MOROCCO 2022 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022

United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system under which

ultimate authority rests with King Mohammed VI, who presides over the Council

of Ministers, although executive authority is shared with Head of Government

Aziz Akhannouch. According to the constitution, the king appoints the head of

government from the political party with the most seats in parliament and approves

members of the government nominated by the head of government. Parliamentary

elections were held in September 2021, and observers characterized them as well

organized and conducted without significant problems or irregularities.

The security apparatus includes several police and paramilitary organizations with

overlapping authority. The national police force manages internal law enforcement

in cities and reports to the Ministry of Interior. The Auxiliary Forces also report to

the Ministry of Interior and support gendarmes (armed police) and other police.

The Royal Gendarmerie, which reports to the Administration of National Defense,

is responsible for law enforcement in rural regions and on national highways. The

judicial police (investigative) branches of both the Royal Gendarmerie and the

National Police report to the royal prosecutor and have the power to arrest

individuals. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over security forces.

There were reports that members of the security forces committed some abuses.

Morocco claims sovereignty over the territory of Western Sahara and controls

approximately 80 percent of the territory. The Popular Front for the Liberation of

Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (also known as the POLISARIO) disputes

Morocco’s claim to sovereignty and seeks independence for Western Sahara.

Moroccan and POLISARIO forces fought intermittently from 1975, when Spain

relinquished colonial authority over the territory, until a 1991 cease-fire and the

establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission. The POLISARIO withdrew from

the cease-fire in November 2020, and since then there have been reports of

intermittent indirect fire between Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces and

POLISARIO fighters across the 1,700-mile separation barriers (the “berm”). The

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara mandate was renewed on

October 27.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel,

inhuman, or degrading treatment by some members of the security forces; political

prisoners; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or

unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on free expression and

media, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists; censorship and

enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel to limit expression; substantial

interference with the freedom of assembly and freedom of association; serious

government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-

based violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian,

gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and the enforcement of laws

criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.

The government took steps to investigate officials who allegedly committed human

rights abuses and acts of corruption, but investigations into police, security force,

and detention center abuses lacked transparency and frequently encountered long

delays and procedural obstacles that contributed to impunity.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person

a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically

Motivated Killings

There was one report that the government or its agents may have committed

arbitrary or unlawful killings.

Local media reported the Benguerir judicial police opened an investigation into the

death of a man in police custody on October 6. In a public statement, the

Directorate General of National Security (DGSN) stated the suspect had been

placed in police custody as part of a criminal case. He lost consciousness and died

in the ambulance. The investigation was ongoing at year’s end.

b. Disappearance

There were reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities

during the year.

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Amnesty International reported in December that at least 77 persons were missing

following their attempt to cross the border into Spain’s Melilla enclave in June (see

section 2.e.). According to the government, on June 24, the UN Committee on

Enforced Disappearances requested its cooperation concerning the alleged

disappearance of the Sudanese national Mazen Dafallah Haroun Dafallah

following his attempt to cross the border post between Nador and Melilla.

Authorities reported they were unable to uncover any information pertaining to

Dafallah.

The National Council on Human Rights (CNDH), a publicly funded national

human rights institution, continued to cooperate with the UN Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on unresolved cases of disappearance

prior to 1992.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or

unishment, and Other Related Abuses

The constitution and the law prohibit such practices, but there were credible reports

that government officials employed them.

Government institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to

receive reports regarding mistreatment of individuals in official custody. The

Public Prosecutor's Office received seven complaints containing allegations of

torture between January and September. At year’s end, one complaint was in the

discovery and evidence gathering phase, five were under investigation, and one

complaint was closed.

According to the government, during the year the Government Prosecution Office

prosecuted nine police officers for the use of violence, who were awaiting

judgment in their cases. Three police officers were investigated for excessive use

of force against a detainee and subsequently placed on administrative leave. Three

other police officers were subjected to administrative investigation for

mistreatment of detainees. No additional details on these cases were provided by

the government.

There were accusations that security officials subjected Western Sahara

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proindependence protesters to degrading treatment during or following

demonstrations or protests calling for the release of political prisoners. On April

16, unidentified individuals in Boujdour, Western Sahara, beat and seriously

injured five women Sahrawi rights and independence activists who were visiting

activist Sultana Khaya under informal house arrest (see section 2.d.). Authorities

said they opened an investigation into the incident, but no results were released as

of year’s end.

International and local human rights organizations claimed that authorities

dismissed complaints of abuse in Western Sahara and relied only on police

statements. Government officials generally did not provide information on the

outcome of complaints. On June 10, the International Service for Human Rights

(ISHR), ACAT-France, the League for the Protection of Sahrawi Political

Prisoners in Moroccan Prisons (LPPS), and a group of lawyers submitted four

complaints to the UN Committee Against Torture on behalf of four Sahrawi human

rights defenders, who they stated endured severe acts of torture at the hands of

government authorities. According to a public statement from ISHR, the four

Sahrawi human rights defenders – Mohamed Lamine Haddi, Hassan Dah,

Abdelmoula El-Hafidi, and Mohamed Bani – had been detained for six to 12 years

based on confessions obtained under torture and without a fair trial. In April

Amnesty International reported that on March 15, 17, 18, and 21, five prison

guards entered the prison cell of Mohamed Lamine Haddi and beat him with

batons and cut his beard against his will after he stated he planned to protest the

prison conditions and the denial of access to medicine by going on a hunger strike.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions improved during the year but in some cases did not meet

international standards. Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening in some

prisons due to overcrowding.

Abusive Physical Conditions: The Moroccan Observatory of Prisons, an NGO

focused on the rights of prisoners, continued to report that some prisons were

overcrowded and failed to meet local and international standards. In newer prisons

pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners were held separately, but in older prisons

the two groups remained together.

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As of the end of November, in the country’s 75 prisons, the prison population

surpassed 175 percent of capacity. According to government sources and NGOs,

prison overcrowding was due in large part to an underutilized system of bail or

provisional release, a severe backlog in cases, and lack of judicial discretion to

reduce the length of prison sentences for specific crimes. Government sources

stated that administrative requirements also prevented prison authorities from

transferring individuals in pretrial detention or the appeals phase to facilities

outside the jurisdiction where their trials were to take place.

The code of criminal procedure considers “preventive detention an exceptional

measure.” Nonetheless, approximately 42 percent of the total prison population

were pretrial detainees, consistent with the trend of the past decade.

The law provides for the separation of minor prisoners from adult prisoners. In all

prisons, officials classify youth offenders into two categories, both of which are

separated from other prisoners: minors younger than 18 and offenders between 18

and 20 years old. According to authorities, minors were not held with prisoners

older than age 20. The General Delegation for Prison Administration and

Reintegration (DGAPR) had three dedicated juvenile “centers for reform and

education” but maintained separate, dedicated youth detention areas for minors in

all prisons. The government reported that, in cases where a juvenile court judge

ruled detention was necessary, minors younger than 14 were detained separately

from minors 15 to 18 years old. A judge is supposed to monitor cases monthly of

detained minors. In some juvenile detention centers, this monitoring included

routine check-ins with wardens and prison officials on cases, and monthly review

of detention case files for updates.

The DGAPR reported there was no discrimination in access to health services or

facilities based on gender for women prisoners, who made up just over 2 percent of

the prison population. Some officials reported that women inmates often had a

harder time accessing gender-specific health specialists such as obstetricians and

gynecologists than a general physician. Local NGOs asserted that prison facilities

did not provide adequate access to health care and did not accommodate the needs

of prisoners with disabilities. The DGAPR reported a nurse and a psychologist

examined each prisoner on arrival and prisoners received care upon request. The

DGAPR reported conducting extensive COVID-19 tests and medical consultations

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in prisons.

Administration: The CNDH and the DGAPR investigated allegations of inhuman

conditions. The CNDH and the DGAPR effectively served the function of an

ombudsperson, and a system of “letterboxes” in prisons to facilitate prisoners’

right to submit complaints regarding their imprisonment. Detainees could submit

complaints without censorship to the DGAPR Delegate General’s Office for

processing, as well as to the CNDH.

While authorities generally permitted relatives and friends to visit prisoners, there

were reports that authorities denied visiting privileges in some instances. The

DGAPR assigned each prisoner to a risk classification level, which determined

visiting privileges. According to its prisoner classification guide, the DGAPR

placed restrictions on the level of visits, recreation, and types of educational

programming for higher-risk prisoners. At all classifications, prisoners may

receive visits, although the length, frequency, and number of visitors may vary.

Most prisons assigned each prisoner a designated “visit day” to manage the

number of visits to the prison. The DGAPR authorized religious observances and

services provided by religious leaders for all prisoners, including religious

minorities. To limit the spread of COVID-19 during the pandemic, DGAPR

suspended family and lawyer visits from January 10 to February 28 but increased

phone time and frequency privileges for inmates during this period. The DGAPR

put in place several measures such as cleaning and periodic disinfection while

providing officials and inmates with means of prevention, including masks.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted some NGOs with a human

rights mandate, as well as the CNDH, to conduct unaccompanied prison

monitoring visits. Government policy also permitted academics, as well as NGOs

that provided social, educational, or religious services to prisoners, to enter prison

facilities. The CNDH reported there were 31 different associations that engaged

with the prisons to provide services such as medical care, victim care, and skills

training. The CNDH conducted 155 monitoring visits through June.

Between January and June, the CNDH carried out 10 visits to prisons in Western

Sahara, including four in Laayoune-Sakia, with the stated goal of preventing

practices likely to lead directly or indirectly to torture or mistreatment and

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engaging with authorities on human rights obligations.

Improvements: According to the DGAPR, the government began development

and restoration projects at prisons in Bourkaiz, Safi, Kenitra, Tiznit, Missour, Salé,

Khémisset, Khouribga, and Ain Sebaa to improve detention conditions for

prisoners, specifically by bringing food, hygiene, and infrastructure up to

international standards.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any

person to challenge in court the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention. The

government generally observed these requirements; however, observers indicated

that police did not always respect these provisions or consistently observe due

process, particularly during or in the wake of protests. According to local NGOs

and associations, police sometimes arrested persons without warrants or while

wearing civilian clothing.

Individuals have the right to challenge the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their

detention and request compensation by submitting a complaint to the court. NGOs

expressed concerns that lack of respect for fair trial guarantees and judicial

independence meant these rights were rarely exercised effectively in practice.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

By law police may arrest an individual after a general prosecutor issues an oral or

written warrant. The law permits authorities to deny defendants’ access to counsel

or family members during the initial 96 hours of detention under terrorism-related

laws or during the initial 24 hours of detention for all other charges, which can be

extended 12 hours with approval of the Prosecutor’s Office. Authorities did not

consistently respect these limits. Most reports of abuse stemmed from police

interrogations during these initial detention periods. The government continued to

require new police officers to receive security and human rights training facilitated

by civil society.

In ordinary criminal cases, the law requires police to notify a detainee’s next of kin

of an arrest immediately after the above-mentioned period of incommunicado

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detention, unless arresting authorities applied for and received an extension from a

prosecutor. Police did not always respect this requirement. Authorities sometimes

did not notify the family or lawyers promptly of the arrest, and the families and

lawyers were not able to monitor compliance with detention limits and treatment of

the detainee.

The law states, “in the case of a flagrant offense, the Judicial Police Officer has the

right to keep the suspect in detention for 48 hours. If strong and corroborated

evidence is raised against this person, [the officer] can keep them in custody for a

maximum of three days with the written authorization of the prosecutor.” The

Antiterrorism Act allows initial detention of a terrorism suspect for 12 days. The

suspect has a right to a 30-minute visit by a lawyer, which authorities can delay

until the end of the 12-day detention period. In non-terrorism-related cases the

lawyer’s visit must occur no later than the midpoint of the detention period.

At the conclusion of the initial detention period in police custody, a detainee must

be presented to a prosecutor, who may issue provisional charges and order

additional investigation by an investigating judge in preparation for trial. The

investigating judge has four months, plus a possible one-month extension, to

interview the individual and determine what charges, if any, to file for trial. An

individual may be detained in investigatory detention or be released during this

phase. At the end of five months (if an extension is granted), the investigative

judge must either file charges, decline to file charges and drop the case, or release

the individual pending additional investigation and a later determination of

whether to file. Authorities generally respected these timelines; however, in at

least one high-profile case, authorities conducted lengthy investigations and

charges remained pending past the allowed timeline.

NGO sources stated that some judges were reticent to use provisional release, bail,

or other alternative sentences permitted under the law. The law does not require

written authorization for release from detention. In some instances, judges

released defendants on their own recognizance. A bail bond system exists,

requiring bond in the form of property or of cash paid to the court. The bond

amount is subject to the judge’s discretion, depending on the offense. Bail may be

requested at any time before the verdict. According to the law, defendants have

the right to attorneys; if a defendant cannot afford private counsel, authorities must

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provide a court-appointed attorney if the criminal penalty exceeds five years in

prison. Authorities did not always provide effective and timely counsel.

Arbitrary Arrest: Security forces often detained groups of individuals for various

reasons, took them to a police station, questioned them for several hours, and

released them without charge.

Under the penal code, any public official who orders an arbitrary detention may be

punished by demotion and, if it is done for private interest, by imprisonment for 10

years to life. An official who neglects to refer a claimed or observed arbitrary or

illegal detention to his superiors may be punished by demotion. Activists asserted

that the government carried out arbitrary arrests associated with enforcement of the

shelter-in-place protocol due to COVID-19 restrictions, but no security officials

were investigated on this basis, and there was no official report that these

provisions were applied during the year.

Pretrial Detention: Although the government claimed authorities generally

brought accused persons to trial within two months, prosecutors may request as

many as five additional two-month extensions of pretrial detention. Government

officials attributed delays to the large backlog of cases in the justice system caused

by a lack of human and infrastructure resources; lack of plea bargaining as an

option for prosecutors, which lengthened case processing times; rare use of

mediation and other permitted out-of-court settlement mechanisms; and the

absence of legal authority for alternative sentencing, among other issues. In some

cases defendants were held in pretrial detention for longer than their eventual

sentence, particularly for misdemeanors.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the government did not

always respect judicial independence and impartiality. As in previous years,

NGOs asserted that corruption and extrajudicial influence weakened judicial

independence. The Supreme Judicial Council, mandated by the constitution and

established in 2017, manages the courts and day-to-day judicial affairs in place of

the Ministry of Justice, but it made limited progress in its stated mission of

improving judicial independence. The king appoints the president of the Court of

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Cassation (the highest court of appeals), who chairs the 20-member council.

Additional members include the president of the First Chamber of the Court of

Cassation; the prosecutor general; the mediator (national ombudsperson); the

president of the CNDH; 10 members elected by the country’s judges; and five

members appointed by the king. Human rights activists alleged trials sometimes

appeared politicized in cases involving Islam as it related to political life and

national security, the legitimacy of the monarchy, and Western Sahara.

Trial Procedures

The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial with the right of appeal, and

the judiciary generally enforced this right, but NGOs reported significant concerns

with fair trial guarantees in some high-profile cases (see sections 1.e. and 2.a.).

The law presumes that defendants are innocent. The law requires defendants be

informed promptly of potential charges after the initial arrest and investigation

period, and authorities generally respected this requirement. Defendants are then

informed of final charges at the conclusion of the full investigatory period, which

may last several months. Trials are conducted in Arabic, and foreigners have the

right to request interpretation if they do not speak Arabic.

Defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to consult in a timely

manner with an attorney of their choice. Defendants have the right to refuse to

participate in their trial, and a judge may decide to continue the proceedings in the

defendant’s absence while providing a detailed summary to the defendant.

Authorities at times denied lawyers timely access to their clients, and in some

cases, lawyers met their clients only at the first hearing before the judge.

Authorities are required to provide an indigent defendant with an attorney in cases

where the potential sentence is greater than five years, but these defense attorneys

often were poorly paid and were not properly trained in matters pertaining to

juveniles. If an attorney has not yet been appointed when a trial begins, the judge

may ask any attorney present to represent the defendant, often resulting in

inadequate representation. At times NGOs provided attorneys for vulnerable

individuals (minors, refugees, victims of domestic violence), who frequently did

not have the means to pay. Access to NGO resources was limited and specific to

larger cities.

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The law permits defense attorneys to question witnesses and present their own

witnesses and evidence, but some judges reportedly denied such defense requests.

Several NGOs noted arbitrary limits on defendants’ access to case files presented a

significant challenge to effective legal representation.

The law forbids judges from admitting confessions made under duress without

additional corroborating evidence, but NGOs reported that some defendants were

provided confessions to sign without translation. Human Rights Watch (HRW)

and local NGOs alleged that judges sometimes decided cases based on forced

confessions. NGOs reported the judicial system often relied on confessions for the

prosecution of criminal cases, and authorities pressured investigators to obtain a

confession from suspects to expedite prosecution.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were credible reports of political prisoners or detainees. The government

did not consider any prisoners to be political prisoners and stated it had charged or

convicted all individuals in prison under criminal law. The criminal law penalizes

certain nonviolent advocacy and dissent, such as insulting police in songs or

“defaming Morocco’s sacred values” by denouncing the king and regime. NGOs,

including the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), Amnesty

International, and Sahrawi organizations, asserted the government imprisoned

persons for political activities or beliefs, using pretextual criminal charges such as

espionage or sexual assault.

On February 23, the Casablanca Court of Appeal upheld the five-year sentence of

Soulaimane Raissouni, journalist and editor in chief of newspaper Akhbar al-

Yaoum. Raisounni was arrested in 2020 after an individual claimed on Facebook

that Raissouni sexually assaulted him in 2018. Raissouni disputed the allegation,

and civil society groups and activists asserted his arrest was politically motivated

and intended to silence independent journalists. Freedom House asserted in its

2022 Freedom in the World report that since 2018 several independent journalists

had been prosecuted on what it called “dubious charges of sexual assault or of

financial misconduct.” An investigating judge charged Raissouni with “violent

and indecent assault and forced detention” and ordered his detention in Oukacha

Prison. Reporters Without Borders described his trial as “tainted by irregularities,”

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and his defense lawyers were not permitted even to consult the indictment issued

by the investigating judge. Raissouni remained in prison at year’s end.

Sahrawi political activists alleged security authorities unlawfully entered their

homes to harass, intimidate, and confiscate personal belongings. Some activists

alleged security authorities carried out these acts to signal that if their political

activities did not stop, harassment and intimidation would increase.

On November 21, the Rabat Court of Appeals upheld the sentence of three years in

prison with a fine of 5,000 Moroccan dirhams ($478) for Mohamed Ziane, former

Minister of Human Rights (1995-98), human rights activist, and lawyer. The court

ordered Ziane’s immediate rearrest. The government prosecuted Ziane on 11

charges, including the insult of a public official, publishing false allegations,

defamation, adultery, incitement to violate health provisions, and sexual

harassment. Human rights organizations raised concerns that Ziane’s arrest and

prosecution was politically motivated and reported that 20 police officers arrested

Ziane using excessive force while he was praying in his lawyer’s office.

Transnational Repression

Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion: Human rights organizations

reported that the government harassed and surveilled human rights activists both

inside and outside the country, including using the NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.

On May 26, Canada granted refugee status to Zakaria Moumni, a French citizen

and former kickboxing world champion, who reported receiving multiple threats

that he attributed to the Moroccan security services while living in France;

Moumni had been critical of the king and royal institutions such as the kickboxing

royal federation. Moumni, a former Moroccan citizen, was incarcerated in

Morocco for 18 months between 2010 and 2012 on charges related to involvement

in an alleged immigration fraud scheme.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Although individuals have access to civil courts for lawsuits relating to human

rights violations and had filed lawsuits, NGOs reported that such lawsuits were

frequently unsuccessful due to the courts’ lack of judicial independence in

politically sensitive cases or lack of impartiality stemming from extrajudicial

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influence and corruption. The Supreme Judicial Council is tasked with ensuring

ethical behavior by judicial personnel. There are administrative as well as judicial

remedies for alleged wrongdoing. Authorities sometimes failed to respect court

orders in a timely manner.

The Institution of the Mediator (akin to a national ombudsperson) helped resolve

civil matters that did not clear the threshold to merit involvement of the judiciary,

including cases involving civil society registration issues (see section 2.b.,

Freedom of Association). The mediator retransmitted to the CNDH for resolution

those cases specifically related to allegations of human rights abuses by authorities.

The CNDH continued to be a conduit through which citizens expressed complaints

regarding human rights abuses.

f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home,

or Correspondence

The constitution prohibits such actions, but there were reports that the government

failed to respect these prohibitions. While the constitution states an individual’s

home is inviolable and that a search may take place only with a search warrant,

authorities at times entered homes without judicial authorization, employed

informers, and monitored, without legal process, personal movement and private

communications, including email, text messaging, or other digital communications

intended to remain private.

NGOs continued to report the use of arbitrary surveillance against human rights

activists and journalists, with Freedom House reporting “widespread” use of

spyware and surveillance technologies by the government. In a July report, HRW

documented physical and electronic surveillance by the government to harass and

violate the rights of independent journalists and human rights defenders.

According to the report, several individuals concluded that some of the information

published about them in the media was sufficiently detailed to have only been

obtained through government surveillance.

g. Conflict-related Abuses

According to the Conduct in UN Field Missions online portal, there was one

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allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse, specifically transactional sex, by

Moroccan peacekeepers deployed to the UN Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. Investigations by the

government and UN Office of Internal Oversight Services into this allegation

remained pending at year’s end. Five allegations from previous years – two from

2021 and three from 2020 – also were pending. The government did not report

final action on two substantiated allegations from 2020 in the UN Organization

Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning sexual

exploitation and sexual assault. Additionally, investigations were pending for two

2021 allegations and one 2020 allegation.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties

a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and

Other Media

The constitution and law generally provide for freedom of expression, including

for the press and other media, although criticism of Islam, the monarchy, or the

government’s positions regarding territorial integrity and Western Sahara is

criminalized. Such criticism can result in prosecution under the penal code, with

punishments ranging from fines to imprisonment. The press code, which also

provides for freedom of expression, applies only to journalists accredited by the

department of communication, under the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports,

and only for speech or publications in the line of work; private speech by

accredited journalists remains punishable under the penal code, as does journalistic

work by individuals to whom the government does not grant accreditation.

According to Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom in the World report, the press

enjoyed a significant degree of freedom when reporting on economic and social

policies, but authorities used an array of financial and legal mechanisms to punish

critical journalists (see section 1.e., Political Prisoners). Local NGOs also reported

that despite press codes intended to prevent the unlawful imprisonment of

individuals exercising their freedom of expression, authorities utilized penal codes

to punish commentators, activists, and journalists criticizing the government.

Freedom of Expression: The law criminalizes criticism of Islam, of the

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legitimacy of the monarchy, of state institutions, of government and military

officials, and of the government’s positions regarding territorial integrity and

Western Sahara. The government sometimes prosecuted persons who expressed

criticism on these topics. Amnesty International and HRW highlighted numerous

cases in which freedom of expression was restricted. Both independent media and

government-affiliated media were active and expressed a variety of views within

the restrictions of the law. The press code limits punishments for the work of

accredited journalists to fines.

The government enforced strict procedures limiting journalists’ meetings with

NGO representatives and political activists. Foreign journalists were required to

request approval from the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports before meeting

with political activists, which they did not always receive. There were several

reports of arrests and charges based on social media activity. On April 29, Saida

El Alami was tried and convicted for social media posts critical of the

government’s repression of activists and journalists and denouncing her

harassment by police, according to Amnesty International. She was charged with

contempt of judicial decisions, insulting a constitutional institution, insulting

public officials during the exercise of their duties, and publication and

dissemination of false facts. A Casablanca court initially sentenced El Alami to

two years in prison and 5,000 Moroccan dirhams ($478), but the appeals court

extended her sentence to three years’ imprisonment.

The government reported it prosecuted 631 individuals in criminal courts for

statements made, declared, or published, including 32 criminal cases against

journalists. The government also reported that during the year it suspended six

electronic newspapers for what it said was noncompliance with the press and

publishing code.

Violence and Harassment: Authorities subjected some journalists to harassment

and intimidation, including attempts to discredit them through harmful rumors

about their personal lives. During the year there were instances where government

authorities harassed individuals accused of public criticism of the king, local

authorities, or Islam. The government did not provide information on how many

individuals were specifically charged for criminal speech, including defamation,

slander, and insult (see Libel/Slander Laws and National Security).

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Journalists reported that selective prosecutions served as a mechanism for

intimidation. A July HRW report detailed persistent harassment of journalists,

including Omar Radi, who was arrested and convicted in 2021 for espionage and

rape. The Clooney Foundation for Justice reported the trial “bore the hallmarks of

an unfair process, with the court denying Radi the opportunity to present evidence

in his defense without justification.” On March 3, the Casablanca Appeals Court

denied Radi’s appeal of his six-year sentence. HRW asserted Radi, an

investigative journalist, had been “detained, tried, and convicted for a tweet, had

spyware intrusion on his smartphone, experienced a pervasive defamation

campaign against him by state-aligned media, and suffered a suspicious physical

assault that the police, despite their promises, showed no sign of having ever

investigated.” At year’s end, Radi remained in prison. International and local

NGOs continued to raise concerns regarding the lack of fair trial guarantees

afforded to Radi.

Journalists continued to denounce cumbersome administrative procedures and the

long wait times to receive accreditation under the press code. Some members of

the press claimed that journalists from progovernment outlets received credentials

faster than journalists from independent outlets. They noted that journalists

waiting for credentials had to operate in an ambiguous legal status, without press

code protections available only to accredited journalists. Many contributors

working for online news outlets and many online news outlets themselves were

unaccredited and therefore not covered under the press code for their publications.

They remained subject to provisions of the antiterrorism law and the penal code

that permit the government to jail and impose financial penalties on anyone who

violates restrictions related to defamation, libel, and insults.

According to an October 3 report submitted by the UN secretary-general pursuant

to the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) mandate,

OHCHR remained concerned by reports of undue restrictions imposed by the

government on the rights to freedom of expression and excessive surveillance of

human rights defenders and journalists in Western Sahara. The report added that

OHCHR continued to receive reports of harassment, expulsion, and denied entry of

human rights defenders covering human rights violations.

Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other

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Media, Including Online Media: Self-censorship and government restrictions on

sensitive topics remained serious hurdles to the development of a free,

independent, and investigative press. Publications and broadcast media require

government accreditation, and the government may deny and revoke accreditation

as well as suspend or confiscate publications that breach public order or criticize

Islam, the institution of the monarchy, or the government’s positions on territorial

integrity. While the government rarely censored the domestic press, it exerted

pressure through written and verbal warnings and by pursuing legal cases that

resulted in heavy fines and suspended publication. Such cases encouraged editors

and journalists to self-censor and host opposition news sites on servers outside the

country to avoid being shut down by the authorities. According to Freedom

House’s 2022 report, “arrests of journalists, bloggers, and activists for critical

speech serve as a deterrent to uninhibited debate among the broader population.”

Libel/Slander Laws: The press code includes provisions that permit the

government to impose financial penalties on accredited journalists and publishers

who violate restrictions related to defamation, libel, and insults, and the

government enforced these provisions. Individuals not registered as journalists

may be charged with defamation, libel, and slander under the criminal code, as

may accredited journalists for their private actions.

In July 2021 the government filed lawsuits in France against Amnesty International

and the French media organization Forbidden Stories for defamation and spreading

false news, following a report that the government used Pegasus spyware

developed by the Israeli company NSO Group to monitor dissidents, human rights

activists, and other high-profile individuals. The French court dismissed the

charges in April, and the government indicated it would seek an appeal but had not

filed an appeal by year’s end.

National Security: Authorities used counterterrorism and national security laws

to arrest or punish critics of the government or deter criticism of government

policies or officials (see the case of Maati Monjib in section 2.d., Foreign Travel).

The antiterrorism law permits the arrest of individuals, including journalists, and

blocking websites deemed to “disrupt public order by intimidation, terror, or

violence.” The law assigns legal liability to the author and anyone who in any way

helps the author to disseminate information the government deems to be

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justification for acts of terrorism, which would include website owners and internet

service providers. Although the stated purpose of the law was to combat terrorism,

authorities retain discretion to define terms such as “national security” and “public

order,” and under the penal code the government can seek fines of up to 200,000

Moroccan dirhams ($19,100) for publishing content online seen as disruptive to

public order, with the maximum fine of 500,000 Moroccan dirhams ($47,900) if

the content offends the military. Online speech offenses related to the monarchy,

Islam, and Western Sahara, as well as threats to national security, can carry prison

sentences of two to six years.

Internet Freedom

The government disrupted access to the internet, and there were credible reports

that the government monitored private online communications without appropriate

legal authority (see section 1.f.). The press code stipulates that online journalism is

equivalent to print journalism. Laws on combatting terrorism permit the

government to block websites. The government repeatedly warned online

journalists to obey the law, leading to self-censorship due to a credible fear of

reprisals by the government. The government also prosecuted individuals for

expressing certain ideological views online.

Restrictions on Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The law criminalizes questioning the legitimacy of Islam, the monarchy, or state

institutions, and the status of Western Sahara. The law restricts cultural events and

academic activities, although the government generally provided more latitude to

political and religious activism confined to university campuses. The Ministry of

Interior approves appointments of university rectors.

b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

The law provides for the right of peaceful assembly with limits. The government

generally allowed authorized and unauthorized peaceful demonstrations to occur,

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but the law requires groups of more than three persons to obtain authorization from

the Ministry of Interior to protest publicly. Several NGOs complained that the

government used administrative delays and other methods to suppress or

discourage unwanted peaceful assembly. Security forces intervened on occasion to

disband both authorized and unauthorized protests when officials deemed the

demonstration a threat to public security. Amnesty International and Transparency

International reported continued arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of

peaceful assembly and association, particularly of individuals supporting

independence for Western Sahara. A health state of emergency remained in place

allowed authorities to limit assembly and association.

Several proindependence organizations and human rights NGOs in Western Sahara

stated that in recent years the submission of applications for permits to hold

demonstrations declined because police rarely granted them. In most cases

organizers proceeded with planned demonstrations in the absence of authorization,

and there was no discernible difference in security forces’ reaction to authorized or

unauthorized protests. Security force practices in Western Sahara were similar to

those in Morocco; however, in Western Sahara there often was a higher ratio of

members of security forces to protesters.

While most protests proceeded peacefully, on several occasions violence erupted

between protesters and police. On March 2, hundreds of teachers protested in

Rabat against temporary contracts. Local media reported the protests turned into

clashes with police who were dispatched to disperse the demonstrators.

Security forces were generally present both in and out of uniform at protests,

particularly if the protest was expected to address a sensitive issue. In general,

officers were under orders to observe and not intervene, unless the demonstration

became unruly, threatening to bystanders, or overflowed into public highways. In

those cases, under standard operating procedures, officers were required to give the

crowd three warnings that force would be used if they did not disperse. Security

forces would then attempt to force protesters to leave the area, using riot shields to

push standing protesters into a designated area or carrying seated protesters to the

designated area.

Security force tactics did not differ significantly whether the protest was authorized

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or unauthorized, although the decision on whether to intervene sometimes

depended on whether the protest was authorized. According to the government, if

officers intervened in a protest, a police judiciary officer not involved in the

intervention and under the supervision of the attorney general must produce a

statement documenting the circumstances of the case, the number of victims, and

the material damage due to the operation. The police judiciary officer must

address the statement to the Attorney General’s Office with a copy to the governor

of the territorial jurisdiction where the incident transpired. The CNDH organized

training on human rights-based methods to manage crowds throughout the year.

In April 2021 a teacher reported she was the subject of verbal, physical, and sexual

harassment by an officer while in police custody for 48 hours after participating in

a teachers’ demonstration outside the parliament and Education Ministry. Widely

shared videos of the arrests showed the teacher being dragged to the ground by

several police officers. Government authorities charged the teacher with “assault

and battery against members of the security forces,” “participation in an

unauthorized demonstration,” and “insulting a constituted body”; other protesters

faced similar charges. On March 10, the Rabat Court of First Instance sentenced

44 protesters from the April 2021 demonstration to two months of suspended

prison sentences and a fine of 1,000 Moroccan dirhams ($96) each for violation of

the state of health emergency, assault and battery, and insults against members of

the forces of order, as well as participation in an unauthorized demonstration (see

section 2.b.). The teacher who reported police harassment received a

nonsuspended sentence of three months. She was the only demonstrator from the

incident to serve time in prison.

Freedom of Association

The constitution and the law provide for freedom of association, although the

government sometimes restricted this freedom. The government prohibited or

failed to recognize some political opposition groups by deeming them unqualified

for NGO status. The government was often more tolerant of labor unions (see

section 7). While the government does not restrict the source of funding for NGOs

operating in the country, NGOs that receive funding from foreign sources are

required to report the amount and its origins to the government within 30 days

from the date of receipt. The government denied official recognition to NGOs it

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considered to be advocating against Islam as the state religion or questioning the

legitimacy of the monarchy or the country’s territorial integrity. Authorities

obstructed the registration of some associations perceived to be critical of the

authorities by refusing to accept their registration applications or to deliver receipts

confirming the filing of applications (see section 5).

Authorities routinely rejected the registration applications of Sahrawi human rights

groups. According to Amnesty International, Sahrawi human rights activists

remained subject to intimidation, questioning, arrest, and intense surveillance that

occasionally amounted to harassment.

The Ministry of Interior required NGOs to register before being recognized as

legal entities, but there was no comprehensive national registry publicly available.

A prospective organization must submit its objectives, bylaws, address, and

photocopies of members’ identification cards to local officials of the ministry. The

local officials of the ministry issue a receipt to the organization that signifies

formal approval. Organizations without receipts are not formally registered.

According to the law, however, any association not denied registration and that did

not receive a receipt within 60 days of submitting the required documentation has

the right to engage in activities. These same organizations reported extended

delays in receiving correspondence from the ministry on the receipt issue.

Unregistered organizations could not access government funds or legally accept

contributions. The organizations stated local officials’ refusal to issue receipts was

a violation of the law that governs the right of association. One of the

organizations, the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, reported the ministry

had refused to issue it a registration receipt for the last seven years.

The Justice and Charity Organization, a Sunni Islamist movement that rejects the

king’s spiritual authority, remained banned but largely tolerated, although

authorities continued to monitor its activities.

c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at

https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/

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d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country

The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration,

and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights, although it

limited movement to areas experiencing widespread unrest. The government

continued to make travel documents available to Sahrawis to travel and encouraged

the return of Sahrawi refugees from Algeria and elsewhere if they acknowledged

the government’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Refugees wishing to return

are required to obtain the appropriate travel or identity documents at a Moroccan

consulate abroad, often in Mauritania.

Sahrawi rights and independence activist Sultana Khaya had been under what

international human rights organizations called “de facto” house arrest since 2020

for her activism, but media reported that as of June Khaya had departed the

country. Previously, she accused security services of abuse, including sexual

assault, destruction of her property, and other claims. On April 16, Sahrawi rights

groups issued a press release alleging that security forces attacked five women who

had visited Khaya’s home (see section 1.c.).

Foreign Travel: NGOs reported authorities can restrict foreign travel with a

judicial order lasting up to two months, which can be renewed up to five times

(allowing for a “travel ban” of up to one year). In practice authorities were able to

prohibit foreign travel for even longer periods. In January 2021 a court sentenced

human rights defender and academic Maati Monjib to one year in prison and a fine

for charges of fraud and endangering national security after authorities arrested

him in 2020. The charges dated back to 2015. In March 2021 authorities released

Monjib after he carried out a hunger strike pending his appeals hearing. In October

2021 Monjib attempted to leave the country for medical treatment but was denied

boarding a flight. The prosecutor of the Rabat Court of First Instance stated that

the terms of Monjib’s provisional release did not allow him to leave the country.

As of December, Monjib remained under a travel ban, which NGOs argued

exceeded the one year allowed, while the government indicated that it had a legal

basis to prohibit Monjib’s travel while his legal appeal remained pending.

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e. Protection of Refugees

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection

and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, and other persons of

concern. The government also provided funding to humanitarian organizations to

provide social services to migrants, including refugees.

The government has historically deferred to UNHCR as the sole agency in the

country entitled to perform refugee status determinations and verify asylum cases.

UNHCR referred cases that meet the criteria for refugee recognition to the

government’s interministerial Commission in Charge of Hearings for Asylum

Seekers within the Bureau of Refugees and Stateless Persons.

Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of refugee status. The

government recognizes asylum status for refugees designated according to the

UNHCR statute. The government continued to grant status to UNHCR-recognized

refugees and temporary status to registered Syrians.

Refoulement: In December 2021 the Court of Cassation approved the extradition

to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of Uyghur journalist Yidiresi Aishan,

who was arrested upon his arrival in the country in July 2021, based on a 2017

INTERPOL Red Notice issued at the request of China. Interpol had cancelled the

Red Notice in August 2021, prior to Aishan’s arrest. Reporters without Borders

and other human rights NGOs reported that the notice was a politically motivated

instance of transnational repression targeting a perceived dissident. Authorities

halted his extradition at the request of UN Committee Against Torture while it

investigated. At year’s end, Aishan remained in detention pending a PRC

extradition request.

Abuse of Migrants and Refugees: Refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants were

particularly vulnerable to abuse. Authorities continued cooperation with Spanish

and EU authorities to thwart trafficking networks and arrest smugglers.

Local and international organizations reported receiving complaints regarding the

rights of migrants. NGOs reported government security forces used excessive

force in arresting or detaining irregular migrants in the north of the country to

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forcibly relocate them away from the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta to

deter attempts to cross illegally into the European Union. Additionally, local and

international organization received reports of security forces physically assaulting

irregular migrants during these forced relocations south or to the Algerian border.

On June 24, nearly 1,500 migrants attempted to cross the border to the Spanish

enclave of Melilla. Human rights organizations asserted that Spanish and

Moroccan security forces used excessive force to prevent them from crossing the

border. MENA Rights Group reported that videos of the incident showed

Moroccan security forces beating men who were visibly injured. Official sources

stated 23 persons died, and nongovernment sources estimated at least 37

individuals died. Human rights organizations accused the Moroccan government

of organizing collective burials without autopsies or identification of remains and

called for an investigation. Human rights organizations and the African Union

called for an investigation into the excessive use of force. On December 13,

Amnesty International reported the victims were met with “prolonged and

unlawful use of force by Moroccan and Spanish security forces” and asserted “this

violence, along with a failure to provide timely medical assistance, contributed to –

if not directly caused – their deaths and injuries.” Amnesty International stated

that in November the organization provided its findings to the government but

received no response.

Employment: Refugees and migrants with residency permits and work

authorization may enter the formal labor market; however, documentation

requirements and yearly renewals mean many who meet the criteria were unable to

obtain legal authorization to work (see section 7 d.).

Access to Basic Services: Migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees have equal

access under the law to justice and public services, including health and education.

Nonetheless, sometimes they were unable to access the national health care system

and continued to have little access to the judicial system until recognized as

refugees. Additionally, migrants without a residency permit had difficulty

receiving vaccinations because they were required to provide proof of residency

and a valid form of identification. Many irregular migrants found it difficult or

costly to obtain a valid form of identification and documents showing where they

resided in the country.

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The law prohibits housing migrants who entered the country irregularly, leaving

them vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, and eviction.

Durable Solutions: The government facilitated voluntary migrant returns with the

support of the International Organization for Migration. The government

maintained that the return of third-country nationals to their country of origin was

coordinated with diplomatic legations that endorsed these departures and issued the

appropriate papers. In addition to the voluntary returns, NGOs reported cases of

security forces expelling irregular migrants across the border to Algeria.

Temporary Protection: The government also provided temporary protection to

individuals who may not qualify as refugees; however, the government did not

provide information on how many individuals received temporary protection.

Syrians and Yemenis benefited from “exceptional regularization” outside the usual

UNHCR asylum process.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

The country is a constitutional monarchy under which ultimate authority rests with

King Mohammed VI, who presides over the Council of Ministers. The king shares

executive authority with the head of government, whom the king appoints from the

political party with the most seats in parliament. The king also approves members

of the government nominated by the head of government.

The law provides for, and citizens participated in, free and fair periodic elections

held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage for parliament’s

Chamber of Representatives (the lower house of parliament) and municipal and

regional councils. Regional and professional bodies indirectly elect members of

parliament’s less powerful Chamber of Counselors.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: In September 2021 the country held local, regional, and

parliamentary elections for the Chamber of Representatives. Although there were

allegations of vote buying and candidate intimidation, domestic and international

observers considered the elections generally free, fair, and transparent.

Page 25

Political Parties and Political Participation: A political party may not legally

challenge Islam as the state religion, the institution of the monarchy, or the

country’s territorial integrity. The law prohibits basing a party on a religious,

ethnic, or regional identity.

Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit

participation of women or members of minority groups in the political process, and

they did participate.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in

Government

The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government

generally did not implement the law effectively. There were recurring reports of

government corruption.

Corruption: Observers generally considered corruption a persistent problem, with

insufficient governmental checks and balances to reduce its occurrence and local

media reported that corruption continued to hamper the country’s development.

Per the Arab Barometer, 72 percent of citizens viewed corruption as prevalent in

state institutions and agencies.

On December 20, the Fez Court of Appeal sentenced former parliamentarian

Rachid El Fayek to six years in prison and a fine of one million Moroccan dirhams

($95,800) for corruption and embezzlement of public money. His brother Jaouad

El Fayek, president of the prefectural council in Fez, was sentenced to three years

in prison and a fine of 50,000 Moroccan dirhams ($4,790) for influence peddling

and illegal transfer of land. The brothers were among six persons under

investigation for misusing public resources, taking bribes, issuing official

documents, and constructing housing units in hereditary lands belonging to private

entities, according to local media. Rachid and Jaouad El Fayak were members of

the country’s ruling National Rally of Independents (RNI) party at the time of their

arrest, but the party suspended their membership.

Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and

Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human

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Rights

A variety of domestic and international human rights groups investigated and

published findings on human rights cases; however, the government’s

responsiveness to, cooperation with, and restrictions on domestic and international

human rights organizations varied, depending on its evaluation of the political

orientation of the organization and the sensitivity of the issues.

HRW reported in its 2022 World Report that authorities continued to impede the

work of the AMDH, the country’s largest independent human rights group. The

organization regularly faced difficulties renewing the registration of its offices,

which impeded its ability to carry out basic functions. Additionally, lesbian, gay,

bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) groups indicated that often

their groups found it difficult to register.

During the year activists and NGOs reported continuing restrictions on their

activities in the country (see section 2.b, Freedom of Association). According to

the government, registered organizations were authorized to meet within their

established headquarters, but any meetings outside that space, including privately

owned establishments and homes, were public spaces and required authorization

from the Ministry of Interior. Organizations stated that government officials told

them their events were canceled for failing to follow required procedures for public

meetings, although the organizations claimed to have submitted the necessary

paperwork or believed the law did not require it.

The United Nations or Other International Bodies: An October 3 report

regarding the situation in Western Sahara, submitted by the UN secretary-general

pursuant to the MINURSO mandate, noted that OHCHR was not permitted to

conduct any visits to the region for the seventh consecutive year and urged the

state and other parties to address outstanding human rights problems and enhance

cooperation with OHCHR.

The country was elected to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in October

for three years beginning January 1, 2023; however, the government does not issue

standing invitations to UN special procedure mandate holders. The government

also continued to postpone or fail to answer requested visits from the UN special

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rapporteurs on disability (pending since 2015), and the UN Working Group on

Arbitrary Detention (pending since 2018).

Government Human Rights Bodies: The CNDH is a national human rights

institution established by the constitution that operates independently from the

elected government. It is publicly funded and operates in conformity with the

Paris Principles, according to the Global Alliance of National Human Rights

Institutions, which sets the minimum standards that national human rights

institutions must meet to be considered credible. The CNDH filled the role of a

national human rights monitoring mechanism for preventing torture. It oversees

the National Human Rights Training Institute, which collaborated with

international organizations to provide training to civil society, media, law

enforcement, medical personnel, educators, and legal practitioners.

Via regional offices in Dakhla and Laayoune, the CNDH continued a range of

activities in Western Sahara, including monitoring demonstrations, visiting prisons

and medical centers, and organizing capacity-building activities for various

government and NGO stakeholders. It also maintained contact with unregistered

NGOs and occasionally investigated cases raised by them, especially those that

drew attention on the internet or in international media.

The Institution of the Mediator acted as a general ombudsperson. It considered

allegations of governmental injustices and has the power to carry out inquiries and

investigations, propose disciplinary action, and refer cases to the public prosecutor.

The mission of the Interministerial Delegation for Human Rights (DIDH), which

reports to the minister of justice, is to promote the protection of human rights

across all ministries, serve as a government interlocutor with domestic and

international NGOs, and interact with relevant UN bodies regarding international

human rights obligations. The DIDH coordinated government responses to UN

bodies on adherence to treaty obligations and served as the principal advisory body

to the king and government on human rights.

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Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: The law punishes individuals convicted of rape

with prison terms of five to 10 years; when the conviction involves a minor, the

prison sentence ranges from 10 to 20 years. Spousal rape is not a separately

enumerated crime, and therefore individuals cannot be charged with it. In practice,

however, there were instances where spousal rape was subsumed within a different

charge, such as “assault and battery” or a related enumerated crime, and the rape

was considered as an aspect of that crime, allowing for prosecution. A sexual

assault conviction may result in a prison sentence of six months to five years and a

fine. The law requires the DGSN, Prosecutor General’s Office, Supreme Judicial

Court, and Ministries of Health, Youth, and Women to have specialized units that

coordinate with one another on cases involving gender-based violence. These

specialized units receive and process cases of gender-based violence and provide

psychological support and other services to victims. Several NGOs provided

hotlines, shelter, resources, guidance, and legal support to survivors of domestic

violence. There were reports, however, that these shelters were not accessible to

persons with disabilities.

Courts maintained “victims of abuse cells” that brought together prosecutors,

lawyers, judges, women’s NGO representatives, and hospital personnel to review

domestic abuse cases, including child abuse, to provide for the best interests of

women or children.

According to local NGOs, survivors did not report most sexual assaults to police,

due to social pressure and the concern that society would most likely hold the

survivors responsible rather than the perpetrators. Some sexual assault survivors

also reported police officers at times turned them away from filing a police report

or coerced them to pay a bribe to file the report by threatening to charge them with

consensual sex outside of marriage, a crime punishable with up to one year in

prison. Police selectively investigated cases; among the minority brought to trial,

successful prosecutions were rare.

The law provides penalties for violence against women and requires certain

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government agencies to establish units to provide psychological support and other

services to victims of gender-based violence. NGOs reported that the law does not

sufficiently define the government’s role in providing services to victims, many of

which fell to NGOs to provide. Additionally, an NGO reported the majority of

women in prison were being held for acts of self-defense.

The law does not specifically define domestic violence against women and minors,

but the general prohibitions of the criminal code address such violence. Legally,

high-level violent misdemeanors occur when a survivor’s injuries result in 20 days

of disability leave from work. Low-level violent misdemeanors occur when a

survivor’s disability lasts for less than 20 days. According to NGOs, the courts

rarely prosecuted perpetrators of low-level violent misdemeanors. Police were

slow to act in domestic violence cases, and the government generally did not

enforce the law and sometimes returned women against their will to abusive

homes. Police generally treated domestic violence as a social rather than a

criminal matter. Physical abuse was legal grounds for divorce, although few

women reported such abuse to authorities.

On October 5, Regional Brigade of the Judicial Police in Fez opened an

investigation into a police commissioner accused of sexually assaulting a minor,

according to local media. In a public statement, the DGSN stated security services

responded “quickly and seriously” to a complaint by the victim’s father. The

complaint said the officer assaulted the minor when she was filing a complaint

against a neighbor. There was no information available on the outcome of the

investigation.

Sexual Harassment: Sexual harassment is a crime punishable by up to six months

in prison and a fine up to 10,000 Moroccan dirhams ($958) if the offense takes

place in a public space or by insinuations through texts, audio recording, or

pictures. For insults and defamation based on gender, an individual may be fined

up to 60,000 Moroccan dirhams for insults and up to 120,000 Moroccan dirhams

for defamation ($5,750 to $11,500). General insult and defamation charges remain

in the penal code. In cases where the harasser is a coworker, supervisor, or

security official, the sentence is doubled. Prison sentences and fines are also

doubled in cases where a spouse, former spouse, engaged partner, or a family

member commits harassment, physical violence, abuse, or mistreatment, or breaks

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a restraining order, or if the victim is a minor. Civil society leaders stated they did

not observe efforts by the government to enforce the law or provide training on the

law for judicial or law enforcement officials.

Women university students reported in the 2021-22 academic year that professors

demanded sexual favors in return for good grades, including at the National School

of Commerce and Management in Oujda, the King Fahd Institute of Translation in

Tanger, and the Faculty of Settat. One university teacher was sentenced to two

years in prison and four others were also sentenced for sexual harassment.

According to local media, dozens of other sexual harassment cases on campuses

were reported, and various universities set up toll-free hotlines and support units.

Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary

sterilization on the part of government authorities.

Individuals and couples have the right to decide the number, spacing, and timing of

their children; manage their reproductive health; and have access to the

information and means to do so, free from discrimination, coercion, or violence.

Authorities generally did not discriminate against women in accessing sexual and

reproductive health care, including for sexually transmitted infections.

Contraception is legal, and most forms were widely available. According to the

Population Reference Bureau, the country has invested in increasing the

availability of voluntary family planning services, expanding and improving

maternal health care, and providing for access to obstetric care by eliminating fees.

There is a disparity between rural and urban women with regard to access to health

services. Socioeconomic status also played part regarding access to health

services.

The contraceptive pill was available over the counter, without a prescription.

Skilled health attendance at delivery and postpartum care were available for

women who could afford it, with approximately 75 percent of overall births

attended by skilled health personnel. In October, following the death of a girl, age

14, during a clandestine abortion, media outlet Le Monde reported deadly illegal

abortions were on the rise. The Moroccan Organization against Clandestine

Abortion estimated between 600 and 800 clandestine abortions occurred each year

and noted there were limited services available for the management of

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complications arising from abortion.

Discrimination: While the constitution guarantees women the same rights and

protections as men in civil, political, economic, cultural, and environmental affairs,

laws favor men in property and inheritance. Despite antidiscrimination laws

provided by the constitution, women as a whole group consistently face legal

inequities. Without legal protections and enforcement of these rights, societal

discrimination persisted. Long-standing traditions continued to dictate preferential

access to education, health care, and other social services to citizens and certain

legal residents when factoring in race, class, sexuality, religion, and disability.

Women with physical and mental disabilities can be excluded from education and

aid. Whether documented or undocumented, non-Muslim sub-Saharan migrants

and refugees are subject to further discrimination. Restrictive laws remained a

widespread threat to LGBTQI+ persons’ security.

According to the law, women are entitled to a share of inherited property, but a

woman’s share of inheritance is generally half of what a man would receive. A

sole male heir would receive the entire estate, while a sole female heir would

receive one-half the estate with the rest going to other relatives.

The family code places the family under the joint responsibility of both spouses,

makes divorce available by mutual consent, and places legal limits on polygamy.

Implementation of family law reforms remained a problem.

The law requires equal pay for equal work, although in practice this often did not

occur.

Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination

The law provides for the protection of members of racial or ethnic minority groups

against violence and discrimination. The government enforced the law effectively.

In August, Arab Barometer, a nonpartisan research organization, reported a third of

respondents from the country said they were the targets of racist comments at least

once. The survey found 43 percent of citizens recognize anti-Black racism as a

problem in the country. In March, Minority Rights Group International reported

“Black Moroccans as well as Black sub-Saharan African migrants and refugees

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continue to suffer from discrimination and violence on the basis of their skin color,

national origin, nationality or lack thereof, and/or immigration status.”

Indigenous Peoples

The Amazigh are an indigenous people of North Africa. The majority of the

population, including some members of the royal family, claimed some Amazigh

heritage. Many of the poorest regions in the country, particularly the rural Middle

Atlas region, were predominantly Amazigh and had illiteracy rates higher than the

national average. Basic governmental services in this region were lacking, and it

remained underdeveloped.

Amazigh cultural groups contended they were rapidly losing their traditions and

language to cultural dominance of the Arabic language and culture. Amazigh

materials were available in news media and, to a much lesser extent, educational

institutions. The government provided television programs in the three national

Amazigh dialects of Tarifit, Tashelhit, and Tamazight. According to regulations,

public media are required to dedicate 30 percent of broadcast time to Amazigh

language and cultural programming. Media reported that on April 11, parliament

started using simultaneous interpretation into the Amazigh language during its

sessions, for the first time in the country's history. The 2023 Finance Bill included

an allocation of 300 million Moroccan dirhams ($27.5 million) to the Ministry of

Digital Transition and Administrative Reform to accelerate the integration of the

Amazigh language in public administrations.

Children

Birth Registration: The law permits both parents to pass nationality to their

children. The law establishes that all children have civil status regardless of their

family status. There were, nonetheless, cases in which authorities denied

identification papers to children because they were born to unmarried parents,

particularly in rural areas or in the cases of poorly educated mothers unaware of

their legal rights.

Education: Education is free and compulsory from age six to 15. The

government offered Tamazight language classes in some schools. Although the

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palace-funded Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture created a university-level

teacher training program to address the shortage of qualified teachers, Amazigh

NGOs contended that the number of qualified teachers of regional dialects of

Amazigh languages continued to decrease. The government reported, however,

that the number of teachers employed to teach the official national Amazigh

language had increased. Instruction in the Amazigh language is mandatory for

students at the Ministry of Interior’s School for Administrators.

Child Abuse: The law prohibits child abuse. NGOs, human rights groups, media

outlets, and UNICEF claimed child abuse was widespread. Prosecutions for child

abuse were extremely rare. Media reported in 2021 that there were 961 cases of

child abuse, of which 405 were cases of sexual abuse. Some children’s rights

NGOs expressed concerns regarding the lack of legislation to prosecute cases

involving incest.

In May a video on social media showed a girl, age six, describing the abuse she

suffered at the hand of her mother. Media reported that authorities opened an

investigation in response to the video. Police visited the girl’s house and found her

locked in a room with apparent evidence of abuse on her body. Police arrested the

mother, and the girl was taken to the hospital to be treated for her injuries. There

was no information available on the outcome of the case at year’s end.

Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal age for marriage is 18, but

parents may secure a waiver from a judge for underage marriage. As of August,

the majority of applications were granted. The government maintained a national

awareness-raising campaign against the marriage of minors.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: The age of consent is 18. The law prohibits

commercial sexual exploitation, sale, offering or procuring commercial sex, and

practices related to child pornography. Penalties for sexual exploitation of children

under the criminal code range from two years to life imprisonment and monetary

fines.

Antisemitism

The constitution recognizes the Jewish community as part of the country’s

population and guarantees everyone the freedom to “practice his religious affairs.”

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Community leaders estimated the size of the Jewish population at 3,500. Overall,

there appeared to be little overt antisemitism, and the Jewish community generally

lived in safety.

Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at

https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/

Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on

Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex

Characteristics

Criminalization: The law criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual activity, with

a maximum sentence of three years in prison for convictions. According to the

government, through October the state prosecuted 283 individuals for same-sex

sexual activity. Activists noted that police used the law to harass individuals

profiled for gender expression. According to NGOs, individuals attracting

attention from police by their appearance could be searched, and innocuous items,

such as a condom, could be used as evidence of a violation.

Violence against LGBTQI+ Persons: According to some human rights

organizations, LGBTQI+ victims of violence in high-profile cases from previous

years continued to be harassed when recognized in public. In October Pan Africa

ILGA (PAI), the African regional organization of the International Lesbian, Gay,

Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, reported “criminalization and a lack of

legal protection leave LGBTIQ+ persons highly vulnerable and without access to

proper recourse or redress.” PAI further stated that the laws also served “to

perpetuate societal prejudice against them, fueling harassment, discrimination and

violence.” Many LGBTQI+ persons were not comfortable reporting problems to

police because LGBTQI+ activity is illegal. The degree of helpfulness from police

in responding to an incident appeared to stem mostly from a police officer’s

personal feelings regarding the LGBTQI+ community. Media reported individuals

within the LGBTQI+ community were subjected to violence because of their

sexual orientation or gender identity.

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On November 12, Tangier’s judicial police arrested an adult and three minors after

a widely circulated video showed them beating a transgender woman. The

attackers reportedly used homophobic slurs during the attack based on the victim’s

attire. Independent media Yabiladi commented that the images were very violent.

After their arrest, the adult was taken into custody, while the three minors were

placed under police surveillance. The adult was later charged for assault and

violence in a public space and given a prison sentence of four months.

Discrimination: The law does not prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate

actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex

characteristics and does not recognize LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, and their

families. There was a stigma against LGBTQI+ persons, including some reports of

overt discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity in employment,

housing, and health care.

Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition is not

available.

Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices Specifically

Targeting LGBTQI+ Individuals: NGOs reported that police officers sometimes

spoke with the parents of LGBTQI+ persons in an attempt to coerce LGBTQI+

persons to change, or simply not express, their sexual orientation, gender identity,

or gender expression. There were also reports of parents forcing lesbian or

bisexual daughters to marry men and live as heterosexuals.

Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:

Media and the public addressed questions of sexuality, sexual orientation, and

gender identity commensurate with previous years. NGOs identified registration

problems as a primary obstacle for LGBTQI+ organizations, as registration

provides access to funding and allows legal operation. For groups that had

attempted to register, they described significant time and energy required, as well

as the safety concerns in running an LGBTQI+ organization in a country where

their “existence is criminalized” and they receive “courtesy visits” from officials.

Persons with Disabilities

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment,

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education, and access to health care. The law also provides for regulations and

building codes that provide for access for persons with disabilities. In general, the

government did not effectively enforce or implement these laws and regulations.

While building codes enacted in 2003 require accessibility for all persons, the

codes exempt most pre-2003 structures, and authorities rarely enforced them for

new construction. Most public transportation was inaccessible to persons with

disabilities, although the national rail system offered wheelchair ramps, accessible

bathrooms, and special seating areas. Although government policy provides that

persons with disabilities should have equal access to information and

communications, special communication devices for persons with visual or audio

disabilities were not widely available. Coordination among government ministries

remained a problem to persons with disabilities receiving access to services.

The Ministry of Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development has

responsibility for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities and attempted to

integrate persons with disabilities into society by implementing a quota of 7

percent for persons with disabilities in vocational training in the public sector and 5

percent in the private sector. Both sectors were far from achieving the quotas. The

government maintained more than 400 integrated classes for children with learning

disabilities, but private charities and civil society organizations were primarily

responsible for integration.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

Persons with HIV and AIDS faced discrimination and had limited treatment

options. UNAIDS reported that some health-care providers were reluctant to treat

persons with HIV and AIDS due to fear of infection. The National Strategic Plan

2017-2021 committed the country to reduce new infections among key and

vulnerable populations, eliminate mother-to-child transmission of HIV, reduce

AIDS-related deaths, confront discrimination, and strengthen governance for an

efficient response. Although an NGO reported the overall objectives in the

National Strategic Plan were achieved, the testing campaigns for affected

individuals were delayed because of COVID-19. As a result, the plan was

extended to 2023.

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Section 7. Worker Rights

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

The constitution provides for the right of workers to form and join unions, strike,

and bargain collectively, with some restrictions. The law prohibits certain

categories of government employees, including members of the armed forces,

police, and some members of the judiciary, from forming and joining unions and

from conducting strikes. The law excludes migrant workers from assuming

leadership positions in unions. The labor code does not fully cover domestic

workers or agricultural workers.

The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and prohibits companies from

dismissing workers for participating in legitimate union-organizing activities.

Courts have the authority to reinstate workers dismissed arbitrarily and may

enforce rulings that compel employers to pay damages and back pay. Trade unions

complained that the government at times used the penal code to prosecute workers

for striking and to suppress strikes. The law gives the government power to

unilaterally dissolve or deregister unions.

The government generally respected freedom of association for labor unions and

the right to collective bargaining. Employers limited the scope of collective

bargaining, frequently setting wages unilaterally for most unionized and

nonunionized workers. The law allows independent unions to exist but limits

collective bargaining rights to those representing 35 percent or more of the

workforce within an enterprise. Unions may legally negotiate with the government

on national-level labor issues. At the sectoral level, trade unions negotiated with

private employers concerning minimum wage, compensation, and other concerns.

Labor disputes were common and, in some cases, resulted from employers failing

to implement collective bargaining agreements and withholding wages. Penalties

were sometimes applied against violators.

The law concerning strikes requires compulsory arbitration of disputes, prohibits

sit-ins, and calls for a 10-day notice of a strike. The government may intervene in

strikes by choosing to criminalize them. A strike may not occur regarding matters

covered in a collective contract for one year after the contract commences. The

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government has the authority to disperse strikers in public areas not authorized for

demonstrations and to prevent the unauthorized occupancy of private space.

Unions may neither engage in sabotage nor prevent individuals not on strike from

working.

Most union federations were affiliated with political parties, but unions were

generally free from government interference.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits and criminalizes all forms of forced or compulsory labor and

establishes penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine for offenses

involving adult victims, and 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment and a fine for those

involving child victims. Penalties were commensurate with those prescribed for

analogous serious crimes, such as rape or kidnapping. The government effectively

enforced the law. The domestic workers law provides some protections to

domestic workers. Reports indicated that forced labor, especially of children,

occurred.

For more information, see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report

at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/

d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation

The labor code prohibits discrimination against persons in employment and

occupation based on race, religion, national origin, color, sex, ethnicity, or

disability, including physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disability. The law

does not address age, pregnancy, HIV status, gender identity, or sexual orientation.

Discrimination occurred despite legal protections. Penalties were not

commensurate to laws related to civil rights, such as election interference.

Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.

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The law requires equal pay for equal work, although in practice this often did not

occur. Women are prohibited from working in occupations that present a risk of

excessive danger, exceeds their capacity, or is likely to undermine their morality,

such as jobs in quarries and underground in mines, or engaging in work that

exposes them to the risk of falling or slipping as well as work in a constant

squatting or leaning position, work or activities using asbestos and benzene and

any other activity exposing them to dangerous chemical agents. Seventy-four

percent of women were homemakers. The overall unemployment rate for women

was 16.8 percent, compared to 10.9 percent for men. Women on average earned

30 percent less than men.

LGBTQI+ persons faced discrimination in employment and occupation (see

section 6).

The public sector has a quota for works with disabilities; however, the private

sector does not. Migrant worker organizations reported that some migrants,

particularly those from sub-Saharan African countries, experienced discrimination

in hiring, wages, or conditions of employment. These workers often reported

employer noncompliance with low or unpaid wages, excessive hours of work,

restricted movement, and dangerous and difficult work conditions. Even after

obtaining a residence card, their vulnerability was reinforced by lack of access to

the formal economy, pushing them to the margins of society, compounding their

problems. Many lived in crowded rooms in dilapidated neighborhoods, while

others slept on the streets, in cemeteries, and forests.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Wage and Hour Laws: The minimum wage was above the poverty line. The law

provides for a 44- to 48-hour maximum workweek with no more than 10 hours’

work in a single day, premium pay for overtime, paid public and annual holidays,

and minimum conditions for health and safety, including limitations on night work

for women and minors. The law prohibits excessive overtime; however, many

employers did not observe the legal provisions regulating conditions of work.

The domestic worker law outlines rights and working conditions for domestic

workers, including limits on working hours and a minimum wage. The law

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establishes a conciliation process for labor inspectors to handle disputes between

domestic workers and their employers, but the law lacks time limits for a

resolution.

Occupational Safety and Health: The Ministry of Employment and Vocational

Integration sets and enforces rudimentary occupational safety and health (OSH)

standards. In the formal sector, workers may remove themselves from situations

that endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their employment, and

authorities effectively protected employees in such situations, although there are no

provisions in the labor code that refer directly to this right.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively

enforce basic provisions of the labor code, such as payment of the minimum wage

and other basic benefits under the National Social Security Fund, or OSH

regulations. The country’s labor inspectors reported that although they attempted

to monitor working conditions and investigate accidents, they lacked adequate

resources, preventing effective enforcement of labor laws. Labor inspectors did

not inspect small workshops with fewer than five employees or private homes, as

the law requires a warrant or permission of the owner to search a private residence.

Inspectors reported that their role as mediators of labor conflicts significantly

limited time spent proactively inspecting work sites and remediating and

uncovering violations. Inspectors do not have punitive power and cannot

independently levy fines or other punishments. Only action by the public

prosecutor that results in a judicial decree can force an employer to take remedial

actions. Enforcement procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.

Penalties for violations were not commensurate with those for similar crimes, such

as fraud, and were sometimes applied against violators. Penalties for violating the

Domestic Worker Law range from fines to one to three months of imprisonment in

cases of repeated offenses. Penalties under the domestic worker law were

sometimes applied against violators. Labor inspectors reported their small

numbers, scarce resources at their disposal, and the broad geographic dispersion of

sites limited their ability to enforce the domestic workers law effectively.

Informal Sector: A Moroccan Central Bank study indicated that 30 percent of

Morocco’s GDP depended on the informal sector. The largest informal sectors

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were agriculture, textiles, and temp agencies.

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