Official is required

to communicate the HRDDP to the Government. This communication should be formal

and in writing (a sample letter is available in Annex II).

In addition to the need for transparency which is emphasized by the policy,

such

communication may play a preventive role by informing the authorities in advance that

in the context of UN support to non-UN security forces, the UN system has to comply

with certain rules, and that it may have to include certain measures in – or require

certain guarantees for – the support it will provide, that it may not be able to provide

support to security forces in certain situations where there exist a risk of grave

violations or that it may have to interrupt its support in certain situations envisaged

under the policy. In any country where this initial communication has not been done

yet, such communication should take place as soon as possible.

In countries where UN support to non-UN security forces is taking place or where such

support is envisaged, the UN system is encouraged to follow up on this formal

communication with additional engagement in the form of discussions, briefings or

presentations of the policy to relevant national authorities, in particular security forces

concerned by the support. These will allow to explain that implementation of the

HRDDP can be more effective if security forces are involved, including for example

with regard to the identification of mitigatory measures (see below), as well as to

strengthen the policy’s preventive impact by directly explaining to security forces the

possible consequences of certain behaviours.

“Effective implementation of the HRDDP requires the understanding and cooperation of

all stakeholders, including donor and programme countries, troop- and police-

contributing countries of UN peacekeeping and political missions. Each entity

mandated to or anticipating support for non-UN security forces shall engage proactively

with Member States and other relevant partners and stakeholders to explain the policy”

(HRDDP, para. 18).

This communication should be carried out irrespectively of whether any UN support falls within the scope of application

of the policy because it is mainly aimed at informing the concerned authorities about UN policy and not, at least initially,

at actually applying the policy to a particular form of support.

HRDDP, para. 2 (b), 18, 19 and 22.

Communication of the policy to external actors will facilitate effective implementation of

the policy at country level and promote a coherent approach by international actors

towards assistance to security forces, including in the context of security sector reform

(SSR). It will also strengthen the ability of the UN system in-country to influence the

behaviour of security forces through the HRDDP and, thereby, contribute to the overall

mandate of the mission or UNCT.

While the UN system should be as transparent as possible with national authorities and

other actors about HRDDP principles, UN entities do not have to necessarily share the

details of their HRDDP analysis in relation to specific requests for support. For

example, UN entities may not want to share HRDDP risk assessments and will rather

limit themselves to communicate to national authorities the concerns they have

identified as a result of the risk assessment exercise and the mitigatory measures they

suggest accordingly. They will also decide on a case-by-case basis whether they want

to associate the recipients to the identification of mitigatory measures, according to the

context and the type of support. Finally, it may be useful for UN entities to adopt a

communication strategy.

In the case of support to regional peacekeeping forces, such as those established by

the African Union, communication about the policy was made from Headquarters via a

letter from the Secretary General to the African Union and a Note Verbale to Member

States contributing troops to the regional forces, informing them about the policy and its

application, and requesting information relevant to carrying out a risk assessment,

including on commanding officers. Such communication may influence Troop

Contributing Countries’ selection of the units that will be deployed to the regional

forces.

Monitor and Review

Support is PROVIDED

Support is REQUESTED

Communicate and consult

RISK ASSESSMENT

Support is PLANNED

Support is

provided

normally

Mitigatory measures

to be fulfilled before

support is provided

No support

is provided

until

situation

changes

and/or

justifies

new RA

Grave violations are reported

No risk

identified

Risks exist but mitigatory

measures identified

Risk is too

high

Not

fulfilled

Mitigatory measures

to be fulfilled

throughout support

Not

fulfilled

Support proceeds

UN entity intervenes with

support recipient

Violations are adequately

addressed

Violations are not

adequately addressed

Support continues

Support

suspended/interrupted

The policy provides that UN entities contemplating or involved in providing support to

non-UN security forces should conduct “an assessment of the risks involved in

providing or not providing such support, in particular the risk of the recipient entity

committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law or

refugee law” (HRDDP, para. 2 (a)). The policy also provides for the identification of

mitigatory measures “[w]here, as a result of this risk assessment, the UN entity

directly concerned concludes that there are substantial grounds for believing that there

is a real risk of the intended recipient committing grave violations of international

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law” (HRDDP, para. 16). The policy therefore

provides for an exercise to be carried out by relevant UN entities that includes two

mutually dependent parts:

1. the assessment of the risks and, as appropriate,

and

2. the identification of measures to mitigate those risks.

The following section analyses the two parts of this phase.

A risk assessment can take different forms and may be carried out in different

manners. The purpose of this section is to provide guidance on how to conduct this

exercise in the most efficient manner.

The HRDDP risk assessment is the exercise by which a UN entity will evaluate whether

“there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the intended

recipient [of support] committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human

rights, or refugee law”. Such “grave violations” do not need to be committed as a result

of the support provided. In other words, it is not necessary to assess whether UN

support may facilitate the commitment of “grave violations”. The important factor is that

such “grave violations” may be committed by the recipients of UN support in the

context or the period of support.

By definition, a risk is related to an event that has not yet taken place and may never

take place. The risk assessment is an evaluation of the likelihood of future events. UN

entities are therefore not expected to ascertain that a specific event will occur; they

only need to assess a level of risk according to a number of criteria (see below).

The risk assessment could indeed conclude that the risk of grave violations is too high and cannot be mitigated by

measures.

However, the fact that a form of support may potentially facilitate or contribute to the commission of grave human

rights violations is an element that should be considered under the HRDDP risk assessment (see below).

According to the policy, a risk assessment should be conducted before any support is

provided. In practice however, this may not always be possible. The following

scenarios may occur:

Support is already provided by a UN entity

In a number of situations, support was already being provided by the UN entity before

the adoption of the policy. This is, for example, the case of pre-existing technical or

financial assistance projects or programmes aimed at national armies or police. In

these situations, if the risk assessment has not been carried out, it should be done at

the earliest opportunity.

Support is planned or under consideration by the UN entity

This would be, for example, the case of a plan to support national security forces

through an SSR programme/project. In these situations, a UN entity may have

discussed support with the potential recipient or received a request for support from the

latter. In either case, support has not started and the risk assessment should be carried

out before a decision is taken regarding the provision of support or – at the latest -

before the beginning of the actual support. It may also be the case of an expected

Security Council mandate requesting the UN to provide support to national forces or a

regional peacekeeping operation.

Support is requested – or offered – on a regular basis

In some situations, the UN entity is regularly faced with requests for support from non-

UN security forces, including in the case of so-called ‘routine’ support. This is, for

example, the case of peacekeeping operations such as UNMISS, ONUCI or

MONUSCO, which receive frequent and regular requests for different types of support

from the national army or police. In these cases, it is recommended that UN entities

conduct a risk assessment independently of the specific requests for support, and

sufficiently wide in scope so as to be relevant to a variety of requests for support that

may be received (based on the General and Preliminary Risk Assessment Framework

described in the box below). In these cases, the risk assessment should be on-going

and regularly updated on the basis of new developments or incidents regarding the

human rights conduct of the relevant security forces. The main advantage of an on-

going risk assessment is that, in contexts where decisions on providing support to non-

UN security forces must be taken quickly, it allows the UN entity to minimize its

response time because it can base its decision on an existing risk assessment.

Support is provided by different UN entities at different times

In some countries, different types of support are provided to the same non-UN security

forces at different times by various UN entities. Also in these situations, it is

recommended that the UN system in-country develops a General and Preliminary Risk

Assessment Framework (see box below).

As a general rule, HRDDP risk assessments have to be carried out as early as possible

whenever support is planned or requested and even more so when support is being

provided. The risk assessment is an on-going exercise. It will need to be updated

regularly, and especially when a significant event is likely to affect its conclusions

(instance of serious violations committed, change in legislation, reform of the army,

etc.).

When support is planned or already provided to non-UN security forces by two or more

UN entities, or when frequent requests for support are anticipated, peacekeeping

operations, special political missions and UNCTs are encouraged to develop as early

as possible, a General and Preliminary Risk Assessment Framework (GPRAF).

The main objectives of this process are to (i) avoid duplication of efforts (different UN

entities are involved in a variety of support to the same national security forces or one

UN entity is involved in different types of support to the same security forces), (ii)

ensure a coherent and consistent assessment of security forces among UN entities

and (iii) ensure a common approach by the UN system in-country with regard to

security forces.

The GPRAF is a basic inter-agency risk assessment, to be carried out under the

coordination of the most senior UN official in-country (SRSG, RC, HC), describing the

common position of the UN system with regard to the level of risk that generally exists

for security forces in-country to commit grave human rights violations. The GPRAF

compiles relevant and available information regarding human rights violations

committed by security forces and other relevant information on security forces. Ideally,

it should be approved by the UNCT (see template in Annex III). Such document will

also facilitate and speed up the process of individual risk assessments in relation to

specific requests for/forms of support that each UN entity needs to undertake under the

HRDDP.

While any UN entity that contemplates to engage in a specific form of support to

national or regional security forces will conduct a specific risk assessment related to

that support, the GPRAF may provide the basis for this specific risk assessment and

avoid repetition, duplication and incoherence. While the GPRAF does not eliminate the

need for the supporting UN entities to carry out a specific risk assessment on the basis

of their mandate and the specific nature of the support, the GPRAF will facilitate (and

shorten) the conduct of the latter.

Developing a GPRAF will thus benefit all UN entities engaging in support to non-UN

security forces and present the following advantages:

- It allows the UN system in-country to be proactive rather than reactive (to a

request for support) thereby strengthening efficient HRDDP implementation;

- An economy of time and resources for most UN entities engaged or planning to

engage in support to non-UN security forces;

- A general agreement within the UN system in-country about the existence (or

not) of a general risk regarding relevant security forces;

- A joint effort in collecting information available with different UN entities present in

the country;

- Avoiding duplication, contradictions and incoherence among the UN system in a

given country.

Content

The GPRAF should include the following parts:

- A compilation of information publicly available on the human rights conduct of

non-UN security forces (see below);

- A compilation of other relevant information about the conduct of security forces

available internally within the UN system present in the country;

- A mapping of existing non-UN security forces present in the country and

information about their structure (including organigramme), the identity of the

most senior officers and the main chains of command;

- A mapping/overview of the various forms of support provided – or planned to be

provided – by the different UN entities in-country with the identification of

recipients.

- A general assessment regarding the existence of a risk (to the effect that a UN

entity planning to engage in support to a security force that is referred to in the

GPRAF as presenting a risk, would need to proceed with a detailed risk

assessment)

The GPRAF should be a living document that can be updated regularly on the basis of

specific developments or incidents.

 Human rights record (HRDDP, para. 14 (a)): The record of the intended

recipient(s) in terms of compliance or non-compliance with international

humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including any specific record of

grave violations. This analysis of the recipient’s past conduct should not be

limited to the possible commission of grave violations as defined under the

It is useful that the GPRAF includes a mapping/overview of the various support – regularly – provided by the different

UN entity in-country with the identification of recipients.

policy. Other types of less serious violations are equally relevant to the risk

assessment as they may lead to grave violations. The supporting UN entity will

decide the extent of the period taken into consideration to assess the human

rights record of intended recipients depending on the specific circumstances in

the country, the type of support envisaged and other elements that UN entities

consider relevant. In assessing the human rights record of intended recipients,

UN entities are not expected to investigate or make a final determination on

specific cases of human rights violations that have been committed in the past;

they only need to review reliable information related to allegations of human

rights violations that would contribute to determine a certain level of risk of

recurrence in the future. The HRDDP does not set a threshold of evidence for

past cases of violations to be considered. The threshold “reasonable grounds to

believe” referred to in the HRDDP only relates to the risk itself.

It should be noted that information is not always available regarding specific

individuals. In a number of situations, there may only be reliable information

about human rights violations committed by a unit, a service or even an entire

institution (i.e. the police), without having information about names of

perpetrators. These cases should be considered as seriously as others for the

purpose of risk assessments. For support to regional peacekeeping forces, the

UN entity will look into the record of security forces of each Troop Contributing

Country. Nevertheless, if available, UN entities will try to obtain information

about individuals in a position of command or responsibility as these may help

to assess more accurately the level of risk in engaging in support.

 Accountability record (HRDDP, para. 14 (b)): The record of the recipient(s) in

taking or failing to take effective steps and corrective measures to hold

perpetrators of any such violations accountable, both generally and for specific

cases of violations.

The effective nature of the “steps” should be assessed on

the basis of relevant international human rights standards (for example, a mere

disciplinary procedure is not adequate for an act of torture);

 Prevention mechanisms (HRDDP, para. 14 (c)): Whether any corrective

measures or mechanisms have been taken or institutions, protocols or

procedures put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such

violations and, if so, their adequacy, including institutions to hold any future

perpetrators accountable;

 Legislative / policy framework: Whether certain legislations or policies, for

example a so-called “shoot to kill” policy, may contribute to increasing the risk of

grave violations;

 Feasibility of monitoring framework (HRDDP, para. 14 (e)): The feasibility of

the UN putting in place effective mechanisms to monitor the use and impact of

the support provided. Practical challenges do not relieve the UN entity from its

monitoring obligations under the policy. Rather, in situations where monitoring

the behaviour of support recipients is practically impossible despite the

existence of a risk, the UN entity may have to reconsider its support altogether.

For example, the accountability record of certain security forces may be generally satisfactory except for a major

incident where serious violations have remained unaddressed.

 UN’s ability to influence and risk of not providing support (HRDDP, para.

14 (d) & (f)): An assessment of the degree to which providing or withholding

support would affect the UN’s ability to influence the behaviour of the receiving

entity in terms of its compliance with international humanitarian, human rights

and refugee law. In some situations where, for example, the support is essential

to the functioning of the recipient entity, providing the support will increase the

ability of the UN to influence the recipient, including regarding compliance with

international standards. In other situations where, for instance, UN support only

represents a minor portion of the support received, its ability to influence the

recipient entity may be reduced. This also includes an assessment based on

the factors above and on the overall context of the support, of the risk that the

receiving entity might commit grave violations of international humanitarian,

human rights, or refugee law even if it does not receive UN support. In some

situations, withdrawal of UN support may even result in an increased

vulnerability of civilian populations that the recipient security forces should

protect. This is the case, for example, where security forces start looting the

population because they do not receive necessary food and water supplies. In

other situations, the provision of support may enable the recipient to carry out

military operations that carry an important risk for civilian populations.

 Risks inherent to the operation: The assessment should not only take into

consideration the past behaviour of security forces that may receive support but

also the risks that are inherent to the operation (if relevant) for which support is

provided. For example, certain types of military or security operations such as

counter-terrorism operations, or those planned to be conducted in heavily

populated areas, may carry additional risks due to their very nature and

independently from the record of those security forces that carry them out.

 Risks inherent to the kind of support envisaged: The assessment should

also take into consideration whether the type of support requested or envisaged

could potentially contribute or facilitate the commission of grave human rights

violations or whether such support could be used in a way to commit grave

human rights violations.

According to the policy, information for the risk assessment should be obtained from

UN or other reliable sources (para. 15). In some countries, relevant information may

not be available from UN presences on the ground. The UN entity will therefore need to

resort to UN information available at Headquarters but also information coming from

outside the UN system.

UN sources include:

 Internal information (a significant source of information will come from within

the UN presence in the relevant country)

 Reports produced by the Country Office of the Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights or by the Human Rights Component of

peacekeeping missions or special political missions as well as various types

of reports of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the

Human Rights Council (HRC). These reports may be public or not.

 Reports of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), UN Treaty Bodies and

Special Procedures

 Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council on peacekeeping

operations

 Reports of other UN mechanisms, offices or agencies (Monitoring and

Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children in armed

conflicts, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General on Children in

Armed Conflicts and Sexual Violence in Conflict, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA)

 Reports of UN commissions of inquiry

 Decisions of UN treaty bodies on individual cases

 Reports from Joint Mission Analysis Cells in peacekeeping operations

 UNODC Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessments

Other sources include, but are not limited to:

 Reports or other documents emanating from the International Criminal Court

(ICC) or other ad hoc or hybrid international tribunals

 Reports from international or regional organizations (Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Court of

Human Rights, European Union, African Union)

 Reports from National Human Rights Institutions such as commissions or

ombudsman offices

 Reports from international non-governmental organizations (International

Crisis Group, International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch,

Amnesty International, etc.)

 Reports from local non-governmental organizations

 Information emanating from the intended recipient security forces

governmental sources

 Media reports

 Reports from Member States

In analysing the information collected for the purpose of the HRDDP risk assessment, it

is important for UN entities to disaggregate data by age and sex to determine the

groups that are most affected by violations, and to reach out to these different groups

to validate their analysis.

According to the policy, it is the UN entity providing the support that is responsible to

carry out the risk assessment. In peacekeeping missions or special political missions,

the task will usually be entrusted to the Human Rights Component of the mission while

in non-mission settings, OHCHR field presences (OHCHR country offices, Regional

Offices or Human Rights Advisers to the country team) will likely be relied upon to

support and contribute to risk assessments of other UN entities, including by providing

A number of national armies maintain websites offering relevant information, including about deployments, chain of

command, structures, for example.

relevant information about security forces and human rights. UN entities are

encouraged to carry out consultations with a broad variety of partners, including other

UN agencies, civil society, National Human Rights Institutions and other national

institutions (for example the judiciary).

Whenever they are operating in-country, mechanisms such as the Protection Cluster,

Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on children and armed conflicts,

O/SRSG-CAAC may provide useful information for the purpose of HRDDP risk

assessments and should also be consulted regarding the identification of mitigatory

measures.

Screening processes (at times also referred to as background checks) are applied by

some UN entities as a way to ensure that support is not provided to individuals or units

that have – and may again – commit grave human rights violations. This practice has

been used particularly in the case of joint operations (that is operations jointly carried

out by UN peacekeepers and national security forces) and in the selection of

participants in training delivered or funded by UN entities.

Screening or background checks may not always be possible, where relevant

information related to individuals is not available, and may be insufficient for the

purpose of complying with the HRDDP. The following guidance is provided for

situations where screening and checks are possible, and is based on practice to-date.

Wherever relevant and possible, the UN entity planning to provide support should

request from the national authorities a list of the units and/or individuals who will

receive UN support. The list should be certified by the relevant authority (for example

the Ministry of Defence in case of military forces) and include full name, rank, military

ID number, and date and place of birth. The list should also include the name of

officers with command responsibilities.

When it is not possible to obtain a list of all individuals composing the units/sections

that will be supported – for example because the number is too large – the UN entity

will seek to obtain the names and other information about officers with command

responsibilities.

Obtaining such a list has two main purposes:

1. allowing the UN entity to carry out background checks on individuals as

appropriate; and

2. sending a clear signal to the national authorities that recipients of the support will

be monitored and could be traced in case of abuse.

If, as a result of a screening, the UN entity considers that it should exclude certain

individuals or units from the support envisaged, a question that often arises is whether

the information resulting in the exclusion can or should be communicated to the

individual concerned or the state institutions responsible for these individuals. The

practice followed by UN entities in this respect is not uniform, with some sharing with

relevant national authorities the reasons for excluding an individual or a unit, others

not.

Finally, it should be noted that screening may have an impact on the timely provision of

support and should therefore be considered in advance in the planning of activities.

There is no mathematic formula to assess a risk of grave human rights violations with

certainty and it is difficult to determine a precise percentage of risk as a result of the

risk assessment.

After gathering and assessing all relevant information on the different elements of the

risk assessment described under section C.1., UN entities should be able to determine

whether the risk that support recipients may commit grave violations is low, medium or

high:

Low-level risk

A low level risk means that the UN entity can safely engage in the intended support

and that grave violations are unlikely to be committed by the recipient and, in case they

are, it is expected that they will be promptly and efficiently addressed. In those cases,

the support will start together with the HRDDP monitoring phase.

Medium-level risk

A medium level risk is a situation where the risk of grave violations is present but can

be reduced if appropriate mitigatory measures are taken by either the UN entity or the

beneficiary of support. Given the difficult contexts in which the UN is usually engaged

with security forces, this is likely to be a frequent scenario of HRDDP implementation.

The final decision regarding support will need to take into consideration both the risks

involved and the possible mitigatory measures identified.

High-level risk

A high level risk means that, on the same basis, there is a real likelihood that grave

violations will be committed by the intended recipients and will remain unaddressed

and that the UN entity will therefore be obliged to withhold or suspend support under

the HRDDP. This will cause the UN entity to question whether it wants to engage with

the intended recipient at all or exclude some recipients (individuals, units, etc.) from the

intended support or decide to reassess the type of support needed by the security

forces concerned.

Different levels of risk may in some situations apply with regard to the same national

security forces depending on locations, regions or states.

In the case of UN support to regional peacekeeping forces composed of troops or

police from different countries, the risk of grave violations may vary according to the

contingent. In cases where UN support is provided to the regional peacekeeping force

as a whole (as opposed to support extended to each contingent independently),

different levels of risk among the contingents may warrant the UN to consider whether

support can be provided at all in the presence of contingents that present a risk of

grave violations that cannot be mitigated.

The risk assessment is a formal exercise that should be done in writing and which

should take the form of a document compiling all relevant information and including a

determination of whether – and how – the support will be provided. A risk assessment

template can be found in Annex I, based on the text of the policy and on the practice of

UN field presences to-date.

Documenting in writing the risk assessment process is important for several reasons: it

lends a certain level of formality to the process, including necessary consultations

among the various UN entities or components that need to be involved; it proves that a

due diligence process has indeed been carried out, should questions be raised if

despite implementation of the HRDDP grave human rights violations are committed by

recipients of UN support.

Whenever the risk assessment has been completed and, as relevant, mitigatory

measures have been identified, and a decision has been reached regarding the

support planned or requested, the UN entity will share with the authorities and/or the

intended recipient in the most appropriate way its proposed approach regarding the

support planned or requested.

In practice, UN entities will usually not share the detailed content of the risk

assessment with their national counterparts nor the document itself. It is important,

however, that UN entities share with the intended recipients and national authorities the

concerns highlighted by the exercise and justifying the adoption of mitigatory

measures, as relevant. This will usually facilitate acceptance, and implementation, of

any mitigatory measures by national (or regional) counterparts.

When, based on the outcome of the risk assessment, the UN entity concerned has to

withhold or interrupt its support or delay the beginning of such support pending the

adoption and implementation of specific measures by the concerned security forces,

the UN entity may request the most senior UN official in-country to communicate this

message. The most senior UN official in-country should be kept informed of any such

communication regardless of his/her role in delivering it.

A very important element of the HRDDP is the identification and integration of

mitigatory measures in support provided by UN entities to national or regional security

forces. Mitigatory measures can lower the risk for security forces to commit grave

violations. A final decision regarding the support should only take place after these

mitigatory measures have been considered.

Mitigatory measures are measures that are established, following and as a result of the

risk assessment, either by the UN entity providing support or by the authorities or

security forces receiving support and are aimed at:

i. reducing the risk that grave violations may be committed during the time

support is provided; and

ii. ensuring that, should these violations occur, appropriate mechanisms are in

place to address them adequately and bring them to an end.

Mitigatory measures can be seen as guarantees that the UN entity wishes to receive

before proceeding with the support or throughout the period of support.

The possibility to identify and agree on mitigatory measures is an essential element of

the HRDDP. UN entities frequently provide support to security forces in difficult

contexts often characterized by violence, political instability, inadequate national

capacities, where risks of grave human rights violations are common. In such contexts,

a risk assessment may conclude that there is indeed a risk of grave violations but that

the support provided by the UN entity is nevertheless necessary and would help

improve the human rights situation in the longer term. In order to address these

dilemmas, the HRDDP provides for the introduction of mitigatory measures, which

enables UN entities to proceed with certain forms of support including in environments

where there is a risk of grave violations to be committed by support recipients. If

mitigatory measures are not implemented, however, the UN may consider that this

increases the risk to an unacceptable level, so that support must be suspended or

withdrawn.

The identification of mitigatory measures should take place as the last part of the risk

assessment process.

Mitigatory measures may, depending on circumstances, need to be taken or fulfilled

before support is provided or during the time support is provided.

Mitigatory measures can be either taken by the UN entity providing support or

requested from the potential recipient of UN support. They may either be integrated by

the UN entity as an element of the support provided, or discussed and agreed with the

national authorities/security forces receiving support. In most cases, the process of

identification and inclusion of these measures will result from both discussions and

unilateral requirements. It is however recommended that in all cases the mitigatory

measures make the object of an agreement in writing through, for example, an

exchange of letters or are part of the project document signed by both parties.

The type and choice of mitigatory measures will depend on the type of support that is

planned to be provided, the human rights context and other elements. The following

examples of mitigatory measures are drawn from practice and are intended to assist

UN entities in considering possible options.

In some situations, the UN entity may make its support contingent to the recipients

undertaking specific training (for example on human rights, IHL or refugee law) before

support is provided, or during the support. These measures may also take the form of

briefings for support recipients on HRDDP requirements.

Capacity building measures are not limited to training and UN entities should consider

other measures aimed at reducing the risk of grave violations and, at the same time,

professionalizing the behaviour – and improving the work – of security forces pursuant

to the HRDDP. In some countries, a system of mentoring of national security forces

through the co-location of UN uniformed personnel and police forces has proven useful

for both capacity building and HRDDP implementation, and for monitoring purposes.

While capacity building activities provide a useful platform to influence the behaviour of

support recipients, they should be complemented by other forms of mitigatory

measures, especially accountability or reporting related measures.

→ As part of the support package, the supporting UN entity will deliver a

refugee law training to all officers of the [relevant units].

→ Before the delivery of support, the recipient will organize briefing sessions

on HRDDP principles to all members of [relevant divisions].

Some mitigatory measures can consist in addressing past cases of human rights

violations (measure to be fulfilled before the support is provided

) or in agreeing with

the receiving entity on a predefined procedure to deal with human rights incidents

should they arise or be reported while support is provided, including corrective

measures (measure that will exist throughout the period of support).

→ The supporting UN entity and the recipient agree that in the case of human

rights incidents, the following procedure will be followed [temporary and

immediate suspension of officers allegedly involved, designation of investigation

body/section, continued communication with supporting UN entity …].

→ Before the provision of support, [relevant proceedings] should be initiated

against the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations in [relevant] case.

[Or] The recipient of support should provide the UN supporting entity with

[relevant information] regarding the investigation and judicial process in the

[relevant] case.

For certain forms of support such as joint military operations, joint planning has proven

to be an effective way to reduce the risk of human rights violations. This is particularly

true for military operations that may potentially have an adverse effect on the protection

of civilians. In such cases, on the basis of the information received from the recipient of

support, UN entities have in the past been able to supplement or modify the military

Because of the length of criminal procedures, the supporting UN entity will decide the most appropriate step in each

case.

plans so as to reduce risks of human rights violations. The mandate of a number of

peacekeeping missions provides for such joint planning.

Besides joint planning, the supporting UN entity may request to be involved in other

ways, or that the planning of security related operations is revised.

→ The UN entity should be associated, through its focal point, to every new

military planning (or concept of operations) that involve directly the UN [relevant

mission] or are conducted thanks to the support offered by the UN.

In many cases, especially in cases of support provided by peacekeeping operations,

and besides any programmatic regular reporting, the UN entity will expect from the

recipient of support some form of reporting about how the support has been used but

also on the activities that have been carried out as a result and/or in the context of the

support provided. Such reporting is equivalent to the programmatic reporting that is

expected from most project beneficiaries. In this context, the UN entity may request the

recipient of support to submit a regular/periodic report that would also include reports

on incidents, including human rights violations that have allegedly been committed by

the relevant security forces and action taken to address them. While such reporting

may not meet the criteria of impartiality, it will not only serve as a deterrent but also

allow for ex post facto cross verification with reports coming from other sources.

→ During the entire period of delivery of support, the recipient will transmit to

the UN entity on a [weekly] basis a report mentioning all incidents

that may

have involved some of its elements with the civilian populations and an account

of numbers and circumstances of civilian(s) that may have been killed or injured

in the context of military operations as well as the measures that have been

taken by the relevant security forces to address these abuses.

It may be useful to refer to the term “incident” rather than human rights violations to avoid the security forces own

qualification of the facts reported.

The UN entity may identify certain policies or rules governing the conduct of security

forces as a major source of concern regarding the potential risk of grave violations. If

appropriate and practicable, the UN entity may suggest the modification, either

temporarily or permanently, of such rules or policy as a mitigatory measure.

→ The UN entity has concluded that [relevant parts] of the rules of engagement

are likely to increase disproportionately the risk of grave violations of human

rights being committed in the context of the support provided. [Relevant]

security forces will modify the said rules [or not apply them during the time

support will be provided] and relevant briefings will be conducted in this regard

to the concerned units.

When as a result of a background check or a screening process, the UN entity has

identified among support beneficiaries one or more individuals or a unit with a human

rights record that may significantly increase the risk that they commit grave violations,

and considers that the exclusion of these individuals or units from actions supported by

the UN is likely to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, then the UN entity concerned

should clarify that the support may not be provided to such individuals or units.

→ The UN entity will not be able to deliver the training on [relevant subject] to

the following individuals: [name and grade of individuals]

→ The UN entity will be able to provide the support requested to all units of the

security forces concerned, at the exclusion of unit [x].

As a rule, the UN entity does not have the mandate to decide, for example, the type of sanction that should be taken

by the support recipient or authorities towards these individuals or units.

The type of monitoring framework that relevant UN entities will adopt pursuant to the

HRDDP will depend on their mandate, configuration, expertise, capacity and on the UN

entities present on the ground (including presence of an OHCHR office or of a human

rights component for peacekeeping operations or special political missions) as well as

on the type of support they envisage to provide and the specific context in which they

operate.

Monitoring under the HRDDP (hereafter HRDDP monitoring) does not require a human

rights monitoring mandate similar to the one entrusted to OHCHR or deriving from

General Assembly, Security Council or Human Rights Council resolutions. HRDDP

monitoring is specifically related to the support provided by the UN entity. In addition to

elements of human rights monitoring, HRDDP monitoring has elements of

programmatic monitoring and evaluation frameworks (M&E) that are used in most UN

projects and programmes. For the purpose of the policy, HRDDP monitoring primarily

consists in proactively observing the behaviour of the recipient in terms of its human

rights obligations, collecting and compiling information about allegations of human

rights violations committed by the recipient and engaging with the latter to discuss

reports of such allegations and ways to address them. It also consists in monitoring

whether the support is used for its intended purpose.

The following is recommended in order to establish an adequate monitoring framework:

 Identification of monitoring responsibility: Whether HRDDP monitoring is

performed by one or more UN staff members on a full or partial time basis,

specific staff/work units should be designated for this task. While UN entities

providing support may seek assistance from other UN partners for HRDDP

monitoring, each entity retains the primary responsibility for monitoring the

behaviour of security forces in the context of the specific support they provide.

 Monitoring format: While the monitoring format can vary, it is important that

there be a pre-established and agreed format to compile and process HRDDP

monitoring related information (log book or other type of document).

 Sources of information: In order to monitor the behaviour of recipients of

support, the UN entity can rely on a large variety of information. Most of the

sources of information indicated under the section on Risk Assessment above

are also relevant for monitoring purposes, in particular:

1. information gathered by the local UN Human Rights presence (OHCHR

country office, Human Rights component of peace mission, etc.);

2. information gathered by other relevant mission components in case of

peacekeeping operations, such as military, police, Joint Analysis Cells,

child protection units;

3. mechanisms such as the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM)

on child rights violations, the Protection Cluster;

4. information from local or international NGOs;

5. media information;

6. reports from country visits of UN special procedures, or missions by

other UN entities and mechanisms.

7. information from members of the diplomatic community present in the

country.

 “Due diligence” monitoring: In most situations, the information initially

collected or received under the HRDDP monitoring framework will constitute

allegations that have not been consistently verified and may necessitate

additional verification or questions to be raised with recipients of support. To

fulfil the due diligence requirements, UN entities engaged in support to non-UN

security forces are not required to actually determine the existence of violations.

Instead, HRDDP monitoring requires the UN entity to closely follow the

behaviour of support recipients and exercise “due diligence” when cases of

violations by those recipients are reported. UN entities are encouraged to

agree, ideally whenever the support begins and before any incident takes place,

on regular meetings with recipients of support to discuss allegations and decide

on appropriate follow-up, including, as appropriate, reviewing mitigatory

measures.

An HRDDP monitoring framework can be linked with other existing forms of monitoring,

for example:

Human Rights Monitoring

Human rights monitoring is a proactive method involving the collection, verification,

analysis and use of information to address human rights problems with the ultimate

goal of improving protection. Human Rights monitoring is performed by OHCHR

(including through its country offices) or Human Rights Components of peacekeeping

missions or special political missions on the basis of OHCHR general mandate or a

specific mandate entrusted by the General Assembly, the Security Council or the

Human Rights Council. It has obvious linkages with the monitoring required for HRDDP

implementation.

Programmatic M&E frameworks

Support to non-UN security forces frequently takes the form of individual projects or

programmes implemented by UN entities and financed through various funding

mechanisms/sources. Most of these projects or programmes have a Monitoring and

Evaluation (M&E) framework, which aims, inter alia, at monitoring the advancement of -

and measuring - the objectives of the projects. The M&E framework also analyses,

often through a pre-established logframe, internal and external factors affecting the

success of some or all project outcome. For the purpose of HRDDP implementation,

such models could be adapted to include collection and analysis of information related

to grave human rights violations relevant to the support provided under the project.

Other mechanisms and work processes

Other mechanisms or work processes that could be used to contribute to an HRDDP

monitoring framework include:

 The UNSC 1612 Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on violations

committed against children in the context of armed conflicts

 The UNSC 1960 Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements (MARA) on

conflict-related sexual violence

 The Protection Cluster

 OCHA situation reports

 UNDSS daily security incident reports

Whether support is provided by a UN entity in charge of one of the above mechanisms

or not, the UN entity providing support is encouraged to establish contact with these

mechanisms when present in-country and agree on ways to receive relevant

information for purposes of HRDDP implementation.

In practice, HRDDP monitoring arrangements will vary depending on context and

available resources.

Where peacekeeping and special political missions are deployed, HRDDP monitoring

is usually carried out/coordinated by their Human Rights Component. HRDDP

implementation arrangements, including the establishment of a monitoring framework,

have usually been put in place through an SOP involving several parts of the mission,

and follow up decisions involve various actors in the mission. The tasks of collecting

relevant information and the verification process would usually be carried out by the

Human Rights Component.

Other UN entities present in the country and providing support to non-UN security

forces are encouraged to develop coordinated arrangements with the Mission in order

to benefit from the findings of its human rights monitoring. This will also prevent

contradictory conclusions regarding cases of alleged violations by security forces.

Depending on their mandate and capacity, OHCHR field presences play a supporting

and advisory role regarding HRDDP implementation, in particular with regard to

HRDDP monitoring. OHCHR field presences are likely to have information about the

behaviour of security forces in the country that is relevant both for the risk assessment

and for monitoring purposes, as well as being able to assess the reliability of certain

allegations against non-UN security forces. UN entities engaged in support to security

forces may thus rely on such presences in developing a suitable HRDDP monitoring

framework. A coordinated approach is recommended to ensure coherence within the

UN system in-country and avoid unnecessary duplication.

OHCHR Regional Offices and Human Rights Advisors usually have a more limited

monitoring capacity, though they would be able to provide advice and other support on

HRDDP implementation.

In countries where there is neither a mission nor an OHCHR field presence, the UN

entity providing support will have to establish its own monitoring framework. Linkages

with the mechanisms under section 3, where present, are strongly encouraged.

Where different UN entities are engaged in multiple forms of support to various non-UN

security forces involving large programmes and funding, the UN system in these

countries may choose to establish a single HRDDP monitoring mechanism that could

support the whole system.

According to the policy, there should be “well-defined procedures to guide decisions by

responsible UN officials on whether or not violations committed by the recipient entity

require intervention with the recipient entity or its command elements or, in the final

resort, require the suspension or withdrawal of support under this policy” (HRDDP,

para. 21 (e)).

The essential aspect of this phase of HRDDP implementation resides in the pre-

established character of the procedure. UN entities should define who is going to

intervene, at what stage, with which counterpart, and when. The Resident Coordinator

should be kept informed of all planned interventions in order to ensure consistency of

UN actions.

In practice so far, these procedures have been articulated, in Standard Operating

Procedures adopted by UN field presences, in the form of a cascade of interventions.

Typically, a staff member specifically designated for this function within the UN entity

that is providing support is required to communicate the allegations of grave violations

and, if relevant, suggested corrective measures, to the relevant counterpart within the

recipient of support, and to request information about the measures that have been

taken to address these violations. Building on the relationship established with

authorities or forces receiving support, UN entities should seek to resolve such

situations by agreeing on action(s) to be taken by the recipients of support to stop and

remedy violations at this stage. If no reply is received, and action taken, within a

specified amount of time, a more senior staff is required to follow up with a reminder to

a counterpart at a higher level. Such procedure may extend to three levels of

responsibility before necessitating an intervention by the Head of the UN entity’s

country office with the relevant suitably senior government official.

Alternatively, when interventions by the UN entity delivering the support do not result in

actions aimed at bringing violations to an end, the UN entity may refer the situation to

the most senior UN official in-country who will provide support to UN entities, including

by taking, as appropriate, a leading role in communicating with relevant authorities.

According to the HRDDP, “UN entities that are contemplating or involved in providing

support to non-UN security forces must […] [conduct] an assessment of the risks

involved in providing or not providing such support, in particular the risk of the recipient

entity committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law

or refugee law”. The following risk assessment template has been developed on the

basis of relevant provisions of the policy as well as practice by a number of UN field

presences.

The risk assessment should remain valid for the entire duration of the support unless it

is considered that circumstances have changed and a review or an update is needed.

I. BACKGROUND AND SUPPORT PLANNED/REQUESTED

This section should provide the background to the request or the support being planned, and

describe the elements of the support envisaged:

 Location, date, time and nature of the support;

 Purpose of the support;

 Intended direct/indirect use of the support;

 Military or security unit(s) involved; and

 Name, rank, ID number of officer or official focal point in recipient.

II. APPLICABILITY OF THE HRDDP

This section should review the applicability of the HRDDP based on the scope of the policy

as set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 (in particular, the type of support and its recipient).

III. ELEMENTS FOR THE RISK ASSESSMENT

III.1. Human rights record of the intended recipient

This section should provide an overview of “the record of the intended recipient(s) in terms of

compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee

law, including any specific record of grave violations” as defined under para 12 of the

HRDDP. The record should go as far back in the past as is considered relevant for

anticipating possible future behaviour.

III.2. Accountability and corrective measures structures/mechanisms

This section should include an assessment of (1) existing accountability mechanisms and

structures, (2)“the record of the recipient(s) in taking or failing to take effective steps to hold

perpetrators of any such violations accountable”, and (3)”whether any corrective measures

have been taken or institutions, protocols or procedures put in place with a view to preventing

the recurrence of such violations and, if so, their adequacy, including institutions to hold any

future perpetrators accountable.”

III.3. Legislative/policy framework

This section should indicate whether certain legislation, rules or policies, if any, (for example

a so-called “shoot to kill” policy or specific rules of engagement) may contribute to increasing

the risk of grave violations.

III.4. Risks inherent to the operation(s) resulting from the support

Regardless of the human rights record of security forces receiving the support, operations or

activities conducted as a result of this support may carry a risk in themselves depending on

their nature, timing, location … (ex: military operations conducted in urban environments

pose more risks for civilians than when they are conducted in non-populated areas).

III.5. Ability to influence and risk of not providing the support

This section should include “an assessment of the degree to which providing or withholding

support would affect the UN’s ability to influence the behaviour of the receiving entity in terms

of its compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law”. This step is

an important element to assess the potential positive impact of the support or the potential

negative impact of not providing support.

III.6. Reputational and political risk

Notwithstanding the potential human rights risk this section should outline the potential

reputational and political risk of providing support.

IV. CONCLUSION (AND MITIGATING MEASURES)

As a result of the analysis made under part III, the UN entity will determine the level of risk

(low, medium, high) that the recipient commit grave violations as defined by the policy and

summarize the reasons behind this assessment. In some case, the risk will be evaluated as

high or very high and the risk assessment will conclude that support should not be provided.

However, in many cases, the UN entity will consider that it can reduce the risk to a

satisfactory level through various measures that it can either put in place itself, or request

from the receiving entity. In these cases, this section should outline what these mitigatory

measures might include, inter alia:

1. Reporting

This would include requesting from the recipient entity specific reports or a regular reporting

about how the support was used, if it was used for its intended purpose and on reported

incidents committed by its own troops and the way they were addressed. Such measure

could also consist in regular meetings between the support provider and the recipient to

monitor support.

2. Exclusion of individuals or certain units

This would involve the screening of relevant individuals or units of security forces that would

benefit from the support and, as appropriate, indicate whether certain units or individuals

should be excluded from support.

3. Corrective and accountability measures

This would involve the UN conveying to the recipient of support that the latter is contingent to

certain corrective measures being taken for those units for which the UN believes grave

violations have occurred and where alleged perpetrators have not been held accountable. It

could also consist in suggesting an agreed procedure to deal with reports of violations

committed by the security forces in the context of the support.

4. Training/Briefing and other forms of technical assistance

The UN could provide training to the recipient units on international humanitarian and human

rights law so as to reduce the risk that violations occur as part of the support, or request that

training be delivered to the recipients before UN support will be provided. It could also

organize briefings on the content, principles, and implications of the policy. It may make its

support contingent to other forms of technical assistance such as in the field of corrective

measures or military justice.

5. Planning related measures

This would involve the UN being involved or having the possibility to adapt the planning of

security related operations. For example, for certain forms of support like joint military

operations, joint planning may be an effective way to reduce the risk of human rights

violations, in particular for military operations that may carry a risk for civilian populations.

6. Changes in policy and regulations or legislation

In some cases, the UN entity will identify certain policies or rules governing the conduct of

security forces (for example rules of engagement) that may contribute to increase the risk of

grave violations. If appropriate and practicable, the UN entity may suggest the modification to

such rules or policy as a mitigatory measure.

[…]

I have the honour to bring to your attention the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on

United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.

United Nations entities have increasingly been called upon to provide support to non-

UN security forces, including national military and police forces and non-UN

peacekeeping forces. It is in the interests of the security forces receiving United

Nations support that they be most strongly encouraged to respect the standards under

international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law to which their Governments

have subscribed. The United Nations, under its Charter, has an important role to play

in this regard. Experience gained in recent years has also underlined that the United

Nations must take deliberate action in such circumstances to safeguard and preserve

its legitimacy and credibility as a universal organization dedicated to the promotion and

protection of human rights and to the development and respect of international law.

The Secretary-General has accordingly instructed all United Nations entities that are

contemplating or that are engaged in providing such support to adhere to a Human

Rights Due Diligence Policy on Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces

(HRDDP). The HRDDP sets out measures that UN entities are to take in order to

exercise due diligence, within the scope of their mandates, to ensure that the support

that they provide to non-United Nations security forces is consistent with the

Organization’s Purposes and Principles in the Charter and its responsibility to respect,

promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and

refugee law.

The policy does not place new requirements on Member States. It is based on existing

standards and obligations that States have accepted through their membership in the

UN, through their recognition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, in the

case of [country], through its ratification of [relevant international instruments ratified].

The HRDDP requires each United Nations entity that is contemplating providing

support to non-UN security forces to conduct a risk assessment beforehand in order to

identify the risks involved, including any risks that the recipient forces might commit

grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law. If, as a

result of that assessment, it is determined that there are substantial grounds to believe

that there is a real risk of such violations taking place, the United Nations entity will

work with the national authorities with a view to putting in place effective measures to

eliminate or minimize that risk. Pending the implementation of such measures, the

United Nations will be obliged to withhold support from the non-UN security forces

concerned.

Where a United Nations entity has engaged in the provision of support to non-UN

security forces, and subsequently receives reliable information that provides substantial

grounds to believe that the recipient forces are committing grave violations of

international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, the United Nations entity will

intercede with the relevant national authorities with a view to bringing those violations

to an end. If, despite such intercession, the situation persists, the United Nations will

suspend or withdraw support from the elements committing those violations.

The Secretary-General intends to keep the experience gained in implementing the

HRDDP under close review.

A copy of the summary of the HRDDP is provided as an annex to the present letter and

the full text of the policy is available on request. UN entities engaged in the provision of

support to security forces will provide additional briefings to national interlocutors,

including the Government and national security forces, in the [time]].

We look forward to discussing with you the implications of this policy with regard to the

support provided by the UN system to non-UN security forces in [country], in particular

[list the different types of support (programmes) provided by the UN to local security

forces].

[…]

[name of country]

According to the HRDDP, “UN entities that are contemplating or involved in providing

support to non-UN security forces must […] [conduct] an assessment of the risks

involved in providing or not providing such support, in particular the risk of the recipient

entity committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law

or refugee law”. Furthermore, “each UN entity should take into account the need to

promote consistency in the implementation of the policy across the UN-system. The

most senior United Nations official in-country (SRSG and/or RC) is responsible for

initiating consultations on the implementation framework with all national and

international stakeholders”.

Peacekeeping missions, special political missions or UNCTs are encouraged to adopt

a GPRAF when support is planned or already provided by two or more UN entities to

non-UN security forces in the country. The main objectives of GPRAF are to avoid

duplication of efforts (when different UN entities are involved in a variety of support to

the same national security forces or one UN entity is involved in different types of

support to the same security forces), and to ensure a coherent and consistent

assessment of security forces by UN entities in the same country.

The GPRAF is a basic inter-agency risk assessment, to be carried out under the

coordination of the most senior UN official in-country (SRSG, RC, HC), representing

the common position of the UN system with regard to the level of risk that generally

exists for security forces in-country to commit grave human rights violations. The

GPRAF compiles relevant and available information regarding human rights violations

committed by security forces. Such document will also facilitate and speed up the

process of individual risk assessments that have to be undertaken by each UN entity

under the HRDDP.

I. EXISTING NON-UN SECURITY FORCES IN-COUNTRY

Name of security

forces

Line ministry

Size, structure, deployment

See HRDDP, para. 7

II. CURRENT AND PLANNED UN SUPPORT TO SECURITY FORCES IN-COUNTRY

UN entity

Security

sector

structure /

institution

(e.g., Army)

Timeframe

of support

(incl. past,

present

and

planned)

(a) Type of support provided

(b) Amount of support provided (or project

costs) (c) Implementing partner

III. COMPILATION OF MAIN EXISTING HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION

UN documents

UPR documents

Status

- Compilation of UN information [title of document and web address]

- Summary of stakeholder’s information [title of document and web address]

- Report of the Working Group [title of document and web address]

Treaty Bodies documents

- Concluding observations of the [relevant treaty body] [title of document and web

address]

Special Procedures documents

- Report of the Special Rapporteur on [relevant mandate] [title of document and web

address]

Other UN reports

- OHCHR (Country Office and Human Rights Components reports and other UN

reports (expert groups, Human Rights Council, General Assembly, Secretary

General …) [title of document and web address]

- SRSG – CAAC

- SRSG – SVC

- SG reports on country

Non-UN reports

- National Human Rights Institutions reports [title of document and web address]

- Regional Human Rights Organization reports [title of document and web address]

Other reports

- Local NGOs reports [title of document and web address]

- HRW Annual Report, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012#countries

- Amnesty International Annual Report http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-

report/2012/country-data

- Other international NGOs reports (ICJ, ICG, …) [title of document and web

address]

- Relevant media article(s) [title of document and web address]

The purpose of this section is to compile all reports and other documentation that could give relevant information

about human rights compliance by the security forces supported by UN entities in-country. Through a relatively basic

search of these documents, UN field presences should be able to quickly check relevant information. The right “status”

column is to be checked for each document/report that has been read and/or verified

IV. MAIN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES REPORTED REGARDING RELEVANT SECURITY

FORCES

This section should provide a summary of the content of the above documents, including

the type of violations most regularly committed by security forces and all relevant human

rights elements that UN entities should take into consideration when planning support to

security forces.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This section should include, on the basis of all the elements developed above, an

analysis of the existing risks with national security forces that will guide the

development of UN entity-specific risk assessments and mitigatory measures, if relevant.

In countries where there is an OHCHR country or regional office, a Human Rights Adviser to the UNCT, or a Human

Rights Component in the peacekeeping or special political mission, UN entities are encouraged to consult them for

advice and support.

I. CORE PRINCIPLES

1. Support by United Nations entities to non-United

Nations security forces must be consistent with the

Organization’s purposes and principles as set out in

the Charter of the United Nations and with its

obligations under international law to respect,

promote and encourage respect for international

humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. Such

support should help recipients to attain a stage

where compliance with these principles and bodies

of law becomes the norm, ensured by the rule of

law. Consistent with these obligations, United

Nations support cannot be provided where there are

substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk

of the receiving entities committing grave violations

of international humanitarian, human rights or

refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail

to take the necessary corrective or mitigating

measures. For the same reasons, if the United

Nations receives reliable information that provides

substantial grounds to believe that a recipient of

United Nations support is committing grave

violations of international humanitarian, human

rights or refugee law, the United Nations entity

providing such support must intercede with the

relevant authorities with a view to bringing those

violations to an end. If, despite such intercession,

the situation persists, the United Nations must

suspend support to the offending elements.

Notwithstanding the present policy, existing

obligations of human rights, humanitarian and

refugee law continue to apply to all United Nations

activities.

2. United Nations entities that are contemplating or

involved in providing support to non-United Nations

security forces must therefore pursue a policy of

due diligence, comprising the following key

elements:

(a) Before support is given, an assessment of the

risks involved in providing or not providing such

support, in particular the risk of the recipient entity

committing grave violations of international

humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law;

(b) Transparency with receiving entities about the

legal obligations binding the Organization and the

core principles governing provision of support; and

including:

(i) Procedures for monitoring the recipient entity’s

compliance with international humanitarian, human

rights and refugee law;

(ii) Procedures for determining when and how to

intercede with a view to putting an end to grave

violations of any of those bodies of law and for

deciding, if need be, upon the suspension or

withdrawal of support; and

(iii) General operational guidance, as required, by

the respective United Nations entities to the country

level on implementation of the policy.

3. Adherence to the human rights due diligence

policy is important to maintain the legitimacy,

credibility and public image of the United Nations

and to ensure compliance with the Charter and with

the Organization’s obligations under international

law.

4. Relevant policies and guidelines on specific

areas of support, including the guidance notes

developed in the inter-agency Security Sector

Reform Task Force, must be consistent with the

due diligence policy.

5. The present policy is not intended in any way to

hinder the normal work of the Organization aimed at

encouraging respect for international humanitarian,

human rights or refugee law, including developing

capacity as well as investigating and reporting on

violations of those bodies of law and interceding

with relevant authorities to protest those violations,

secure remedial action and prevent their repetition.

The policy is intended to complement those normal

processes.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE

POLICY

A. Scope of the policy

6. The human rights due diligence policy applies to

all United Nations entities providing support to non-

United Nations security forces. It therefore applies

not only to peacekeeping operations and special

political missions, but also to all United Nations

offices, agencies, funds and programmes that

engage in such activities.

B. Definitions

7. For the purpose of this policy, “non-United

Nations security forces” include:

(a) National military, paramilitary, police, intelligence

services, border control and similar security forces;

(b) National civilian, paramilitary or military

authorities directly responsible for the management,

administration or command or control of such

forces;

organizations.

8. “Support” is understood to mean any of the

following activities:

(a) Training, mentoring, advisory services, capacity-

and institution-building and other forms of technical

cooperation for the purpose of enhancing the

operational capabilities of non-United Nations

security forces;

(b) Ad hoc or programmatic support to civilian or

military authorities directly responsible for the

management, administration or command and

control of non-United Nations security forces;

bursaries, allowances and expenses, whatever the

source of the funds;

(d) Strategic or tactical logistical support to opera-

tions in the field conducted by non-United Nations

security forces;

(e) Operational support to action in the field

conducted by non-United Nations security forces,

including fire support, strategic or tactical planning;

(f) Joint operations conducted by United Nations

forces and non-United Nations security forces.

9. “Support” does not include:

(a) Training or sensitization regarding international

humanitarian, human rights and refugee law;

(b) Standard-setting (e.g. advice on and review of

legislation, codes and policies) and capacity support

directly related to the implementation and promotion

of compliance with human rights laws and

standards and to foster democratic governance of

security institutions;

humanitarian, human rights and refugee law or to

negotiate humanitarian access and carry out relief

operations;

(d) Mediation and mediation-related support;

(e) Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and casualty

evacuation (CASEVAC).

10. “Support” may be direct or indirect — that is,

through implementing partners.

11. When determining whether an activity

constitutes support or not in accordance with

paragraphs 8 and 9 above, United Nations entities

should consider the need to promote consistency in

the implementation of the policy across the United

Nations system according to paragraphs 18 and 20

below.

12. “Grave violations” mean, for the purposes of the

present policy:

(a) In the case of a unit:

(i) Commission of “war crimes” or of “crimes against

humanity”, as defined in the Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court, or “gross violations” of

human rights, including summary executions and

extrajudicial killings, acts of torture, enforced

disappearances, enslavement, rape and sexual

violence of a comparable serious nature, or acts of

refoulement under refugee law that are committed

on a significant scale or with a significant degree of

frequency (that is, they are more than isolated or

merely sporadic phenomena); or

(ii) A pattern of repeated violations of international

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law

committed by a significant number of members of

the unit; or

(iii) The presence in a senior command position of

the unit of one or more officers about whom there

are substantial grounds to suspect:

 Direct responsibility for the commission of “war

crimes”, “gross violations” of human rights or

acts of refoulement; or

 Command responsibility, as defined in the

Rome Statute of the International Criminal

Court, for the commission of such crimes,

violations or acts by those under their

command; or

 Failure to take effective measures to prevent,

repress, investigate or prosecute other

violations of international humanitarian, human

rights or refugee law committed on a

significant scale by those under their

command;

(b) In the case of civilian or military authorities that

are directly responsible for the management,

administration or command of non-United Nations

security forces:

(i) Commission of grave violations by one or more

units under their command;

(ii) Combined with a failure to take effective

measures to investigate and prosecute the

violators.

13. “United Nations” includes any office,

department, agency, programme, fund, operation or

mission of the United Nations.

C. Risk assessment

14. Before engaging in support, the United Nations

entity directly concerned must conduct an

assessment of the potential risks and benefits

involved in providing support. This assessment

should include consideration of the following

elements (where a United Nations entity has an

existing mechanism in place, this may be used to

conduct the assessment in accordance with

paragraph 19 below):

(a) The record of the intended recipient(s) in terms

of compliance or non-compliance with international

humanitarian, human rights and refugee law,

including any specific record of grave violations;

(b) The record of the recipient(s) in taking or failing

to take effective steps to hold perpetrators of any

such violations accountable;

taken or institutions, protocols or procedures put in

place with a view to preventing the recurrence of

such violations and, if so, their adequacy, including

institutions to hold any future perpetrators

accountable;

(d) An assessment of the degree to which providing

or withholding support would affect the ability of the

United Nations to influence the behaviour of the

receiving entity in terms of its compliance with

international humanitarian, human rights and

refugee law;

(e) The feasibility of the United Nations putting in

place effective mechanisms to monitor the use and

impact of the support provided;

(f) An assessment based on the factors above and

on the overall context of the support, of the risk that

the receiving entity might nevertheless commit

grave violations of international humanitarian,

human rights or refugee law.

15. Information on the record of the intended

recipient with regard to compliance with

international humanitarian, human rights and

refugee law should be obtained from the United

Nations or other reliable sources.

16. Where, as a result of this risk assessment, the

United Nations entity directly concerned concludes

that there are substantial grounds for believing that

there is a real risk of the intended recipient

committing grave violations of international

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law,

notwithstanding any mitigatory measures that the

United Nations might take, then the United Nations

entity concerned must not engage in the provision

of support to that intended recipient. The United

Nations entity should make clear that support will

not be possible unless and until the intended

recipient takes measures that are of such effect that

there are no longer substantial grounds for believing

that there would be a real risk of such grave

violations occurring. Such measures might include,

for example, the removal of an officer from a senior

command position when there are substantial

grounds for suspecting that officer of being

responsible for grave violations of international

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law.

17. Where, as a result of the risk assessment, the

United Nations entity directly concerned concludes

that substantial grounds do not exist for believing

there to be a real risk of the intended recipient

committing such violations, then the United Nations

entity concerned may proceed to engage in the

provision of support, subject to compliance with the

following sections of this policy.

D. Transparency

18. Effective implementation of the policy requires

the understanding and cooperation of all

stakeholders, including donor and programme

countries, troop and police-contributing countries

and host countries of United Nations peacekeeping

and political missions. Each entity mandated to or

anticipating support for non-United Nations security

forces shall engage proactively with Member States

and other relevant partners and stakeholders to

explain the policy.

19. Before engaging in support to non-United

Nations security forces, the responsible senior

United Nations official[s] (e.g. Special

Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident

Coordinator, country representative) should inform

the recipient authority/ies in writing of the United

Nations core principles for support to non-United

Nations security forces under this policy. In

particular, recipients should be notified that United

Nations support cannot be provided to units that fall

under the command of individuals against whom

there are substantiated allegations of grave

violations of international humanitarian, human

rights or refugee law. The recipient authority should

also be advised of procedures or mechanisms to

implement the policy, as outlined in section III

below. It should be made clear to the recipient that,

in order to sustain the support, the United Nations is

obligated to continuously assess whether or not the

recipient’s actions are consistent with the

Organization’s obligations under the relevant bodies

of law. While advocacy and communication may be

undertaken by a specific United Nations entity, it

should be coordinated to promote consistency

across the United Nations in-country, and the most

senior United Nations official in a given country

(Special Representative of the Secretary-General

and/or Resident Coordinator) should be kept

informed of such steps.

III. ENSURING EFFECTIVE

IMPLEMENTATION

A. Elements of an implementation

framework

20. Implementation of the human rights due

diligence policy must take into account the specific

mandates of the United Nations entity concerned,

as well as the nature and extent of the support, and

the political and operational context in which it is

delivered.

21. Each United Nations entity providing support

must develop an implementation framework in

accordance with its management practices in order

to ensure compliance with this policy. That

framework should be clearly set out in a standing

operating procedure or similar instrument. The

framework should, where relevant, be reported to

the entity’s mandating body. Such a framework

should include, as required:

(a) Resources required to effectively manage

delivery of the support and to monitor and evaluate

its impact;

(b) Incentives or other accompanying measures

aimed at improving compliance by the recipient with

international humanitarian, human rights and

refugee law;

recipient’s behaviour to detect grave violations of

international humanitarian, human rights and

refugee law and the recipient institution’s responses

to any violations (such mechanisms should include

procedures for regular reporting from the Office of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights (OHCHR), the Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(OCHA) and the United Nations Children’s Fund

(UNICEF) and from the offices of the Special

Representatives of the Secretary-General for

Children and Armed Conflict, and the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual

Violence in Conflict);

(d) Well-defined systems for the collation and

effective review of information gathered through

such monitoring and from other sources, including

local protection of civilian networks;

(e) Well-defined procedures to guide decisions by

responsible United Nations officials on whether or

not violations committed by the recipient entity

require intervention with the recipient entity or its

command elements or, as a final resort, require the

suspension or withdrawal of support under this

policy;

(f) Clear procedures for communication with the

relevant authorities where United Nations

intervention or the suspension or withdrawal of

support is required under this policy;

(g) Clear and effective procedures for evaluating

and considering the possible risks if support is

suspended or withdrawn, including risks to the

safety and security of United Nations and

associated personnel, and for identifying

appropriate mitigatory measures, and ensuring that

they are taken.

22. In the application of the policy and the use of

measures set out in paragraphs 21 (a) to (g) above

at the country level, each United Nations entity

should take into account the need to promote

consistency in the implementation of the policy

across the United Nations system. The most senior

United Nations official in country (Special

Representative of the Secretary-General and/or

Resident Coordinator) is responsible for initiating

consultations on the implementation framework with

all national and international stakeholders. In the

case of integrated missions, consultations between

the mission and the United Nations country team

should be part of established procedure.

B. Prior advice to United Nations

legislative bodies

23. Action by United Nations entities to support non-

United Nations security forces requires particularly

careful attention due to the special risks, potential

liabilities and high visibility involved. It is therefore

important that United Nations entities exercise due

diligence, in particular by conducting a risk

assessment, before a mandate or directive is

adopted to provide support to non-United Nations

security forces. The resulting evaluation should be

included in reports or briefings to legislative bodies,

as appropriate. In the peacekeeping context, such

evaluations should help inform and shape proposals

by the Secretary-General to legislative bodies

regarding mandates.

C. Reporting and oversight

24. Relevant official United Nations reports (e.g.

reports of the Secretary-General to the Security

Council, country and thematic reports by United

Nations offices, programmes, agencies and funds)

should cover support provided to non-United

Nations security forces, including the nature and

scope of the support, measures employed to ensure

compliance with the “due diligence” policy, related

actions to promote respect for the core principles of

United Nations support and an assessment of the

impact of the support.

25. Where critical difficulties arise relating to such

support, United Nations entities should report

immediately to the relevant decision-making United

Nations officials and legislative bodies, as

appropriate, on developments related to the

elements of the risk assessment that present the

Organization or its personnel with the risk of being

associated with grave violations of international

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law. The

United Nations entities involved should report on

the circumstances, any measures taken to mitigate

or remedy the situation and recommendations for

follow-up action.

D. Mitigatory measures

26. If the United Nations receives reliable

information that provides substantial grounds for

believing that a recipient of United Nations support

is committing grave violations of international

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, the

United Nations entity providing support should bring

these grounds to the attention of the relevant

national authorities with a view to bringing those

violations to an end.

27. If, despite intercession by the United Nations

entity concerned, the United Nations receives

reliable information that provides substantial

grounds to suspect that the recipient entity is

continuing to engage in grave violations of

international humanitarian, human rights or refugee

law, then the United Nations entity must suspend or

withdraw support from the recipient.

E. Operational challenges

28. In the peacekeeping context, withholding or

withdrawing support in the face of a failure by

recipient security forces to comply with the core

principles of the policy may significantly diminish the

mission’s ability to fulfil the overall mandate and

objectives set out by the Security Council.

Suspension or withdrawal of logistical, material or

technical support may, however, become necessary

where continued support would implicate the

Organization in grave violations of international

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law. The

Secretary-General should keep the Council

informed of measures taken by a peacekeeping

operation under this policy and, where it is thought

that application of this policy would have a critical

impact on the ability of the operation to discharge its

mandate, should advise the Council in a timely

manner and seek the Council’s advice regarding the

way forward.

Similarly, should the withholding or withdrawal of

support by a United Nations agency, fund or

programme affect the ability of that entity to fulfil its

mandate, the Executive Head of the said agency,

fund or programme will advise the governing body

of the agency, fund or programme in a timely

manner, and seek its advice regarding the way

forward.

F. Accountability

29. Following endorsement of the present policy

framework by the Secretary-General, senior

managers at Headquarters (Under-Secretaries-

General, the Administrator of the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), the Executive

Directors of funds and programmes) are

responsible for ensuring that support for non-United

Nations security forces and institutions and

implementation of the policy are kept under regular

review in their areas of responsibility. They are also

responsible for ensuring that significant

developments in the implementation of this policy,

including mitigatory actions taken under it, are

brought to the timely attention of the Secretary-

General and the relevant legislative bodies.

30. Where relevant, integrated mission task forces

and integrated task forces should include in their

agendas a standing item on review and evaluation

of support provided to non-United Nations security

forces.

31. A further submission to the Policy Committee

should be prepared in one year’s time, in the light of

experience gained to determine, inter alia, if any

further implementation measure(s) or mechanisms

are required.