MANZARI V. ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS 19
author acted] deliberately or recklessly.” Id. at 521.
Although the author “contests petitioner’s allegations, . . .
only a trial on the merits will resolve the factual dispute. . . .
[A]t this stage, the evidence creates a jury question whether
[the author] published the statements with knowledge or
reckless disregard of the alterations.” Id.
In implied defamation cases, “where a statement . . .
reasonably implies false and defamatory facts regarding
public figures or officials, those individuals must show that
such statements were made with knowledge of their false
implications or with reckless disregard of their truth.”
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
“[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably
prudent man would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1971). This
standard ensures that publishers are not held liable for
unintentional misstatements or implications, which public
figures later claim are defamatory. See Howard v. Antilla,
294 F.3d 244, 252 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[I]mplications perceived
in a statement but not intended by the speaker cannot be
actionable in public official or public figure cases.”) (quoting
Robert D. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § 5.5.1,
at 5–64 (3d ed. 1999)).
3
3
Our sister circuits have also adopted a standard of subjective awareness
of the implication. See Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Inv’rs Servs., Inc.,
499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007) (defendant must have intended or knew
of the implied meaning); Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 190 F.3d
1230, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999) (to show actual malice in an implied
defamation case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “entertained
serious doubts” that the “underlying thrust” of the publication was true