Office of Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 6
these existing resources, including step-by-step procedures on how to terminate
contracts for convenience and default and templates for the process. For example, a few
COs expressed an interest in templates while another noted that it “would be nice to
have sample terminations, and how to calculate fees and remaining costs at
termination.”
Of note, this interest in additional resources—such as training and supplemental
guidance—to support terminations was not limited to newer COs, but was noted by
COs with different years of experience. Multiple COs also noted that USAID-specific
training on terminations, both for convenience and default, would be beneficial to staff.
For example, one survey respondent explained, “The bar for default is quite high… it
would be nice to have a dedicated online class that goes through different scenarios
regarding risks, and justifications for termination for default.” Another CO stated that
“[m]ore training, perhaps stand-alone training, on both types of determination could be
helpful if the course was tailored to USAID contracting and used USAID contracts
examples.”
Additionally, multiple COs indicated that termination decisions had been made more
difficult by varying degrees of management engagement in terms of both undue pressure
and a lack of leadership support. In our survey, we asked COs, “Has anyone exerted any
undue influence on any of your contract termination decisions?” Thirteen—close to 20
percent of survey respondents, or 10 percent of the total universe of 129 COs—noted
undue pressures by a range of players, including mission leadership and general counsel,
to either terminate a contract, not terminate a contract, or to terminate a contract for
convenience despite raising the adverse cost implications of doing so. These
observations echo issues identified in a prior OIG audit, in which COs and agreement
officers (AOs)
11
reported pressure to make award decisions.
12
External pressure related to termination decisions may hinder COs’ ability to effectively
manage contracts and independently exercise business judgment in safeguarding the
interest of the U.S. government as required by law.
13
Given this concern, also identified
in a prior OIG audit, the Agency took steps designed to reduce undue pressure exerted
on COs. For example, in December 2018, USAID issued an executive communication
stating that COs and AOs must be able to act based on independent judgment and
without inappropriate influence on award or award administration decisions. In addition,
USAID and the Department of State issued a worldwide cable in February 2019
emphasizing the independence of COs and AOs.
Our survey also found that some COs expressed a concern over a lack of support from
Agency leadership to terminate for default. One survey respondent explained,
“[termination for default] could potentially impact a contractor's ability to secure future
[U.S. government] work… Processing a [termination for default] would require USAID
11
Like COs, AOs have the authority to enter into, amend, and terminate assistance agreements
(cooperative agreements and grants) on behalf of USAID.
12
USAID OIG, “USAID’s Award Oversight Is Insufficient To Hold Implementers Accountable for
Achieving Results” (9-000-19-006-P), September 25, 2019.
13
Federal Acquisition Regulation 1.602-2 - Responsibilities.