Federal Civil Procedure Analysis
Here, the court should find that the logging company meets this test. First, the logging
company has a strong interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of this action. The
USFS has accepted the logging company’s bid, and the logging company is merely awaiting
issuance of a logging permit to begin logging. The nonprofit organization is seeking to prevent
this logging. The logging company therefore has a strong, direct, and substantial interest in the
subject matter of the lawsuit and in having its winning bid honored and a logging permit issued.
See, e.g., Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that “[t]imber
companies have direct and substantial interests in a lawsuit aimed at halting logging”); see also
Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1343–
44 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that applicants whose license renewals were pending had Rule
24(a)(2) interests where the lawsuit sought to halt the license-issuing process pending
preparation of environmental impact statements). See generally 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra,
§ 1908.1, at 309 (“If there is a direct substantial legally protectable interest in the proceedings, it
is clear that this requirement of the rule is satisfied.”).
Second, the logging company’s interest in receiving a logging permit may well be
impaired, as a practical matter, by the outcome of the lawsuit. If the USFS loses the lawsuit, it
will have to prepare an environmental impact statement before issuing the logging company’s
permit. This will, at a minimum, delay the logging company’s ability to exercise its rights and
may, in the long r un, mean that no logging permit is ever issued. Intervention of right is not
limited to those that would be legally bound as a matter of preclusion doctrine. Id. § 1908.2, at
368. Rather, “[t]he rule is satisfied whenever disposition of the present action would put the
movant at a practical disadvantage in protecting its interest.” Id. § 1908.2, at 369. Here, that
condition is easily satisfied. See Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972 (“Timber companies have direct and
substantial interests in a lawsuit aimed at halting logging . . . .”).
Given that the logging company has an interest that may be impaired by disposition of
the action, it should be allowed to intervene unless the court is persuaded that the USFS
adequately represents the logging company’s interest. See Rule 24(a)(2); 7C WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra, § 1909. Here, it could be argued that the USFS adequately represents the logging
company’s interest because the USFS presumably wants the court to uphold its development
plan and allow it to proceed with issuance of the logging permit, which is the same relief that the
logging company would seek. However, whether representation is truly adequate depends upon
“[a] discriminating appraisal of the circumstances.” 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 1909, at 440.
Although both the government and the logging company wish to avoid the preparation of an
environmental impact statement, their interests are distinct. The USFS’s interest is proper
management of the national forest system, while the logging company’s interest is making a
profit from logging the 5,000-acre tract. The USFS’s handling of the litigation is likely to be
affected by a variety of policy concerns and political considerations that have nothing to do with
the logging company’s purely economic interest in securing the right to cut trees in the Scenic
National Forest. See, e.g., Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 973–74 (“[T]he government represents
numerous complex and conflicting interests in matters of this nature. The straightforward
business interests asserted by intervenors here may become lost in the thicket of sometimes
inconsistent governmental policies.”).
[NOTES: (1) Examinees who mistakenly analyze the logging company’s case for joinder
under the related but incorrect Rule 19 “Required Joinder of Parties” may receive credit. Rule 19
allows existing parties to demand joinder of non-parties (or seek dismissal of the case if they
can’t get it). There is a close relationship between Rule 24 and Rule 19 and both contain a
similar standard for determining when “interested” third parties are “entitled” or “required” to be
in the lawsuit. Indeed, the two prongs of the Rule 24 intervention test that are discussed above
23