Parnoff v. Yuille

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LAURENCE V. PARNOFF v. DARCY YUILLE

(AC 36106)

Gruendel, Prescott and Pellegrino, Js.

Argued October 28, 2015—officially released February 23, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Tobin, J. [judgment]; Hon. Richard P. Gilardi,

judge trial referee [motion for judgment, judgment].)

Thomas J. Weihing, with whom, on the brief, were

Dana P. Lonergan, John T. Bochanis and Laurence V.

Parnoff, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

Barbara L. Cox, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. The issue raised in this appeal

requires us to assess whether an attorney who executes

a fee agreement that violates General Statutes § 52-

251c,

commonly known as the ‘‘fee cap statute,’’ may,

nevertheless, recover against the client under the doc-

trine of quantum meruit. The plaintiff, Laurence V. Par-

noff, appeals from the judgment of the trial court,

rendered on remand from this court, in favor of the

defendant, Darcy Yuille. On appeal, the plaintiff claims

that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in

favor of the defendant on his claim of quantum meruit.

We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

The following facts, set forth in the first appeal of

this case, Parnoff v. Yuille, 139 Conn. App. 147, 57 A.3d

349 (2012), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 956, 59 A.3d 1192

(2013) (Parnoff I), and procedural history are relevant

to our resolution of this appeal. On December 5, 1998,

the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contingent

fee retainer agreement through which the defendant

retained the plaintiff to seek damages for personal injur-

ies that she sustained as a result of her employer’s

allegedly bad faith handling of her workers’ compensa-

tion claim. Id., 152, 160. The fee agreement provided

for a contingent fee of 40 percent, which exceeds the

cap set forth in § 52-251c. Id., 152. An arbitration panel

issued its decision on the personal injury case on June

29, 2004, and awarded the defendant damages in the

amount of $1,096,032.93. Id., 153. The plaintiff sent the

defendant an itemized invoice with an attorney’s fee

representing 40 percent of the gross settlement pro-

ceeds. Id. The defendant objected to the fee and, after

the parties were unable to reach an accord, the plaintiff

served a three count complaint against the defendant.

Id., 153–54.

The first count alleged a breach of contract claim

that was based on the written fee agreement. The sec-

ond count alleged a quantum meruit claim. The third

count alleged a bad faith claim, specifically, that the

defendant’s conduct was intentional and wilful. Id., 154–

55. Following a jury trial, the jury found in favor of the

plaintiff on the first and third count. Id., 157. As to the

second count, quantum meruit, the jury was instructed

that it need not reach the claim should the jury find

the existence of a contract and a subsequent breach,

which it did. Id., 157–58.

Following the verdict, the plaintiff appealed and the

defendant cross appealed. Id., 159. This court held, inter

alia, that the fee cap statute applied to the personal

injury complaint that the plaintiff had brought on behalf

of the defendant, and that a fee agreement that required

payment of fees greater than permitted by the fee cap

statute is not enforceable and against public policy. Id.,

161, 169, 172. This court reversed the judgment in favor

of the plaintiff on the breach of contract and bad faith

counts, and ordered the case remanded with direction

to dismiss counts one and three of the complaint. Id.,

173. This court did not address count two, quantum

meruit, because neither party asked that the matter be

remanded for a hearing. Id., 158 n.10.

On remand to the trial court, the defendant filed a

‘‘Motion for Judgment’’ and moved for judgment as a

matter of law on count two. The trial court rendered

judgment in favor of the defendant on count two, quan-

tum meruit. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly

granted the defendant’s motion for judgment as to count

two of his complaint. Specifically, he argues that count

two was never decided on the merits by the jury and

he requests his day in court. Although count two is

captioned ‘‘unjust enrichment’’ and the plaintiff refers

to it as such throughout his brief, this court, in Parnoff

I, noted that the second count of the complaint ‘‘sets

forth a claim more properly viewed as one in quantum

meruit . . . .’’ Parnoff v. Yuille, supra, 139 Conn. App.

154. Accordingly, we will refer to it as such.

This court previously held that § 52-251c governs the

fee agreement at issue and that the fee agreement vio-

lated the provisions of § 52-251c, making the entire con-

tract unenforceable. Id., 161, 169. Thus, the only

question is whether, under these circumstances, an

attorney may nonetheless recover under the doctrine

of quantum meruit. We hold that a lawyer who is barred

from contract recovery because of the contract’s failure

to comply with the fee cap statute cannot recover under

the doctrine of quantum meruit.

We begin with the principles of law that guide our

discussion. ‘‘The determination of whether an equitable

doctrine applies in a particular case is a question of

law subject to plenary review.’’ Walpole Woodworkers,

Inc. v. Manning, 307 Conn. 582, 588, 57 A.3d 730 (2012).

‘‘Quantum meruit is a theory of contract recovery

that does not depend upon the existence of a contract,

either express or implied in fact. . . . Rather, quantum

meruit arises out of the need to avoid unjust enrichment

to a party, even in the absence of an actual agreement.

. . . Quantum meruit literally means as much as he has

deserved . . . . Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999).

Centered on the prevention of injustice, quantum meruit

strikes the appropriate balance by reevaluating the equi-

ties and guaranteeing that the party who has rendered

services receives a reasonable sum for those services.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 401, 766 A.2d 416

(2001).

In Parnoff I, this court discussed the public policy

considerations underlying § 52-251c. ‘‘If, as has been

stated, the purpose of the legislation when enacted was

to protect the public from overreaching attorneys,

enforcement of an overreaching fee agreement would

violate such a policy even where recovery is limited

to the statutory amounts because such a result would

create no disincentive for an overreaching attorney and

no corresponding public benefit. In other words, if an

attorney could be assured of a fee no less than the

amount provided by the fee cap statute, such an attor-

ney, if unscrupulous, would have no reason, based in

law, to limit fees to the statutory prescribed amount

because enforcement of the contract in accordance

with the statutorily permitted amount would simply

become the lowest possible fee recoverable. That out-

come, however, does not comport with the statute’s

stated purpose.’’ Parnoff v. Yuille, supra, 139 Conn.

App. 169–70.

In Parnoff I, this court was concerned with the public

policy implications of allowing an attorney who exe-

cuted a fee agreement in violation of § 52-251c to none-

theless recover under the contract, although at the

amount provided by the fee cap statute. Id., 170. These

same public policy concerns are present when an attor-

ney seeks to recover in quantum meruit. An attorney

who is permitted to recover in quantum meruit,

although unable to recover under the unenforceable

contract, would again, if unscrupulous, have no reason

based in law to limit fees as required by § 52-251c if he

knows that at the very least he can recover in quantum

meruit. Accordingly, to permit a recovery in quantum

meruit would render the statutory limits of the fee cap

statute a meaningless legislative gesture.

Although recovery under a theory alternative to § 52-

251c may sometimes be available, such is not the case

here. In Gagne v. Vaccaro, supra, 255 Conn. 392, our

Supreme Court held that § 52-251c did not prevent an

attorney from recovering from a successor attorney in

quantum meruit when the first attorney violated the

provisions of the fee cap statute. The court concluded

that the goal of the fee cap statute is to protect consum-

ers from attorneys who charged excessive contingency

fees. Id., 406. Therefore, the court concluded that the

fee cap statute did not preclude recovery in that case

because ‘‘[t]he ability of an attorney to recover from a

successor attorney does not endanger the important

public policy of protecting the public from excessive

legal fees, particularly when the plaintiff’s agreement

with the defendant is a separate transaction from the

plaintiff’s agreement with the [client].’’ (Internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) Id. In this case, allowing an attor-

ney to recover from a client in quantum meruit when

the fee agreement violated the fee cap statute would

violate the public policy of protecting the public from

excessive legal fees.

Further, the plain language of § 52-251c indicates that

other methods of recovery are forbidden by statute.

Section 52-251c (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any

such contingency fee agreement such fee shall be the

exclusive method for payment . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) Had the legislature intended to allow an attor-

ney to recover under equitable remedies, it could have

explicitly done so, as it did in other consumer oriented

statutes. For example, in determining the contours of

§ 52-251c, our Supreme Court has compared the fee cap

statute to the Home Improvement Act, General Statutes

§ 20-418 et seq. See Gagne v. Vaccaro, supra, 255 Conn.

404. The Home Improvement Act specifically permits

a noncompliant contractor to nevertheless recover

money due in quantum meruit, in certain circum-

stances.

Thus, had the legislature intended to allow an

attorney who violated the fee cap statute to nonetheless

recover under equitable remedies, it could have specifi-

cally provided for such.

Accordingly, an attorney is unable to recover in quan-

tum meruit when the attorney is barred from contrac-

tual recovery because the retainer fee agreement

violated the fee cap statute and the fee cap statute

precludes such recovery.

The plaintiff also claims that the trial court inappro-

priately acted on the defendant’s motion, which was

captioned ‘‘Motion for Judgment,’’ because a stand-

alone motion for judgment does not exist under our

rules of practice. We do not agree that the trial court

erred.

‘‘The interpretive construction of the rules of practice

is to be governed by the same principles as those regu-

lating statutory interpretation. . . . The interpretation

and application of a statute, and thus a Practice Book

provision, involves a question of law over which our

review is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn.

94, 99, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).

In Grimm v. Fox, 303 Conn. 322, 327 n.6, 33 A.3d

205 (2012), our Supreme Court held that a stand-alone

motion for judgment does not exist in Connecticut. The

court, however, construed the ‘‘Motion for Judgment’’

filed by the defendants in that case to be a motion for

summary judgment and found no error in the trial court

ruling on that motion. Id., 337. Furthermore, the caption

of a motion is not dispositive, and ‘‘we look to the

substance of the relief sought by the motion rather than

the form . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Farren v. Farren, 142 Conn. App. 145, 156, 64 A.3d 352,

cert. denied, 309 Conn. 903, 68 A.3d 658 (2013).

In Parnoff I, this court held that a fee agreement

governed by § 52-251c was the ‘‘exclusive method for

payment of the attorney . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Parnoff v. Yuille, supra, 139 Conn. App.

169. We have previously stated that ‘‘[t]he trial court

should examine the mandate and the opinion of the

reviewing court and proceed in conformity with the

views expressed therein.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) TDS Painting & Restora-

tion, Inc. v. Copper Beech Farm, Inc., 73 Conn. App.

492, 507, 808 A.2d 726, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 925, 814

A.2d 379 (2002). Thus, when the trial court rendered

judgment in favor of the defendant on the quantum

meruit count of the complaint, the trial court was acting

in conformity with this court’s holding in Parnoff I.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

General Statutes § 52-251c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In any claim

or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful

death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, the

attorney and the claimant may provide by contract, which contract shall

comply with all applicable provisions of the rules of professional conduct

governing attorneys adopted by the judges of the Superior Court, that the

fee for the attorney shall be paid contingent upon, and as a percentage of:

(1) Damages awarded and received by the claimant; or (2) the settlement

amount received pursuant to a settlement agreement.

‘‘(b) In any such contingency fee agreement such fee shall be the exclusive

method for payment of the attorney by the claimant and shall not exceed

an amount equal to a percentage of the damages awarded and received by

the claimant or of the settlement amount received by the claimant as follows:

(1) Thirty-three and one-third per cent of the first three hundred thousand

dollars; (2) twenty-five per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars;

(3) twenty per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; (4) fifteen

per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; and (5) ten per cent of

any amount which exceeds one million two hundred thousand dollars. . . .’’

General Statutes § 20-429 (f) provides: ‘‘Nothing in this section shall

preclude a contractor who has complied with subdivisions (1), (2), (6), (7)

and (8) of subsection (a) of this section from the recovery of payment for

work performed based on the reasonable value of services which were

requested by the owner, provided the court determines that it would be

inequitable to deny such recovery.’’