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MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.
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Phone: (800) 637-9176
leewickert@mwl-law.com
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS AND LIABILITY WAIVERS IN ALL 50 STATES
Society has become very risk averse. It is hard to participate in any activity without being asked to read and sign some sort of exculpatory agreement or liability waiver
in advance. A key tool of risk management is the exculpatory agreement - a generic term which can refer to a provision in a contract, the back of a receipt or invoice,
or simply a statement posted in a prominent location, in which one of two things is stipulated:
(1) One party is relieved of any blame or liability arising from negligence or wrongdoing regarding a particular activity, and/or
(2) One party (usually the one that drafted the agreement) is freed of all liability arising out of performance of that contract.
An exculpatory agreement is usually a provision contained in a contract between a service provider and a participant, relieving the service provider from any liability
resulting from loss or damage sustained by the participant. The terms “waiver” and “release of liability” are usually used interchangeably. An example of an
exculpatory clause is a dry cleaner’s receipt that includes a disclaimer purportedly relieving the dry cleaner from any liability for damage to the clothing during the dry-
cleaning process, or a waiver agreement that is signed by a participant in a particular recreational activity or event. Disclaimers can appear as warning signs posted on
playgrounds, sports arenas, constructions sites or other areas involving risk of physical injury (“enter at your own risk” or “use at your own risk”). It is common to see
signs like the following in places of business: “Park at your own risk!”; “Swim at your own risk!”; “Enter at your own risk!”; or “The occupier is not liable for any item
damaged or stolen from this property however caused!” They can appear as part of the packaging or advertising for consumer products. They can also be found as a
“license” allowing a person to be on business premises or to use certain property, subject to limitations. Sometimes they take the form of “click-wrap” or “shrink-wrap
agreements - the fine print you see, among other things, when you click through terms and conditions in accessing an online service or as part of the installation of a
piece of software. A typical waiver of liability form may read as follows:
I expressly, willing, and voluntarily assume full responsibility for all risks of any and every kind involved with or arising from my participation in hot air balloon
activities with Company whether during flight preparation, take-off, flight, landing, travel to or from the take-off or landing areas, or otherwise. Without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, I hereby irrevocably release Company, its employees, agents, representatives, contractors, subcontractors, successors, heirs,
assigns, affiliates, and legal representatives (the “Released Parties”) from, and hold them harmless for, all claims, rights, demands or causes of action whether
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, arising out of the ballooning activities….
An exculpatory clause and/or liability waiver is not always effective. Society and the law attempt to balance a persons right to recover damages for the negligence of
another and the ability of a business to conduct an activity that carries with it an amount of risk without being subjected to lawsuits every time somebody is hurt, or
property is lost or damaged. Such an agreement may be invalidated by courts if it is found to be unreasonable in any way. Exculpatory agreements come in all shapes,
sizes, and types. They include liability waivers, releases of liability, assumption of risk agreements, pre-injury releases, disclaimers of liability, sign postings, etc. Most
people are unaware of what rights, if any, they are giving up or waiving, when they sign such exculpatory agreements. For many years, many professionals labored
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under the misconception that waivers are not worth the paper they are written on. Over time, this erroneous notion was replaced by the equally-erroneous belief that
waivers can offer total liability protection for all facility and service providers under all circumstances. Neither belief is correct. Insurance and subrogation professionals
must become familiar with the legal and binding effect of such exculpatory agreements to evaluate liability claims and subrogation potential. It is the purpose of this
article and the chart below to provide a general overview of the subject and a summary of the general law in all 50 states regarding whether and to what extent such
agreements and waivers are binding and of legal effect.
History of Exculpatory Agreements
At common law, a party to whom a duty of care was owed could sue another party for acts which breach that duty, if those acts were reasonably foreseeable to lead to
damage or injury. In the late 19
th
Century and early 20
th
Century, in a series of cases involving injury to people or property, the U.S. Supreme Court created a hard and
fast rule that demanded reasonable care from contracting parties regardless of any contractual limitation of negligence or liability. In The Syracuse, 79 U.S. 167 (1870),
the Supreme Court ruled that an exculpatory clause contained in a contract for towing a canal boat from Albany to New York City, which stated that the boat was being
towed at the risk of her master and owner, was unenforceable and could not eliminate the tug masters duty of reasonable care. It held that the exculpatory
language in the contract was ineffective because the damage to the canal boat was the result of negligence. As a result, the tug company was liable for the damage
notwithstanding the contractual limitations.
The period from 1897 to 1937 became known as the Lochner Era.” This was a period during which the U.S. Supreme Court routinely struck down economic regulations
adopted by individual states, using due process and infringement on individual contract rights arguments, based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate
means for the State to implement its intra-state policies. The era takes its name from the 1905 Supreme Court decision of Lochner v. New York. Even during the
Lochner Era and its increased emphasis on freedom of contract, the Court held accountability for negligent actions to an even higher priority than freedom of contract.
It felt that even though the freedom to contract is held in high regard, courts will nullify exculpatory agreements if they perceive significant unfairness, unequal
bargaining power, or the potential for lack of reasonable care. In his Supreme Court nomination proceedings, Justice Robert Bork referred to the Lochner Era as the
“quintessential judicial usurpation of power.” Later, Justice John Roberts suggested that Lochner was clearly a case of making the law, rather than interpreting the law.
The modern era of exculpatory clauses saw competing economic theories influencing the courts. These included the efficiency theory, which hypothesized to
encourage and promote productive economic growth, predictability and reliability of laws relating to property and contracts was necessary. The modern era saw
courts tending to limit judicial interference with and invalidation of exculpatory agreements between parties. Modern courts also began to stress that if a contract
involved a purely private transaction, they became reluctant to invalidate contractual provisions on public policy grounds. Private parties became freer to allocate risk
among themselves in any manner they felt appropriate. Despite a continued disfavor of exculpatory clauses, the courts began to discount concerns over the bargaining
process and public policy vigilance and instead, began to favor strict construction. Today, courts construing exculpatory clauses do so using two important safeguards:
(1) The exculpatory clause must be strictly construed against the party relying on it; and
(2) The exculpatory clause must conspicuously and clearly describe the liability to be limited.
From there, the states have each developed their own case decisions and legislation about the enforcement of exculpatory provisions in contracts. Some states, such
as Wisconsin, heavily disfavor their use and invalidate them if they are presented on a “take-it or leave-it” basis, with no opportunity to bargain. For example, in Atkins
v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center, 691 N.W.2d 334 (Wis. 2005), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a guest registration and waiver form signed by a woman who
drowned in a lap pool was an invalid exculpatory provision and against public policy, because it was overly broad and all-inclusive. The Court held that (1) the term
“fault” did not make clear that the guest was releasing others from intentional, as well as negligent, acts, (2) the form served two purposes - guest registration and
waiver of liability for “fault”, and (3) the guest did not have the opportunity to bargain - she either signed or she couldn’t swim. Other states invalidate them if they are
overly broad and all-inclusive. Still others find a variety of public policy reasons for striking them down and/or place significant restrictions on their use.
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Other states, like Ohio, have looked to the complexity of the language within the document to determine if an “ordinarily prudent and knowledgeable individual would
have understood the provision as a release from liability for negligence.” Hall v. Woodland Lake Leisure Resort Club, 1998 WL 729197 (Ohio App. 1998). California
courts have identified six criteria established to identify the kind of agreement in which an exculpatory clause is invalid as contrary to public policy:
(1) It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation;
(2) The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some
member of the public;
(3) The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least any member coming within certain
established standards;
(4) As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of
bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services;
(5) In exercising a superior bargaining power, the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract or exculpation, and makes no provision
whereby a purchaser may pay additional fees and obtain protection against negligence; and
(6) As a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller
or his agents. Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92 (Cal. 1963).
In many states, to be enforceable, waivers need to be narrowly and clearly drafted to fully notify the parties of the significance of the document and inform them as to
the specific nature of what is being waived. In some jurisdictions, the waiver must be a separate document with its own signature line, should not use excessive legal
jargon, and should discuss only the risks associated with the activity and the release from liability due to negligence. Some states even require that the party waiving
rights must be provided with an opportunity to bargain over the terms of the waiver. The text of the waiver itself should provide for the opportunity to bargain or at a
minimum demonstrate that the waiving party considered bargaining prior to executing the release.
Generally, even if the waiver is held valid, it will apply only to ordinary negligence. A majority of states hold that such agreements generally are void on the grounds
that public policy precludes enforcement of a release that would shelter aggravated misconduct or gross negligence. City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.4
th
747 (Cal. 2007). Some states, such as Connecticut, do not recognize degrees of negligence and, consequently, do not recognize the tort of gross negligence as a
separate basis of liability. Such courts have nevertheless limited the application of the releases to situations in which considerations relating to public policy and good
conscience are not implicated. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., et al., 885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005). In addition, some state statutes affect the viability of an
exculpatory clause. In New York, any assumption of risk/waiver in connection to any pool, gymnasium, amusement park, or any other similar facility is deemed
statutorily void as against public policy most notably when the plaintiff pays a fee to use the facility. They cite N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 5-326. New Jersey has held that a
release signed by a decedent with the express purpose of barring his potential heirs from instituting a wrongful death action in the event of his death was void as
against public policy because of its Wrongful Death Act.
Types of Exculpatory Agreements
As stated above, exculpatory agreements come in all shapes, sizes, and types.
LIABILITY WAIVER. A waiver is a contract between a service provider and a participant signed prior to participating in an activity. In it, the participant agrees to waive
liability against the provider for any fault or liability for injuries resulting from the ordinary negligence of the provider, its employees, or its agents. The agreement
attempts to relieve the service provider of liability for injuries resulting from mistakes, errors or faults of the provider and, in effect, relieves the provider of the duty to
use ordinary care in providing for the participant. The waiver often states that the participant agrees to “release, waive, discharge, hold harmless, defend, and
indemnify [the gym] and its [staff] from any and all claims, actions, or losses for bodily injury, property damage, wrongful death, loss of services or otherwise” arising
out of the participant’s use of the gym facilities and equipment. Please note that indemnity agreements are not covered by or discussed in this article.
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ASSUMPTION OF RISK AGREEMENT. Assumption of risk refers to situations in which an individual acknowledges the risks associated with any activity but chooses to
take part anyway. At common law, “assumption of the risk” is an affirmative defense where the defense claims that the plaintiff knowingly exposed himself to the
hazards that caused injury or damages. It alleges that the risks assumed are not those created by the defendant’s negligence, but rather by the nature of the activity
itself. The rationale is that some activities are inherently dangerous and imposing a duty to mitigate those inherent dangers could alter the nature of the activity or
inhibit vigorous participation. To avoid this chilling effect, owners or occupiers of premises or businesses in which a plaintiff engages in these activities, have no duty to
eliminate those risks.
In the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the discussion regarding express assumption of risk is explained is follows:
The risk of harm from the defendant’s conduct may be assumed by express agreement between the parties. Ordinarily such an agreement takes the form of a
contract, which provides that the defendant is under no obligation to protect the plaintiff and shall not be liable to him for the consequences of conduct which
would otherwise be tortious. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B.
An individual can assume the risks involved in an activity in one of two ways: (1) expressly, by signing an agreement, or (2) by his conduct. Express assumption of
risk involves a written agreement in which an individual acknowledges the risk of injury or other damages and agrees to assume those risks. A “Waiver of Liability”
usually includes language that the participant understands the risks inherent in certain activities and that participation in such activities could result in injury. The
participant usually acknowledges that the risks and dangers may be caused by the negligence of the staff of the business, accidents, breaches of contract, or other
causes, and that the participant assumes all risks and dangers, including the responsibility for any losses or damages, whether caused in whole or in part by the
negligence or conduct of service provider. To prevail on an assumption of risk affirmative defense, the defendant must show the court that the plaintiff knew there
was a risk of injury or other harm, and knowingly engaged in the activity which resulted in his injury or damages anyway.
PRE-INJURY RELEASE. A pre-injury release or waiver is a written document that a participant signs prior to engaging in an activity, which purports to release the service
provider from claims an individual may bring as a result of the provider’s negligence. This release of future liability is a contractual arrangement where one party
surrenders legal rights or obligations. American Jurisprudence states that “[a] valid release continues to be a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions in every
jurisdiction.” 30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 161 § 3. What courts consider to be a valid release, however, varies from state to state. A properly worded pre-injury
release can be an effective way to limit liability. However, there are many ways injured parties can defeat a poorly worded pre-injury release. States such as Texas
require that for a pre-injury release to be effective, it must (a) meet the fair notice requirements, (b) constitute a meeting of the minds, and (c) be supported by valid
consideration. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT. To “indemnify” means to reimburse another party for loss or damage suffered because of a third party’s or one’s own acts or omissions. It is
a promise to reimburse another for such a loss and to give security against such a loss. It is a promise to do something in the future, should injury or damage result
from an activity. An agreement to indemnify is often coupled with a promise to “hold harmless” another party:
Seller shall hold harmless and indemnify Buyer against any losses, liabilities, and claims arising out of or relating to this transaction.
HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT. A hold harmless agreement is one in which the participant absolves the service provider from any responsibility for damage or other
liability arising from a transaction or activity. Black’s Law Dictionary says that to hold harmless and to indemnify have the same meaning whereas Mellinkoff’s
Dictionary of American Legal Usage says that one can also distinguish the two terms - that “hold harmless is understood to protect another against the risk of loss as
well as actual loss” whereas indemnify can also mean “reimburse for any damage,” a narrower meaning than that of hold harmless. Technically, the former is
defensive, while the latter is offensive. The participant agrees to hold harmless” (i.e., indemnify) a service provider even before any injury or damage is sustained. A
“hold harmless” agreement protects against losses and liabilities, while an indemnity agreement protects against losses alone. Indemnity agreements are much
different than waivers of liability and releases and are not discussed at length in this article.
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DISCLAIMER/SIGN POSTING. A disclaimer is any statement or posting that is used to specify or limit the scope of obligations and rights that are enforceable in a legally
recognized relationship (such as host/visitor, manufacturer/consumer, etc.). The disclaimer usually attempts to relieve a party of liability in situations involving risk or
uncertainty. A very common method of communicating this attempted limitation on liability is posting a sign, such as “Use or Enter at Your Own Risk.” The sign on the
back of a tractor-trailer which reads: “Stay Back: Not Responsible for Broken Windshields” is not a contract that would prevent a motorist from presenting a claim for
damages against a trucking company. At best an attorney for the trucking company would argue that the sign was a warning which creates some contributory
negligence on the part of the damaged motorist. A sign which warns of dangers or conditions of real property won’t exonerate premises liability or a duty owed by a
property owner, but it may serve to put an occupier on notice of a condition and will allow the owner to argue contributory negligence or “assumption of the risk.” In
some states, a person who is found to have “assumed the risk” might not be able to recover at all. However, other states treat the assumption simply as a way to
reduce, but not eliminate, the owner’s legal liability.
Signs which purport to limit liability for injuries or accidents simply because they are posted are found everywhere. Some signs serve a legitimate function, such as
notifying people of “hidden” hazards such as wet floors, steps, or uneven surfaces. That’s why every time there is a spill in a store, out comes the “wet floor” sign.
While “wet floor” signs may fulfill a duty to warn others, other signs attempt to limit liability. A sign which reads Not Responsible for Stolen Vehicles” is attempting to
shirk a duty a valet service owes to its customers to safeguard and protect items left in their care and custody.
COVENANT NOT TO SUE. This agreement provides that the participant agrees or covenants not to sue the service provider for any loss, damage, or injury to their
person or property which may occur from any cause whatsoever during the event or service provided.
TICKETS/RECEIPTS. An exclusion clause, waiver or disclaimer may appear on a document which does not appear to be a contract. These may be found on the back of
tickets to a basketball game, amusement park, concert, etc. Exculpatory clauses are often found on the back of a ticket or a receipt that you have not signed. The
theory is that the act of purchasing the ticket is all that is needed for an agreement to form between the parties in which one promises not to sue the other in the
event of an injury. Disclaimers can often be seen where information, products, or services are supplied. The disclaimer and other terms and conditions should be
available for viewing at the point in time that the contract is entered into, before the purchaser or user agreed to proceed. The effectiveness of such an exclusion
clause is assessed by considering whether actual or constructive notice occurred prior to the contract forming. It is harder to prove notice was given in the case of
unsigned disclaimers or disclaimers printed on receipts issued after payment. In such cases, a court considers whether a reasonable person would consider the receipt,
voucher, or ticket to be part of the contract and know that they should read it. In some states, the courts hold that that the release on a ski ticket stating that the skier
“assumes the inherent risks of skiing” does not clearly and unambiguously release the operator from liability for the operator’s negligence. Steele v. Mt. Hood
Meadows Oregon, Ltd., 974 P.2d. 794 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). They are frequently held to the same standards as waivers and exculpatory clauses found in written and
signed contracts. In Wisconsin, for example, the only issue is whether the language is against public policy. Yauger v. Skiing Enterprises, Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis.
1996). Other states make their ultimate determination on the effectiveness of such agreements” based on what constitutes the public interest after considering the
totality of the circumstances of any given case. Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522 (Md. App. 1994).
CLICK-WRAP / SHRINK-WRAP. “Shrink-wrap” and “click-wrap” agreements are the fine print you see, among other things, when you click through terms and conditions
in accessing an online service (e.g., in connection with a purchase or an online service) or as part of the installation of a piece of software. The term shrink-wrap”
comes from the packaging method of computer installation disks and associated documentation sealed by shrink-wrap cellophane. The purported end user license
agreement was often itself packaged in shrink-wrap cellophane and placed on the outside of the package or included as the top item in the package. Shrink-wrap
agreements can take a variety of forms and are found in both software and hardware acquisitions. However, they all have a common structure: essentially non-
negotiable terms and conditions that accompany the product. The terms are often used interchangeably. Although this article doesn’t deal with these types of
agreements, courts have tended to uphold as enforceable “shrink-wrap” and “click-wrap” agreements, even if the consumer fails to read them. The terms and
conditions found in shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements vary greatly, but include such terms as warranty terms, licensing use restrictions, limitations on liability,
indemnity, and arbitration and venue terms. These clandestine agreements may also be encountered as part of the documentation provided with new software or a
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hardware component. They may even be found, with some searching, in a file entitled “license.txt” or similar name on the installation CD on which a new piece of
software is delivered. Businesses seldom read these terms in any detail, generally view them as non-negotiable, and accept them as a necessary evil.
Enforcement Generally
The enforcement of exculpatory clauses is very state-specific. Each state can be classified as to its enforcement of such waivers. Some are very lenient, others
moderate, and many have very strict requirements. Three states disallow such waivers entirely. Because exculpatory clauses are widely disfavored, a majority of state
courts strictly construe the terms and conditions against the party seeking to enforce them and require that the contract “clearly set out what negligent liability is to be
avoided.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. El Dorado Chem. Co., 283 S.W.3d 191 (Ark. 2008). This generally means that the courts require the exculpatory clause to be clear and
unambiguous. Any such release must clearly, explicitly, and comprehensibly set forth to an ordinary person untrained in the law the intent and effect of the document.
Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 72 Cal. Rptr.3d 471 (Cal. App. 2008). Some courts require that the word “negligence” be specifically included, and that the waiver explicitly
state the type of negligence being waived to distinguish between losses resulting from inherent risks and those resulting from fault or wrongdoing Slowe v. Pike Creek
Court Club, Inc., 2008 WL 5115035 (Del. Super. 2008).
The most common reason waivers are not enforced is because they are poorly written. Courts in all states require that the language be clear and unambiguous. In
addition, many states require specific language for the waiver to be enforceable. For instance, New York courts (and the courts in several other states) require that the
waiver include language specifying the negligence of the provider. Failure to use the word negligence in those states causes an otherwise enforceable waiver to
fail.
Most states will not enforce waivers intended to protect the provider against liability for gross negligence, reckless conduct, willful/wanton conduct, or intentional
acts. Ordinary negligence is the failure to take the prudence and care that a reasonable, prudent professional would take under the circumstances. Gross negligence is
an extreme form of negligence in which the party fails to take the care that even a careless person would take under the circumstances. It is sometimes said that gross
negligence includes a reckless disregard for the rights and welfare of others.
In some states a waiver signed by a spouse protects the provider from litigation by the non-signing spouse in the event of injury or death of the signing spouse. In other
states, such a waiver has no effect on the right of the non-signing spouse to bring suit.
Some states, such as Arizona, have held that the validity of an express contractual assumption of risk is a question of fact for a jury, not a judge. Phelps v. Firebird
Raceway, Inc., 111 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. 2005). States such as Virginia “universally prohibit” any “provision for release from liability for personal injury which may be caused
by future acts of negligence” and only allow releases of liability for property damage. The Supreme Court of Virginia has clearly held that public policy forbids the
enforcement of a release or waiver for personal injury caused by future acts of negligence. Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond and Danville R.R. Co., 11 S.E. 829 (Va. 1890).
Louisiana has a statute that declares as null any clause that limits liability based on intentional fault or gross fault or for physical injury. Ostrowiecki v. Aggressor Fleet,
Ltd., 965 So.2d 527, (La. App. 2007). Montana similarly prohibits exculpatory clauses that purport to release a party from negligence. In Montana, “it is statutorily
prohibited for any contracts to have as their object, directly or indirectly, the exemption of anyone from responsibility for their own fraud, their willful injury to the
person or property of another, or for their willful or negligent violation of the law. Montana Code Ann. § 28-2-702.
In at least 46 states, a well-written, properly administered waiver, voluntarily and knowingly signed by an adult, can protect the drafter of the waiver from liability for
injuries resulting from ordinary negligence. Not all waivers, however, are well-written and properly administered. Some states, such as Louisiana, Montana, and
Virginia, simply refuse to enforce such exculpatory agreements. Twenty (20) states have very strict standards which must be adhered to for an exculpatory agreement
to be effective. These include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Sixteen (16) states have more moderate standards for such an exculpatory clause to
be valid. They include Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
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South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. Ten (10) states have very lenient standards and tend to enforce sloppily-drafted exculpatory agreements. They
include Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, and Tennessee. Rhode Island hasn’t clearly defined its
requirements and is hard to classify.
Parental Waivers Signed on Behalf of Minors
An issue which is developing in many states is the restriction on enforcing waivers signed by minors or signed by the parents of minors (parental waivers). Until recent
years, the general rule was that waivers signed by minors or waivers signed by the parents of minor children were not enforceable. In the past few years, courts in
several states have begun to enforce parental waivers. Additionally, two states (Alaska and Colorado) have passed statutes enabling the enforcement of such
agreements.
Application to Business Losses
Whether the same public policy concerns and applications which govern the efficacy of exculpatory clauses involving personal injury claims applies equally to the
release of business losses in a contract between two commercial entities is also an area that varies from state to state. Although there is often a correlation between
the two, the subject of exculpatory agreements between two commercial entities is not covered in the chart below. As an example of its treatment, however, in
Discount Fabric House v. Wisconsin Telephone, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 417 (Wis. 1984), the plaintiff, a drapery business, sued the Wisconsin Telephone Company for omitting
the plaintiffs trade name from an advertisement in the Yellow Pages. The court noted that the nature of the telephone companys business gave it a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength. Therefore, the exculpatory clause was held invalid.
Posted Warning and “Not Responsible for Injuries” Signs
Many businesses are choosing to display warning signs about potentially dangerous conditions on a property or inside a building. A “Do Not Enter” sign may transform
social guests or invitees into trespassers, altering the duty owed to the injured party. But it doesn’t necessarily relieve the premises owner of premises liability. A
“Beware of Dog” sign may actually be used against the property owner, who apparently is aware that people must be “warned” about the dangerous propensity of the
dog. At the same time, it may allow the dog owner to argue that the person assumed the risk of a dangerous dog after reading the sign. A “Caution: Wet Floor” sign
may serve as notice to invitees and social guests of a hazardous condition. However, they open a new area of litigation regarding their visibility and specificity. A
tractor-trailer may have a sign on the back of the trailer which reads, Warning: Stay Back 200 Feet. Not Responsible for Broken Windshields.” However, these are
often of little legal effect. In Florida, for example, F.S.A. § 316.520 states that a vehicle may not be driven or moved on any highway unless the vehicle is so constructed
or loaded as to prevent any of its load from dropping, shifting, leaking, blowing, or otherwise escaping therefrom, except that sand may be dropped only for the
purpose of securing traction or water or other substance may be sprinkled on a roadway in cleaning or maintaining the roadway. It is the duty of every owner and
driver, severally, of any vehicle hauling, upon any public road or highway open to the public, dirt, sand, lime rock, gravel, silica, or other similar aggregate or trash,
garbage, any inanimate object or objects, or any similar material that could fall or blow from such vehicle, to prevent such materials from falling, blowing, or in any way
escaping from such vehicle. No sign will erase the legal duty which the statute creates. A sign in a hotel lobby that states “This hotel is not responsible for any stolen or
lost items” may be enough for hotels to avoid liability in some states. However, other states hold that a simple sign without any other precautions is not enough.
Drafting Effective Exculpatory Agreements
It is not possible to draft a release/waiver that will withstand judicial scrutiny in every state given the variations in standards for each state. Moreover, because state
statutes can affect whether an exculpatory clause will be enforced (for example, whether it will be effective against one’s heirs/assigns), a “one size fits all” approach is
simply not feasible. It is still possible to create enforceable exculpatory agreements; there remain numerous traps for non-vigilant drafters. Throughout this last 25
years, the courts have repeatedly said that waivers of liability clauses are and will continue to be looked at with disfavor. Waivers of liability (i.e., an exculpatory clause)
are not invalid per se. Rather, provisions of any such waiver must be closely scrutinized and strictly construed against the party seeking to rely on it.
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Drafters of exculpatory agreements are not always given clear guidance as to what is and what isn’t acceptable. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has now considered
exculpatory agreements in six cases in the past 25 years, and each time has found the agreement as drafted to be unenforceable. It isn’t so much that lawyers and
businesses that draft such agreements are ignoring what the Court is telling them, as much as it is that the Supreme Court has not formulated a clear, uniform test for
these agreements. Until the Court announces such a test, lawyers who draft exculpatory agreements must carefully apply what the Court has said so far and give
thorough consideration to the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement.
Despite their unpredictability, exculpatory agreements are the best risk-management tool available to businesses and service providers. Put succinctly, they can’t hurt.
Frequently, exculpatory agreements are accompanied by such contractual risk management tools as indemnification agreements, covenants not to sue, a severability
clause, a venue and jurisdiction clause, a mediation/arbitration provision, and an assumption of risk statement. Interpreting the interplay between all these usually
requires engaging qualified counsel. The following chart provides a brief and general summary of how exculpatory clauses are treated in all 50 states. Exculpatory
agreements most commonly fail because they are poorly drafted. For a more detailed and case-specific evaluation of the effect an exculpatory agreement may have on
a claim or matter, contact Lee Wickert at leewickert@mwl-law.com or submit the matter to MWL for review and handling HERE.
STATE
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
DRAFTING GUIDELINES
COMMENTS
ALABAMA
Valid, unless it releases a party
for wanton or willful conduct.
Barnes v. Birmingham Intern.
Raceway, Inc., 551 So.2d 929
(Ala. 1989); Young v. City of
Gadsden, 482 So.2d 1158 (Ala.
1985) (overruled by Barnes).
Contract of adhesion are unenforceable in
Alabama. These are contracts in which the
principal obligation of the adhering party is the
payment of money. Ensure that the major
obligation of the contract is to participate in an
activity or obey certain rules not to secure the
payment of money. Dudley v. Bass Anglers
Sportsman Soc., 777 So.2d 135 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000).
An exculpatory agreement between parties
with unbalanced bargaining powers (e.g.,
landlord/tenants) are scrutinized more
thoroughly. Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,
466 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1985). The mere fact that a
party did not understand the release is an
insufficient defense for voluntary hazardous
activities. Rommell v. Automobile Racing Club,
Inc., 964 F.2d 1090 (11
th
Cir. 1992).
ALASKA
Valid if it reflects “conspicuous
and unequivocally expressed”
intent to release a party from
liability. Kissick v. Schmierer,
816 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1991).
(1) Risk clearly set forth (2) using the word
negligence; (3) clear simple words and capital
letters; (4) doesn’t violate public policy; (5) must
state if seeking to release for negligence
unrelated to inherent risks; and (6) can’t
suggest standards of safety. Donahue v.
Ledgends, Inc., 331 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2014).
Ambiguities are strictly construed against the
party seeking immunity. Ledgends, Inc. v. Kerr,
91 P.3d 960 (Alaska 2004). In Kissick, plaintiff
was not barred from bringing a wrongful death
claim since the term “injuries” was ambiguous
regarding whether it included death. Further,
in Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., plaintiff’s
claim was not barred because the scope of the
exculpatory agreement only covered the
inherent dangers of riding an ATV and not the
dangers of an unnecessarily dangerous course.
Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628
(Alaska 2001).
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
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ARIZONA
Valid. The validity of every
exculpatory agreement is
constitutionally required to be
a jury question. Phelps v.
Firebird Raceway, Inc., 111
P.3d 1003 (Ariz. 2005); AZ
Const. Art. 18, § 5.
Although a party may effectively use a release
to avoid liability, there is a duty to disclose all
facts which they know or should know would
reasonably affect the releasing party’s
judgment, unless the releasing party knows
such facts or that he does not care to know
them. Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel,
Inc., 890 P.2d 69 (Ariz. App. 1994).
ARKANSAS
Valid, but strongly disfavored
based on the encouragement
of exercising care. Jordan v.
Diamond Equipment & Supply
Co., 207 S.W.3d 525 (Ark.
2005). Exculpatory contracts
are strictly construed against
the party relying on them and
must clearly set out the
liability which is being
avoided. Plant v. Wilbur, 345
Ark. 487 (Ark. 2001).
Courts do not limit interpretations to the literal
language of the release, but also consider the
facts and circumstances surrounding the
release to determine the intent of the parties.
Miller v. Pro-Transportation, 77 S.W.3d 551
(Ark. App. 2002).
CALIFORNIA
Valid, except when involving
the public interest. Sproul v.
Cuddy, 280 P.2d 158 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1955) Must be “clear,
unambiguous, and explicit in
expressing the intent of the
parties.” Paralift, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 23 Cal.App.4
th
748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
The inclusion of the term negligence” is not
required if the agreement’s intent is reasonably
clear. Sanchez v. Ballys Total Fitness Corp., 68
Cal.App.4
th
62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
A list of characteristics is provided in Tunkl v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. to determine when the
public interest is affected. Tunkl v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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STATE
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
DRAFTING GUIDELINES
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COLORADO
Valid, although disfavored.
Not strictly against public
policy “if one party is not at
such obvious disadvantage in
bargaining power that the
effect of the contract is to put
him at the mercy of the
other’s negligence.” Heil
Valley Ranch v. Simkin, 784
P.2d 781 (Colo. 1989). Can’t
be used to shield against a
claim of willful/wanton
negligence. McShane v.
Stirling Ranch Property
Owners Assn, Inc., 393 P.3d
978 (Colo. 2017).
Courts consider four elements: (1) the existence
of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the
service performed; (3) whether the contract
was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the
intention is expressed in clear and unambiguous
language. Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376
(Colo. 1981).
A waiver may violate public policy “if it
involves a service that a defendant is obligated
to provide for the public.” Chadwick v. Colt
Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo.
2004). However, businesses offering
recreational activities, which are non-essential,
such as horseback riding and snowmobiling, do
not owe a special duty to the public. Id.
CONNECTICUT
Reluctantly valid. However,
exculpatory agreements must
be expressed in clear and
unmistakable language. Hanks
v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp.,
276 Conn. 314 (Conn. 2005);
Hyson v. White Water
Mountain Resorts of Conn.,
Inc., 265 Conn. 636 (Conn.
2003).
Although Connecticut does not recognize
degrees of negligence in the law of torts
(Decker v. Roberts, 125 Conn. 150 (Conn.
1939)), Connecticut courts are careful not to
allow the release of defendant from conduct
which violates public policy. Reardon v.
Windswept Farm, LLC, 280 Conn. 153 (Conn.
2006). Releases have been considered against
public policy when it’s a “take-it or leave-it”
situation or when the party seeking the release
invites the public to use their facilities
regardless of ability level. Id.
DELAWARE
Valid if clear and unequivocal;
not unconscionable; and not
against public policy. Ketler v.
PFPA, LLC, 132 A.3d 746 (Del.
2016).
Courts have found a release for a party’s own
negligence to be sufficiently crystal clear”
when they include language “specifically
referring to the negligence of the protected
party. Slowe v. Pike Creek Court Club, Inc., 2008
WL 5115035 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008).
Release does not have to specifically name a
party to be enforceable. Evans v. Feelin Good,
Inc., 1991 WL 18066 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991).
Can be a general release, including a release of
third parties. Chakov v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 429 A.2d 984 (Del. 1981).
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STATE
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
DRAFTING GUIDELINES
COMMENTS
DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Valid if clear and
unambiguous. Maiatico v. Hot
Shoppes, Inc., 287 F.2d 349
(D.C. Cir. 1961). Must not
violate public policy. Godette
v. Estate of Cox, 592 A.2d
1028 (D.C. 1991).
To be enforceable, an exculpatory provision
must clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and
unmistakably express the parties’ intention to
exculpate from its own negligence. Moore v.
Waller, 930 A.2d 176 (D.C. 2007). Must
expressly refer to releasing the release from
negligence claims. Id.
Cannot limit a party’s liability for gross
negligence, recklessness, or intentional torts.
Moore v. Waller, 930 A.2d 176 (D.C. 2007).
FLORIDA
Valid if the intention is clear
and unequivocal and the
wording so clear and
understandable that an
ordinary party will know what
he is contracting away. Brooks
v. Paul, 219 So.3d 886 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
The word “negligent” not required but highly
suggested. Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc.,
157 So.3d 256, 270 (Fla. 2015). An exculpatory
agreement need not use express language or
list every possible way plaintiff could be injured.
Id. Suggested that agreements be dated, signed,
witnessed, and exculpatory language be clearly
visible in conspicuous print.
An exculpatory agreement cannot be used to
release a party for an intentional tort. Mankap
Enterprises, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., a
Div. of Baker Protective Servs., Inc., 427 So.2d
332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
GEORGIA
Valid if not against public
policy. Cash v. St. & Trail, Inc.,
221 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975). Whether “against
public policy” is a decision for
the General Assembly.
McFann v. Sky Warriors, Inc.,
603 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004).
Exculpatory waivers do not need to use the
word “negligence.” Neighborhood Assistance
Corp. of Am. v. Dixon, 593 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004).
An exculpatory agreement may not relieve a
party from liability for willful or wanton
conduct. McFann v. Sky Warriors, Inc., 603
S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
HAWAII
Valid if it does not “exempt a
party from negligence in the
performance of a public duty,
or where a public interest is
involved.” Fujimoto v. Au, 19
P.3d 699 (Haw. 2001).
(1) Provide full disclosure of the inherent risks;
and (2) Take steps to ensure patron is physically
able to participate and is given the necessary
instruction to safely participate.
Waiver can release you for inherent risks when
providing recreational activities. Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 663-1.54 defines “inherent risks.
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STATE
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
DRAFTING GUIDELINES
COMMENTS
IDAHO
Valid - subject to certain
exceptions. Steiner Corp. v.
Am. Dist. Tel., 683 P.2d 435
(Idaho 1984). Exceptions
include (1) disparity in
bargaining power, and (2) a
public duty is involved. Lee v.
Sun Valley Co., 695 P.2d 361
(Idaho 1984).
The release must be (1) clear and ambiguous,
and (2) must address the conduct that caused
the harm. However, there is no need to state
the precise occurrence which could cause
injury, rather adopt broad language to cover a
wide range of accidents. Morrison v. Northwest
Nazarene Univ., 273 P.3d 1253 (Idaho 2012).
Contributory negligence is not a complete bar
to recovery. Liability is apportioned between
the parties based on the degree of fault.
Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P.2d 369 (Idaho 1985).
ILLINOIS
Valid, but generally disfavored
and will be construed against
the drafter. Chicago & N.W.
Ry. Co. v. Chicago Packaged
Fuel Co., 195 F.2d 467 (7
th
Cir.
1952).
(1) Clearly spell out the intention of the parties;
(2) No social relationship between the parties
preventing enforcement; and (3) not against
public policy. Evans v. Lima Flight Team, Inc.,
373 Ill. App.3d 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). Must
contain clear, explicit, and unequivocal language
referencing the types of activities,
circumstances, or situations that may occur. Not
specific instances. Garrison v. Combined Fitness
Ctr., Ltd., 559 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, LLC, 927 N.E.2d
137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
A release can be set aside if there is fraud in
the execution or fraud in the inducement. Bien
v. Fox Meadow Farms Ltd., 574 N.E.2d 1311
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
INDIANA
Valid. “Parties may agree that
one is under no obligation of
care for the benefit of the
other and shall not be held
liable for the consequences of
conduct which would
otherwise be negligent.
Marshall v. Blue Springs Corp.,
641 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994).
To ensure a party’s acceptance, a release must
specifically and explicitly refer to the negligence
the party is being released from. Powell v. Am.
Health Fitness Ctr. of Fort Wayne, Inc., 694
N.E.2d 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). However, this
does not specifically require the use of the word
“negligence.” Avant v. Cmty. Hosp., 826 N.E.2d
7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Three exceptions: (1) release invalid where
legislature has deemed it so, (2) if release
affects public interest, and (3) unequal
bargaining power between parties. LaFrenz v.
Lake Cty. Fair Bd., 360 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977).
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STATE
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
DRAFTING GUIDELINES
COMMENTS
IOWA
Valid and not contrary to
public policy. Huber v. Hovey,
501 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1993).
A release need not specify that it covers
negligent acts if the clear intent is to provide for
such a release. Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 534
F.2d 775 (8
th
Cir. 1976). The parties don’t need
to contemplate the precise occurrence if the
parties reasonably contemplated a similar range
of accidents. Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435
N.W.2d 746, 749 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
Releases will be upheld even when it was not
read before signed - absent fraud or mistake.
See Huber.
KANSAS
Valid, unless contrary to
public policy, illegal, or a
disparity in bargaining power.
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Fox
Midwest Theatres, Inc., 457
P.2d 133 (Kan. 1969); Corral v.
Rollins Protective Servs. Co.,
732 P.2d 1260 (Kan. 1987).
Not necessary that the release contain express
language covering the party’s negligence.
However, the intention to exculpate the party
from liability must be clear. Fee Ins. Agency, Inc.
v. Snyder, 930 P.2d 1054 (Kan. 1997).
A release must be “fairly and honestly
negotiated and understandingly entered into”
determined by examining the totality of the
circumstances. Ki Ron Ko v. Bally Total Fitness
Corp., 2003 WL 22466193 (D. Kan. 2003).
KENTUCKY
Valid. Cumberland Valley
Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cty.
Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644
(Ky. 2007). However, a release
will be invalid if it releases a
party for willful or wanton
negligence. Coughlin v. T.M.H.
Intl Attractions, Inc., 895 F.
Supp. 159 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
(1) Explicitly use of the word negligence; or (2)
Clearly and specifically indicate an intent to
release from liability caused by that partys own
conduct; or (3) Protection against negligence is
the only reasonable construction of the
language; or (4) The hazard is clearly within the
contemplation of the release. Hargis v. Baize,
168 S.W.3d 36 (Ky. 2005).
Courts have carved out an exception for
racetracks. Dunn v. Paducah Intl Raceway, 599
F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
Releases with a for-profit entity signed by a
parent on behalf of a child are invalid. In re
Miller v. House of Boom Kentucky, LLC, 2019
WL 2462697 (Ky. June 2019)
LOUISIANA
Invalid. Any clause that limits
the future liability of one party
for causing physical injury to
the other party is invalid.
Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp.,
575 So.2d 811 (La. 1991).
Any clause that limits liability based on
intentional fault or gross fault or for physical
injury is unenforceable. Ostrowiecki v.
Aggressor Fleet, Ltd., 965 So.2d 527 (La. Ct.
App. 2007).
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
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MAINE
Valid, however must
“expressly spell out the
intention of the parties
contractually to extinguish
negligence liability.” Hardy v.
St. Clair, 739 A.2d 368 (Me.
1999).
Including a specific reference in the release to
the negligence sufficiently “spells out” the
intent of the party seeking immunity. Lloyd v.
Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 833 A.2d 1 (Me.
2003).
Releases signed by parents on behalf of a child
are invalid. Rice v. Am. Skiing Co., 2000 WL
33677027 (Me. 2000).
MARYLAND
Valid, with three exceptions:
(1) cannot release for
intentional harms or the more
extreme forms of negligence,
(2) obvious disparity in
bargaining power, and (3)
cannot affect the public. Wolf
v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1994); Winterstein
v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
There is no requirement to use the word
“negligence” or other specific phrase for a
release to be valid. Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real
Estate, Inc., 686 A.2d 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996). A release must clearly and specifically
indicate the release’s intent. Id.
Gyms or health spas are not activities of great
public importance nor of practical necessity.
Seigneur v. Natl Fitness Inst., Inc., 752 A.2d
631 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
MASSACHUSETTS
Valid. Enforcement of waivers
for ordinary negligence has
long been favored. Sharon v.
Newton, 437 Mass. 99 (Mass.
2002).
A party who signs a release is bound by its
terms whether he reads and understands the
release. The time for performance of a release
does not extend forever but only for a
reasonable time. Borges v. Sterling Suffolk
Racecourse, 2000 WL 1298805 (Mass. 2000).
Waiver will not be enforced if:
(1) Obtained by fraud, duress, deceit or ones
that go against public policy, Lee v. Allied
Sports Assocs., Inc., 209 N.E.2d 329(Mass.
1965).
(2) Releases a party for an injury caused by
gross negligence, Zavras v. Capeway Rovers
Motorcycle Club, Inc, 687 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1997).
(3) If the conduct violates a statute. Henry v.
Mansfield Beauty Academy, 233 N.E.2d 22
(Mass. 1968).
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
DRAFTING GUIDELINES
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MICHIGAN
Valid if clear and
unambiguous. Cole v.
Ladbroke Racing Michigan,
Inc., 614 N.W.2d 169 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2000).
“A contract is ambiguous only if its language is
reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation. The fact that the parties dispute
the meaning of a release does not establish an
ambiguity. See Cole.
A failure to read a release is not a defense
unless induced by fraud. Requesting the
release be signed is enough to demonstrate
the release has been read. Faranso v. Cass
Lake Beach Club, Inc., 1998 WL 1991226 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1998). Party may not insulate himself
against liability for gross negligence or willful
and wanton misconduct. Lamp v. Reynolds,
645 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
MINNESOTA
Valid only when releasing for
negligent conduct. Schlobohm
v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d
920 (Minn. 1982).
Valid if: (1) not ambiguous; (2) does not purport
to release a defendant from liability for
intentional, willful, or wanton acts; and (3) does
not violate public policy. Malecha v. St. Croix
Valley Skydiving Club, 392 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.
App. 1986).
MISSISSIPPI
Valid, but very disfavored.
Subject to scrutiny if the
intention of the parties is not
expressly and unmistakably
clear. Farragut v. Massey, 612
So.2d 325 (Miss. 1992).
An exculpatory contract should waive
negligence as clearly and precisely as possible.
Leach v. Tingle, 586 So.2d 799, 801 (Miss. 1991).
The waiver must be fairly and honestly
negotiated, and the person must understand
what they are entering. Turnbough v. Ladner,
754 So.2d 467 (Miss. 1999).
MISSOURI
Valid, but disfavored. Courts
will enforce contracts
according to the plain
meaning, unless induced by
fraud, duress, or undue
influence. Util. Serv. & Maint.,
Inc. v. Noranda Aluminum,
Inc., 163 S.W.3d 910 (Mo.
2005).
“Consumer contracts must conspicuously use
the terms ‘negligence,’ ‘fault’ or equivalent
words so that a clear and unmistakable waiver
of risk occurs.” Milligan v. Chesterfield Village.
GP, LLC, 239 S.W.3d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
Requires clear, unambiguous, unmistakable,
and conspicuous language for an exculpatory
contract to release for one’s future negligence.
Milligan, 239 S.W.3d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
MONTANA
Invalid, it is statutorily
prohibited for any contracts to
have the exemption of anyone
from responsibility for their
own fraud, willful injury to
person or property, or
violation of the law.
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
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NEBRASKA
Valid for cases involving
ordinary negligence. Mayer v.
Howard, 370 N.W.2d 93 (Neb.
1985).
Whether a contract violates public policy must
be considered based on the facts surrounding
the agreement. OB-GYN v. Blue Cross, 361
N.W.2d 550 (Neb. 1985).
Can’t be exempt from liability for gross
negligence or willful misconduct. New Light Co.
v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 525 N.W.2d 25
(Neb. 1994).
NEVADA
Valid. Agricultural Aviation
Eng. Co. v. Bd. of Clark Cty.
Comm’rs, 794 P.2d 710 (Nev.
1990).
To relieve yourself of statutory liability:
(1) must be construed strictly; (2) must spell out
the intention of the party with the greatest
particularity and show the intent to release
from liability beyond doubt by express
stipulation and no inference from the words of
general import can establish it; (3) must be
construed with every intendment against the
party who seeks immunity; and (4) the burden
to establish immunity from liability is upon the
party who asserts such liability. Id. (quoting
Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville
Business Men’s Ass’n, 224 A.2d 620 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1978).
See also, Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entmt,
LLC, 180 P.3d 1172 (Nev. 2008).
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Valid. Generally prohibited
but in limited circumstances,
can expressly consent to
waive the liability of another
who causes injury. Dean v.
MacDonald, 786 A.2d 834
(N.H. 1986).
Will be enforced if: (1) does not violate public
policy; (2) plaintiff understood the agreement
or a reasonable person in his position would
have understood; and (3) plaintiff’s claims were
within the contemplation of the parties when
contract was executed. See Dean.
An exculpatory contract completely bars a
plaintiff’s recovery, and, therefore, the
comparative fault statute does not apply. Allen
v. Dover Co Recreational Softball League, 807
A.2d 1274 (N.H. 2002).
Failure to read the entire release does not
preclude enforcement of the agreement.
Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass’n, 509
A.2d 151 (N.H. 1986).
Contract will violate public policy if a special
relationship exists or if there’s a disparity in
bargaining power. Id.
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NEW JERSEY
Valid, but generally disfavored
and subject to scrutiny.
Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters.,
LLC, 1 A.3d 678 (N.J. 2010).
Unenforceable when adverse
to the public interest. Frank
Briscoe Co. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 65 F. Supp.2d 285 (D.N.J.
1999).
To be enforceable: (1) must demonstrate that
party assented voluntarily, intelligently and with
full knowledge of its consequences, and (2)
can’t be obtained via fraud, or unconscionable
means. Knorr v. Smeal, 836 A.2d 794 (N.J. 2003);
Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381 (N.J.
2006).
Courts deem exculpatory clauses contrary to
the public interest when they: (1) release party
for intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct. Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 146
A.3d 162(N.J. App. Div. 2016); (2) waive liability
for a duty imposed by statute. Marcinczyk v.
State of New Jersey Police Training Commn, 5
A.3d 785 (N.J. 2010); and (3) release a public
utility or common carrier. Gershon, Admx Ad
Prosequendum for Estate of Pietroluongo v.
Regency Diving Center, Inc., 845 A.2d 720 (N.J.
App. Div. 2004).
Release signed by a decedent with the express
purpose of barring potential heirs from
bringing a claim in the event of death is void as
against public policy. N.J.S.A. § 2A:31-1.
NEW MEXICO
Valid, unless they violate law
or contrary to public policy.
Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia
Alfalfa Growers’ Ass’n, 353
P.2d 62 (N.M. 1960).
Two-Pronged Test. (1) A person without legal
training could understand the agreement; and
(2) Not contrary to public policy. Berlangieri v.
Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003)
(Berlangieri lists six factors for guidance on
violation of public policy).
Public policy favoring the invalidation of a
release can be furnished either through
statutory or common law. See Berlangieri.
NEW YORK
Valid, except where
prohibited by statute. Gross v.
Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1979).
To be enforceable: (1) intention of parties is in
unmistakable language; (2) the agreement is
clear and coherent and; (3) does not violate
public policy. See Gross.
Will be deemed against public policy if it
conflicts “with a public interest or constitutes
an abuse of a special relationship (employer/
employee, common carrier/passenger). See
Gross.
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
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NORTH
CAROLINA
Valid, except where it violates
a statute, inequality of
bargaining power, or is
contrary to a substantial
public interest. Fortson v.
McClellan, 508 S.E.2d 549
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
The exculpatory clause being in all capital letters
and specifically mentioning the word
“negligence” are factors the court looks at to
determine conspicuousness. Waggoner v. Nags
Head Water Sports, Inc., 141 F.3d 1162 (4
th
Cir.
1998) (unpublished).
A defense based on a release is an affirmative
defense. Therefore, the defendant bears the
burden of proof. Lyon v. Shelter Resources
Corp., 253 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
North Carolina has not decided whether a
waiver for gross negligence is enforceable.
NORTH DAKOTA
Valid, unless the exculpatory
contract is ambiguous or
releases a party for
intentional, willful, or wanton
acts. Reed v. Univ. of N.
Dakota, 589 N.W.2d 880 (N.D.
1999).
Interpretation of releases is governed by
N.D.C.C. § 9-08-02. The language for “any
claims and all responsibility is limited to
negligent acts as a matter of law. See Reed.
Any provision of a contract is unlawful if it is:
(1) Contrary to an express provision of law; (2)
Contrary to the policy of express law, though
not expressly prohibited; or (3) Otherwise
contrary to good morals. N.D.C.C. § 9-08-01.
OHIO
Valid, if the intent of the
parties, regarding exactly the
type of liability and who is
being released, is stated in
clear/unambiguous terms.
Hague v. Summit Acres Skilled
Nursing & Rehab., 2010 WL
5545386 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
A pre-injury release is unenforceable where
party seeking protection failed to exercise any
care whatsoever, willful or wanton misconduct,
or if clause is against public policy,
unconscionable, or vague/ambiguous.” Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. D & J Distrib. & Mfg., Inc., 2009
WL 2356849 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
Courts determine ambiguousness by asking
whether an ordinarily prudent and
knowledgeable individual would have
reasonably understood it was a release. Hall v.
Woodland Lake Leisure Resort Club, Inc., 1998
WL 729197 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). Use phrases
such as “at their own risk,” “Company will not
be responsible or liable,” “Company has no
duty.” The specific use of the word “negligence”
or “release” not required. Id.
A waiver signed by a participant in a sports
activity does not waive the participant’s right
to bring a product liability claim. Curtis v.
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 299 F. Supp.2d 777
(N.D. Ohio 2004). A decedent can only waive
their own claims and not the claims a survivor.
Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 873
N.E.2d 1258 (Ohio 2007).
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OKLAHOMA
Valid, if clear/unambiguous
and would not be injurious to
public health or morals or
against public policy. Schmidt
v. U.S., 912 P.2d 874 (Okla.
1996).
Must identify the tortfeasor to be released, the
nature of the wrongful act, and the type and
extent of damages covered. Linda Wright v. W.
Shamrock Corp., 2016 WL 4386038 (N.D. Okla.
2016).
The more unusual the activity, the more
explanation in a release is required for a waiver
to be upheld. Manning v. Brannon, 956 P.2d 156
(Okla. Civ. App. 1997).
Three conditions must be satisfied to be
enforceable: (1) clear, definite, and
unambiguous language; (2) no vast disparity of
bargaining power between the parties; and (3)
the exculpation is not contrary to statute or
public policy. Manning v. Brannon, 956 P.2d
156 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997).
OREGON
Valid, however determined on
a case-by-case basis. Will be
enforceable when the court
determines its neither
unconscionable nor against
public policy. Bagley v. Mt.
Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27
(Or. 2014).
Public policy considerations: (1) release is
conspicuous/unambiguous; (2) is there disparity
in bargaining power; (3) was it offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis; and (4) did it involve a
consumer transaction.
Substantive considerations: (1) release causes a
harsh or inequitable result; and (2) releasee
serves an important public interest or function.
See Bagley.
Release language should be in a different
typeface and larger size compared to the rest of
agreement. Landgren v. Hood River Sports Club,
Inc., 2001 WL 34041883 (D. Or. 2001).
Releases for gross negligence, reckless, or
intentional conduct are unenforceable. See
Bagley.
PENNSYLVANIA
Valid if (1) not against public
policy, (2) between persons
relating entirely to their own
private affairs, and (3) each
party must be free to bargain
the agreement. Topp Copy
Prods., Inc. v. Singletary, 626
A.2d 98 (Pa. 1993).
Must clearly state the intention of the parties,
by express stipulation; any ambiguous language
of the contract will be construed against the
party seeking immunity. Vinikoor v. Pedal
Pennsylvania, Inc., 974 A.2d 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009).
Courts look for the words waiver, release, or
waiver of liability,” or any other words of similar
import and effect to determine the clear
intention of the contract. Fay v. Thiel Coll., 2001
WL 1910037 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
Release of reckless conduct is against public
policy. Tayar v. Camelback Ski Co., 47 A.3d
1190 (2012).
Only “individuals of 18 years and older shall
have the right to enter into binding and legally
enforceable contracts…”. 23 Pa. C.S. § 5101.
RHODE ISLAND
Valid if it “sufficiently
specific.” Corrente v. Conforti
& Eisele Co., 468 A.2d 920 (R.I.
1983).
The intent of the parties must be clearly and
unequivocally expressed in the contract. See
Corrente.
Courts examine the specific language of the
exculpatory contract to determine its intent.
Brown v. Wakefield Fitness Ctr, Inc., 1994 WL
930947 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1994).
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SOUTH CAROLINA
Valid, however not favored by
the law and will be strictly
construed against the party
relying on them. Fisher v.
Stevens, 584 S.E.2d 149 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2003).
Will be against public policy if it does not inform
the plaintiff he is waiving all claims due to
defendant’s negligence. Fisher v. Stevens, 584
S.E.2d 149 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
The phrase “Any person in any restricted area”
was overly broad and unenforceable. Id.
See McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting
Range, Inc., 612 S.E.2d 462 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005)
for proper waiver.
SOUTH DAKOTA
Valid if fairly and knowingly
made. Holzer v. Dakota
Speedway, Inc., 610 N.W.2d
787 (S.D. 2000).
More likely to be enforceable if written on a
separate document. The more inherently
dangerous an activity, the more likely an
exculpatory contract will be valid. See Holzer.
Releases that cover willful or intentional torts
are not valid and against public policy. Id.
TENNESSEE
Valid. Such agreements are of
a contractual nature and will
generally be enforced unless
contrary to public policy.
Perez v. McConkey, 872
S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1994).
In Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn.
1977), the court lays out six factors to consider
when determining if an exculpatory contract is
against public policy.
Not having the word “negligence” in the
agreement is not fatal. Henderson v. Quest
Expeditions, Inc., 174 S.W.3d 730 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005).
Releases for gross negligence or willful conduct
are against public policy. Adams v. Roark, 686
S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1985). As well as releases for
fraud or intentional misrepresentation.
Houghland v. Sec. Alarms & Servs., Inc., 755
S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. 1988).
TEXAS
Valid, if it complies with both
fair notice doctrines: (1)
conspicuousness, and (2)
express negligence. Enserch
Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2
(Tex. 1990).
Express Negligence Doctrine: Requires a party
seeking release to express such intent in specific
terms within the four corners of the document.
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Pers., Inc., 768
S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1989).
Conspicuousness: Release language should
appear in larger type, contrasting colors, or
otherwise call attention to itself. Storage &
Processors 134 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. 2004).
If both parties have actual knowledge of the
contract’s terms, the fair notice requirements
need not be satisfied. Dresser Indus., Inc. v.
Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.
1993).
A waiver of gross negligence is against public
policy. Van Voris v. Team Chop Shop, LLC, 402
S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App. 2013). As well as
waivers for intentional or reckless conduct.
Zachry Constr. Corp. v. Port of Hous. Auth. of
Harris Cty., 449 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2014).
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UTAH
Valid, except for releases that
(1) offend public policy,
Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.,
175 P.3d 560 (Utah. 2007); (2)
fall within the public interest
exception, Berry v. Greater
Park City Co., 171 P.3d 442
(Utah 2007); and (3) are
unclear or ambiguous, Pearce
v. Utah Auth. Found., 179 P.3d
760 (Utah. 2008).
Do not need to include the word negligence if
the intent to release liability is clearly and
unequivocally expressed. Russ v. Woodside
Homes, 905 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
A waiver of gross or wanton negligence is
unenforceable. Russ v. Woodside Homes, 905
P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
VERMONT
Valid, but must meet higher
standards for clarity and must
pass public policy inspection.
Provoncha v. Vermont
Motocross Assn, Inc., 974
A.2d 1261 (Vt. 2000).
Releases are valid when they sufficiently and
clearly reflect the parties intent. Fairchild
Square Co. v. Green Mountain Bagel Bakery,
Inc., 658 A.2d 31 (Vt. 1995).
A specific reference to negligence is not
essential to effectively immunize a party from
such liability, but “words conveying a similar
import must appear.” Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553
A.2d 143 (Vt. 1988).
Courts consider “the nature of the parties’
relationship, including whether the party
granting exculpation is in a position of
dependency, and the type of service provided
by the party seeking exculpation, including
whether the service is laden with public
interest.” Thompson v. Hi Tech Motor Sports,
Inc., 945 A.2d 368 (Vt. 2008).
VIRGINIA
Invalid. Public policy forbids
the enforcement of a release
or waiver for personal injury
caused by future acts of
negligence. Hiett v. Lake
Barcroft Community Assoc.,
418 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1992).
Court will uphold exculpatory contracts when
involved with an auto race due to its inherent
danger. Elswick v. Lonesome Pine Int’l
Raceway, Inc., 2001 WL 1262224 (Va. Cir.
2001).
WASHINGTON
Valid, unless against public
policy, inconspicuous, or the
negligent act falls below the
legal standard for protection
of others. Johnson v. NEW,
Inc., 948 P.2d 877 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1997).
Need not specifically mention that it releases
the service provider from liability or negligence
just clearly state the intent. Craig v. Lake
Shore Athletic Club, Inc., 1997 WL 305228
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
The waiver being a separate document using
the word “Waiver” as a title in large type, with
the sentence “Please Read Carefully and Sign”
are factors the court looks at to determine
conspicuousness. Id.
See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d
968 (Wash. 1988) for 6 factors to determine if
an exculpatory release violates public policy.
Must show that plaintiff: (1) Had full subjective
understanding; (2) of the nature of the specific
risk; and (3) voluntarily chose to encounter
that risk. Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 746
P.2d 285 (Wash. 1987).
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WEST VIRGINIA
Valid, if agreement expressly
and clearly includes a waiver
of liability and is made freely
and fairly between parties in
equal bargaining position,
unless there is a contrary
safety statute or public
interest. Murphy v. N. Am.
River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d
504 (W. Va. 1991).
Releases for party’s intentional/reckless/gross
negligence are unenforceable unless the
release clearly indicates that such was the
releasing party’s intention. Murphy v. N. Am.
River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va.
1991).
WISCONSIN
Valid. However, when overly
broad it will be invalid and will
only bar claims which were
within the contemplation of
the parties at the time of
signing. Arnold v. Shawano
Cty. Agr. Soc., 330 N.W.2d 773
(Wis. 1983).
An exculpatory contract is one which “relieve[s]
a party from liability for harm caused by his or
her own negligence.” Merten v. Nathan, 321
N.W.2d 173 (Wis. 1982). Exculpatory
agreements are unenforceable when (1) there is
not adequate notice of agreement’s
significance; (2) there is no opportunity to
bargain; and (3) the scope of the release
expands beyond negligence claims. Brooten v.
Hickok Rehab. Servs., LLC, 831 N.W.2d 445 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2013); Atkins v. Swimwest Family
Fitness Ctr., 691 N.W.2d 334 (Wis. 2005).
Two-fold test to determine enforceability (1)
agreement must clearly, unambiguously, and
unmistakably inform what is being waived, (2)
must alert signer to the significance of what is
being signed. Yauger v. Skiing Enterprises, Inc.,
557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
Section 895.447 does not void subrogation
waiver agreements. A subrogation waiver does
not limit or eliminate “tort liability. Rural Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Lester Buildings, LLC, 929 N.W.2d
180 (Wis. 2019).
WYOMING
Valid, only if it does not
contravene public policy.
Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d
1057 (Wyo. 1986)
Claims for willful/wanton
misconduct cannot be waived
by exculpatory agreement.
Street v. Darwin Ranch, Inc.,
75 F.Supp.2d 1296 (D. Wyo.
1999).
Language of the release should clearly state the
intention to release a party from liability and, in
plain reading of the language in the context of
the release, should show no other rational
purpose for which it could have been intended.
Massengill v. S.M.A.R.T. Sports Med. Clinic, P.C.,
996 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 2000).
Court considers: (1) whether a duty to the
public exists; (2) nature of the service
performed; (3) if contract was fairly entered
into; and (4) whether the intention of the
parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous
language. Id.
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