Priester, Media Paratext and Constitutional Interpretation
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And once we move beyond the range of constitutional terminology and concepts that have
reached general public attention, the breadth and depth of the Supreme Court’s paratext rivals the
immense Expanded Universe of Star Wars. At many law schools today, the introductory courses
in constitutional law span two semesters and six credit hours. Law schools may offer an entire
course on First Amendment law, or even separate courses on freedom of speech and press and
freedom of religion, among a wide variety of elective offerings relating in whole or in part to
constitutional law doctrines.
On the other hand, it is also paratext which leads law school
constitutional law to quickly dispense with study of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: the Supreme Court effectively deprived it of meaningful substantive
content in the notorious Slaughterhouse Cases five years after ratification, has applied it to
invalidate government action only once in the modern era, and recently declined the invitation to
overrule Slaughterhouse when the question was briefed and argued.
Though a significant
number of Supreme Court cases address the high degree of privacy accorded to the home under
the Fourth Amendment, the lack of similar case law paratext leaves the adjacent Third
Amendment generally ignored, if not unmentioned, in the law school curriculum and by the
Court, despite the fact that the Third Amendment’s text overtly protects the home from (one
explicitly enumerated form of) unwanted and invasive government intrusion.
From a practical
standpoint, it is the paratext, not the text, which defines the meaning of U.S. constitutional law in
law schools, in the legal profession, and in the Supreme Court.
doctrine, see, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Rummel,
445 U.S. 263. For recent controversial and sharply divided decisions involving capital punishment, which cite and
discuss earlier case law, see, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Courses in administrative law, election law, and civil rights law, for example, typically involve substantial study
of statutory law as well as the relevant constitutional principles. Other courses such as intellectual property law,
federal criminal law or white collar criminal law, and environmental law typically would include some discussion of
governing constitutional law doctrines but primarily would emphasize the statutory provisions that for the most part
encompass the field. Some required courses include units involving constitutional law, such as the Confrontation
Clause in Evidence or the Takings Clause when covered in Property.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), McDonald v. Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010). Justice Thomas was the only member of the Court who wrote, in an extensive concurring opinion,
to express interest in revisiting the Court’s longstanding interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805-06, 811-13 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1424 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“I decline to apply the legal
fiction of due process incorporation. … I would accept petitioner’s invitation to decide this case under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. (quoting Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“nothing in this case turns on that question,” i.e., whether incorporating the Bill of
Rights to restrict state governments under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment ought to be doctrinally
grounded in the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause)).
For cases emphasizing the Fourth Amendment’s special degree of protection of homes, see, e.g., Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). By contrast, as of this writing, the Third
Amendment is cited substantively on the merits (i.e., in support of reasoning about the scope of constitutionally
protected privacy) within the body of the text of only one majority opinion of the Court, which itself drew on a
previous dissenting opinion for the analytical point, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), as well as tangentially within two familiar opinions which
are well known for other reasons, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.5 (1967); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15
(1972) (holding that plaintiffs’ challenge to Army domestic surveillance program must be dismissed due to failure to
demonstrate Article III standing).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3771460