Microsoft Word - Turkey-Access to justice-Advocacy-Analysis Brief-2018-ENG.docx

Justice Suspended:

Access to Justice and the

State of Emergency in Turkey

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Justice Suspended:

Access to Justice and the

State of Emergency in Turkey

Since 16 July 2016, Turkey has been living under state of emergency. President

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced that he will not seek a renewal of the state

of emergency that will otherwise lapse on 19 July.

Two years under a state of emergency have nonetheless had a devastating

impact on the human rights of vast numbers of persons in the country. Hundreds

of thousands of civil servants, judges, military personnel, and academics have

been dismissed from their jobs; thousands of people have been arrested,

investigated, tried and convicted; hundreds of associations have been closed and

key State institutions, under legislative, executive and judicial authority, have

been radically overhauled. Many of these changes are there to stay and, even

now that the state of emergency is over, the question remains of what remedies

can people access for human rights violated in this last two years.

Human rights are illusory if there is no effective remedy to access to protect

them, or to provide redress where they have been violated. It is through its

justice and accountability mechanisms, in particular the judicial systems, that

corrective action takes place to bring the State in compliance with the rule of law.

This is even more the case in times of public emergency. Indeed, “the role of

the judiciary and legal profession is paramount in safeguarding human rights and

the Rule of Law in times of crisis, including declared states of emergency."

It is

essential that these mechanisms of protection be independent and effective at all

times.

This report will provide an overall assessment of the impact that the state of

emergency and the reforms undertaken have had on the capacity of people in

Turkey to access effective legal remedies for human rights violations.

ICJ Geneva Declaration on Upholding the Rule of Law of Judges and Lawyers in Times of Crisis of 2008, Principle 1

(hereinafter "ICJ Geneva Declaration"). See, ICJ Legal Commentary to the ICJ Geneva Declaration on Upholding the

Rule of Law of Judges and Lawyers in Times of Crisis, ICJ Human Rights and Rule of Law Series No. 3, Geneva,

2011, available at https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ICJ-genevadeclaration-publication-2011.pdf ,

pp. 1-15.

1. General context

On the night of 15 July 2016, elements of the Turkish army attempted to

overthrow the democratically elected Government. They blocked the bridges on

the Bosphorus in Istanbul, bombed the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,

seized control of several media outlets and reportedly attempted to kill President

Erdoğan.

The attempted military coup was ultimately unsuccessful, partly due to the

mobilization of civilians including police officials that blocked the advance of army

movements. By the morning of 16 July 2016, the attempted coup was over. That

night ended with 246 persons dead and more than 2,500 wounded.

The “Gülen movement”, a religious-based organization led by US-based cleric

Fethullah Gülen, and designated as a terrorist organization by the Turkish

authorities, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Gulf Cooperation

Council,

and the Asian Parliamentary Assembly

, under the name of Fetullahist

Terrorist Organisation (FETÖ/PDY),

was accused by the Government to be

behind the attempted coup.

In reaction to the attempted coup, the Council of Ministers, under the

chairmanship of President Erdoğan, declared, on 21 July, a nation-wide state of

emergency that was ratified by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Shortly afterwards, a series of decree laws were issued by the Council of

Ministers. To date, 32 emergency Decree Laws have been issued modifying

legislation ranging from the Criminal Procedure Code to the Law on International

Protection and media laws. All of these Decrees were eventually enacted into law

by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The Human Rights Joint Platform estimates that over 160,000 people have been

held in police custody since the declaration of the state of emergency and that,

from 17 October 2016 to 20 March 2018, 79,301 were held in policy custody for

terrorism-related offences.

Between 16 July 2016 and 20 March 2018 at least

The description of the context for the purpose of this report is necessarily cursory and incomplete. An official

account by the Government of Turkey of the eventy of 15 July may be found in annex 1. Authoritative accounts and

assessment of the situation in Turkey under the State of Emergency are available at: Human Rights Joint Platform

(IHOP), Updated Situation Report - State of Emergency in Turkey (21 July 2016 - 20 March 2018), published on 17

April 2018 (hereinafter "IHOP Report"), available at http://www.ihop.org.tr/2018/04/25/updated-situation-report-

state-of-emergency-in-turkey-21-july-2016-20-march-2018/ accessed on 16 July 2018; Report of the Special

Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on his mission to Turkey, UN

Doc. A/HRC/37/50/Add.1, 18 December 2017 (hereinafter "Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture"); Office

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report on the impact of the state of

emergency on human rights in Turkey, including an update on the South-East - January - December 2017, March

2018 (hereinafter "Second Report on Turkey"); European Commission, Turkey 2018 Report, Doc. No. SWD(2018)

153 final, 17 April 2018 (hereinafter "European Commission 2018 Report"). The ICJ has carried out a visit to Turkey

from 7 to 11 May 2018.

See account by the Turkish Government in Annex 1.

MFA Turkey, Information on the terrorist attempt on 15 July 016 and the investigations conducted against the

judges and public prosecutors, in Notification of State of Emergency under article 15 ECHR, Doc. JJ8190C, Tr./005-

192, p. 9, p. 10.

Hürriyet Daily News, "OIC lists Gülen network as 'terrorist group'", 19 October 2016, available at

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/oic-lists-gulen-network-as-terror-group--105128 accessed on 16 July 2018

Sputnik News, "APA Branding FETO Terrorist Organization 'Important Step' - Turkish Official", 8 December 2016,

available at https://sputniknews.com/world/201612081048302019-apa-feto-terrosrist-organization-important-step/

accessed on 16 July 2018

Reuters, "Turkey officially designates Gulen religious group as terrorist", 31 May 2016, available at

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-gulen/turkey-officially-designates-gulen-religious-group-as-terrorists-

idUSKCN0YM167 accessed on 16 July 2018.

See, articles 2, 3, 4, Decree Law no. 667. The ICJ will adopt the terminology used by the United Nations to refer to

this group or movement. Turkey refers to them, based on decisions of their domestic courts as a terrorist

organisation called the "Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation" or "FETÖ".

Declaration, State of emergency declared in Turkey following the Coup Attempt of 15 July 2016, para. 4.

IHOP report, op. cit., p. 10.

228,137 persons were held in pre-trial detention.

The profiles of those arrested

include members of the army, judges and prosecutors, public servants, Members

of Parliament, journalists, human rights defenders, students and lawyers.

As of 20 March 2018, 112,679 public servants were dismissed for life from public

office.

In the same timespan, 5,705 academics and 4,113 judges and

prosecutors were dismissed.

During the state of emergency, authorities

ordered, via emergency decrees, the closure of 1,064 private education

institutions (kindergartens, elementary schools, junior high schools and high

schools), 360 private training courses and study centres, 847 student

dormitories, 47 private healthcare centres, 15 private foundation universities, 19

trade unions affiliated to two Confederation, 1,419 associations, 145 foundations

and 174 media and broadcasting organizations.

A new emergency decree, issued on 8 July 2018 has led to the further dismissal

of 18,632 public servants, including 6,153 military personnel and 9,647 members

of the police and of the gendarmerie, several civil servants and 199

academicians. 12 associations, three newspapers and one TV station have been

closed.

2. A brief introduction to Turkey's judicial system

Turkey is a civil law system governed under a Constitution. International treaties,

once ratified by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, have force of domestic

law and "in the case of a conflict between international agreements, duly put

into effect, concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws due to

differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international

agreements shall prevail."

The principle of the rule of law is enshrined in article 2 of the Turkish Constitution

which describes the State as “a democratic, secular and social state governed by

the rule of law”. In the Turkish legal system, the Constitution is the supreme law

of the land, laws cannot be contrary to the Constitution and all executive,

legislative and judicial organs, administrative authorities, institutions and

individuals are bound by its provisions and must comply with them.

Under article 9 of the Constitution, the judicial power is exercised by

“independent and impartial courts on behalf of the Turkish nation.” Within the

civil judicial system, there are separate ordinary and administrative jurisdictions.

The Constitutional Court has the power to review the constitutionality of laws; the

High Court of Appeals which has power to review the judgments of first instance

civil and criminal courts; the Council of State has the power to review the

decisions and judgments of all administrative courts; and Court of Jurisdictional

Disputes, has the power to resolve disputes of jurisdiction among high courts.

The independence of the Turkish courts is guaranteed in article 138 of the

Constitution as follows:

Ibid., p. 11.

See, ibid., p. 13.

See, ibid., p. 24.

See, ibid., p. 37.

Ibid., p. 43

See, Emergency Decree No. 701 of 8 July 2018, available (in Turkish) at

http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180708.htm&m

ain=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180708.htm

accessed on 16 July 2018.

Article 90, Constitution of Turkey (hereinafter the "Constitution"). Official translation by the Grand National

Assembly of Turkey.

Article 11, ibid.

Judges shall be independent in the discharge of their duties; they shall

give judgment in accordance with the Constitution, laws, and their

personal conviction conforming with the law.

No organ, authority, office or individual may give orders or instructions to

courts or judges relating to the exercise of judicial power, send them

circulars, or make recommendations or suggestions. ...

Article 139 establishes the security of tenure of judges and public prosecutors. It

stipulates:

Judges and public prosecutors shall not be dismissed, or unless they

request, shall not be retired before the age prescribed by the Constitution;

nor shall they be deprived of their salaries, allowances or other rights

relating to their status, even as a result of the abolition of a court or a

post. Exceptions indicated in law relating to those convicted for an offence

requiring dismissal from the profession, those who are definitely

established as unable to perform their duties because of ill health, or those

determined as unsuitable to remain in the profession, are reserved.

Turkish prosecutors form part of the judicial system, although they have powers

and functions distinct from those of judges.

The role of public prosecutors is

particularly important in Turkey during the pre-trial phase of criminal

proceedings. They have the duty to investigate the facts promptly after being

informed about suspicions of a crime

and must gather and secure evidence both

in favour of and against any suspects. Throughout the investigation, the judicial

police are under the command of public prosecutors.

If the public prosecutors

believe that there is a reasonable basis for suspicion of a crime, they are obliged

by law to file indictments.

Under Turkish law, the work of lawyers is described as an independent public

service.

In order to practice law, a lawyer must be registered with the bar

association of the city where he or she resides. The bar associations, including

the Union of Turkish Bar Associations at national level and the regional bar

associations, are responsible for the admission of candidates to the profession,

the regulation and the conduct of their internship and disciplinary investigations.

The Ministry of Justice retains a significant role in the admission of lawyers to the

profession and in their disciplinary system. The admission decisions of the Union

of Turkish Bar Associations are subject to the approval of the Ministry, which is

also needed to launch criminal investigations and impose disciplinary measures

against lawyers.

3. The declaration of the State of Emergency

3.1. International law

Turkey is party to two treaties that regulate human rights obligations in states of

emergency, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 4 of the ICCPR affirms

that:

1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the

existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present

Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the

Article 139 and 140, ibid.

Article 160 of the Law on Criminal Procedure

Article 161, ibid.

Article 170, ibid.

Article 1/1 of the Law on Practice of Law.

Articles 8, 58 and 71, ibid.

present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the

situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other

obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on

the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18

may be made under this provision.

3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of

derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present

Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United

Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by

which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the

same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.

Article 15 ECHR declares that:

1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation

any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations

under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the

situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other

obligations under international law.

2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from

lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made

under this provision.

3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall

keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the

measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the

Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased

to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.

Under international human rights law, a state of emergency may be invoked only

in time of war or of "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and

the existence of which is officially proclaimed".

Under both instruments, States

"may take measures derogating from their obligations ... to the extent strictly

required by the exigencies of the situation."

States must communicate the

derogation, the measures undertaken and the extent to which they derogate from

their obligations under the relevant human rights treaty to the treaty's

depository, i.e. the UN Secretary General for the ICCPR and the Council of

Europe's Secretary General for the ECHR.

Under both treaties, certain rights can never be derogated from even under a

state of emergency, including freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment, most elements of the right to life, freedom

from slavery and servitude; and freedom from retroactive criminal liability

(nullum crimen sine lege).

The ICCPR, in addition, makes non-derogable

freedom from imprisonment merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a

contractual obligation, the right to recognition of as a person before the law,

and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

The right not be subjected to

the death penalty is non-derogable in respect of States, such as Turkey, that are

parties to the respective protocols on the death penalty.

No derogating measure

Article 4.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 15.1 of the European

Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). (The ECHR also contains the ground of "times of war").

Article 4.1 ICCPR, article 15.1 ECHR.

Article 4.3 ICCPR, article 15.3 ECHR.

see, articles 4.2 ICCPR, 15.2 ECHR.

Article 4 ICCPR.

Protocol 6 ECHR, Protocol 2 ICCPR.

may breach the prohibition on discrimination and no measure may be inconsistent

with other obligations under international law.

In addition to the rights that are made expressly non-derogable under the

treaties, the jurisprudence of the supervisory organs has made clear that other

rights are effectively non-derogable. These include the right to an effective

remedy for a violation of rights and the fundamental requirements of the rights to

a fair trial and to liberty.

Furthermore, in regard to the ICCPR, States "may in no circumstances invoke

article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law

or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages, by

imposing collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by

deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of

innocence."

Other rights and prohibitions that are held as non-derogable include

the right to humane treatment in detention;

the prohibitions against taking of

hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention; the international protection

of the rights of persons belonging to minorities; deportation or forcible transfer of

population without grounds permitted under international law and the prohibition

of propaganda for war, or in advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that

would constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.

Critically, derogating measures must comply with the principles of necessity and

proportionality, since they are limited “to the extent strictly required by the

exigencies of the situation.”

This means that “derogation” from rights is not

equivalent to “suspension of rights” and, as the Human Rights Committee has

affirmed that “no provision of the [ICCPR], however validly derogated from will be

entirely inapplicable to the behaviour of a State party.”

The proportionality and

necessity requirements "relate to the duration, geographical coverage and

material scope of the state of emergency and any measures of derogation

resorted to because of the emergency."

The Human Rights Committee has held that the "restoration of a state of

normalcy where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the

predominant objective of a State party derogating from the Covenant."

The

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stressed that

"emergency legislation cannot therefore remain in force for so long that it

becomes institutionalized so that it is the rule rather than the exception."

The European Court of Human Rights has held that, "even in a state of

emergency – which is ... a legal regime whose aim is to restore the normal

regime by guaranteeing fundamental rights ... – ... States must bear in mind that

any measures taken should seek to protect the democratic order from the threats

to it, and every effort must be made to safeguard the values of a democratic

society, such as pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness."

Article 4.1 ICCPR, Article 15.1 ECHR.

Human Rights Committee (CCPR), General Comment no. 29, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001,

para. 14-16.

Ibid., para. 11.

Article 10 ICCPR.

Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 29, op. cit., para. 13.

Article 4.1. ICCPR, article 15.1 ECHR.

Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 29, op. cit., para 4.

Ibid.

Ibid., para. 1.

OHCHR Manual, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors

and Lawyers, Chapter 16 - The Administration of Justice During States of Emergency, available at

https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/manual-on-human-rights-for-judges-prosecutors-and-lawyers-

chapter-16/ accessed on 16 July 2018 (hereinafter "OHCHR Manual"), p. 824.

Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018, para. 210.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has stressed that

the "fundamental safeguard of the rule of law, in particular legality, effective

parliamentary oversight, independent judicial control and effective domestic

remedies, must be maintained even during a state of emergency. Due democratic

process, including separation of powers, as well as political pluralism and the

independence of civil society and the media must also continue to be respected

and protected."

A state of emergency "must be limited in duration,

circumstances and scope. Emergency powers may be exercised only for the

purposes for which they were granted. The duration of emergency measures and

their effect may not exceed that of the state of emergency."

3.2. Turkish law

According to the Turkish Constitution in force in July 2016, a state of emergency

can be declared by the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of

the President of the Republic, after consultation with the National Security

Council, for a period not exceeding six months in the "event of serious indications

of widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruction of the free democratic

order established by the Constitution or of fundamental rights and freedoms, or

serious deterioration of public order because of acts of violence."

Such a

decision must be published in the Official Gazette and must be approved by the

Grand National Assembly of Turkey that "may alter the duration of the state of

emergency, may extend the period for a maximum of four months each time at

the request of the Council of Ministers, or may lift the state of emergency".

Furthermore:

The financial, material and labour obligations which are to be imposed on

citizens in the event of the declaration of state of emergency under Article

119 and the manner how fundamental



rights and freedoms shall be

restricted or suspended in line with the principles of Article 15, how and by

what means the measures necessitated by the situation shall be taken, ...

shall be regulated by the Act on State of Emergency.

During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers, meeting under the

chairpersonship of the President of the Republic, may issue decrees having

the force of law on matters necessitated by the state of emergency. These

decrees shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall be submitted to

the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the same day for approval; the

time limit and procedure for their approval by the Assembly shall be

indicated in the Rules of Procedure.

As regards the human rights enshrined in the Constitution, the general principle is

that

In times of war, mobilization, martial law, or a state of emergency, the

exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms may be partially or entirely

suspended, or measures derogating the guarantees embodied in the

Constitution may be taken to the extent required by the exigencies of the

situation, as long as obligations under international law are not violated.

Even under the circumstances indicated in the first paragraph, the

individual’s right to life, the integrity of his/her corporeal and spiritual

existence shall be inviolable except where death occurs through acts in

State of emergency: proportionality issues concerning derogations under article 15 of the European Convention on

Human Rights, PACE Resolution 2209(2018), para. 3.

Ibid., para. 4.

Article 120, Constitution of 2016.

Article 121.1, ibid.

Article 121.2-3, ibid.

conformity with law of war; no one shall be compelled to reveal his/her

religion, conscience, thought or opinion, nor be accused on account of

them; offences and penalties shall not be made retroactive; nor shall

anyone be held guilty until so proven by a court ruling.

Box 1: State of emergency in the new Constitution

Under the new Constitution, as revised after the referendum of 16 April 2017, the

derogation of constitutional rights cannot take place in cases of "martial law" as

the possibility of resort to martial law has been abolished (new article 15.1).

A new regime of state of emergency has been enshrined in article 119 that

previously allowed for declaring state of emergency only for "natural disaster,

dangerous epidemic diseases or a serious economic crisis".

The new article 119 gives the President of the Republic, without the involvement

of the Council of Ministers or of the National Security Council, the power to

declare a state of emergency also in the event of "war, the emergence of a

situation necessitating war, mobilization, uprising, strong and actual attempt

against homeland and Republic, widespread acts of violence of internal or

external origin threatening the indivisibility of the country and the nation,

emergence of widespread acts of violence which are aimed at the destruction of

the constitutional order or the fundamental rights and freedoms, severe

destruction of public order due to acts of violence," in addition to the previous

grounds contemplated by the provision.

However, the new article 119 establishes the same procedure of ratification by

the Grand National Assembly of Turkey provided for by article 120. The Grand

National Assembly can reject the declaration, modify it or approve it and extend it

of terms of four months.

During the state of emergency, the President of the Republic can legislate directly

by presidential decree, that must be later approved by the Assembly, in all

matters, without limitation of competence on fundamental rights or other issues

ordinarily reserved to Parliament.

3.3. The declaration of the state of emergency in Turkey

In its first ratification of the state of emergency, the Grand National Assembly of

Turkey affirmed that:

purpose of the state of emergency is to take required measures in the most

speedy and effective manner in the fight against FETÖ terrorist organisation in

order to save the nation from this ferocious terror network and return to

normalcy as soon as possible. Meanwhile, utmost care will will (sic) be

maintained with a view of upholding democracy standards as well as

respecting the fundamental rights of citizens.

Notifications of the state of emergency were filed to the Secretary General of the

Council of Europe, with regard to article 15 of the ECHR on 21 July 2016, and, on

2 August 2016, with the UN Secretary General with regard to article 4 of the

ICCPR.

Article 15, ibid.

Declaration, State of emergency, declared in Turkey following the Coup Attempt of 15 July 2016, para. 4.

The notification to the UN Secretary General with regard to the ICCPR refers to

derogation from article 2.3 (right to an effective remedy), article 9 (right to

liberty and security), article 10 (right to humane treatment in detention), article

12 (freedom of movement), article 13 (procedural guarantees in expulsion

proceedings), article 14 (right to a fair trial), article 17 (right to privacy), article

19 (right to freedom of expression), article 21 (right of peaceful assembly),

article 22 (freedom of association), article 25 (political rights), article 26 (equality

before the law) and article 27 (protection of minorities). The declaration of

derogation from the ECHR refers to no specific articles to be derogated from.

Neither of the two declarations states the extent of the derogation requested

while, at least for the ECHR, the Turkish Government sent periodically to the

Secretary General of the Council of Europe translations and summaries of part of

the adopted Emergency Decree-Laws.

3.4. Assessment of the state of emergency

The European Court of Human Rights has recently noted that "the notice of

derogation by Turkey ... does not explicitly mention which Articles of the

Convention are to form the subject of a derogation. Instead, it simply announces

that “measures taken may involve derogation from the obligations under the

Convention”."

The European Court has accepted that "the attempted military

coup disclosed the existence of a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the

nation’ within the meaning of the Convention."

The PACE has declared that "Turkey's response to the unquestionably serious

situation described in the derogation is disproportionate on numerous grounds,"

in particular because the powers granted went beyond what was strictly

necessary by the exigencies of the situation, the duration of the state of

emergency was excessive, emergency measures were converted into permanent

changes to the legal framework, the overall impact of the measures was

excessive and indiscriminate and there were "delays in implementing a timely

effective remedy."

The PACE Rapporteur noted that:

The resulting practice of government by emergency decree, often in

apparently unrelated areas, has bypassed effective scrutiny by Parliament

and the Constitutional Court. This seems to have occurred with an

apparent unwillingness to exercise independent control of State authorities

that should, in a democracy, act as checks and balances on the

government.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted that "the

sheer number, frequency and the lack of connection of several decrees to any

national threat, seems to indicate the arbitrary nature of some measures, and

point to the use of emergency powers to stifle any form of criticism or dissent vis-

à-vis the Government."

The European Commission has affirmed that "the broad scale and collective

nature, and the disproportionality of measures taken since the attempted coup

The declarations and annexes sent to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe are available at

https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/declarations?p_auth=7j0iiinC .

Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018, para. 89; Sahin Alpay v Turkey,

ECtHR, Application no. 16538/17, 20 March 2018, para. 73. The Court has not ruled on the validity of the notice of

derogation; it accepted it for the purpose of this case, because the parties to the case did not raise the issue.

Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 93; Sahin Alpay v Turkey, op. cit., para. 77.

State of emergency: proportionality issues concerning derogations under article 15 of the European Convention on

Human Rights, PACE Resolution 2209(2018), para. 16. The states of emergency of France and Ukraine were also

criticised in the resolution.

Ibid.

State of emergency: proportionality issues concerning derogations under article 15 of the European Convention on

Human Rights, PACE report, Doc. No. 14506, 27 February 2018 (hereinafter "PACE Report"), para. 91

OHCHR, Second Report on Turkey, op. cit., para. 42.

under the state of emergency, such as widespread dismissals, arrests, and

detentions, continue to raise serious concerns. Turkey should lift the state of

emergency without delay."

Furthermore, the European Commission has found that "[s]erious shortcomings

affect the 31 decrees taken to date under the state of emergency. They have not

been subject to a diligent and effective scrutiny by parliament. Consequently, the

decrees have long not been open to judicial review and none of them has yet

been subject to a decision by the Constitutional Court. These emergency decrees

have notably curtailed certain civil and political rights, including freedom of

expression, freedom of assembly and procedural rights. They also amended key

pieces of legislation which will continue to have an effect when the state of

emergency is lifted."

During the days in which the coup attempt was underway and the period

immediately thereafter, there was likely a public emergency that was of sufficient

gravity to constitute a threat the life of the nation. For purposes of conducting its

analysis, therefore, the ICJ will take as a given that the one element required for

lawful derogation has been satisfied in the initial period, that of the existence of a

public emergency threatening the life of the nation.

Measures of derogation can range from the adoption of legislation, executive or

administrative decrees or regulations, to ad hoc practices. This briefing paper

does not make an assessment of each and every derogating measure under the

state of emergency or its compliance with Turkey’s obligations under international

law. Nonetheless, Turkey is under an obligation to ensure both that a public

emergency that threatens the life of the nation continues and that all emergency

measures derogating from rights are strictly necessary and proportionate to

address a threat to the life of the nation, and to continuously review whether

these requirement are met.

The ICJ stresses that, at present, urgent review of the necessity and

proportionality of the extensive measures taken under the state of emergency is

needed.

The ICJ’s own assessment is that more than one year and a half after the events

that gave rise to the state of emergency, it is now time to lift it and revoke such

measures that risk giving emergency measures permanent effect.

Furthermore, the ICJ stresses that, under international law, a declaration of state

of emergency must identify the particular human rights provisions from which it

has derogated. Turkey has failed to this done in respect of the ECHR. It also must

as describe in detail and with precision each derogating measure and the extent

of the derogation in relation to specific provisions, parts of provisions, and to the

exceptional measure(s) undertaken under the state of emergency. The ICJ notes

that even in the case of the ECHR, where Turkey provided partial translation of

the Decree-Laws with some introductory explanation, this requirement has not

been satisfied.

As highlighted in the section on international law, the ICJ considers that the

derogations by Turkey to the right to an effective remedy (article 2.3 ICCPR), the

right to humane treatment in detention (article 10 ICCPR), and the protection of

minorities (article 27 ICCPR) are prima facie invalid, as they refer to non-

derogable rights. They should therefore be withdrawn.

In addition, a number of

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 3.

Ibid.

See, Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 29, op.cit., paras. 13-14.

derogations undertaken in respect of rights notionally subject to derogation, will

be invalid as not complying with the requirements of necessity and

proportionality.

4. The right to an effective remedy under international law

Under general international law, and including in times of crisis,

the obligation

to respect and ensure respect for international human rights law and international

humanitarian law includes the duty to provide effective remedies to victims,

including reparation.

This obligation has been recognized and accepted by all

members of the UN, through General Assembly resolution 60/47 of 16 December

2005. In respect of the right at issue here, it is guaranteed under article 2.3 of

the ICCPR and articles 13 and 41 of the ECHR.

To be effective, remedies must be prompt, accessible, impartial and independent,

must be enforceable, and lead to cessation of violations and reparation for the

human rights violation concerned.

The right to reparation includes the right to

restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-

repetition.

An effective remedy should be provided by a judicial body, and must be in

respect of gross human rights violations. For certain other violations, provided

there is the availability of judicial review, there may be the possibility, in limited

circumstance, of non-judicial remedies. However, these must fulfil the

requirements set out above, of effectiveness - i.e. the power to bring about

cessation of the violation and appropriate reparation - of impartiality and

independence.

The remedy must be prompt and effective in practice as well as

in law, and must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts of State authorities.

ICJ Geneva Declaration, principle 2. See, ICJ Legal Commentary, op. cit., pp. 17-28.

Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights; articles 13 and 14 of the Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment; article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination; article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; articles 25 and 63(1) of the American

Convention on Human Rights; article 7(1)(a) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; articles 12 and

23 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights; articles 5 (5), 13 and 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights;

article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; article 27 of the Vienna Declaration and Program of

Action;UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations

of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN Principles and

Guidelines on Reparation), adopted by GA Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, Article 3. See also UN Set of

Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through action to Combat Impunity (UN Impunity

Principles), recommended by UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/81 of 21 April 2005, Principle 31:

“Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or her beneficiaries,

implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and the possibility for the victim to seek redress from

the perpetrator.”  See also: UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power;

UN Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of

international human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law; Article 19 of the UN Declaration

on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance; Principle 20 of the UN Principles on the Effective

Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions; UN Declaration on the Elimination of

Violence against Women; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (85) 11 to member

states on the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure (28 June 1985); Guidelines on

the Protection of Victims of Terrorist Acts adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2005);

Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa; and Council of European Union

Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, 2001/220/JHA. 

See, generally, ICJ, Practitioners’ Guide No. 2, The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross Human Rights

Violations, December 2006, pp. 46-54.

Articles 2 and 3, 18-23 of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation; UN

Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity.

Principle 34; Human Rights Committee (CCPR), General Comment no. 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26

May 2004, para 16.

See, ICJ, Practitioners’ Guide No.2, op. cit, pp. 49-54.

Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, Application no 42502/06, 11 December 2008, para. 100; Isakov v. Russia, ECtHR,

Application no. 20745/04, 19 June 2008, para. 136; Yuldashev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application no. 1248/09, 8 July

2010, paras. 110-111; Garayev v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Application no. 53688/08, 10 June 2010, paras. 82 and 84.

The remedy’s purpose is to “enforce the substance of the [human rights treaty]

rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the

domestic legal order”.

Furthermore, the right to an effective remedy effectively is not subject to

derogation during a state of emergency. As the UN Human Rights Committee has

pointed out:

... Even if a State party, during a state of emergency, and to the extent

that such measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,

may introduce adjustments to the practical functioning of its procedures

governing judicial or other remedies, the State party must comply with the

fundamental obligation ... to provide a remedy that is effective.

....

As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed

under international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the

Committee finds no justification for derogation from these guarantees

during other emergency situations. The Committee is of the opinion that

the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental

requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.

An effective remedy at a national level is simultaneously a substantive right

States must guarantee to all persons under their jurisdiction and a crucial aspect

of establishing the admissibility of a complaint before an international human

rights mechanism. In this regard, aside from the possibility to bring complaints to

the European Court of Human Rights, Turkey has accepted the competency to

complain through the communication procedures of the Committee against

Torture (CAT) pursuant to a declaration under article 22 CAT; the Human Rights

Committee, pursuant ratification of the first Optional Protocol; the Committee on

the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), pursuant to the

ratification of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW; and Committee on the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), pursuant to its accession to the optional protocol

to the CRPD.

Generally, an applicant to an international court or tribunal or a quasi-judicial

mechanism, such as a treaty body communication procedure, must exhaust all

effective domestic remedies before submitting his or her case at the international

level. For this reason, much of the case-law on how to assess the effectiveness of

a remedy and, hence, the respect of this international obligation relies on both

substantive and procedural findings of international courts and bodies.

The assessment of the effectiveness of a remedy depends on the individual case

and must be assessed both in law and in practice.

Nonetheless, a set of

requirements may be construed, in particular from the jurisprudence of the

European Court of Human Rights. This jurisprudence is generally consonant with

that of international authorities, including the UN treaty bodies and other regional

mechanisms. Notwithstanding whether it has a preventive or compensatory

nature, remedy must respect the following requirements:

i. Independence and impartiality.

The European Court of Human

Rights, in interpreting and applying the right to a fair hearing under ECHR

Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 50963/99, Judgment of 20 June 2002, para. 132.

Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 29, op. cit., para. 14.

Ibid., para. 16.

Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Applications nos. 36925/10 21487/12 72893/12, 27 January 2015, para.

178, 179-181; Akdivar and others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application no. 21893/93, 1 April 1998, paras. 66-73.

Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Applications nos. 65540/16 22368/17, para 49, 59; Neshkov and

others v. Bulgaria, op. cit., para. 183; Demopoulos and others v. Turkey, Applicatons nos. 46113/99 3843/02

13751/02, para. 120.

article 6, has held that “[i]n determining whether a body can be

considered to be 'independent’—notably of the executive and of the parties

to the case—the Court has had regard to the manner of appointment of its

members and the duration of their term of office, the existence of

guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body

presents an appearance of independence.”

International standards on

the independence and accountability of the judiciary, prosecutors and

lawyers, including the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the

Judiciary, the European Charter on the Statute for Judges and the

Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to

Member States on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities

also provide authoritative standards against which recent developments in

the Turkish judicial system should be measured.

ii. Accessibility and respect of the principle of fairness under the right

to a fair trial:

procedural guarantees of a remedy against human rights

violations (in particular when it is dealing with systemic or a great number

of allegations of violations) must "make it simple to use,"

not impair

access to remedy, for example with excessive legal costs,

and must "not

place an undue evidential burden"

on the applicant. It must provide the

possibility of a public hearing in its presence and with his or her "effective

presence"

in adversarial proceedings.

The European Court of Human

Rights has held that the principle "that the Convention is intended to

guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical

and effective ... is particularly true for the guarantees enshrined in Article

6, in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right

to a fair trial with all the guarantees under Article 6."

iii. Timeliness: the remedy must not be excessively long in providing with

redress.

Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has stressed " the

importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise

its effectiveness and credibility".

iv. Scope of the assessment: the remedy must be able to consider the

substance of the complaint including in light of the relevant State's

See, Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 7819/77, 28 June 1984, para. 78. See also,

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and

to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 19.

Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, op. cit., para.184; Valada Matos das Neves v. Portugal, Application no. 73798/13,

para. 73(c).

Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria, op. cit., paras. 50, 61.

Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), Application no. 36813/97, para. 201 ("unreasonable restriction on the right to lodge such

an application"); Valada Matos das Neves v. Portugal, op. cit., para. 73(d)

Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria, op. cit., para 50, 61; Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, op. cit., para. 184;

Valada Matos das Neves v. Portugal, op. cit.

Ibid., para 51, Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, op. cit., paras. 183, 212, 283

Ibid., paras. 49, 59.

Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), op. cit., para. 192.

Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria, op. cit., paras. 52, 63; Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, op. cit., para. 183-

184, 281 ("swift redress" for preventive remedies), 283. Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), op. cit., para. 195: "it cannot be

ruled out that excessive delays in an action for compensation will render the remedy inadequate ... ". In the case

Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) the ECtHR found that four months to reach the judicial decision on the violation of

reasonable length of judicial proceedings was reasonable, but held that more than six months to execute the

decision and provide compensation was excessively long (para. 198, 208-209). Indeed the Court regretted "to

observe that, where a deficiency that has given rise to a violation has been put right, another one related to the first

one appears: in the present case the delay in executing decisions. It cannot overemphasise the fact that States must

equip themselves with the means necessary and adequate to ensure that all the conditions for providing effective

justice are guaranteed." (para. 238). In Parizov v. "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", ECtHR, Application

no. 14258/03, the Court found the newly introduced remedy ineffective because "the fact remains that no court

decision has been taken although more than twelve months have elapsed after the introduction of the remedy"

(para. 44). See in 2015, Valada Matos das Neves v. Portugal, op. cit., paras. 73 (a) and (b) and 93.

Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), op. cit., para. 224.

obligations under international human rights law

and be able to

acknowledge such violation, if ascertained.

v. Capacity to provide redress: redress "can be considered as appropriate

and sufficient"

if the violation is ascertained by a binding and enforceable

decision.

Remedies with mere declaratory effect, even before

constitutional courts, cannot be considered effective.

5. The situation in the Turkish judiciary

In times of crisis the stability and continuity of the judiciary is essential.

Judges should not be subject to arbitrary removal, individually or collectively,

by the executive, legislative or judicial branches.

A competent, independent and impartial judiciary is fundamental to the rule of

law, particularly in respect of the fair administration of justice and for the

protection of human rights. It is therefore essential that a judicial system is able

to guarantee the independence and effectiveness of its courts and judges.

Developments in the judiciary, prosecution and legal profession in Turkey must

therefore be assessed in the framework of its obligations under international

human rights law. The ECHR the ICCPR both provide for the right to a fair hearing

before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, and

the right to an effective remedy for violations of human rights.

The European Court of Human Rights, in interpreting and applying the right to a

fair hearing under ECHR article 6, has held that “… [i]n determining whether a

body can be considered to be 'independent’ – notably of the executive and of the

parties to the case – the Court has had regard to the manner of appointment of

its members and the duration of their term of office, the existence of guarantees

against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an

appearance of independence.”

The Human Rights Committee affirms that

The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal ...

is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception. The requirement of

independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the

appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until

a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such

exist, the conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation

of their functions, and the actual independence of the judiciary from political

interference by the executive branch and legislature.

International standards on the independence and accountability of the judiciary,

prosecutors and lawyers, including the UN Basic Principles on the Independence

of the Judiciary, the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and the UN

Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, also provide authoritative standards

against which recent developments in the Turkish judicial system should be

measured.

Furthermore, measures undertaken under the state of emergency may infringe

upon the enjoyment of the right to a professional life under article 8 ECHR and 17

Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, op. cit., paras. 185, 203.

Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), op. cit., para. 193.

Ibid., para. 193.

Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, op. cit., paras. 183, 212, 283.

Puchstein v. Austria, ECtHR, Application no. 20089/06, para. 31.

ICJ Geneva Declaration, principle 5. See, ICJ Legal Commentary, op. cit., pp. 77-87.

See Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., para. 78.

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, op. cit., para. 19.

ICCPR, or the right to a fair hearing in case it is applicable to the dismissal

procedures, which is undoubtedly the case in regard to the dismissal of

academics, judges and prosecutors.

The independence of the judiciary in Turkey was already subject to significant

strains before the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and the beginning of the state

of emergency, as already described by the ICJ, in its briefing paper Turkey: the

Judicial System in Peril.

Nonetheless, the measures undertaken under the current state of emergency, in

particular the mass dismissal of judges and prosecutors, as well as the

constitutional reforms that have further modified the judicial structure of self-

governance, have considerably undermined the capacity of the Turkish judiciary

to administer justice generally and to provide an effective remedy for human

rights violations.

5.1. Mass dismissals

Judges should not be subject to arbitrary removal, individually or collectively,

by the executive, legislative or judicial branches. Judges may only be removed,

by means of fair and transparent proceedings, for serious misconduct

incompatible with judicial office, criminal offence or incapacity that renders

them unable to discharge their functions.

Measures undertaken under the state of emergency, the summary and mass

dismissals of around 30 percent of active judges and prosecutors following the

attempted coup,

and the mass arrests of judges, prosecutors and lawyers, have

significantly weakened the justice system and its capacity to protect against, and

effectively remedy violations of, human rights.

The mass dismissal of judges and prosecutors has been adjudicated by judicial

bodies of varying competences, based on unclear or vague grounds of association

with terrorism. As outlined below, judges of the Constitutional Court have been

dismissed where such links have been found to exist by an absolute majority of

the Constitutional Court; judges of the Court of Cassation and the Council of

State by an absolute majority of the Boards of the Presidency of the Court of

Cassation, respectively. Judges of the Court of Accounts have been dismissed by

a commission set up by the President and Vice-President of that Court. Decisions

on the dismissal of all other judges and prosecutors have been made by the

Plenary Session of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.

On 4 August 2016, the Constitutional Court dismissed two of its members,

Alparslan Altan and Erdal Tercan, after they had been taken into custody, under

orders of the Ankara Chief's Public Prosecutor's Office of 16 July 2016 purportedly

to prevent their fleeing the country or absconding.

The arrest warrant was

confirmed by the Ankara Magistrate's Judge on 20 July 2016 that authorized their

See, Baka v. Hungary, ECtHR, GC, Application no. 20261/12, 23 June 2016.

ICJ, Turkey: the Judicial System in Peril, 2 June 2016, available at https://www.icj.org/turkey-icj-raises-concerns-

at-threats-to-the-independence-of-judges-prosecutors-and-lawyers/ .

ICJ Geneva Declaration, principle 5. See, ICJ Legal Commentary, op. cit., pp. 77-87.

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 23.

ICJ, 'Turkey: emergency measures have gravely damaged the rule of law', 6 December 2016, available at

https://www.icj.org/turkey-emergency-measures-have-gravely-damaged-the-rule-of-law/ .

Article 3.1, Decree Law no. 667. Article 3.2 allowed the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors to appoint as

judges and prosecutors candidates for these positions "regardless of the duration of their candidacies", upon

proposal of the Ministry of Justice.

Press Release of the Constitutional Court in English of 9 August 2016 , available

athttp://constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/press/PressReleases/detail/31.html, para. 18.

detention on remand and charged them with "being a member of an armed

terrorist organization".

Five members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, Mustafa Kemal

Özçelik, Kerim Tosun, Şaban Işık, Ahmet Berberoğlu and Mahmut Şen, were

dismissed from their position by the Plenary of this institution on 16 July 2016 "by

virtue of the report prepared by the assigned investigator."

They were

dismissed from their membership of the High Council for lack of one of the entry

requirements, i.e. not being investigated or prosecuted for an offences sanctioned

with more than three months of imprisonment.

The then High Council of Judges and Prosecutors subsequently proceeded to

dismiss 4,279 judges and prosecutors

as an "exceptional measure" because

"retaining in office members of the judiciary, who are linked to the FETÖ/PDY,

which is responsible for the coup attempt on 15/07/2016 conflicts first and

foremost with the independence and impartiality of the judiciary."

100

Box 2: The dismissal ruling of the Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court held that dismissal from the profession is an

"extraordinary" "non-temporal" measure that "aims to terminate the existence of

terrorist organizations and other structures, which are established as engaging in

activities against the national security, in public institutions and organizations."

101

When this kind of dismissal touches upon members of the judiciary, this is "of

special importance for ensuring the reliability and honour of the judiciary which is

one of the fundamental values of a democratic society."

102

The Constitutional Court interpreted the Emergency Law Decree no. 667

103

requiring, in order to justify dismissal of a judge, a mere "cohesion" or

"connection" with an unlawful structure, organisation or group that the National

Security Council has deemed as engaging in activities against the national

security of the State. It further held that "certainty" was not required as the

standard of proof, since the decision had no bearing on criminal liability. Instead

what was required was a conviction on the part of a simple majority of the

Plenary of the Constitutional Court that there existed such "cohesion" or

"connection".

104

The Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the dismissal of the

two Constitutional Court judges for "having links" with FETÖ/PDY based on

"information from the social circle that they are connected with the organization

in question and the common conviction formed by the Members of the

Constitutional Court over time."

105

The processes of dismissal conducted by the Constitutional Court and by the High

Council of Judges and Prosecutors led the Council of Europe’s European

Ibid. para. 19

MFA Turkey, Information on the terrorist attempt on 15 July 2016 and the investigations conducted against the

judges and public prosecutors, in Notification of State of Emergency under article 15 ECHR, Doc. JJ8190C, Tr./005-

192, p. 9, p. 10.

See Article 18.1, Law on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors no. 6087, read together with article 8.h of the

Law on Judges and Prosecutors no. 2802; MFA Turkey, Information on the terrorist attempt on 15 July 2016 and the

investigations conducted against the judges and public prosecutors, in Notification of State of Emergency under

article 15 ECHR, Doc. JJ8190C, Tr./005-192, p. 9, p. 11.

See, IHOP Report, op. cit., p. 38.

100

Press Release of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors of 15 November 2016. in English, available at

http://www.judiciaryofturkey.gov.tr/pdfler/hsyk_karar440.PDF accessed on 16 July 2018.

101

Ibid. para. 30.

102

Ibid. para. 32.

103

Published on Official Gazette no. 29779 of 23 July 2016.

104

Press Release of the Constitutional Court in English, available at

http://www.judiciaryofturkey.gov.tr/pdfler/anayasa_Alparslan%20ALTAN%20and%20Erdal%20TERCAN.PDF

accessed on 16 July 2018, paras. 35-38.

105

Ibid., paras. 48-49.

Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) to warn that

"challenging the legitimacy of the process of mass dismissals of judges and

prosecutors before those courts will have little chance of success. The judges and

prosecutors may probably still seek review of their individual cases, or challenge

other aspects of the decree laws ..., but the general legitimacy of the scheme of

dismissals de facto cannot be put into question."

106

The Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights found that this situation

created "an atmosphere of fear among the remaining judges and prosecutors."

107

Furthermore, "based on credible reports from a variety of sources, OHCHR

documented increased executive control over, and interference with the judiciary

and prosecution service; the arrest, dismissal and arbitrary transfer of judges and

prosecutors to other courts; and recurring instances of threats against

lawyers."

108

The PACE noted that the "dismissal of so many judges and prosecutors has had a

serious impact on the capacity of the courts and a chilling effect on the

willingness of judges to act independently and impartially in proceedings involving

the State."

109

The European Commission also stressed that "these dismissals

had a chilling effect on the judiciary as a whole and risk widespread self-

censorship among judges and prosecutors. No measures were taken to restore

legal guarantees ensuring the independence of the judiciary."

110

For judges and lawyers that were dismissed by decisions of the then High Council

of Judges and Prosecutors (HCJP), the Council of State is the only avenue of

appeal. Indeed the HCJP has processed the objection and reconsideration

requests of 3,953 dismissals in total by 20 March 2018. As a result, the dismissal

decisions on 166 judges and prosecutors were revoked. The remaining 3,786

applicants’ objections were rejected.

111

It is striking that, to date, the Council of

State, whose competence to hear appeals against the Council's decision has been

affirmed on 23 January 2017 by Decree Law no. 685, has issued no decision.

5.2. Effectiveness and competence

The mass dismissals of judges, the need to recruit large numbers of new judges

and the relative inexperience of many such new recruits, as well as the additional

caseload generated by state of emergency measures, has had a significantly

adverse impact on the effectiveness, competence and fairness of the justice

system. The ICJ’s assessment in this respect is similar to those of various

international authorities that have evaluated the system.

The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment following his visit to Turkey from 27 November to 2

December 2016 found that "the mass arrest, dismissal or suspension of civil

servants, including judges, prosecutors and other representatives of the judiciary,

has entailed a major setback and delays in the administration of justice."

112

106

Venice Commission, Opinion on the Emergency Decree Laws Nos. 667-676 adopted following the failed coup of 15

July 2016, adopted at its 109th plenary session, 9-10 December 2016, Doc. CDL-AD(2016)037-e, para. 186.

107

Abdullah Zeydan others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application no. 25453/17 and others, Third party intervention by the

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Doc. CommDH(2017)33, 2 NOvember 2017, Coe Commissioner

third party intervention in journalist case, para. 35.

108

OHCHR, Second Report on Turkey, op. cit., para. 48

109

PACE Report, op. cit., para. 97 that also says "the President of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations,

commenting on the climate of paranoia and fear amongst judges and prosecutors, has said that “[j]ustice is now

vested in a judge’s personal bravery”. "

110

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 23.

111

IHOP Report, op. cit., pl. 39.

112

Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, op. cit., para. 62.

The European Commission similarly determined in April 2018 that "large parts of

the Turkish judiciary continue to be under severe pressure to handle cases in a

timely manner. The ability of the judiciary to effectively perform its tasks has

suffered in the aftermath of the attempted coup and the large-scale dismissals,

indictments and other administrative measures that followed."

113

It has been reported that, because of the sudden and unforeseen dismissal of

around 30 percent of judges in Turkey and the immediate need to replace those

position, recruitment of new judges has been hastily carried out. The result is

that a significant number of newly appointed judges appear not to have the

required experience for the job and with suspicion that selection of new judges

has been carried out sometimes on the basis of political affiliations. The following

testimony reported by the PACE rapporteur paints a particularly troubling picture:

The President of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, whom I met,

mentioned the lack of a minimum score in the entrance exam and the

preponderant weight given to performance in subsequent unrecorded oral

interviews involving politically biased questions: as a result, candidates with

the “right” political profile who performed badly in the written tests were

nevertheless recruited. Judges are also being appointed directly from the

justice academy, without completing their training. 5 000 of 15 000 first

instance judges have less than one year’s experience, and another 5 000

have less than five years. ...

114

The ICJ, during its mission to Turkey in May 2018, has also heard from some

judges and prosecutors that the newly recruited judges and prosecutors were

young and lacked sufficient training, which would explain certain "disfunctions"

within the judiciary.

5.3. Structural changes

The independence of the judiciary has been further imperilled following the

constitutional amendments approved by referendum on 16 April 2017. One of the

constitutional reforms introduced as a result of this referendum modified the

composition and appointment of the institution responsible for the self-

government of judges and prosecutors, now called the Council of Judges and

Prosecutors (previously preceded by a "High").

Based on the new constitutional provision, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors

has been reappointed. Of the thirteen members, six are now effectively appointed

by the President of the Republic, including four ordinary members as well as the

Minister of Justice (who acts as President of the Council) and the Under-Secretary

of the Ministry of Justice. The remaining seven members are appointed by the

National Assembly. None of the members of the Council is appointed by judges or

public prosecutors. Finally, under the new constitutional regime, the President of

the Republic no longer has a neutral role but may maintain political party

affiliations.

The Turkish Ministry of Justice has declared that the

purpose of the change envisaged in the structure and electoral procedure of

the Council is primarily to prevent the judiciary from being politicized,

prevent another attempt to seize this institution which can be launched by

organizations with secret goals such as FETÖ and to increase the

effectiveness of the parliament that is a reflection of the national

113

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 26

114

PACE Report, op. cit., para. 98.

sovereignty, in the elections to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP)

... .

115

The Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights found that this new

composition "did not offer adequate safeguards for the independence of the

judiciary and considerably increased the risk of it being subjected to political

influence."

116

The Venice Commission echoed these concerns, noting that this

"composition of the CJP is extremely problematic. This would place the

independence of the judiciary in serious jeopardy ... . Getting control over this

body thus means getting control over judges and public prosecutors, especially in

a country where the dismissal of judges has become frequent and where transfers

of judges are a common practice."

117

The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression raised concern "about

structural changes to the judicial system which undermine the independence of

the judiciary, even those that predate the emergency declared in 2016."

118

In this

connection, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded

that "the new appointment system for the members of the Council of Judges and

Prosecutors ... does not abide by international standards, such as the Basic

Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. Because of the Council's key

role of overseeing the appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges and public

prosecutors, the President's control over it effectively extends to the whole

judiciary branch."

119

The European Commission, in its 2018 Progress Report found that:

There has been further serious backsliding in the past year, in particular

with regard to the independence of the judiciary. The Constitutional

amendments governing the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) entered

into force and further undermined its independence from the executive. The

CJP continued to engage in large-scale suspensions and transfers of judges

and prosecutors. No efforts were made to address concerns regarding the

lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria in the

recruitment and promotion of judges and prosecutors.

120

Previously in the report of June 2016, the ICJ had expressed concern that

transfers of judges between judicial positions in different regions of Turkey were

being applied as a hidden form of disciplinary sanction and as a means to

marginalize judges and prosecutors seen as unsupportive of government interests

or objectives.

121

As the European Commission stated in April 2018 and as the ICJ

heard from direct testimony, this practice has not ended in the last two years.

Therefore, "there is a need for legal and constitutional guarantees to prevent

115

Ministry of Justice of Turkey, Directorate General for EU Affairs, Information Note on the issues to be handled in

the visit of the Venice Commission regarding the constitutional Amendments, Doc. CDL-REF(2017)015-e, p. 39

116

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Third Party Intervention, op. cit., para. 37 and statement of 7

June 2017 available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/country-monitoring/turkey/-

/asset_publisher/lK6iqfNE1t0Z/content/turkey-new-council-of-judges-and-prosecutors-does-not-offer-adequate-

safeguards-for-the-independence-of-the-

judiciary?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fcommissioner%2Fcountr

monitoring%2Fturkey%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_lK6iqfNE1t0Z%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnorma

l%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D2 accessed

on 16 July 2018.

117

Venice Commission, Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on

21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 207, adopted at its plenary session, 10-

11 March 2017, Doc. CDL-AD(2017)005-e, para. 119.

118

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and

expression on his visit to Turkey, UN Doc. A/HRC/35/22Add.3, 21 June 2017, 2017, para. 68.

119

OHCHR, Second Report on Turkey, op. cit., para. 34

120

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 6.

121

ICJ, Turkey: the Judicial System in Peril, op. cit., p. 18.

judges and prosecutors from being transferred against their will, except where

courts are being reorganised."

122

5.4. Independence and effectiveness of the Turkish judiciary: conclusions

The situation of individual judges and the role of judiciary as a whole and of its

structural independence, does not accord with rule of law principles. The situation

continues to deteriorate rapidly due to the measures undertaken under the state

of emergency legislation and the constitutional amendments approved by the

referendum of 16 April 2017.

Under the current constitutional framework, the Council of Judges and

Prosecutors cannot be considered fully structurally independent due to the

excessive degree of political control of appoints. In particular, it does not comply

with the Recommendation of the Council of Europe on judges: independence,

efficiency and responsibility that "not less than half the members of [councils for

the judiciary] should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the

judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary."

123

Without an independent institution of self-governance and, therefore, without

strong structural independence, it is difficult to see how judges and prosecutors

can carry out their duties independently in politically sensitive cases such as

those arising under the state of emergency.

The credible reports indicating that many of the judges and prosecutors

appointed to replace those dismissed are not fully qualified for the positions are

of particular concern, as this deficiency will, no doubt, carry an adverse impact on

the quality and effectiveness of courts' decisions and decision-making process.

The ICJ notes that in the seminal Greek Case, the European Commission on

Human Rights, even if the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies,

"having regard to the measures taken by the respondent Government with

respect to the status and functioning of courts of law, did not find that in the

particular situation prevailing in Greece, the domestic remedies indicated by the

respondent Government could be considered as effective and sufficient."

124

The

Commission reached this conclusion "having particular regard to the dismissal of

thirty judicial officers in May 1968".

125

It attached particular importance to the

independence of courts, both ordinary and special.

126

The dismissals of around 30 percent of the entire judiciary shortly after the

declaration of the state of emergency gives rise to significant concerns for the

independence of judges who remain in office, as the situation of mass dismissal

of their colleagues must exert a considerable chilling effect on their own decision-

making. This effect must be heightened by concerns with regard to the lack of

due process in the dismissal proceedings below (see further, section 7). The ICJ is

particularly concerned that 18 months after being tasked with the competence to

hear appeals on dismissals of judges and prosecutors, the Council of State has

yet to issue a single decision. This fog of uncertainty with regard to the legitimacy

of the whole dismissal process raises serious doubts about the capacity of single

judges and prosecutors to withstand attacks on their independence.

122

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 24.

123

Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges:

independence, efficiency and responsibilities, para 27.

124

The Greek Case, ECommHR, Applications nos.3321/67 - 3322/67 - 3323/67 - 3344/67, Admissibility Decision of

31 May 1968, p. 8, para. 11.

125

Ibid., p. 121, para. 231.

126

Ibid., p. 122, para. 322.

The lack of institutional independence of the judiciary, the chilling effect of the

mass dismissals and the diminished quality and experience of the members of the

judiciary that resulted from it are serious threats to the rule of law. These factors

clearly undermine the capacity of the judiciary as a whole to provide an effective

remedy for human rights violations, both in regard to measures taken under the

state of emergency, and in general.

6. Effectiveness of the Constitutional Court

To safeguard the Rule of Law and the indivisibility of all human rights, all

measures adopted to address the crisis, including those taken pursuant to a

declared state of emergency or to prevent social dissent in times of economic

crisis, must be subject to judicial oversight and review. Affected persons must

have the right to fair and effective judicial proceedings to challenge the legality

of these measures and/or their conformity with national or international law.

127

The Constitutional Court has the responsibility to examine "the constitutionality,

in respect of both form and substance, of laws, decrees having the force of law

and the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and decide

on individual applications."

128

The Court has the power to annul laws on grounds of unconstitutionality when so

requested by the President of the Republic, parliamentary groups of the ruling

party or of the main opposition party, or one-fifth of the members of the Grand

National Assembly of Turkey, within 60 days from the publication of the law.

129

Additionally, any Turkish courts may request the Constitutional Court to rule on

the constitutionality of a legal provision at stake in the case before it.

130

In 2010, the Constitution was amended by popular vote to introduce a system of

individual applications before the Constitutional Court for human rights violations

under the ECHR.

131

Judgments of the Constitutional Court are final and "binding

on the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, on the administrative

authorities, and on persons and corporate bodies".

132

If the Constitutional Court,

in an individual application case, finds that a violation of human rights arises from

the decision of a court, it must refer the case back to the lower court that must

rule again in accordance with the ruling of the Constitutional Court.

133

This

system was introduced to meet Turkey's obligations to implement the European

Convention on Human Rights, in particular to ensure the effective resolution of

human rights disputes domestically, before they were brought before the

European Court of Human Rights.

134

6.1. The functioning of the individual application procedure

The individual application procedure began to function in 2012. The European

Court of Human Rights has considered that, at least as formally designed, it

fulfills the procedural requirements of an effective remedy for human rights

violations. The European Court of Human Rights has dismissed a considerable

number of applications for reasons of failure to exhaust domestic remedies,

127

ICJ Geneva Declaration, principle 4. See, ICJ Legal Commentary, op. cit., pp. 57-72.

128

Article 148.1, Constitution.

129

Articles 150-151, ibid.

130

Article 152, ibid.

131

Article 148, ibid.

132

Article 153, ibid.

133

See, article 50 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

134

Venice Commission, Opinion on the law on the establishment and rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court of

Turkey, adopted at its 88th plenary session, 14-15 October 2011, Doc. CDL-AD(2011)040-e.

considering this remedy offered by the Constitutional Court must be resorted to

before an application can be made internationally.

135

To date, the Constitutional Court has decided only three cases regarding

dismissals under the state of emergency.

136

It stressed the complementarity of its

role to that of the State of Emergency Commission and decided to dismiss

applications that could have been dealt with by the Commission, even in cases

which were filed before the Constitutional Court before the Commission had been

established.

137

The Court has however ruled on the lawfulness of certain pre-trial detentions for

persons arrested in the wake of the state of emergency.

In a judgment of 30 June 2017, the Constitutional Court upheld the lawfulness of

the detention on remand of two electronic and computer engineers accused of

terrorism offences and of "overthrowing the constitutional order". In this

judgment, it held that it had competence to assess individual applications on the

respect of human rights under state of emergency measures.

138

On 26 July 2017, the Court upheld the detention on remand of a dismissed judge

under charges of being member of an armed terrorist organization, FETÖ/PDY,

based on the understanding that having used the communication app Bylock

could be regarded as a "strong indications regarding criminal suspicion" of this

offence,

139

since, in this case, it was corroborated by precise testimony of former

judicial colleagues about the defendant's membership of FETÖ/PDY. Furthermore,

the Court accepted that there was there was a risk of fleeing if granted bail.

140

A more recent development has raised serious concerns regarding the capacity of

the remedy before the Constitutional Court to be effective. On 11 January 2018,

four criminal courts in Istanbul

141

refused to implement the orders of the

Constitutional Court prescribing a remedy for breaches of the right to liberty and

freedom of expression of two journalists, Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay,

detained on remand while under trial for terrorism offences and alleged links to

the attempted coup of 15 July 2016.

The lack of respect of the binding force of the Constitutional Court's ruling by

lower courts was strongly criticized by the European Court of Human Rights and

the Constitutional Court itself. The Strasbourg Court held that

For another court to call into question the powers conferred on a

constitutional court to give final and binding judgments on individual

applications runs counter to the fundamental principles of the rule of law

and legal certainty.

142

The Court found, in this case, that the detentions of both Mehmet Altan and Şahin

Alpay were unlawful and in breach of the right to liberty under article 5 ECHR as

well as the right to freedom of expression under article 10 ECHR.

143

While the

European Court fell short of ruling that the remedies before the Constitutional

Court were ineffective, it held that the applicants' "continued pre-trial detention,

135

See, among others, Uzun v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application no. 48544/99, 20 April 2006.

136

Constitutional Court, Sait Orçan, B. No: 2016/29085, 19/7/2017; Ramazan Korkmaz, B. No: 2016/36550,

19/7/2017; Remziye Duman, B. No: 2016/25923, 20/7/2017. See, IHOP Report, op. cit., p. 60.

137

See, Constitutional Court, Remziye Duman, op. cit.

138

See, Constitutional Court Press release on individual application no. 15/17, 30 June 2017.

139

Constitutional Court Press release on individual application, available at

http://www.constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/press/PressReleasesofJudgments/detail/78.html accessed on 16

July 2018.

140

Ibid.

141

The 26th and 27th Assize Courts for Mehmet Hasan Altan, the 13th ad 14th Assize Courts for Sahin Alpay.

142

Mehment Hasan Altan v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 139; Sahin Alpay v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 118.

143

Ibid., para. 214; Sahin Alpay v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 184.

even after the Constitutional Court's judgment, as a result of the decisions

delivered by the first instance courts, raises serious doubts as to the

effectiveness of the remedy of an individual application to the Constitutional

Court in cases concerning pre-trial detention."

144

On 15 March, the Constitutional Court itself issued a further judgment in the case

of Şahin Alpay strongly asserting its competence and the binding nature of its

judgments:

In this respect, there is no hesitation in respect of the binding nature of the

Constitutional Court's decisions including those rendered through individual

applications mechanism. Indeed, regard being had to the judgments

rendered by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State that emphasize

the binding nature of the individual application judgments of the

Constitutional Court, it also appears that, in this respect, there is no

practical problem in the Turkish legal system.

145

The ICJ notes that, despite this welcome clarification within the Turkish legal

system concerning the binding force of constitutional court's judgments, it

appears that no disciplinary action of any kind has been activated by the Council

of Judges and Prosecutors for what appears to be a deliberate misapplication of

the law by four different Assize Courts.

6.2. Structural changes

Regarding the structural independence of the Constitutional Court, the

constitutional amendments of April 2017 have led to an effective increase the

influence of the Executive on the Court itself. As the Venice Commission pointed

out,





he changes regarding the manner of appointment of the members of the

CJP will have repercussions on the Constitutional Court. The CJP is

responsible for the elections of the members of the Court of Cassation and

the Council of State. Both courts are entitled to choose two members of the

Constitutional Court by sending three nominees for each position to the

President, who makes the appointments. The influence of the Executive

over the Constitutional Court is therefore increased.

146

Finally, the workload of the Court due to the cases arising from the state of

emergency is also a source of concern. According to the official statistics of the

Constitutional Court, at the end of 2016 it had received 80,756 applications,

compared to 20,376 in 2015, 20,578 in 2014 and 9,897 in 2013 when it begun to

receive individual applications.

147

The UN Special Rapporteur on torture, after his mission in the country, reported

that, "since the failed coup, the number of complaints had increased

significantly, amounting to 69,752 individual petitions in 2016 alone."

148

6.3. Preliminary assessment

Recent developments have cast doubt on the capacity of the Court to provide an

effective remedy for violations of human rights due to its backlog and to the

worrying signals that, in sensitive cases, its rulings may not be executed by lower

144

Ibid., para. 142; Sahin Alpay v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 121.

145

Constitutional Court, Sahin Alpay (2), Application 2018/3007, para. 63.

146

Venice Commission, Report on Constitutional Amendments, op. cit., para. 121.

147

See, statistics of the Constitutional Court on its won website at

http://anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/istatistikler/bireyselistatistik.html . This exponential increase has been stressed by

the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, Report 2017, op. cit., para. 71.

148

Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, op. cit., para. 73.

courts. These concerns are strengthened by the 2017 constitutional changes that

undermine the structural independence of the Court.

With regard to sensitive cases arising from state of emergency measures, the ICJ

notes that most favourable rulings, from a human rights perspective, by the

Constitutional Court appear to take place in cases that have already been

submitted to, and are under examination by, the European Court of Human

Rights.

Despite assurances from several authorities that the failure of lower courts to

implement the Constitutional Court's judgment was an isolated incident not to be

repeated, the ICJ is concerned at the inaction of the Council of Judges and

Prosecutors on such a blatant defiance of the Constitutional Court by not one

judge but four different Assize Courts. Failure to take disciplinary action against

the judges in these cases suggests a risk that incident may be repeated should

the sensitivity of the case demand it.

7. Are there effective remedies for dismissed public servants?

Immediately after the declaration of a state of emergency, President Erdoğan

issued Decree Law no. 667 of 22 July 2016 that enacted the procedures of

dismissal of public servants, judges and prosecutors and closure of legal entities

considered as belonging to, connected to or having contacts with the Gülenist

movement. Following this and other decrees, public servants were dismissed and

legal entities were closed through insertion of their names in Annexes to Decree

Laws or by commissions established in the relevant Ministries.

149

Moreover,

Decree Law no. 667 gave power to Ministries and independent agencies to

dismiss their own personnel on the same grounds.

As of 20 March 2018, 112,679 public servants have been dismissed for life from

public office.

150

In the same timespan, 75,705 academics and 4,113 judges and

prosecutors were dismissed.

151

During the state of emergency, authorities

ordered, via emergency decrees, the closure of 1,064 private education

institutions (kindergartens, elementary schools, junior high schools and high

schools), 360 private training courses and study centres, 847 student

dormitories, 47 private healthcare centres, 15 private foundation universities, 19

trade unions affiliated to two Confederation, 1,419 associations, 145 foundations

and 174 media and broadcasting enterprises.

152

A new emergency decree, issued on 8 July 2018 has led to the further dismissal

of 18,632 public servants, including 6,153 military personnel and 9,647 members

of the police and of the gendarmerie, several civil servants and 199

academicians. 12 associations, three newspapers and one TV station have been

closed.

153

The ICJ has previously stressed that

The executive, legislative and judicial branches should under no circumstance

invoke a situation of crisis to deprive victims of human rights violations and/or

their relatives of their rights to effective access to justice, effective judicial

remedies and full reparation. The adoption of measures to remove jurisdiction

149

Articles 2.3 and 4, Decree Law no. 667. They were banned not only from taking any position or task in the public

sector, but also from working as private security or establishing a private security company.

150

See, IHOP report, op. cit., p. 24.

151

See, ibid,, p. 37.

152

Ibid., p. 43.

153

See, Emergency Decree No. 701 of 8 July 2018, available (in Turkish) at

http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180708.htm&m

ain=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180708.htm

accessed on 16 July 2018.

or the judicial remedies for human rights violations from the ordinary courts

constitutes a serious attack against the independence of the judiciary and

basic principles of the Rule of Law. State secrecy and similar restrictions must

not impede the right to an effective remedy for human rights violations.

154

These decisions and procedures of dismissal of public servants and closure of

institutions were highly criticized by the Venice Commission, which found them

"deficient in the sense that the dismissals were not based on individualised

reasoning, which made any meaningful ex post judicial review of such decisions

virtually impossible".

155

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in the

immediate aftermath of the attempted coup expressed its concerns regarding

“the numerous measures taken by the Government, including removal of large

numbers of members of the judiciary, academic institutions and civil servants,

including teachers."

156

The Committee urged Turkey "to uphold its commitment to

human rights, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the

preservation of the freedom of expression."

157

Drawing on the testimony of individuals as well as analysis of the Decree-Laws,

the ICJ is concerned that the mass dismissal of public servants, including judges

and prosecutors, have been undertaken without a pre-determined or clear

definition of what "belong to, be connected to or having contacts with" a terrorist

organization means in law. The ICJ understands that these categories did not

exist in Turkish criminal or administrative law before Decree Law 667, which did

not establish any clear definition of their scope. Since the Gülen movement/FETÖ

has been identified as a "terrorist armed group" under Turkey's anti-terrorism law

no. 3713, the long-standing concerns with regard to the excessively wide

definition of "terrorism" in this legislation

158

further fuel the lack of foreseeability

with regard to the punishable conduct and, therefore, the disregard of the

principle of legality in criminal law.

In addition, it is clear that these restrictions may be incompatible with, and

constitute an unnecessary and/or disproportionate restriction of the right to

freedom of expression and the right to information, freedom and association. For

instance, it may put insurmountable obstacles in the performance of standard

academic research and inquiry.

Several experts interviewed by the ICJ referred to criteria developed in the

practice of public administrations as well as from indications enshrined in criminal

judgments in relation to FETÖ by criminal courts, including the Court of

Cassation. Grounds for considering a person as belonging to, connected to or

having contacts with FETÖ have been reported to include using the messaging

application ByLock, having closed accounts after a certain date in Bank Asya, past

experience of social contacts, etc. The list is not public and it is not even certain

that it is exhaustive. Rather it appears to act as general, non-exhaustive and

open-ended guidance for authorities applying emergency measures.

The ICJ is concerned at the impact of these dismissals for the enjoyment of the

affected persons' human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression,

association and at the human rights implications for those charged with criminal

154

ICJ Geneva Declaration, principle 11.

155

Venice Commission, Report on State of Emergency Decrees, op. cit., para. 140 and 148.

156

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Concluding Observations on Turkey,

UN Doc. CEDAW/C/TUR/CO/7, 25 July 2016, para. 7.

157

Ibid,, para. 8.

158

ICJ, Assessing Damage, Urging Action - Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and

Human Rights, 2009, p. 37.

offences. The measures are contrary to principles of legal certainty and,

specifically, to the obligation that interferences with human rights must be

adequately prescribed by law, serve a legitimate purpose and be necessary and

proportionate to that purpose. This element alone taints the entirety of the

dismissal proceedings with arbitrariness.

7.1. Seeking a remedy for complaints against dismissals

A problem that immediately arose for those dismissed under the state of

emergency was how they could challenge these decisions. It transpired not to be

an easy task. Some persons affected sought to challenge the dismissal decisions

made by administrative bodies, including by the High Council of Judges and

Prosecutors, before administrative courts. However, on 4 November 2016, the

Council of State, the highest administrative court, declared that it was not

competent to assess the merits of an annulment action brought by a judge

against the decision of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors on his

dismissal, and sent the case back to the first instance administrative courts.

159

Since then, in addition, several first instance administrative courts have also

declared their lack of competence to examine cases challenging dismissals by

insertion on lists annexed to Decree-Laws.

160

Meanwhile, in four judgments issued on 12 October and 2 November 2016, the

Constitutional Court, reversing its established jurisprudence, dismissed a

challenge to the constitutionality of decree-laws issued during the state of

emergency, submitted by a group of MPs. Taking a literal interpretation of then

article 121 of the Constitution, the Court held that it did not have competence to

review the decree-laws’ constitutionality but did not foreclose the possibility to do

so by means of individual application.

161

According to the media statement made

by the Constitutional Court

on 4 August 2017, a total of 70,771 applications

lodged to the Court have been transferred to the Commission.

162

This development notwithstanding, the European Court of Human Rights found

that these domestic remedies, including before the Constitutional Court, must be

resorted to before bringing a case before it. On 8 November 2016, the European

Court rejected the case of the dismissed Judge Zeynep Mercan, at the time in

detention for alleged links with the attempted coup, in which she claimed

violations of her right to liberty. The European Court held that there was no

element to establish that the individual application before the Constitutional Court

could not provide an effective remedy for violations of their human rights.

163

added that the fear of lack of impartiality of the Constitutional Court adduced by

the applicant, based on the dismissal by the same Court of two of its members,

could not exempt her from resorting to the remedy, although it could later be the

ground for a complaint of a violation of the right to a fair trial under article 6

ECHR.

164

On 26 November 2016, in the case of dismissal of a teacher, the Court

upheld its previous position and held that it was also too early to know whether

administrative courts were ineffective in providing remedies for violations of the

Convention rights.

165

159

See, Köksal v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, Application no. 70478/16, para. 14.

160

See, ibid., para. 15.

161

See judgments nos. 668 and 669 of 12 October 2016 and nos. 670-671 of 2 November 2016.

162

See, IHOP Report, op. cit., p. 60.

163

Mercan v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, Application no. 56511/16, 8 November 2016, para. 25.

164

Ibid., para. 26.

165

Akif Zihni v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, Application no. 59061/16, 29 November 2016, paras. 28-29

7.2. The Commission on State of Emergency Measure

Given the pressure of the massive number cases alleging human rights violations

due to measures under the Emergency Decree Laws, in particular in relation to

dismissal of civil servants, judges and lawyers, the Secretary General of the

Council of Europe suggested the introduction of a commission for state of

emergency complaints.

166

The suggestion was endorsed in principle by the Venice Commission, which

recommended the establishment of a "special ad hoc body, which would be

tasked with the examination of individual cases related to dismissals of public

servants and other associated measures."

167

It further stressed that such body

should

"give individualised treatment to all cases



;



have to respect the basic

principles of due process, examine specific evidence and issue reasoned

decisions



;



be independent, impartial and be given sufficient powers to

restore the status quo ante, and/or, where appropriate, to provide adequate

compensation. The law should enable for subsequent judicial review of

decisions of this ad hoc body. Limits and forms of any compensation may be

set by Parliament in a special post-emergency legislation, with due regard

to the Constitution of Turkey and its international human-rights

obligations."

168

7.2.1. The Commission’s rules

On 23 January 2017, the Turkish Council of Ministers issued Decree Law no. 685

establishing a "Commission to Review the Actions Taken under the Scope of the

State of Emergency" that will be in place for a maximum of two years. This

maximum term may however be extended by the Council of Ministers at its

discretion for additional terms of one year.

169

The Council of Ministers called the establishment of the Commission a "tangible

example of Turkey's commitment to the Council of Europe's standards"

170

and

declared that the Commission was "established with the aim to creating an

effective domestic remedy for those who were affected by the measures under

the decree laws."

171

The Commission has the competence "to carry out an assessment of, and render

a decision on, applications related to acts established directly through the decree-

laws, without any other administrative acts being carried out, within the scope of

the state of emergency ... on the ground of membership of, or have relation,

connection or contact with terrorist organizations, or structures/entities, or

groups established by the National Security Council as engaging in activities

against the national security of the State."

172

The Commission is composed of seven members that hold office for two years:

• Three are appointed by the Prime Minister from among public servants;

• One appointed by the Ministry of Justice from among judges and

prosecutors working within the Ministry;

166

See, Speech by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe Thorbjørn Jagland of 24 January 2017, available

https://www.coe.int/en/web/secretary-general/speeches/-/asset_publisher/gFMvl0SKOUrv/content/understanding-

populism-and-defending-europe-s-democracies-the-council-of-europe-in-2017 accessed on 16 July 2018.

167

Venice Commission, Report on State of Emergency Decrees, op. cit., para. 221.

168

Ibid., para. 222.

169

Article 3.1, Decree Law no. 685, Published in the Official Gazette no. 29957, dated 23 January 2017 (Translation

provided by the Turkish authorities to the Venice Commission).

170

Information Note Concerning the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures Established by the

Decree Law no. 685 dated 23 January 2017 and amended by the Decree law no. 690 dated 29 April 2017.

171

Ibid.

172

Article 1.1 Decree Law no. 685, Published in the Official Gazette no. 29957, dated 23 January 2017 (Translation

provided by the Turkish authorities to the Venice Commission).

• One appointed by the Minister of Interior from among public servants;

• Two appointed by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors from among

"rapporteur judges who hold office in the Court of Cassation or in the

Council of State."

173

After the expiry of the first two-year term, the Commission may be granted one

more year of mandate, subsequently renewable for one year terms. In this event,

new members must be appointed in accordance with this rule. If existing

members want to stay in the Commission, they may be reassigned in accordance

with the same procedure.

174

The secretariat of the Commission is provided by the

Prime Minister's Office that also sets its procedural rules,

175

published on 12 July

2017, and its officers remain under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office.

The ICJ was informed that the staff of the Commission are also assisted by

investigative judges as rapporteurs, and that at least four rapporteurs assist each

Commission's member.

The members of the Commission are not subject to dismissal unless:

"a) the member has failed to attend a total of five Commission meetings within

one calendar year, without any reason that could be accepted by the

Commission,

b) it is documented by a medical board report that the member is unfit to work

due to a serious disease or disability,

c) a conviction pronounced in respect of the member due to offences he/she

has committed related to his/her duties becomes final,

ç) the total duration of the member’s temporary unfitness for work lasts more

than three months,

d) an investigation or prosecution is initiated against the member for offences

listed in Articles 302, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314 and 315 of the Turkish

Criminal Code (Law no. 5237, dated 26 September 2004),

e) an administrative investigation against the member is initiated by the Prime

Ministry or a permit for prosecution against the member is issued on the

ground that the member concerned is a member of, or has relations,

connection or contact with terrorist organizations, or terrorist

structures/entities, or groups established by the National Security Council as

engaging in activities against the national security of the State."

176

Any investigation against the members of the Commission must be authorized by

the Prime Minister.

177

The Commission has competence to review dismissals, closure of associations,

annulment of ranks of retired personnel ordered through decree-laws, however

not for those decided by administrative act in accordance with rules contained in

these decrees, including dismissals of judges and prosecutors.

178

The applications

must be filed with the relevant governorate or the institution where the applicant

worked within sixty days from the entry into function of the Commission or of the

entry into force of the Decree Law if later.

179

The Commission decides on admissibility, examining the respect of procedural

deadlines, legal interest of the applicant, material jurisdiction, and respect for

other procedural requirements. It is also the Commission that establishes the

rules of procedure for the admissibility assessment.

180

Further inadmissibility

173

Article 1.2, Decree Law no. 685.

174

Article 3.2, ibid.

175

Articles 12 and 13, ibid.

176

Article 4.1, ibid.

177

Article 3.3. ibid.. Included for the offences referred to in point (d) article 4, Article 197 in Decree Law no. 694.

178

Article 2, ibid.

179

Article 7.3, ibid.

180

Article 8, ibid.

grounds (or more specific grounds) have been added by internal regulations.

These include applications not duly made, lack of capacity to represent the

applicant, application not made in writing, another legal remedy is available, and

other unspecified requirements.

181

In the merits phase, the Commission examines the case "on the basis of the

documents in the file. The Commission may, following the examination, dismiss

or accept the application."

182

No hearing is possible.

183

Decisions are taken by absolute majority (four members) and abstentions are

forbidden.

184

If the decision is positive, the State Personnel Administration must propose to the

applicant solutions for reinstatement to an equivalent position to the one he or

she previously occupied, excluding the administration where he or she used to

work previously.

185

If the case concerns a legal entity, the decision of its closure

and all its effect and consequences must be considered null and void.

186

The first seven members of the Commission were appointed on 16 May 2017

187

and include "judges from the Court of Cassation and the Council of State as well

as senior government officials."

188

It reportedly commenced functioning on 22

May 2017.

189

It started receiving applications on 17 July 2017 and finished

receiving them on 14 September 2017.

190

It made its first decision on 22

December 2017.

191

Decisions of the Commission may be challenged within sixty days, before the

Ankara administrative courts nos. 19 and 20.

192

Individuals that were dismissed

through an administrative decision based on a decree-law may challenge it before

an administrative court and appeal before the Council of State. Those whose

names were inserted in annexes to decree-laws must use the remedy of the

Commission.

193

Judges and prosecutors may file an action before the Council of

State as first instance court.

194

7.2.2. The functioning of the Commission in practice

As of 17 May 2018, there had been 108,905 cases filed with the Commission. Of

these, 17,000 had been decided.

195

Somee 1,990 of the applicants concerned had

already been reinstated by emergency decree so are not examined in substance

181

Article 10.3, Procedures and Principles Regarding the Functioning of the Commission on Examination of the State

of Emergency Procedures.

182

Article 9, Decree Law no. 685

183

Article 14.3, Procedures and Principles Regarding the Functioning of the Commission on Examination of the State

of Emergency Procedures.

184

Article 1.3, Decree Law no. 685.

185

Article 10.1, ibid.

186

Article 10.2, ibid.

187

Information Note Concerning the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures Established by the

Decree Law no. 685 dated 23 January 2017 and amended by the Decree law no. 690 dated 29 April 2017.

188

Ibid.

189

Ibid.

190

Hürriyet Daily News, "Turkey's state of emergency commission to start receiving applications on July 17", 12 July

2017, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-state-of-emergency-commission-to-start-receiving-

applications-on-july-17-115437 accessed on 16 July 2018; Comments of the Turkish Government to the report of

the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/50/Add.2, para. 87

191

Hürriyet Daily News, "Turkey's state of emergency commission makes first decisions on dismissed public sector

staff", 22 DEcember 2017, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-state-of-emergency-commission-

makes-first-decisions-on-dismissed-public-sector-staff-124583 accessed on 16 July 2018.

192

Article 11.1, Decree Law no. 685, and article 16, Procedures and Principles Regarding the Functioning of the

Commission on Examination of the State of Emergency Procedures.

193

As clearly explained by PACE Report, op. cit., para. 53.

194

Article 11.2, Decree Law no. 685. See, Information Note Concerning the Inquiry Commission on the State of

Emergency Measures Established by the Decree Law no. 685 dated 23 January 2017 and amended by the Decree law

no. 690 dated 29 April 2017.

195

Information on https://ohalkomisyonu.basbakanlik.gov.tr/ visited on 11 June 2018.

by the Commission. Of the remaining 15,010 cases, 660 resulted in a positive

decision for the applicant, while 14,350 were rejected.

The rejection rate is 95.60 percent.

The current caseload of the Commission is represented here:

The ICJ was told that the Commission is currently processing around 800-1,000

cases per week and was informed that the aim is to speed up the work of the

Commission that should finish its work in two to three years maximum. The ICJ is

however concerned that the speed of examination of cases by the Commission at

a rate of 1,000 cases per week may seriously jeopardize the quality of the

assessment with serious repercussions on the later appeal stages.

Finally, the extremely low admission rate raises concerns about the capacity of

the Commission to conduct a thorough individual assessment in every case. This

rate should be clarified by the Commission in case it is related to prioritization of

more clear-cut cases or other factors.

7.2.3. International reactions to the establishment of the Commission

The introduction of the Commission was initially welcomed by the Venice

Commission

196

and the PACE.

197

The Commission drew particular attention to the

fact that its decisions "are subject to judicial review by the competent

administrative courts, whose decisions may be further challenged before the

Constitutional Court and, as a last resort, before the Strasbourg Court, which will

then decide whether a remedy is effective or not."

198

Nonetheless, in March 2017, the Venice Commission identified some points of

concern:

• the lack of requirement for the Commission's decisions to "be supported

with evidence, reasoned and/or published" which makes difficult in

practice to challenge them before the designated administrative court(s) in

Ankara. The Venice Commission pointed out that, "if the commission is not

196

Venice Commission, Opinion on the Measures provided in the recent Emergency Decree Laws with respect to

Freedom of the Media, adopted at its 110th plenary session, 10-11 March 2017, para. 84.

197

Ibid., para 17.

198

Ibid.

Reinstated by emergency

decree

Decided

Accepted

Rejected

Remaining

capable of issuing reasoned and individualized decisions, it is unclear what

would be the role of the administrative courts and of the Constitutional

Court in this scheme."

199

• Lack of clarity in the remedies the Commission has the power to provide:

restitution, restoration of status quo ante, returning of assets,

compensation.

The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, the first UN independent

human rights expert to visit Turkey after the establishment of the Commission,

expressed concern "about the narrow scope of the Commission’s mandate and its

lack of independence and impartiality."

200

The UN Special Rapporteur on torture expressed the view that "the composition

of the Commission may raise legitimate questions regarding its independence and

impartiality, given that the majority of its members will be appointed by the

Government. ... Concerns have also been raised that the Commission may be

considered as an additional domestic remedy that has to be exhausted before

individuals or institutions can have their cases reviewed by the Constitutional

Court (and possibly later by the European Court of Human Rights)."

201

On 7 March 2017, the European Court of Human Rights dismissed the case of

another judge complaining about the fairness of her dismissal. This case came

after the issuance of Decree Law no. 685 establishing the State of Emergency

Commission. The Court held that a remedy should be sought before the State of

Emergency Commission before applying to the European Court of Human Rights,

taking into consideration the fact that its decisions are subject to the judicial

review of the administrative courts and, in the end, the individual application

mechanism of the Constitutional Court. The Court held that the Commission was

a priori an effective and accessible remedy, but that this did not preclude the

Court upon later review from a later finding that it was non-compliant as a

remedy.

202

On 12 June 2017, the Court, in a decision rejecting the case of a

dismissed teacher, upheld this approach. It further stressed that the Commission

is not a judicial remedy but found it positive that its decisions were subject to

judicial review.

203

In the latest judgment of the Court affirming this approach, it

found inadmissible the case of a former judge challenging the conditions of his

detention.

204

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

205

and the Office of the UN

High Commissioner for Human Rights

206

have recently expressed concern at the

199

Op Ibid., para. 88, other reasons listed here are in paras. 86-87.

200

Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, op. cit., 2017, para. 30.

201

Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, op. cit., para. 84.

202

Catal v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, Application no. 2873/17, 7 March 2017, paras. 29-32.

203

Köksal v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, Application no. 70478/16, paras. 28-29.

204

Ayhan Bora v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, 28 November 2017. The complaint on the alleged inhuman

or degrading treatment for the detention conditions was dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

205

PACE Report, op. cit., para. 92: "The Commission's members come from the same authorities which dismissed

the officials in question, putting in doubt their independence and impartiality; its members are automatically

dismissed should a terrorism-related investigation be opened concerning them – given the very broad scope of anti-

terrorism law in Turkey and the potential for its arbitrary abuse, this places the members’ positions on the

Commission at the mercy of the authorities; the secretariat of the Commission, responsible for administrative and

preparatory work, is appointed by the Prime Minister, putting its independence in question; the basis of contested

decisions is unclear, making them difficult to contest; there is no possibility of adversarial proceedings and there are

no hearings, making it difficult for applicants to articulate their cases; the workload, working methods (each decision

requires the participation of four of the Commission’s seven members) and time-frame available would seem to

make it almost impossible “to give individualised treatment to all cases”, as intended by the Venice Commission."

206

OHCHR, Second Report on Turkey, op. cit., para. 106: "there is no requirement for the decisions of the

Commission to be supported with evidence, reasoned and/or published. As pointed out by the Venice Commission, it

is of great concern that the Commission will conduct its examinations on the sole basis of documents in the case-file,

seemingly without participation of the person concerned.

It is estimated that the Commission would receive around

100,000 applications in a period of two years.

With only seven members, it would be difficult for it to issue reasoned

and individualized decisions in each case." And, "the Commission of Inquiry for State Emergency Practices cannot be

considered as an independent body that will guarantee full respect of due process. It regrets the lack of appropriate

lack of independence and impartiality of the Commission as well as at the fact

that the very basis of the Commission’s decisions are not clear, at the lack of

hearings and adversarial proceedings and the lack of conditions that would allow

the Commission to give genuinely individualized decisions.

The European Commission, in its 2018 Progress Report on Turkey, determined

that the Commission "still needs to develop into an effective and transparent

remedy for those unjustly affected by measures under the state of

emergency."

207

7.2.4. An interim assessment on the OHAL Commission as an effective

remedy

The State of Emergency Commission has clear shortcomings related to its

independence from the executive that disqualify it as a judicial remedy. The

duration of its members’ mandate is neither open-ended nor clearly defined, as

the Council of Ministers, i.e. the Executive, can extend them yearly at discretion.

Furthermore, its appointment system clearly reveals executive influence since the

executive appoints directly five of its members and the other two are nominated

by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors that is also appointed by the executive

and legislature. Even more, the membership of the Commission is modified or

renewed by these bodies any time the Council of Minister renews the term of the

Commission’s mandate. This means that, from the beginning of 2019, the

professional tenure of the Commission's members is at the discretion of the

political powers, the executive and legislature. In light of this appointment

system, it counts for little that some of the members of the Commission are

members of the judiciary.

An additional obstacle to the body's independence is the fact that members can

be dismissed when the Prime Minister initiates administrative investigations

against them or authorises the carrying out of criminal investigations.

It is therefore clear, on these grounds alone, that the Commission is not

independent and does not in itself provide an effective remedy. However, many

authorities have stressed that "this commission is an administrative, not a judicial

body."

208

Rather its function is seen as being to protect the judicial system from

excessive workload, including in sudden increases in workload related to

emergency decrees.

The establishment of the State of Emergency Commission recalls several past

experiences of Turkey that have sought to provide effective remedies for

extensive violations of a Convention right. The most recent was the establishment

of a compensation commission for excessive length of judicial proceedings that

was tasked with providing compensation in cases for excessive length of judicial

proceedings, under article 6.3 ECHR, that took place before the remedy of

individual application to the Constitutional Court entered into force.

209

However,

this remedy was limited to one kind of human rights violation that by its nature

does not allow for restitutio in integrum but only for compensation. Furthermore,

its competence was limited in time as it could consider cases that would have

remedies to address thousands of dismissals of employees, liquidation of thousands of private entities, including

health and education institutions, as well as trade unions" (para 108).

207

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 3.

208

PACE Report, op. cit., para. 57.

209

See, Turgut and others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, Application no. 4860/09, 26 March 2013. The

remedy was set up after the pilot judgment Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application no. 24240/07,

Judgment of 20 March 2012.

taken place only before the date of entry into force of the individual complaint

mechanism before the Constitutional Court.

There are several other important reasons why the remedy before the State of

Emergency Commission is not effective.

First, the Commission cannot hold any public or non-public hearing and must

decide on the merits based on the written submitted files. However, it appears

that generally people dismissed by virtue of being listed in an Annex to a Decree-

law - and several of those dismissed by administrative decision - are not shown

the individual grounds for their dismissal. This makes challenging their dismissal

via documentary virtually impossible.

It is still unclear whether the decisions and the reasoning on which they are

based on these cases will be published or not. To date no decision has been

published by the authorities.

Finally, it is difficult to see how it is possible for the Commission under the

current structure to finish its work in the next few years while giving a proper

individualized assessment of each case. This is likely to make cases subject to

significant delays, which in itself would put at risk the effectiveness of the remedy

before the Commission.

The current rejection rate of more than 95 percent already casts doubt on the

effectiveness of the remedy, particularly given the lack of certain procedural

guarantees such as a hearing, difficulties for applicants in presenting evidence, or

the availability of a reasoned decision. Because of this, it is highly likely that the

workload of the appeal remedies will also become excessive.

The State of Emergency Complaints Commission cannot therefore be considered

per se either an independent or an effective remedy. The key question then

becomes whether appeals of the Commission’s decisions through the Turkish

judicial system can remedy the limitations of the Commission itself, and thereby

ensure that the national system as a whole provides an effective remedy for

persons dismissed under the state of emergency. Indeed, administrative courts

are appeal bodies against the decisions of dismissal by Ministries and Agencies

under emergency Decree Law 667, as well as against decisions of the State of

Emergency Complaints Commission.

However, the alarming situation of the judiciary in Turkey, described above, casts

serious doubts as to the capacity of the judicial system to provide an effective

appeal against decisions of the Commission or of ministries or agencies that have

dismissed employees.

The effectiveness of administrative courts in Turkey with regard to cases of

dismissals has yet to be tested by the likely wave of cases that will come from the

State of Emergency Complaints Commission. Nonetheless, it is of particular

concern that the Ankara administrative courts nos. 19 and 20 were designated as

the courts competent to hear appeals from the Commission’s decisions by the

Council of Judges and Prosecutors, in its formation following the constitutional

reform.

210

This situation has tainted the very administrative courts that are

entrusted with providing an appeal against decisions of the State of Emergency

Complaints Commission of suspicions of lack of independence. It is further

symptomatic that the Council of State, the supreme administrative court of

Turkey, has not issued a single ruling on the appeals of judges and prosecutors

210

See article 11 Emergency Decree No. 685 (Article 11) dated 23 January 2017.

against their dismissal. This negligence has deprived administrative courts, the

State of Emergency Complaints Commission, and all public administration

institutions of the necessary guidance and precedent for due process compliant

decisions on dismissals and their appeals.

8. Obstacles in access to a lawyer

The state of emergency Decree Laws have introduced a set of measures that

have considerably restricted the capacity of lawyers, in accordance with their

professional responsibilities, to effectively represent clients involved in

investigations for terrorism and/or linked to the attempted coup of 15 July 2016

The Decree Laws introduced the following restrictions:

211

1. Public prosecutors have been granted the authority to deny access to a

lawyer to detainees for up to five days under Emergency Decree no. 668

of 28 July 2016. Later, this period was reduced to 24 hours under

Emergency Decree no. 684 of 23 January 2017.

2. Limitations on the confidentiality, frequency and duration of interviews

between the detainee and his/her lawyer, “where there is a risk that public

security and the security of the penitentiary institution is endangered, that

the terrorist organization or other criminal organizations are directed, that

orders and instructions are given to them or secret, clear or crypto

messages are transmitted to them through the remarks during the

interviews between the detainees and their lawyer”.

212

These include:

a. Auditory or audio-visual recordings of the interviews can be made

via technical devices;

b. Officers may be present during interviews between the detainee

and his/her lawyer with a view to monitoring the interview;

c. The documents or document templates and files given by the

detainee to his/her lawyer or vice versa and the records kept by

them concerning the interview between them may be seized;

d. The days and hours of the interviews may be limited upon the

public prosecutor’s order;

e. In the event that the interview of the detainee is understood to be

made for the aim set out above, the interview shall be immediately

ended;

f. In the event that such minutes are drawn up in respect of a

detainee, the Office of the Magistrates’ Judge can ban the detainee

from meeting with his or her lawyer(s), upon the public

prosecutor’s request. The decision on banning shall be immediately

served on the detainee and the relevant Bar Presidency with a view

to assigning a new lawyer.

213

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has reported that the

"risks faced by criminal defence lawyers is reportedly so high that it is extremely

difficult for suspects arrested during the state of emergency to find a lawyer.

Some lawyers still willing to defend suspects of terrorism demand fees that are

unaffordable for the majority of suspects. This constitutes an obstacle to the

enjoyment of the right to fair trial and access to justice."

214

211

See, Article 6 of the Decree Law No. 667 reads that: “Investigation and prosecution procedures

ARTICLE 6 – (1) During the period of state of emergency, with regard to the offences enumerated under Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Sections of Fourth Chapter of Second Volume of the Turkish Criminal Code no. 5237 dated

26 September 2004, the offences falling under the Anti-Terror Law no. 3713 dated 12 April 1991 and the collective

offences; ... .”

212

Article 6(d) of the Decree Law No. 667.

213

See, ibid.

214

OHCHR, Second Report on Turkey, op. cit., para. 57.

The ICJ has received numerous reports indicating that, while currently detainees

charged with offences linked to the attempted coup can have access to a lawyer

of their choice and lawyers are defending them, the fees requested to take up

their defence are considerably higher than normal by Turkish standards.

The ICJ has previously stressed that

In times of crisis, lawyers must be guaranteed prompt, regular and confidential

access to their clients, including to those deprived of their liberty, and to

relevant documentation and evidence, at all stages of proceedings. All

branches of government must take necessary measures to ensure the

confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship, and must ensure that the

lawyer is able to engage in all essential elements of legal defence, including

substantial and timely access to all relevant case files.

215

In this connection, the UN Basic Principles on the role of lawyers require

governments to ensure that lawyers: “(a) are able to perform all of their

professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper

interference; (b) are able to travel and to consult with their clients freely both

within their own country and abroad; and (c) shall not suffer, or be threatened

with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action

taken in accordance with recognized professional duties, standards and ethics”.

216

These protection measures are crucial to providing effective legal assistance to

clients.

217

The State has a duty to safeguard lawyers where their security is threatened, and

to ensure that lawyers are never identified with their clients or their clients’

causes as a result of discharging their professional functions.

218

The UN Special

Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers emphasized that “even

during a state of emergency, the rule of law must be respected, there should be

no prolonged detentions without trial, all detainees shall have access to a legal

representative and shall have the right to have the lawfulness of their detention

reviewed by an independent court”.

219

Recommendation R (2000) 21 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers

identifies the obligations of States take all necessary measures “to respect,

protect and promote the freedom of exercise of profession of lawyer without

discrimination and without improper interference from the authorities or the

public, in particular in the light of the relevant provisions of the European

Convention on Human Rights”.

220

Under international human rights law, including

the European Convention on Human Rights, States must take measures to

protect persons who the authorities know or ought to know are at risk of physical

attack.

221

States must also ensure that a prompt and thorough investigation is

undertaken, by an independent and impartial authority, into attacks that

endanger lives or physical integrity of those within their jurisdiction, including

lawyers.

222

215

ICJ Geneva Declaration, principle 8. See ICJ Legal Commentary, op. cit., pp. 125-137.

216

UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, principle 16. 

217

Ibid., principles 16 (b), 22. 

218

Ibid., principle 18; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, UN document

E/CN.4/1998/39, para. 179. 

219

Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,

Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/39, UN

Doc. E/CN.4/2002/72, para. 28.

220

Recommendation No. R (2000) 21 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the freedom of exercise

of the profession of lawyer, principle I.1. 

221

UN HRC, General Comment No. 31, the Nature of the General Obligations Imposed on State Parties



to the

Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, para. 8; ECtHR, Osman v UK, Application No. 23452/94,

Judgment of 28 October 1998. 

222

Convention Against Torture, article 12; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20 on



article 7,

HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 7, para. 14; See generally, ICJ, Practitioners Guide no. 2, op. cit., Chapter IV. 

The obstruction of the work of lawyers will typically impermissibly impede the

lawyer in providing an effective defence, contrary to the right to a fair trial;

223

prevent the lawyer from challenging arbitrary detention,

224

or torture or other ill-

treatment.

225

In addition to violating the rights of the lawyer, attacks on lawyers,

or threats or harassment of lawyers, are likely to violate the rights of the clients

they represent.

Under international law, an accused person must be granted prompt access to

counsel in accordance with the right to communicate with counsel

226

and as part

of the right to a fair trial.

227

Such access may serve as a preventive measure

against ill-treatment, coerced self-incrimination and “confessions” or other

violations of the rights of the suspect.

228

Moreover, the European Court of Human

Rights has held that “a deliberate and systematic refusal of access to a lawyer to

defend oneself, especially when the person concerned is detained in a foreign

country, must be considered to amount to a flagrant denial of a fair trial”.

229

The

Human Rights Committee has affirmed that there is a violation of the right to a

fair trial if a "court or other relevant authorities hinder appointed lawyers from

fulfilling their task effectively."

230

Therefore, not only do practices of impeding

access of lawyers to clients run contrary to the international law and standards,

but they also lead to violations of human rights, which may not necessarily be

remedied at future stages in the proceedings.

231

Under international law, States have an obligation to ensure full confidentiality of

communication between a lawyer and a client.

232

In a memorandum published in October 2016, the Council of Europe’s

Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the drastic restrictions to access to

lawyers, as well as limitations on the confidentiality of the client-lawyer

relationship. In particular, the Commissioner urged the Turkish authorities to

revert to the situation before the state of emergency as a matter of urgency.

233

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also urged Turkey to

“redress the procedural shortcomings under the state of emergency, in particular

with respect to the duration of detention and effective access to lawyers”.

234

The ICJ considers that, in the current conditions, lawyers face significant

obstacles to providing effective representation and defense to clients that have

been subject to criminal prosecution and/or dismissals following the state of

emergency. The five-day delay before the visit of a lawyer and the restrictions to

the possibility to hold confidential interviews between lawyers and their clients

strike at the core of the legal profession's guarantees and of the fair trial rights of

the defendants.

223

Guaranteed, inter alia, under article 6 ECHR and article 14 ICCPR. 

224

Guaranteed, inter alia, under article 5 ECHR and article 9 ICCPR 

225

Guaranteed, inter alia, under the UN Convention against Torture; article 3 ECHR and article 9 ICCPR 

226

Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 32, op. cit., para. 34; UN Basic Principles on the Role of

Lawyers, principle 1 .

227

Salduz v Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Application no. 3639/02, paras. 54–55. 

228

Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 20, op. cit., para. 11; Salduz v Turkey, op cit , para. 54. 

229

Al-Moayad v Germany, Application No.35865/03, (inadmissibility) Decision of the European Court (2007), para.

101.

230

Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 32, op cit , para. 38.

231

ECtHR, Salduz v Turkey, op cit , para. 62. 

232

Human Rights Committee, General Comment no.32, op cit , para. 34; UN Basic Principles on the Role of

Lawyers, principle 8, 22. 

233

Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE, Memorandum on the human rights implications of the measures

taken under the state of emergency in Turkey, CommDH(2016)35, 7 October 2016, para. 16.

234

PACE, The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey, report by Committee on the Honouring of Obligations

and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), 2017, para 21.4.

9. Obstacles to the action of civil society

Since the declaration of the State of Emergency and to the time of publication of

this report, some 1,619 associations have been closed by Emergency Decrees No:

667, 677, 679, 689, 693, 695 and 701. While 188 of these decisions were later

revoked, as of 20 March 2018, the number of closed associations was 1,419. 12

associations have been closed by Emergency Decree no. 701 of 8 July 2018.

235

The majority of these organizations have been closed down permanently and

their assets were seized under Emergency Decree no. 677. Among these civil

society organizations, there were tens of local human rights, woman’s rights,

child rights, cultural heritage protection, poverty alleviation and legal rights

organizations. Lawyers’ organizations such as Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği

(Contemporary Lawyers Association) and Özgürlükçü Hukukçular Derneği

(Association of Lawyers for Freedom) comprising lawyers representing the victims

of torture and other ill-treatment and Mezopotamya Hukukçular Derneği

(Mesopotamia Lawyers Association) representing the people effected from the

curfews in the southeast Anatolia; women’s domestic violence and the child rights

organisation Gündem Çocuk Derneği (Agenda Child) are among the organizations

that have been closed down.

Two associations, Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği (Contemporary Lawyers

Association) and Mesopotamia Lawyers Association (composed mainly of lawyers

of Kurdish origin) were closed down on 22 November 2016 by Emergency Decree

No 677. Established by lawyers, these associations were working on cases

involving torture and ill-treatment, enforced disappearance and other serious

human rights violations. The head of the Contemporary Lawyers Association,

Selçuk Kozağaçlı was arrested on 13 November 2017.

According to the recent Report entitled "Lawyers under the Judicial

Pressure" published by the Human Rights Association, 76 cases concerning

investigations and trials had been launched against lawyers.

236

Since the declaration of the state of emergency, a number of human rights

defenders and other civil society actors have been arrested, and are currently

standing (or have already stood) trial under charges of membership of a terrorist

armed group. The following individuals are among them:

Taner Kılıç, Chair of Amnesty International Turkey, was detained on 6 June 2017

in Izmir. He was charged three days later with “membership of the Fethullah

Gülen Terrorist Organization” (FETÖ) and remanded in pre-trial detention. Since

then he has been held at the Şakran prison in Izmir. He has been charged based

on the allegation that he downloaded and used the ByLock messaging application,

claimed to have been used by the Gülen movement to communicate. However,

two independent forensic analyses of his phone commissioned by Amnesty

International found that there was no trace of ByLock having been on his phone.

On 31 January 2018, the İstanbul Heavy Penal Court No. 35 ordered Taner Kılıç’s

conditional release; however, the Istanbul Heavy Penal Court no. 36 reversed this

decision on 1 February 2018 after the prosecutor appealed the release order. The

fifth hearing is scheduled to take place on 7 November 2018.

Osman Kavala: Osman Kavala, the founder and Head of Board of Anadolu

Kültür, a non-profit company founded in 2002, was taken into custody on 18

October 2017. Following 14 days in police custody, the Istanbul Chief Public

235

See complete data in IHOP Report, op. cit.

236

Human Rights Association, Yargi Baskisi Altindaki Avukatlar Raporu Yayinlandi, 1 May 2018, available at

http://www.ihd.org.tr/yargi-baskisi-altindaki-avukatlar-raporu-yayinlandi/ accessed on 16 July 2018.

Prosecutor’s Office referred him to court for arrest without taking his testimony.

The Istanbul 1st Criminal Court of Peace ruled that Osman Kavala should remain

in detention awaiting trial on charges under articles 309 (attempt to attack the

constitutional order) and 312 (attempt to abolish the government of Turkey or

preventing it from fulfilling its duties) of the Turkish Penal Code. At the time of

this report, there had been no indictment yet issued.

Eren Keskin, Co-Chair of the Human Rights Association: A total of 143 court

cases were launched against Eren Keskin, the editor in chief of newspaper Özgür

Gündem Daily in 2014 and 2015. She was subject to an administrative fine of

355,920 TL, later reduced to 105,920 TL. Eren Keskin was sentenced to seven

and a half years’ imprisonment, following her conviction on charges under Articles

299 (insulting the President of the Republic) and 301 (publicly degrading the

Turkish Nation) of the Turkish penal Code by the İstanbul Second First Instance

Criminal Court on 29 March 2018.

The European Commission, in its Progress Report 2018, found that

Civil society came under increasing pressure, notably in the face of a large

number of arrests of activists, including human rights defenders, and the

recurrent use of bans of demonstrations and other types of gatherings,

leading to a rapid shrinking space for fundamental rights and freedoms.

Many rights-based organisations remained closed as part of the measures

under the state of emergency and an effective legal remedy has not been

available with respect to confiscations.

237

The UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and

Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms (Declaration on Human Rights Defenders) affirms

that "everyone is entitled, individually and in association with others, to be

protected effectively under national law in reacting against or opposing, through

peaceful means, activities and acts, including those by omission, attributable to

States that result in violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as

well as acts of violence perpetrated by groups or individuals that affect the

enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms."

238

The UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders stresses that "individuals, non-

governmental organizations and relevant institutions have an important role to

play in contributing to making the public more aware of questions relating to all

human rights and fundamental freedoms through activities such as education,

training and research in these areas to strengthen further, inter alia,

understanding, tolerance, peace and friendly relations among nations and among

all racial and religious groups, bearing in mind the various backgrounds of the

societies and communities in which they carry out their activities."

239

The prosecution of a number of human rights defenders in the country as well as

the closure of several human rights non-governmental organizations has had a

chilling effect on the work of civil society as a whole. While human rights work

has not stopped it completely thanks to the courageous dedication of civil society

actors, the threat of proscription and prosecution for derivative offences such as

"collaboration" or "support" and on the basis of general and arbitrary criteria is a

sword of damocles hanging over every human rights defender’s head.

237

European Commission 2018 Report, op. cit., p. 4.

238

UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and

Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 12.3.

239

Ibid., article 16.

10. Conclusions

On 15 July 2016, Turkey experienced a condemnable attempt of a coup d'Etat

that led to the completely destabilization of its already shaky institutions,

particularly as concerns the administration of justice and the rule of law. The ICJ

condemns that attack.

The declaration of state of emergency has led to systematic unlawful derogations

from, and restrictions and limitations on, human rights protections. Many of the

measure are unnecessary and disproportionate and have seriously impaired

human rights enjoyment and due process guarantees. This constitutes an abuse

of state of emergency legislation apparently for extrinsic policy objectives. The

result has been a mass dismissal of public servants, judges and prosecutors

without ensuring due process guarantees and the degradation of the justice

system, depriving the judiciary of essential guarantees to ensure its

independence from the political authorities. Taken together, these measures have

seriously crippled the capacity of the Turkish legal system to provide an effective

remedy for human rights violations.

The particular measures to reform the Council of Judges and Prosecutors as well

as the diffuse chilling effect caused by the mass dismissal of judges and

prosecutors at all levels cannot currently guarantee the requirements of

independence necessary in domestic courts for a remedy to be effective.

Furthermore, the dramatic fall in the competence of judges and prosecutors

following the replacements of the mass dismissals, as well as the increasing

workload that will face administrative courts and the Constitutional Court once

decisions of the Commission are appealed, are worrying signals for the capacity

of the justice system to withstand the workload arising from cases challenging

human rights violations committed by State institutions, whether linked to the

state of emergency or not.

At the constitutional level, concerns arise from the capacity of the Constitutional

Court to withstand the heavy backlog that inevitably follows from appeals against

the Commission’s decisions and/or administrative courts’ decisions, considering

its already important workload. At the very best, this situation exposes the Court

to an incalculable number of cases for lack of respect of procedural guarantees in

a fair trial as well as virtually countless violations of the right to a fair trial within

a reasonable time, under article 6.1 ECHR.

It is true, as many interlocutors the ICJ have engaged with have indicated, that

"ordinary" cases - e.g. neighbours disputes, contract lawsuits, theft trials - are

generally unaffected by this constitutional crisis. Only so-called "sensitive"

"political" cases are said be affected. The problem with this observation is that it

misses the point that any case may, under certain conditions, become "sensitive",

such as a civil dispute with a politically connected neighbour. In addition, human

rights protection must never be seen as something that is extraordinary or

“political”.

It is for this reason that it is important for civil society to be alert to the

effectiveness of remedies for human rights violations also for "sensitive" cases, in

particular when they amount to hundreds of thousands. In this regard, the mass

disestablishment of NGOs in the country under emergency legislation, the arrests

and trials of some of its human rights defenders, coupled with the lack of

procedural guarantees to access a lawyer under state of emergency legislation

and the high fees some lawyers demand, have seriously curtailed that capacity of

civil society and the legal profession to assist and represent victims of human

rights violations in accessing remedies.

After an assessment of the legal framework of the Commission, of its extremely

high rejection rate, as well as the rapid work-pace, it is apparent that this

administrative mechanism does not provide an independent – nor it appears an

effective - remedy for human rights violations under its competence. It is instead

highly likely that it will operate as a factor of further excessive delay in accessing

effective remedies for human rights violations.

It is highly symptomatic of the incapacity of the judicial system to provide an

effective remedy in sensitive cases under the state of emergency that the Council

of State that is the first appeal instance on dismissal decisions of judges and

prosecutors since 23 January 2017, have not decided a single case. For 18

months, appeals have been pending before the supreme administrative court that

has not taken up this chance to give essential guidance through case-law for both

the Commission and first-instance administrative courts. This negligent attitude

necessarily engenders ineffectiveness and a poor quality of justice in the court

system in these cases.

To these concerns one must add the recent cases of disregard of decisions of the

Constitutional Court in spite of clear legal and constitutional obligations and the

further erosion of its institutional independence following the constitutional

amendments of 2017. It is a symptom of the lack of independence within the

judiciary that the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, that dismissed more than

4,000 judges and prosecutors immediately after the attempted coup of 15 July

2016 for alleged links with the Gülenist movement/FETÖ, has not begun any

disciplinary proceedings of any sort against any of the judges of the four Assizes

Courts. Those courts deliberately failed to execute the rulings of the

Constitutional Court despite what appears, in the very words of the same

Constitutional Court, a clear violation of constitutional law.

At the international level, based on the principle of subsidiarity, the European

Court of Human Rights has so far not determined there to be an absence of

effective remedies for human rights violations arising from measures adopted

under the state of emergency in Turkey. However, the Court did not foreclose a

possible re-assessment of the question of effectiveness and existence of a

remedy, both in theory and in practice, in light of the decisions issued by the

Commission and by national courts, as well as of the effective execution of these

decisions.

240

The reality on the ground, from this assessment of laws and practice, leads to the

conclusion that the current system of remedies in Turkey has had the effect of

merely slowing down the referral of cases to the country’s highest courts and,

ultimately, the European Court of Human Rights. The ICJ has gathered several

testimonies of the growing frustration in Turkey with the inaction of the European

Court of Human Rights, with some underlining that pilot judgments or guidance

through case-law from the Court would assist national courts, including the

Constitutional Court, to produce ECHR complaint decisions.

Unless there are significant changes in the Turkish legal system such as to

provide access to effective and independent judicial remedies for human rights

violations at first instance level, high courts in Turkey, especially the

Constitutional Court, and international human rights mechanisms, risk being

flooded with cases in the years of come.

240

Köksal v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 29.

Meanwhile, victims of human rights violations will remain without an effective

remedy, adding another human rights violation to their complaints.

11. Recommendations

The Turkish authorities should dial back the hastily conceived, and in

many instances arbitrary, measures implemented in the wake of the

2016 failed coup attempt. These include the derogations from human

rights guarantees and the mass purges of persons from a wide range of

professions and institutions, including the judiciary. Reversal of these

measures will be necessary to address the central concern of this report,

which is the failure by Turkey to provide access to effective remedies and

reparation to everyone in the country in implementation of their

obligations under international law and the Turkish Constitution.

It is an encouraging signal that the government has lifted the state of

emergency.

In this spirit, the ICJ provides the Turkish authorities with the following

recommendations to ensure an effective remedy and access to justice:

A. To the President, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament:

1. Repeal the accompanying Law Decrees to the state of emergency.

2. Withdraw all derogations to the European Convention on Human

Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

To the extent that any derogations are not withdrawn, justify all

specific measures, pursuant to an assessment that each are

strictly necessary to address a specific threat to the life of the

nation.

3. Abolish the State of Emergency Complaints Commission and

provide direct access to administrative courts in compliance with

due process guarantees, full legal representation, access to all files

and the opportunity to have a hearing with an adversarial

procedure.

4. In the event that the Commission is not abolished, revise its

procedure to provide such guarantees and publicize, in

anonymised format, its reasoned decisions.

5. The constitutional amendments on the appointment of members of

the Council of Judges and Prosecutors should be amended to

ensure a majority presence of judges and prosecutors in the board

and their sole presence in chambers dealing with appointment,

career, transfer and dismissals of judges and prosecutors.

6. The constitutional amendments on the appointment of members of

the Constitutional Court should be amended in order to ensure that

the political branches of government are not predominant in

appointments.

7. State authorities should desist from making comments on judicial

proceedings

8. Reform the Anti-Terrorism Law no. 3713 and related counter-

terrorism legislation in order to:

a. Provide a definition of terrorism that is clear and in line with

principles of legality and international human rights and

counter-terrorism standards;

b. Ensure that no provision related to "terrorism" offences

arbitrarily and disproportionately interferes with any

person's fundamental freedoms, including the rights to

freedom of expression, assembly and association. The right

of all persons to discuss laws, policies and actions must be

protected.

9. Ensure that legal aid is available to every person regardless of the

criminal offence of which is accused and that legal fees do not

constitute an obstacles in accessing a lawyer.

10. Abrogate all amendments to criminal procedure under emergency

legislation that curtail an effective access to a lawyer.

11. Promote and protect the work of civil society and the legal

profession for the respect, protection, fulfilment and advancement

of human rights and the rule of law, including when critical of the

State's laws, policies and actions.

B. To the judiciary:

1. The Council of State should as soon as possible provide guidance

with regard to the criteria and jurisprudence on dismissals in line

with international law and standards on the independence of the

judiciary, the right to a fair hearing and due process.

2. The Constitutional Court should expeditiously issue judgments

which will instruct lower courts on the proper and effective

implementation of legislation linked to state of emergency in a

manner compliant with human rights law.

3. The Council of State should immediately hear and decide cases on

dismissals of judges and prosecutors based on fair trial and due

process guarantees, full legal representation, access to the file and

the opportunity to have an open hearing with an adversarial

procedure and a public judgment. Judges and prosecutors should

be reinstated immediately by the Council of Judges and

Prosecutors if cleared.

4. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors should make it a priority to

increase the quality of judges and prosecutors in the judicial

system, especially with regard to the implementation of

international human rights and constitutional law, by giving

priority to the training in these fields of law.

5. The system of transfer of judges, including laws and procedures,

should be independently reviewed to ensure that transfers are not,

in practice, used as a disguised disciplinary measure.

Administrative decisions on the transfer of judges and prosecutors

should be transparent and subject to effective due process

safeguards. Judicial review of such decisions on the application of

the affected judge or prosecutor should be introduced as a matter

of priority. The system, including laws and procedures, should be

independently reviewed to ensure that transfers are not, in

practice, used as a disguised disciplinary measure.

6. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors should set up a procedure

for protection of judges and prosecutors from attacks and

interferences from other State authorities and private persons and

make this task a priority of the Council's mandate.

7. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors should initiate fair

disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors that do

not comply with the directives of the Constitutional Court.

8. Release and discontinue the prosecution of all human rights

defenders and lawyers that are not accused of participation in the

attempted coup and/or are subject to prosecution solely for

activities carried out as part of their legitimate professional

functions or the exercise of internationally protected human rights

and fundamental freedoms.

9. Reassess the prosecution of persons under anti-terrorism offences

in light of the principle of legality under international law to ensure

that they are charged only with a cognizable offences consistent

with human rights and the rule of law.

Annex 1 - Extracts from Turkey's reply to the follow up-questions of the

UN Committee against Torture

The terrorist coup attempt of 15th July 2016

58.On the night of 15 July, upon the instruction of the founder and leader of the

Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/the Parallel State Structure (“FETÖ/PDY”),

Fetullah Gülen, and in line with the plan approved by him, “terrorists in uniforms”

within the Turkish Armed Forces attempted an armed coup against the democracy

for the purpose of overthrowing the democratically elected government together

with the President and the constitutional order in Turkey.

59.The Presidential Compound, the hotel where the President of the Republic was

staying at, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (“TGNA”), the Police Special

Operations Centre and the security units, the premises of the National

Intelligence Organization and various military units were attacked with bombs

and arms. The President of the Republic survived the assassination attempt by

leaving the lieu by 15 minutes before the raid on that hotel. The coup plotters

also opened fire on the convoy of the Prime Minister. ...

60.The bomb attack by jet fighter aircraft (F-16) was made in the course of the

extraordinary meeting of the Plenary Session against the coup attempt. During

the attack, Parliament officials, some civilians and many police officers were

injured, and extensive damage was caused to the Parliament building. ...

61.On the night of 15 July, tanks ran over the civilians and some of them died

and were injured as a result of being trapped under the tanks. Fighter aircrafts

made low altitude flights over the cities by breaking through the sound barrier

and in a manner which would lead to fear and panic in the public. The TGNA and

people were shot randomly by the coup plotters, snipers directly targeted people

from strategic points, the crowd was bombed and shot from aircrafts and the

civilians, who defended the democratic regime at the cost of their lives, were

murdered. In the course of the coup attempt, 246 persons were killed and more

than 2000 were injured....

62.The terrorists seized the state-run television (“TRT”) and forced a newsreader

to read a faux declaration stating that the democratic regime was taken over.

Raids were also made to private media and press organizations, and the free

media was tried to be silenced. The coup plotters also attacked satellite control

centers in order to cut off TV broadcasting all around the country, except for the

state-run TV channel. ...

63.The Turkish people from all walks of life and regardless of their political

affiliations united on the streets on the night of 15th July. Putting all the political

and ideological differences aside, they peacefully gathered and jointly defended

common democratic values and bravely stood against tanks, helicopters and

aircrafts with only national flags in their hands. ...

64.The unity and solidarity among the nation on the night of 15 July continued

among the political parties as well. All political parties represented at the

Parliament signed a joint statement against the coup attempt. Representatives of

the media, academia, business circles and all other segments of Turkish society

uniformly condemned the coup attempt. ...

65.Even after 15th July, Turkish citizens continued to gather regularly at the main

squares in each and every city in Turkey to show their unity and support for the

Turkish democracy, for approximately one month.

66.This spirit was crowned with the historic meeting in İstanbul on the 7th of

August where 5 million people came together. They were joined by the President,

the Prime Minister and the leaders of opposition parties.

Other Commission Members:

Professor Kyong-Wahn Ahn, Republic of Korea

Ms Chinara Aidarbekova, Kyrgyzstan

Justice Adolfo Azcuna, Philippines

Mr Muhannad Al-Hasani, Syria

Mr Abdelaziz Benzakour, Morocco

Mr Reed Brody, United States

Prof. Miguel Carbonell, Mexico

Justice Moses Chinhengo, Zimbabwe

Prof. Sarah Cleveland, United States

Justice Martine Comte, France

Mr Gamal Eid, Egypt

Mr Roberto Garretón, Chile

Prof. Jenny E. Goldschmidt, Netherlands

Prof. Michelo Hansungule, Zambia

Ms Gulnora Ishankanova, Uzbekistan

Ms Imrana Jalal, Fiji

Ms Jamesina Essie L. King, Sierra Leone

Justice Kalthoum Kennou, Tunisia

Prof. David Kretzmer, Israel

Prof. César Landa, Peru

Justice Ketil Lund, Norway

Justice Qinisile Mabuza, Swaziland

Justice José Antonio Martín Pallín, Spain

Prof. Juan Méndez, Argentina

Justice Charles Mkandawire, Malawi

Mr Kathurima M’Inoti, Kenya

Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, South Africa

Justice Tamara Morschakova, Russia

Justice Willly Mutunga, Kenya

Justice Egbert Myjer, Netherlands

Justice John Lawrence O’Meally, Australia

Ms Mikiko Otani, Japan

Justice Fatsah Ouguergouz, Algeria

Dr Jarna Petman, Finland

Prof. Mónica Pinto, Argentina

Prof. Victor Rodriguez Rescia, Costa Rica

Justice Michèle Rivet, Canada

Mr Alejandro Salinas Rivera, Chile

Mr Michael Sfard, Israel

Prof. Marco Sassoli, Italy-Switzerland

Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, India

Justice Kalyan Shrestha, Nepal

Ms Ambiga Sreenevasan, Malaysia

Mr Wilder Tayler, Uruguay

Justice Philippe Texier, France

Justice Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, Uganda

Justice Stefan Trechsel, Switzerland

Prof. Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Colombia

Commission Members

July 2018 (for an updated list, please visit www.icj.org/commission)

President:

Prof. Robert Goldman, United States

Vice-Presidents:

Prof. Carlos Ayala, Venezuela

Justice Radmila Dragicevic-Dicic, Serbia

Executive Committee:

(Chair) Justice Azhar Cachalia, South Africa

Justice Sir Nicolas Bratza, UK

Dame Silvia Cartwright, New Zealand

Ms Roberta Clarke, Barbados-Canada

Mr. Shawan Jabarin, Palestine

Ms Hina Jilani, Pakistan

Justice Sanji Monageng, Botswana

Mr Belisário dos Santos Júnior, Brazil