The Philippines

forward from the Solomons and from

Hawaiian areas, notably to Roi, Engebi

and Majuro in the Marshalls, and later to

Peleliu, Tinian and Guam.

In late July 1944, General Vandegrift

made an extensive inspection trip to the

Pacific. On his return through Pearl

Harbor, conferences were held with

Admirals Nimitz, Tower and Sherman;

General Rowell, Commander, Marine Air

Wings, Pacific; Brigadier General

Thomas, Director Plans and Policies; and

Brigadier General Harris, Director of

Marine Aviation. The decisions reached

brought significant changes in the

employment of Marine Aviation for the

balance of the war. There was a

revalidation of the primary role of Marine

Aviation as the support of Marine ground

forces, with a recommendation that a

division of six Commencement Bay -class

escort carriers be manned with Marine

Aviation squadrons for the purpose. The

six carrier groups would be trained at

MCAS Santa Barbara, Calif. Each group

would be composed of one VMF

squadron with 18 planes and one Marine

torpedo-bomber (VMTB) squadron with

12 planes, under a Marine Air Support

Group known as Marine Carrier Groups,

Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

By the time the units were assembled,

trained and qualified aboard their ships,

the war was drawing to its end. The first

of the Marine escort carriers (CVEs) to

deploy was Block Island, which arrived

off Okinawa on May 10, 1945. In addition

to attacks on Japanese installations in

the Okinawa area, she also supported the

Marine divisions on the island. She was

joined by the Gilbert Islands on June 1,

and both participated in strikes in the

Okinawa area and in the Balikpapan

invasion. Two more Marine CVEs came

out before the end, Cape Gloucester and

Vella Gulf. All four Marine CVEs

participated in various aspects of the

wind-down of the war, Block Island and

Gilbert Islands taking part in the

surrender of Formosa and the evacuation

of approximately 1,000 allied POWs who

had been imprisoned there.

The Philippines

During the Leyte operations in the fall

of 1944, the kamikaze threat became a

serious propblem for our carrier task

forces. To deal with it, faster climbing

fighters were needed with greater top

speed in order to reach and shoot down

the suicide planes before they could

reach their targets. The Corsair, which

was not then operating in the fleet, had

these capabilities and became the

solution. Ten VMF squadrons were

immediately assigned to carrier duty with

Task Forces 38 and 58, two squadrons

aboard each of five fast carriers of the

Essex class. Between January and June

1945, the program operated and helped

solve the problem. Since many pilots had

no previous carrier experience, the

operational accident toll was a little

heavy at first. However, all units soon

settled down and the only difference was

in the uniforms being worn in the ward

room. It was an admirable example of the

close relationship which exists between

Naval and Marine Aviation in training,

equipment and operational under-

standing.

As events began to crowd into each

week of the fall of 1944, the two gigantic

pushes westward toward the Japanese

home islands began to come together.

With Peleliu and Ulithi as major air and

fleet bases in the southwest Pacific,

decisions previously made to also take

the Philippines route were being carried

out. MAG-12 arrived in early December

at Tacloban,

and MAG-14 in early

January at Guiuan on neighboring

Samar. Later, as the landings moved to

Mindoro and then to Luzon at Lingayen

Gulf, one of the most interesting

involvements of Marine Aviation in the

Pacific war began to unfold. On

Bougainville, now one of the backwaters

of the war, Major General Mitchell,

ComAirNorSols, and commanding the

1st Marine Air Wing, had his Chief of

Staff, Colonel Jerry Jerome, set up a

close air support school with two MAGs,

a total of seven SBD squadrons. The

school was under the charge of the

operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel

Keith McCutcheon. A formal curriculum

was drawn up, including a multilecture

course for all pilots, communications

technicians, and officers of the 37th

Army Division,

also stationed at

Bougainville and scheduled for

deployment to the Philippines. The

program was an unqualified success.

Once established at Dagupan near the

foot of Lingayen Gulf, Jerome’s

command was designated MAGS-

DAGUPAN and there they operated for

the next three months. Their mission was

to keep a nine-plane air alert cover over

the 1st Cavalry Division on its dash to

Manila, ordered by MacArthur, to free

allied prisoners at Santo Tomas prison. In

66 hours, the 1st Cavalry was in Manila

with its flank protected all the way by

Jerome’s MAGSDAGUPAN.

Okinawa

In April 1945, the long struggle on

Okinawa, which would bring the war to

an end,

began with the largest

amphibious operation of the war. The

operation reunited Marine Aviation with

the Marine ground forces on a scale

heretofore unknown.

For Marine Corps Aviation, as for all

participating units, the Okinawa

operation was the culmination of all that

had been learned in the Pacific war, Here,

knocking on the door of the enemy

homeland, after four long years, was the

final test.

Planning for the operation separated

strategic and tactical aviation. Strategic

air fell to the Army Air Forces (AAF) with

the 20th Air Force. The 10th Army’s

Tactical Air Force (TAF) was commanded

by Major General Mulcahy with Brigadier

General Bill Wallace as his Air Defense

Commander. Bearing in mind that the

TAF could not function until the

command had moved ashore and the

amphibious phase of the operation was

ended, tactical air during the afloat phase

came from a task unit of the Amphibious

Force Commander who headed 18 escort

carriers of what was known as carrier-

based tactical aviation. The kamikaze

problem delayed the shift of command

ashore until May 17, after the landings

were initiated on April 1. In the TAF

organization, the Air Defense Command

alone, by the end of June, had a total of

15 Marine fighter squadrons and 10 AAF

fighter squadrons. In its Bomber

Command, there were 16 bomber

squadrons by mid-July. When the radar

warning

units’,

reporting and

communications network units are

added in, the size and scope of the TAF is

evident.

There were three Landing Force Air

Support Control Units (LFASCU) under

Colonel Vernon Megee which were

outside the command chain of the TF, and

reported to Air Support Control Units,

PhibPac. This was complicated by the

inability to shift control ashore earlier

than May 17, but generally worked well

in processing, evaluating and assigning

air support aircraft through the

LFASCU’s ashore. In conjunction with

the latter, there were two VMTB

squadrons assigned to the TAF, originally

for antisubmarine patrol. However, this

function was taken over by the patrol

squadrons of the Navy and the two TBF

squadrons were

used for close air

support, supply drops to troop units, and

other special troop support missions for

which they were well-suited. As could be

expected, there were some problems

throughout the operation but, generally,

air support was handled, evaluated,

processed and delivered by shore-based,

CVE-based and fast CV-based aircraft

more quickly and smoothly than in any

other operation of the war.

Four Marine observation (VMO)

squadrons operated at Okinawa, twice as

many as in any other operation of the

war. They not only spotted for the

artillery, but also flew message pickups

and drops, laid wire, transported

personnel and performed general utility

functions. They also performed superbly

in the evacuation of wounded with

planes modified to carry stretchers.

Marine Aviation had about one-tenth

of its total personnel strength

participating in the Okinawa operation,

or about 1,575 officers and 10,800

enlisted personnel. The Marine total

plane commitment to the operation was

around 700. Altogether, the 17 Marine

squadrons (two VMTBs) shot down 506

Japanese aircraft during the campaign.

There was no way the end of the war

could be announced to the entire island

simultaneously but, as the word quickly

spread ashore and to ships anchored

close in,

there was no need. Every

weapon that could be fired was cut loose

and, against the night sky, rivaled any

display put on by AA at the height of the

operation. It signaled to all that at last

Japan had capitulated. It took a little time

to restore order and control, and realize

that the long struggle had come to an

end, but then things settled down rapidly.

The Occupation of Japan and

Demobilization

For the occupation, two MAGs went to

Japan and several units were assigned to

China, with the rest eventually sent

home. The drop in strength of the Marine

Corps and Marine Aviation began as

abruptly as it had increased at Pearl

Harbor — almost immediately. However,

a few overall statistics are in order before

closing the book on WW II. There were 38

Marine squadrons of all types in combat

against the Japanese. They shot down a

total of 2,354 Japanese aircraft.

Members of Marine Aviation were

awarded a total of 11 Medals of Honor,

and units of Marine Aviation were

awarded 78 Presidential Unit Citations,

52 Navy Unit Citations and one

Distinguished Unit Citation (Army).

Marine Aviation assignments during

the occupation period after the war were

largely confined to Japan and mainland

China. MAG-31 was established at the

Yokosuka naval base airfield at Oppama,

five days after the formal surrender

aboard USS Missouri. The mission of

MAG-31 was surveillance and

reconnaissance of the Tokyo Bay area,

and it was a key air unit of the Japanese

occupation until July 1946, when it

returned to the U.S.

MAG-22 flew into the Omura airfield

on Kyushu from Okinawa, the entire

logistic move being made by airlift. The

group then moved to the U.S. in early

December 1945. MAG-22 had been

formed on Midway in the spring of 1942,

and it saw home for the first time that

December.

Headquarters of the 2nd Marine Air

Wing, with MAGs 14 and 33, remained at

Okinawa until February 1946, when they

returned to the continental U.S. Marine

air units in the occupation of China

The use of helicopters in combat was pioneered by Marine Corps HRS-1s in Korea.

consisted of the 1st Marine Air Wing and

its attached groups, MAGs 12, 24, 25 and

32. Their mission was primarily to fly

show-of-strength patrols, and provide

reliable air transport and logistic services

to all Marine units in the occupation,

MAGs 12 and 32 were tranferred back to

Marine Air West in California in the

spring of 1946. Remaining units were

gradually reduced, the last element, Air

Fleet Marine Force WestPac, in January

1949.

In the 10 months from V-J Day to July

1, 1946, Marine Aviation went from 103

fighter and bomber squadrons to only 27,

and in the next year the total dropped to

21. This level was held until June 30,

1950, when squadron strength dropped

to 16, only three more squadrons than

the total number in Marine Aviation on

December 7, 1941. The Marine Corps

was not alone in this seeming rush

backward to a state of unpreparedness.

III. Post-WW II Operations

The period following the end of WW II

brought a cascade of technological

advances, unprecedented in both volume

and application to almost all fields of

endeavor. For aviation in general, the

advent of the jet age opened new

horizons in transportation and worldwide

communication, but for military aviation

it was a new ball game. An era of range

extension, compression of speed/time

factors, routine all-weather operations,

and greatly improved weapons delivery

accuracy.

The major problems that dominated

the period following V-J Day, from the

Navy’s and Marine Corps’ viewpoints,

was the effect of the atom bomb on future

amphibious operations. For the planners

and architects of tactics, the problem

boiled down to devising some means of

rapid concentration of troops from greatly

increased dispersal distances that went

with fleet cruising dispositions in the

atomic age. It had to be a swift

concentration in order to gain the relative

safety of close contact with defending

forces in minimum time, to lessen the

likelihood of enemy atomic attack. The

most promising design for a vehicle

which might accomplish this turned out

to be that of rotary-wing aircraft. The

operational concepts were explored by

special boards and study groups at

Quantico, while the Division of Marine

Aviation was investigating every rotary-

wing aircraft idea that industry was

trying to put into flying form. A

developmental helicopter squadron,

HMX-1, was formed at Quantico, and

much in the same way that the

development of amphibious landing craft

was pursued in the thirties, each idea

was given consideration and tested.

VMA-121 introduced Marine Corps ADS to Korean combat. The aircraft ware able to carry heavier

loads than the B-17s of WW II.

Jet fighter squadrons became a part of Marine Corps Aviation with the introduction of the

McDonnell FH-1 Phantom.

Progress was slow because the state of

the art was in its infancy but, by the early

fifties, some realistic capabilities were in

hand.

The first major surprise of the post-

WW II years came when, in late June

1950, the United States responded in

crisis fashion to the North Korean

invasion of the new Republic of South

Korea (RoK), just four years and nine

months after V-J Day.

IV. Korean War

On June 25, the North Koreans

attacked with nine well-equipped

infantry divisions, spearheaded by one

armored division equipped with Soviet-

built T-34 tanks. The RoK forces were no

match for the invaders. Seoul fell on June

28, and its near collapse was faced by the

U.S. and the United Nations (UN) in the

first week of the war.

The United States responded to the

invasion

of South Korea both

independently and through strong

support and leadership in a UN resolution

condemning the breaking of world peace

by the North Koreans. President Truman

gave General MacArthur the go-ahead to

send Army units into Korea from Japan

and to take other actions in support of the

shattered RoK forces. In addition to the

Army forces, a naval blockade of the

entire Korean coast was ordered, and Air

Force units based in Japan were

authorized to bomb specific targets in

North Korea.

In response to urgent requests for U.S.

reinforcements,

the First Provisional

Marine Brigade was activated on July 7.

It was an air-ground team composed

mainly of the Fifth Marine Regiment and

MAG-33, both based on the West Coast.

The time and space factors in the

activation and deployment of the brigade

were extraordinary. Normally, after the

cutbacks and reductions following WW II,

the division-wing teams on both coasts

would have been hard pressed to deploy

one reinforced brigade of regiment-group

size in 30 days, let alone the seven days

required in this case.

At departure, the strength of the

brigade was 6,534. MAG-33 totaled 192

officers and 1,358 enlisted men, and was

composed mostly of VMFs 214 and 323,

night-fighter squadron VMF(N)-513 and

VMO-6. An important component of

VMO-6 was a detachment of four HO3S-

1 Sikorsky helicopters, hurriedly

assigned and moved to El Toro from

HMX-1 at Quantico. Aircraft stength at

deployment added up to 60 F4Us, eight

OYs and the four HO3S-1s. The original

plan to hold the brigade in Japan

temporarily was abandoned. This was a

result of the deteriorating position of the

UN command in Korea which, by the

fourth week of the war, had drawn into a

perimeter-type defense of the port of

Pusan at the southern tip of the

peninsula. MAG-33 shipping had been

directed to Kobe and debarkation began

there on July 31. The fighter squadrons

were flown off the CVE Badoeng Strait to

ltami near Osaka, where they were

checked for combat by the ground crews,

and hastily transported overland from

Kobe. With one refresher hop at Itami,

VMF-214 landed aboard the CVE Sicily

for operations on August 3 and, on

August 5, VMF-323 returned to Badoeng

Strait for the same purpose.

VMF(N)-513 was assigned to the 5th

Air Force (5th AF) for control and began

shore-based operations from ltazuke

airfield on the southern island of Kyushu.

Its mission was to fly night heckler

operations over the brigade, while the

two carrier-based units provided close air

support. On arrival at Kobe, a tank

landing ship (LST) was waiting to

reembark Marine Tactical Air Control

Squadron (MTACS) Two and the ground

echelon of VMO-6 for transport to Pusan.

The aircraft of VMO-6 were readied at

Kobe and Itami, and ferried to Pusan by

air. Thus the air-ground integrity of the

brigade was intact as it entered its first

combat less than 30 days after activation,

a truly remarkable achievement.

At the time of the commitment to

action of the brigade, the UN defense had

contracted to a perimeter around the

southernmost port of Pusan. It was vital

that the perimeter be reduced no further,

since the port was the logistic link to a

viable base position in support of a UN

recovery on the peninsula. To bring this

to reality, the Marines were accorded the

honor of restoring the confidence of UN

troops by destroying the myth that the

North Koreans were somehow invincible.

Like the deployments aboard the fast

carriers in WW II to help thwart the

kamikaze threat, the basing of VMFs 214

and 323 aboard Sicily and Badoeng Strait

again showed the wisdom of the long-

standing commonality policies between

Naval and Marine Aviation.

From Sicily in the form of eight

Corsairs, came the first Marine offensive

action of the war. Eight VMF-214 F4Us

took off at 1630 on August 3, 1950. They

carried incendiary bombs and rockets

and made numerous strafing runs. VMF-

323 joined the fray from Badoeng Strait

on August 6. Because the carriers were

so close to the front lines of the

perimeter, the strikes could reach their

targets in a matter of minutes at almost

any point where support was requested.

MAG-33 aircraft were constantly

orbiting on station over the front line as

the ground forces advanced, and

communications within the air-ground

team were steady, from the tactical air

control parties (TACP) with the battalions

all the way back to the brigade

headquarters. The air support system,

controlled by the active presence of

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron

Two and VMO-6 at brigade headquarters

from August 6 on, was a complete

success.

The 5th AF exercised overall control of

tactical air operations in Korea but

Marine Aviation units, as components of

an integrated Fleet Marine Force,

operated in support of the brigade as their

highest priority, and in support of other

UN units as a lower priority. The brigade

control organization consisted of three

battalion tactical air control parties and

one regimental TACP, each consisting of

one aviation officer, an experienced and

fully-qualified pilot, and six enlisted

technicians. In addition, there were the

facilities and personnel of MTACS-2 at

brigade headquarters, as well as the

Brigade Air Section of the staff. There

was also the Brigade Observation

Section, consisting of the tactical air

observer, three gunnery observers, and

the light observation and rotary-wing

aircraft of VMO-6.

The foregoing gives an abbreviated

description of the brigade air support

system which operated very effectively

through some of the most rugged fighting

of the Korean War. In addition, brigade air

in the case of VMO-6 established so

many

“firsts” with their helicopters

during the period that it was obvious that

a major tactical innovation was in the

making. An adjacent Army infantry

regiment summed up the air component

performance in the perimeter: “The

Marines on our left were a sight to

behold. Not only was their equipment

superior or equal to ours, but they had

squadrons of air in direct support. They

used it like artillery. It was ‘Hey, Joe, this

is Smitty. Knock the left off that ridge in

front of Item Company.’ They had it day

and night. It came off nearby carriers and

not from Japan with only 15 minutes of

fuel to accomplish the mission.”

Gen. MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs

of Staff for the 1st Marine Division, with

appropriate air in the form of the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing. General Lemual C.

Shepherd knew full well that the

understrength division could hardly

deploy the reinforced Fifth Marines to the

brigade, let alone field the balance of the

division, but he had an abiding faith in the

loyalty and performance potential of the

Marine Corps Reserve. The reserve,

ground and air, came through and in less

than 60 days after receiving the initial

orders, both the wing and division made

the landing at lnchon on September 15.

With the strengths of the division and

the wing being only at 7,779 and 3,733,

respectively, there was no way war-

strength manning levels could be

reached and maintained without drawing

heavily on both the ground and aviation

organized reserve contingents. Division

war strength ran about 25,000 and the

wing about 9,500. On July 19, 1950,

mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve

was authorized. The first reservists

arrived at Camp Pendleton and El Toro on

July 31, and by utilizing some units and

personnel of the 2nd Division and 2nd

Wing on the East Coast, the 1st MarDiv

and the 1st MAW were able to realize

their scheduled mount-out dates of

August 10-15. Because many reservists

were combat veterans of WW II, only

about 10 percent required any form of

basic indoctrination and training. The

fact that personnel were well-trained,

experienced and seasoned was a key

factor, particularly in aviation, since the

total time required from commencement

of pilot training to operational status is a

matter of some two years. The Marine

Corps Reserve made the Marine Corps

force in readiness a reality of the Korean

War.

The sky over the objective area was

to be divided between the air units of

Joint Task Force Seven of the Navy, and

those of X Corps.

The command was

designated by the 1st MAW as Tactical

Air Command, X Corps (TAC X Corps)

with principal units VMFS 212 and 312,

plus VMF(N)s 513 and 542. The

command of X Corps was given to Gen.

Cushman who had MAG-33 which was

under Colonel Frank Dailey. Close

support for the landing was assigned to

the task group, including the two small

carriers Sicily and Badoeng Strait, still

operating with VMFS 214 and 323.

The 1st MAW designated MTACS-2,

which had controlled air support for the

brigade, to function in that capacity for

the landing and, upon establishment of X

Corps ashore, to then continue to patrol

for TAC X Corps.

A primary and crucial objective in the

lnchon landing was Wolmi-do Island.

Preparation of Wolmi-do began on

September 10, with attacks by VMFs 214

and 323 with bombs, rockets and

napalm. The Corsairs literally blackened

the entire island with napalm to the

extent that, during the second day of

attacks, the whole island appeared to be

ablaze. During the afternoon of

September 15, VMFs 214 and 323, plus

three squadrons of Navy Skyraiders.

alternately blasted Inchon, integrating

their strikes with naval gunfire from

1430 right up to H-hour. The successful

outcome was indeed welcome.

During the advance from the

beachhead, which commenced the day

following the landing, the air support

control system functioned precisely as

previously described. One of the key

objectives of the assault phase and the

advance toward Seoul was the capture of

Kimpo airfield. As the objective areas

widened and expanded with the advance,

however, it was essential to bring in more

shore-based aviation to meet the demand

quickly on a constantly broadening front.

The field was captured and declared

secure in the mid-morning of September

18. The first plane to land at Kimpo was

an HO3S of VMO-6 which brought Gen.

Shepherd and Colonel Krulak.

Gen. Cushman established his

headquarters at Kimpo on September 19,

and was quickly joined by MTACS-2,

Marine Ground Control Intercept

Squadron (MGCIS) 1 and VMO-6. The

first fighter squadron of MAG-33 to

check in was VMF(N)-542 with five F7Fs,

VMCJ-3, with its Grumman F9F-8Ps, was one

of three Marine Corps squadrons to provide

photoreconnaissance support.

Beech SNBs provided small transport and

multiengine training throughout WW II and

into the 1970s.

landing late in the afternoon of the 19th.

Corsairs of VMFs 212 and 312 landed

shortly after 542 and also went into

action on the 20th. During the transition

of the squadrons assigned to MAG-33

from MAG-12 in Japan, the operational

burden of Marine air support was

handled entirely by the two CVE-based

Corsair squadrons, VMFs 214 and 323,

administratively assigned to MAG-12.

Also supporting the move forward of the

division-wing team into the Korean

peninsula was VMF(N)-513, still

operating from ltazuke AFB in Japan.

Control of air support had passed from

the Amphibious Force Commander to

MTACS-2 ashore on D-plus-2, when the

Landing Force Commander (1st MarDiv)

declared he was ready to assume control.

With Kimpo in hand, the next major

objective became the forced crossing of

the Han and the taking of the essential

key terrain from which to launch the

assault on Seoul properly. MAGs 12 and

33 made their contributions to these

endeavors by rapidly increasing their

strengths and capabilities at Kimpo, and

through strikes against redeployment

and reinforcing

moves by the

communists attempting to improve the

defenses of the city.

From September 19 on, both MAGs 12

and 33 flew “maximum effort” schedules

in close support of both the 1st and the

5th Marines in their assaults toward the

city. Typical during this period was a

flight of five Corsairs led by Lieutenant

Colonel Lischeid of VMF-214 which

effectively broke up a threatened

counterattack on Hill 105-S, held by the

1st Battalion, 5th Marines. On the 24th,

on the east slopes of Hill 56, VMF-323

dropped 500-pound bombs only 100

yards in front of the attacking Marines, F

Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines,

enabling them to seize the high ground of

their objective.

The supply lines of the North Korean

invading forces had been cut totally and

the lnchon landing had halted the North

Korean army.

During the period of the Inchon-Seoul

operation, September 15-October 7, the

1st MarDiv suffered 2,450 battle

casualties. The division took 6,492 North

Korean prisoners and estimates of total

enemy casualties added up to 13,666,

most of whom were counted dead on the

battlefield. These figures represent a

ratio of better than eight to one, a

commendable performance considering

the speed with which the air-ground

team was put together and deployed. It

says much for the force-in-readiness

concept of the Marine Corps and for the

wisdom of maintaining a viable, strong

and loyal Marine Corps Reserve, ground

and air.

When it became clear that the landing

had achieved a total rout of the North

Koreans, Commander in Chief, Far East

(CINCFE) made plans for the follow-up. It

was decided that the UN command could

conduct pursuit operations beyond the

38th parallel into North Korea but the

authority for Gen. MacArthur to deploy

his forces was burdened with several

limitations. Briefly, no force other than

those of the Republic of Korea could enter

if there was a clear indication of Soviet or

Chinese entry. Also, there could be no

attack of any type against any portion of

Chinese or Soviet territory. Further, only

RoK forces would be deployed in those

provinces of North Korea bordering on

the Soviet Union or Manchuria.

Generally, the plan was for the 8th

Army to advance along the axis; the RoK II

Corps in the center and the RoK I Corps

up the East Coast direct to Wonsan. The

1st Marine Division would make an

assault landing at Wonson and the 7th

Army Division would follow ashore in an

administrative landing. After

establishment ashore at Wonsan, the X

Corps would then advance west to join up

with 8th Army. The entire force would

then advance north to two phase lines;

only RoK forces would advance beyond

the second phase line, in keeping with

the restrictions mentioned above. The

8th Army would cross the parallel on

October 15 and the Wonsan landing was

set for a D-day of October 20.

The discovery that the harbor and

approaches to Wonsan were sown with

rather sophisticated Russian mines of all

kinds made it impossible for any landing

to be made until the harbor was safely

swept. The delays entailed in the

sweeping, combined with the early

taking of Wonsan by the RoK I Corps,

reversed the normal order in amphibious

operations. When the assault elements

of the division finally landed at Wonsan,

they were welcomed ashore by the

already well-established Marine Aviation

units.

On October 13, General Field Harris,

commanding the 1st MAW and TAC X

Corps, flew into Wonsan and decided to

begin operations there immediately.

VMF-312 flew in from Kimpo on the 14th,

and wing transports brought in 210

personnel of the headquarters and

VMF(N)-513 the same day. Two LSTs

sailed from Kobe with MAG-12

equipment and personnel, while some

bombs and rockets were flown in on the

planes of VMF(N)-513. On the 16th,

VMFs 214 and 323, still on board Sicily

and Badoeng Strait, began operations at

Wonsan, covering the minesweeping

activities until October 27.

With the change from an assault to an

administrative landing at Wonsan, the

1st MAW was placed under the control of

Far East Air Force, with delegation of

control to the 5th AF north of the 38th

parallel. This required the daily

An Air Force F-86 flown by John Glenn

while on exchange duty in Korea.

operations schedule to be submitted to

5th AF at Seoul by 1800 of the previous

day. The distance involved and relatively

poor communications made it extremely

difficult to get clearance back in time.

This was resolved between Gen. Harris

and General Partridge, Commanding

General 5th AF, with permission for the

former to plan and execute missions for X

Corps in northeast Korea without waiting

for 5th AF clearance.

With the major changes in strategy

that accompanied the collapse of the

North Koreans, and the rapid advances of

8th Army and the two RoK Army Corps to

the north, CINCFE issued some new

directions which affected X Corps and the

Marines directly. One aspect was an

order for the 1st MarDiv to “advance

rapidly in zone to the Korean northern

border.”

Chosin Reservoir

The 1st MarDiv command post was

moved to Hungnam on November 4, with

the 7th and 5th Marines operating north,

closing the “stretch” to less than 60

miles. Wonsan, from the viewpoint of

Marine Aviation, was looking like a

bypassed Japanese base from WW Il. The

concentration of the division north of

Hungnam, in its march to the Yalu River,

made the airfield at Yonpo increasingly

attractive to the 1st MAW because it was

in the center of the Hungnam-Hamhung

area. This meant that response times for

close air support would be considerably

reduced. On November 6, MAG-33 was

ordered to Yonpo from Japan, and was

operating there by November 10, in time

to receive VMF-212 from Wonsan. On

the 15th, VMF-214 was ordered ashore

from Sicily and set up at Wonsan with

MAG-12 supporting the squadron as best

it could.

By November 27, the 1st MarDiv was

concentrated in the vicinity of the Chosin

Reservoir, with the command post at

Hagaru, the 7th and 5th Marines at

Yudamni, and the 1st Marines along the

main supply route with a battalion each

at Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru.