THE PANDEMIC FUND:
Guidance Note for Applicants on the
Second Call for Proposals
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in bioinformatics, to detect new variants and pathogens as they arise in people,
animals and the environment, consistent with the WHO’s 10-year strategy for genomic
surveillance of pathogens with pandemic and epidemic potential; d) training to help
national/regional public health, animal health and environmental health agencies
generate and analyze data to strengthen national capacities for public health
intelligence (e.g. analysis of unstructured data for rapidly identifying and monitoring
concerning health events reported in media); and e) strengthening science-society-
policy dialogue relevant to surveillance issues to ensure engagement with local
communities and relevant stakeholders of the civil society and to promote One Health
collaboration between agencies.
2. Laboratory Systems: Laboratories are critical to surveillance, detection, and response.
Strengthening laboratory systems requires investments across several areas and sectors,
for example, in: a) specimen referral and transport systems to ensure that specimens
can be shipped in a timely manner to appropriate reference laboratories, as necessary;
b) developing and implementing national biosafety and biosecurity systems that allow
for pathogens to be identied, characterized and monitored according to best practices,
including activities such as a biological risk management training, country specic
biosafety and biosecurity legislation, associated data management, laboratory licensing
and pathogen control measures, and ensuring veterinary expertise is represented; c)
strengthening lab quality management systems; d) building capacity to ensure reliable
and timely testing including relay of results; e) ensuring appropriate deployment,
utilization and sustainment of modern, safe, accurate, affordable, and appropriate
diagnostic tests and devices across human and animal analysis; and f) establishing and
managing diagnostic networks. These investments are needed at the national level as
well as across and between countries to strengthen existing networks of reference
laboratories and specialized centers linked, for example, to WHO, FAO or WOAH.
3. Human Resources / Public Health and Community Workforce Capacity:
A multisectoral workforce is key to enabling prevention, early detection, and rapid
response to potential events of concern at all levels of health and community systems,
as required by the IHR and WOAH Standards, at a minimum. The availability and
accessibility of a quality health workforce for surge capacity in emergencies, including
a workforce for surveillance (e.g., eld investigation and contact tracing teams,
logisticians, laboratory personnel, animal and environmental health experts, clinicians,
communications and event managers, and experts in nance, human resources,
supplies, etc.) and for early warning and awareness raising, is critical to prevention
efforts, building the resilience of communities and for the continuity of health services
during an emergency. This priority requires investing in a well-educated, trained and
appropriately compensated workforce, to ensure readiness for surges of workforce
across sectors during public health emergencies and for constant, sustained effort on
prevention and surveillance between emergencies. Training must be based on up-to-date
curricula, common standards, and competencies, reecting an interdisciplinary approach
for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, as well as One Health. Building
regional centers of expertise that can serve as hubs for education and training, as well as
national and regional cadres of primary health care workers, with the necessary training
on pandemic PPR and public health, could play a useful role.