1
Education Department's Decades-Old Debt Trap:
How the Mismanagement of Income-Driven
Repayment Locked Millions in Debt
March 2021
45 million Americans carry student loan debt, and over 8 million are currently enrolled in the
federal government’s income-driven repayment (IDR) plansplans that base borrowers’
monthly payment on their monthly income and promise cancellation of any remaining debt after
20 or 25 years.
1
The IDR plans have existed for more than 25 years.
2
Yet in all this time, of the
millions of borrowers eligible for IDR, new data obtained by the National Consumer Law Center
(NCLC) shows that the total number of borrowers who have ever received cancellation is 32.
3
No, there aren’t some digits missing from that number: just 32 individuals have received the
loan cancellation promised through the IDR program.
To put this number in context, a new analysis of government data reveals that approximately
two million federal student loan borrowers have been in repayment for more than 20 years, yet
still owe student loans for undergraduate debt.
4
All of these students could have had a path to
enroll in IDR, including a path to debt cancellation, if their loans had been competently serviced
by the federal government’s contracted student loan servicers. If they were able to properly
access and persist in IDR plans, millions of borrowers would now have their debt cancelled by
the U.S. Department of Education (ED).
This abysmal track record demonstrates how 25 years of repayment policies have failed.
Congress’s intention to give federal student loan borrowers an affordable path out of debt is
buried by flawed program design, failed implementation by the student loan industry, and
ongoing mismanagement by ED. It shows why outright debt cancellationnot tied to IDRmust
be part of the Biden Administration’s student loan plan, and why the existing IDR program is not
a substitute.
A Short History of Income-Driven Repayment
The first income-driven repayment (IDR) plan was made available to federal student loan
borrowers in 1995. Titled Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR), the plan was authorized by
Congress under the Higher Education Act and was later joined by several other similar but more
affordable repayment plans, including Income-Based Repayment (IBR), Pay As You Earn
(PAYE), and Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE) plans.
2
All of these IDR plans work in a similar way: they set the borrower’s monthly payment based on
a portion of the borrower’s income and cancel any remaining loan balance after 20 to 25 years
of payments, depending on the plan. Because many borrowers’ loan balances grow while they
are in IDR due to their monthly payments often being less than the interest that accrues on the
loan each month, loan cancellation is a critical structural feature of IDR. Cancellation was
designed to ensure that low-income borrowers are able to eventually get out from under the
burden of unaffordable debt and insulate them from the harmful financial effects of this negative
amortization”—ensuring that federal student loans did not turn into the type of debt trap
commonly associated with payday loans and predatory subprime mortgages.
If this structure worked as intended when first authorized more than two decades ago, low-
income borrowers would routinely see their debts cancelled under IDR today. Borrowers have
two paths to access IDR under current law and regulations:
Cancellation through ICR (25 years): The first IDR plan, ICR, became available to
borrowers in 1995 and has a 25-year repayment period until cancellation. This is the most
straightforward optionborrowers who enrolled and persisted in ICR at its inception should
have benefited from debt cancellation beginning in 2020.
Cancellation through ICR and REPAYE (20 years): REPAYE became available to
borrowers in December 2015 and allowed some borrowers to cancel their debt after
20 years of repayment.
5
Significantly, it allowed borrowers to include payments already
made under the ICR plan as qualifying REPAYE payments.
6
As a result, REPAYE should
have resulted in borrowers with old loans getting debt cancellation under the plan as early
as 2016a little more than 20 years after ICR was first made available to borrowers. Most
borrowers in ICR could and should have been advised to switch into the REPAYE plan to
achieve cancellation sooner, once REPAYE became available in December 2015.
7
REPAYE
is superior to ICR in that it not only provides a lower monthly payment than ICR, but also has
a shorter repayment period for borrowers who do not have graduate school loans. Put
another way, most borrowers who entered ICR in 2000 or earlier should have received
complete loan cancellation by now.
3
The Failure of the Department of Education's Income-Driven
Repayment Plans for Student Debt Cancellation
It is also important to note that borrowers with any type of federal loan are potentially eligible for
debt cancellation under either of these two paths. Beginning in 1995, borrowers with federal
Direct Loans have had access to ICR. Borrowers with Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP) loans, which are guaranteed by the federal government but were made by banks and
other private lenders. Perkins loans, which are federal loans originated by schools, have also
had access to ICR since 1995, although they had to take an additional, intermediate step by
refinancing these loans into a new Direct Consolidation Loan.
8
If IDR Worked, Millions of Borrowers Would be Receiving Student
Debt Cancellation
As noted, only 32 IDR borrowers have successfully cancelled their loans even though
approximately two million borrowers have been in repayment for 20 years or longer. The
shockingly low rate of cancellation of these borrowers’ loans is emblematic of ED’s failure to
4
deliver the relief Congress intended when it passed the
statutes enabling the creation of these IDR programs.
9
For nearly a decade, stakeholders across the student
loan system, including borrowers,
10
advocates,
11
regulators,
12
law enforcement officials,
13
economists,
14
and even leaders in the student loan industry
15
have
warned about severe flaws in the design of this
program’s regulations, in its administration by ED’s Office
of Federal Student Aid, and in its implementation by the
student loan industry.
Government Actions Reveal Widespread Industry Abuses Denying Millions the
Benefit of IDR
Over the past five years there has been a series of lawsuits and regulatory actions taken
against private-sector actors across the student loan system, including the federal government’s
largest student loan contractors. These suits demonstrate that the problems identified in these
early warnings, which were largely ignored by ED, grew to fatally undermine the promise of IDR.
For example:
Federal student loan servicers have systematically stopped millions of financially distressed
borrowers from accessing IDR. Public enforcement actions allege that the government’s
largest student loan contractors have systematically steered financially distressed borrowers
away from IDR and into high-cost repayment options such as forbearance
16
that are
temporary in nature and offer no long-term path to debt cancellation.
17
This has allegedly
happened both to borrowers with government-owned student loans and also to borrowers
with older federal loans held by private creditors.
18
Deceptive communications deterred borrowers from staying enrolled in IDR over the long
term. A report from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau revealed that as many as 6 in
10 borrowers fail to meet annual deadlines for recertifying their income when enrolled in
IDRa key requirement necessary to maintain an affordable payment for more than
12 months.
19
Public enforcement actions reveal one likely explanationsystematic
misinformation provided by one large student loan company, Navient, about the steps
necessary to retain these affordable loan payments.
20
These abuses derailed borrowers’
efforts to stay in IDR over the long term and ultimately achieve debt cancellation.
21
Widespread servicing errors continue to derail borrowers throughout the process. Public
enforcement and regulatory actions reveal a wide range of other abuses, including unlawful
paperwork processing delays, inaccurate denials, lost paperwork, and insufficient
information or guidance.
22
These abuses have long- and short-term consequences for borrowers. Not only is the borrower’s
monthly payment unaffordable but also the months spent in short-term arrangements like
forbearance do not count towards the required 20 or 25 years of eligible payments that will qualify
Only 32 IDR borrowers
have successfully
cancelled their loans
even though about
2 million borrowers have
been in repayment for
20 years or longer.
5
the borrower for loan cancellation.
23
IDR solves both problems; it reduces monthly payments (as
low as zero-dollar payments) and puts the borrower on a path towards cancellation.
When servicers steer borrowers into forbearance, they cheat them out of both forms of relief.
For example, Jane, a borrower who uses forbearance as short-term relief, will eventually return
to the same cancellation-ineligible payment plan she had before the forbearance began and
likely face financial hardship again. Even if Jane eventually does end up in an IDR plan, neither
the time spent in forbearance nor the time spent in the ineligible plan will count towards the
20 or 25 years of repayment necessary for cancellation. Jane will have made years or decades
of unnecessary payments and will have to wait years longer before she reaches cancellation.
Servicers stop borrowers from accessing IDR in other ways, too. For example, when a
borrower, Roberto, is unable to recertify his income in a timely manner, his monthly payments
may snap back to an unaffordable amount, forcing Roberto to use forbearance until he is able to
get back on trackand forfeiting months of progress toward debt cancellation. In addition,
servicers routinely do not tell FFELP borrowers they can consolidate their loans into the Direct
loan programor even obstruct their applicationsso that they can gain access to more
favorable IDR plans.
24
Recent Research Demonstrates That IDR Has Failed to Deliver Relief for Low-
Income Borrowers
Amid this wave of public enforcement and regulatory action, a growing body of research has
documented the failure of IDR to function as an effective tool to mitigate financial distress for
vulnerable borrowers. For example, one recent study found that “[c]ounter to expectations, low-
income borrowers and borrowers with high debt-to-income ratios are less likely to enroll in
IDR.”
25
Another analysis observed that “[m]ore than half (54 percent) of borrowers at the lowest
income level (those who report making up to $20,000 annually) report having fallen behind on
their student loans without accessing IDReven though effectively all borrowers making less
than approximately $20,000 would qualify for a $0 payment through an IDR plan.”
26
These and other studies demonstrate how millions of vulnerable borrowers have been denied
IDR’s twin promises of affordable payments and a path to a debt-free future over the past two
decades. If IDR programs worked as they were intended, millions of these borrowers would
have been eligible to have their debts cancelled over the past five years.
IDR’s Failures Have Worsened Disparities, Especially for Borrowers
of Color
The student loan crisis is worsening racial, gender, and economic disparities. Increasingly, it is
burdening a large number of older borrowers.
27
Borrowers of color and women typically need to
take on more debt to attend college, and due to wealth and pay disparities they have a harder
time paying it back.
28
Black and brown borrowers, affected by the continuing systemic racism
pervasive in America, are not only more dependent on student loans to pay for their higher
education, but are more likely to be thrown into financial hardship as a result of their debt.
29
6
Problems with the implementation of income-driven repayment worsen racial disparities in the
student loan system. Because of decades of structural inequities and discrimination, student
loans burden Black and Latinx borrowers more than other groups. For example, a recent study
by the JPMorgan Institute found “significant disparities exist across racial groups in managing
student debt, with Black student loan borrowers having higher student loan balances and
repayment burdens and being less likely to be making progress on their loans compared to
White and Hispanic borrowers.”
30
Majority-Black zip codes have default rates double those in
white-majority zip codes.
31
Controlling for differences in degree attainment, college GPA, and
post-college income and employment does not explain why Black borrowers default at
substantially higher rates.
32
The researcher noting this discrepancy thought it could be caused
by student loan servicers’ failure to relay information to Black borrowers.
33
A recent analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances offers new evidence
that borrowers of color struggle to benefit from IDR, even as they access this protection at
higher rates than their white peers.
34
An analysis of 2017 ED data found that even though one-
third of Black borrowers with a bachelor’s degree who are in repayment use IDR—more than
any peer groupthey will not receive the same economic benefits over the long term as white
borrowers.
35
Even with IDR, Black borrowers continue to default at extraordinarily high ratesa
potential result of disparities in recertification.
36
Recommendations
As this policy brief details, America’s severely broken student loan safety net has failed a
generation of low-income student loan borrowers, breaking the decades-old promise that
student loan payments should remain affordable and never be a lifelong burden. To address the
failure of the IDR programs, ED must:
1. Immediately review and audit the implementation of Income-Driven Repayment.
Widespread mismanagement and pervasive industry abuses have plagued IDR for more
than two decades. These failures have likely affected millions of student loan borrowers,
including both those with loans owned by ED and those with federal loans held by private
creditors. To ensure that all borrowers entitled to relief under the various IDR programs are
able to benefit, the Secretary of Education should undertake a comprehensive review of all
borrowers’ accounts, including an audit of open loan accounts for all borrowers who have
potentially made progress toward or should have qualified for debt cancellation via IDR. The
student loan payment pause presents an opportunity for ED to scrutinize the policies and
practices that led to the failure of the IDR program to protect the most vulnerable borrowers.
Following the review, ED must remedy the financial harm caused by the broken federal
student loan system and allow borrowers who could have made progress toward
cancellation to count that time within an IDR plan.
37
This holistic review and all debt
cancellation delivered as a result must be complete before student loan payments resume.
7
2. The needs of low-income borrowers should drive the process.
Income-driven repayment was promised to be the most powerful anti-poverty tool in the
Education Secretary’s student loan toolbox. Yet, it has fundamentally failed to serve this
purpose. To ensure that any review of IDR covers the full range of breakdowns encountered
by low-income borrowers, ED must get meaningful input from borrowers. Auditors should
analyze borrowers’ experiences and outcomes throughout the review, audit, and reform
process. ED must be transparent with borrowers and the public about this review, including
the data and evidence considered when identifying borrowers eligible for relief, and where
gaps in information exist. This will ensure that any effort to deliver promised debt relief is
done equitably and prioritizes the needs of the most vulnerable borrowers.
3. Cancel student debt for all in debt for two decades or more, regardless of whether
they previously enrolled in an IDR plan.
At the conclusion of this review and audit, the Secretary of Education must take immediate
administrative action to cancel student debt for any borrower who has been saddled with a
student loan for two decades or more. The review previously described should be used to
identify these borrowers and to develop a process to deliver debt cancellation quickly and
with as few administrative requirements for borrowers as possible. This debt relief should be
extended regardless of a borrower’s loan type or the payment plans selected over time.
Instead, it should be governed by the presumption that no borrower should ever be forced to
pay a student loan for more than 20 years.
In addition, where a borrower has not been in repayment for two decades or more, ED
should provide prorated credit toward debt cancellation, remedying the same underlying
failures that have caused persistent financial hardship for those with older debts.
Where ED determines that existing regulations or statutory requirements impose an
insurmountable obstacle to widespread debt cancellation for these borrowers, the Secretary
should invoke his emergency powers under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for
Students Act to waive or modify the statute and regulations as necessary.
38
Further, the
Secretary should use his authority to “compromise, waive, or release” claims against
borrowers as needed to ensure all borrowers who should benefit from debt relief are able to
do so.
39
At the time of publication, Congress was poised to change the tax treatment of
cancelled student debt to protect borrowers from tax liability for the next five years, including
borrowers whose loans would be cancelled should this recommendation be implemented.
40
4. Fix Income-Driven Repayment plans.
Executive actions to implement debt cancellation as described in the preceding
recommendation will leave the student loan portfolio significantly smaller. As a result,
overhauling the income-driven repayment scheme becomes much more feasible.
President Biden needs to follow through on his promise to create a truly affordable IDR
plan
41
that will actually provide borrowers with a functioning pathway to tax-free cancellation.
It should include vital safeguards to protect borrowers from future servicing errors and
abuses. In any effort to overhaul IDR, the administration must prioritize action to eliminate
8
the accrual and capitalization of unpaid interest charges and reduce or eliminate paperwork
burdens and other administrative barriers to enrollment and persistence.
All of these steps are necessary, but are not a substitute for broad cancellation of a fixed
amount of student loan debt for all borrowers, not tied to the failure of the IDR programs.
President Biden has asked the Justice Department to advise him about whether the federal
government can use executive authority to cancel a substantial amount of student debt for
all borrowers.
42
Broad cancellation would accomplish, with the stroke of a pen, what
decades of student loan policies have failed to accomplish. In doing so, the President would
create a smaller, more nimble student loan systemone that can finally be run effectively,
free from the mismanagement and abuse that have blocked millions of borrowers from
accessing IDR and the many other benefits and protections guaranteed by the Higher
Education Act.
But even if a fixed amount of student loan debt is cancelled, the problems in IDR still need to
be resolved. Borrowers will need a functioning IDR program in order to repay whatever
balances remain after loan cancellation. And, as long as the higher education system is
funded by debt, a functioning IDR program will be essential for new borrowers.
Conclusion
More than 20 years after IDR cancellation became a theoretical possibility under law, only
32 borrowers have qualified for cancellation while millions of borrowers have been in
repayment. This should be a wake-up call to those who contend that income-driven repayment
plans are the answer to the crisis of unaffordable student loans.
The student loan system is broken. ED must act now to reverse course and deliver on the
promise made by Congress when it created income-driven repayment, that no federal student
loan would be a life sentence of debt. The only way to fix the harm that borrowers have suffered
is to ensure that all borrowers who have been in repayment for longer than 20 years receive the
discharge they are entitled to and to put borrowers who should have made progress under an
IDR plan back on the path to forgiveness.
9
1
As described, there are a wide range of barriers that stop borrowers from staying in their IDR
plan and that undermine the financial benefits of this protection for the most vulnerable student
loan borrowers.
2
P.L. 102-325. (Establishing Income-Contingent Repayment for borrowers with Direct Loans).
3
Interim Response to Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr. Freedom of Information Act request to U.S. Dep’t
of Education, 20-02573-F (Jan. 6, 2021). Data also shows that no borrowers in the Income-
Contingent Repayment plan (“ICR”) have reached 25 years and are thus eligible for cancellation
under the ICR program.
4
The authors estimate that approximately 2 million borrowers owe federal student loans used to
finance undergraduate debt that are 20 years old or older loans that are potentially eligible for
immediate debt cancellation had borrowers been able to invoke their rights under the law. On
February 27, 2021, the Department of Education sent a letter to the Treasury Department
identifying the volume of outstanding student loans segmented for the first time by the age of
outstanding loans in each loan program. In this letter, the Education Department identifies 2.6
million cumulative borrowers who owe loans that are 20 years old or older. See U.S.
Department of Education, Letter from Acting Secretary Phillip Rosenfeldt to Matthew Miller,
Acting Commissioner for the Bureau of the Fiscal Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury
(2021). A separate analysis of College Scorecard data performed by the National Consumer
Law Center reveals that approximately 600,000 borrowers owe a mix of undergraduate and
graduate loans that are 20 years old or older. Recognizing that borrowers with both types of
loans are only eligible for debt cancellation under income-driven repayment after 25 years, the
authors excluded these loans from our estimate of the volume of borrowers with outstanding
undergraduate-only loans that are 20 years old or older.
5
REPAYE has different repayment period requirements for borrowers who did not borrow loans
to attend graduate school (20 years of repayment until cancellation) from those who did borrow
loans to attend graduate school (25 years of repayment until cancellation).
6
34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c) (5)(iv)(B). See Kendra Cobb, Switch Now, Pay Less: How Borrowers in
ICR Can Reach Student Loan Forgiveness Sooner, Nat’l Consumer Law Center (Aug. 1, 2019).
7
Borrowers with a Direct Consolidation Loan that repaid a Parent PLUS loan are the exception,
as they are eligible to repay under ICR but not under REPAYE. Compare 34 C.F.R. §§
685.208(a)(1)(i)(D), (a)(2)(iv)(D) (ICR) with 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(1)(ii)(REPAYE).
8
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal Student Aid, Federal Student Aid Handbook 1998-1999, §11.3
(Direct Consolidation Loan).
9
See, e.g., 153 Cong. Rec. S9536 (daily ed. July 19, 2007).
10
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Request for Information: Student Loan Servicing (May 21,
2015).
11
Deanne Loonin and Jillian McLaughlin, The Student Loan Default Trap: Why Borrowers
Default and What Can Be Done, Nat’l Consumer Law Center (July 2012).
12
Rohit Chopra, Prepared Remarks Before the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau (Nov. 18, 2013).
13
The Role of States in Higher Education, Hearing of the Sen. Comm. on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong., (July 24, 2014) (Testimony of Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan).
Endnotes
10
Endnotes (cont.)
14
Susan Dynarski, An Economist’s Perspective on Student Loans in the United States,
Economic Studies at Brookings (Sept. 2014).
15
Navient, Response to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Request for Information
Regarding Student Loan Servicing, CFPB-2015-0021-0355 (July 13, 2015).
16
Forbearance involves a loan holder agreeing to a temporary stoppage of payments, an
extension of time for making payments, or acceptance of smaller payments. During the
forbearance, interest continues to accrue and is capitalized at the end of the forbearance period.
Consequently, the size of the outstanding obligation may increase due to a forbearance. See
Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Student Loan Law, Ch. 4 (6th ed. 2019), updated at
www.nclc.org/library.
17
New York v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1:19-cv-09155 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3,
2019); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 17-cv-00101, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123825 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
18
Vullo v. Conduent Educ. Serv., LLC, Consent Order (N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv. Jan. 4, 2019),
(alleging that ACS obstructed borrowers’ access to federal loan programs; claiming in part, that
ACS failed to provide borrowers who sought to consolidate their loans the necessary account
information, preventing some from doing so for more than three years); Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 17-cv-00101, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123825 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4,
2017).
19
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Student Loan Servicing: Analysis of Public Input and
Recommendations for Reform (Sept. 2015).
20
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 17-cv-00101, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123825 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017); Complaint, Pa. v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-1814-RDM (M.D.
Pa. June 19, 2019); Complaint, Cal. v. Navient Corp., No. CGC-18- 19 567732 (Cal. Oct. 16,
2018); Complaint, Ill. v. Navient Corp., No. 2017-CH-00761 (Ill. July 10, 2018); Complaint, Miss.
v. Navient Corp., No. G2108-98203 (Miss. July 24, 2018); Complaint, Wash. v. Navient Corp.,
No. 17-2- 01115-1 SEA (Wash. Jan. 18, 2017).
21
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 17-cv-00101, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123825 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017); Complaint, Pa. v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-1814-RDM (M.D.
Pa. June 19, 2019); Complaint, Cal. v. Navient Corp., No. CGC-18- 19 567732 (Cal. Oct. 16,
2018); Complaint, Ill. v. Navient Corp., No. 2017-CH-00761 (Ill. July 10, 2018); Complaint, Miss.
v. Navient Corp., No. G2108-98203 (Miss. July 24, 2018); Complaint, Wash. v. Navient Corp.,
No. 17-2- 01115-1 SEA (Wash. Jan. 18, 2017).
22
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Monthly Snapshot Spotlights Student Loan Complaints,
(Apr. 25, 2017); see also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Finds
Consumers Complain of Needless Hurdles in Applying for Lower Student Loan Payments (Aug.
18, 2016); Vullo v. Conduent Educ. Serv., LLC, Consent Order (N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv. Jan. 4,
2019).
23
See, e.g. 20 USC 1098e.
24
See, e.g. Vullo v. Conduent Educ. Serv., LLC, Consent Order (N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv. Jan. 4,
2019) (alleging in part, that ACS failed to provide borrowers who sought to consolidate their
loans the necessary account information, preventing some from doing so for more than three
years); Complaint, Hyland v. Navient Corp., No. 18-cv-09031 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16. 2019).
11
Endnotes (cont.)
25
Daniel Collier et al, Exploring the Relationship of Enrollment in IDR to Borrower Demographics
and Financial Outcomes (Dec. 30, 2020); see also Seth Frotman and Christa Gibbs, Too many
student loan borrowers struggling, not enough benefiting from affordable repayment options,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug. 16, 2017).
26
Ben Kaufman, New Data Show Borrowers of Color and Low-Income Borrowers are Missing
Out on Key Protections, Raising Significant Fair Lending Concerns, Student Borrower
Protection Center (Nov. 2, 2020).
27
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Snapshot of older consumers and student loan debt (Jan.
2017); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Social Security Offsets: Improvements to
Program Design Could Better Assist Older Student Loan Borrowers with Obtaining Permitted
Relief, GAO-17-45: (Pub. Dec 19, 2016).
28
Center for Responsible Lending, UnidosUS, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, the National Urban League, and the Leadership Conference Education Fund.
Quicksand: Borrowers of Color and the Student Debt Crisis (Sept. 2019).
29
Andre M. Perry and Carl Romer, Student Debt Cancellation Should Consider Wealth, Not
Income, Brookings Institution (Feb. 25, 2021); Raphaël Charron-Chénier and Louise Seamster,
Some notes on the impact of student debt forgiveness across income groups, Scatterplot (Dec.
17, 2020).
30
Policy Brief Student Loan Debt: Addressing Disparities in Who Bears the Burden, JP Morgan
Chase & Co. Institute (Oct. 2020).
31
Kat Welbeck, Communities of Color in Crisis: Examining Racial Disparities in Student Loan
Debt and Borrower Outcomes, Student Borrower Protection Center (Jan. 8, 2020).
32
Judith Scott-Clayton, What accounts for gaps in student loan default, and what happens after,
Brookings Institute (June 21, 2018).
33
Id.
34
Ben Kaufman, New Data Show Borrowers of Color and Low-Income Borrowers are Missing
Out on Key Protections, Raising Significant Fair Lending Concerns, Student Borrower
Protection Center (Nov. 2, 2020).
35
Ben Miller, The Continued Student Loan Crisis for Black Borrowers, American Progress (Dec.
2, 2019).
36
Welbeck supra note 31.
37
See Persis Yu, Repayment for Borrowers in Income-Driven Repayment, Nat’l Consumer Law
Ctr., Student Borrower Protection Ctr. (Nov. 2020) (describing legal authority to include
payments already made as qualifying payments under the IDR statutes).
38
P.L. 108-76; 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb.
39
20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6).
40
On March 6, 2021, the U.S. Senate passed a bill to protect borrowers from tax liability for
student debt cancelled between 1/1/2020 and 1/1/2026. The House is expected to concur and
the President is expected to sign this bill.
41
For further discussion of one approach to fixing IDR moving forward, see Julia Barnard et al.
Road to Relief: Supporting Federal Student Loan Borrowers During the COVID-19 Crisis and
Beyond, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. and Ctr. For Responsible Lending (Nov. 2020).
42
Biden will ask DOJ to review his authority to cancel student loan debt White House, Reuters
(Feb. 17, 2021).