The History of the Police
The History of the Police
SECTION
1
Native American police officers—1883
I
t is important to examine the history of policing in the United States in order to understand how it has
progressed and changed over time. Alterations to the purpose, duties, and structure of American police
agencies have allowed this profession to evolve from ineffective watch groups to police agencies that incor-
porate advanced technology and problem-solving strategies into their daily operations. This section provides
an overview of the history of American policing, beginning with a discussion of the English influence of Sir
Robert Peel and the London Metropolitan Police. Next, early law enforcement efforts in Colonial America are
discussed using a description of social and political issues relevant to the police at that time. And finally, this
section concludes with a look at early police reform efforts and the tension this created between the police and
citizens in their communities. This section is organized in a chronological manner, identifying some of the
most important historical events and people who contributed to the development of American policing.
y The Beginning of American Policing:
The English Influence
American policing has been heavily influenced by the English system throughout the course of history. In
the early stages of development in both England and Colonial America, citizens were responsible for law
• Examine the English roots of American policing.
• Understand evolution from watch groups to formalized police agencies.
• Look at the professionalization of the police through reform.
Section Highlights
2
Section 1 The History of the Police 3
enforcement in their communities.
1
The English referred to this as kin police in which people were respon-
sible for watching out for their relatives or kin.
2
In Colonial America, a watch system consisting of citizen
volunteers (usually men) was in place until the mid-19th century.
3
Citizens that were part of watch groups
provided social services, including lighting street lamps, running soup kitchens, recovering lost children,
capturing runaway animals, and a variety of other services; their involvement in crime control activities at
this time was minimal at best.
4
Policing in England and Colonial America was largely ineffective, as it was
based on a volunteer system and their method of patrol was both disorganized and sporadic.
5
Sometime later, the responsibility of enforcing laws shifted from individual citizen volunteers to groups
of men living within the community; this was referred to as the frankpledge system in England.
6
The
frankpledge system was a semistructured system in which groups of men were responsible for enforcing the
law. Men living within a community would form groups of 10 called tythings (or tithings); 10 tythings were
then grouped into hundreds, and then hundreds were grouped into shires (similar to counties).
7
A person
called the shire reeve (sheriff) was then chosen to be in charge of each shire.
8
The individual members of
tythings were responsible for capturing criminals and bringing them to court, while shire reeves were
responsible for providing a number of services, including the oversight of the activities conducted by the
tythings in their shire.
9
A similar system existed in America during this time in which constables, sheriffs, and citizen-based
watch groups were responsible for policing in the colonies. Sheriffs were responsible for catching criminals,
working with the courts, and collecting taxes; law enforcement was not a top priority for sheriffs, as they
could make more money by collecting taxes within the community.
10
Night watch groups in Colonial
America, as well as day watch groups that were added at a later time, were largely ineffective; instead of
controlling crime in their community, some members of the watch groups would sleep and/or socialize
while they were on duty.
11
These citizen-based watch groups were not equipped to deal with the increasing
social unrest and rioting that were beginning to occur in both England and Colonial America in the late
1700s through the early 1800s.
12
It was at this point in time that publicly funded police departments began
to emerge across both England and Colonial America.
Sir Robert Peel and the London Metropolitan Police
In 1829, Sir Robert Peel (Home Secretary of England) introduced the Bill for Improving the Police in and
Near the Metropolis (Metropolitan Police Act) to Parliament with the goal of creating a police force to
manage the social conflict resulting from rapid urbanization and industrialization taking place in the city
of London.
13
Peel’s efforts resulted in the creation of the London Metropolitan Police on September 29,
1829.
14
Historians and scholars alike identify the London Metropolitan Police as the first modern police
department.
15
Sir Robert Peel is often referred to as the father of modern policing, as he played an integral
role in the creation of this department, as well as several basic principles that would later guide the forma-
tion of police departments in the United States. Past and current police officers working in the London
Metropolitan Police Department are often referred to as bobbies or peelers as a way to honor the efforts of
Sir Robert Peel.
16
Peel believed that the function of the London Metropolitan Police should focus primarily on crime
prevention—that is, preventing crime from occurring instead of detecting it after it had occurred. To do
this, the police would have to work in a coordinated and centralized manner, provide coverage across large
designated beat areas, and also be available to the public both night and day.
17
It was also during this time
that preventive patrol first emerged as a way to potentially deter criminal activity. The idea was that citizens
4 PART I OVERVIEW OF THE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES
would think twice about committing crimes if they noticed a strong police presence in their community.
This approach to policing would be vastly different from the early watch groups that patrolled the streets in
an unorganized and erratic manner.
18
Watch groups prior to the creation of the London Metropolitan Police
were not viewed as an effective or legitimate source of protection by the public.
19
It was important to Sir Robert Peel that the newly created London Metropolitan Police Department be
viewed as a legitimate organization in the eyes of the public, unlike the earlier watch groups.
20
To facilitate
this legitimation, Peel identified several principles that he believed would lead to credibility with citizens
including that the police must be under government control, have a military-like organizational structure,
and have a central headquarters that was located in an area that was easily accessible to the public.
21
He also
thought that the quality of men that were chosen to be police officers would further contribute to the orga-
nization’s legitimacy. For example, he believed that men who were even tempered and reserved and that
could employ the appropriate type of discipline to citizens would make the best police officers.
22
It was also
important to Peel that his men wear appropriate uniforms, display numbers (badge numbers) so that citi-
zens could easily identify them, not carry firearms, and receive appropriate training in order to be effective
at their work.
23
Many of these ideologies were also adopted by American police agencies during this time
period and remain in place in some contemporary police agencies across the United States. It is important
to note that recently, there has been some debate about whether Peel really espoused the previously men-
tioned ideologies or principles or if they are the result of various interpretations (or misinterpretations) of
the history of English policing.
24
y Policing in Colonial America
Similar to England, Colonial America experienced an increase in population in major cities during the
1700s.
25
Some of these cities began to see an influx of immigrant groups moving in from various countries
(including Germany, Ireland, Italy, and several Scandinavian countries), which directly contributed to the
rapid increase in population.
26
The growth in population also created an increase in social disorder and
unrest. The sources of social tension varied across different regions of Colonial America; however, the intro-
duction of new racial and ethnic groups was identified as a common source of discord.
27
Racial and ethnic
conflict was a problem across Colonial America, including both the northern and southern regions of the
country.
28
Since the watch groups could no longer cope with this change in the social climate, more formal-
ized means of policing began to take shape. Most of the historical literature describing the early develop-
ment of policing in Colonial America focuses specifically on the northern regions of the country while
neglecting events that took place in the southern region—specifically, the creation of slave patrols in the
South.
29
Slave patrols first emerged in South Carolina in the early 1700s, but historical documents also identify
the existence of slave patrols in most other parts of the southern region (refer to the Reichel article
included at the end of this section).
30
Samuel Walker identified slave patrols as the first publicly funded
police agencies in the American South.
31
Slave patrols (or “paddyrollers”) were created to manage the race-
based conflict occurring in the southern region of Colonial America; these patrols were created with the
specific intent of maintaining control over slave populations.
32
Interestingly, slave patrols would later
extend their responsibilities to include control over White indentured servants.
33
Salley Hadden identified
three principal duties placed on slave patrols in the South during this time, including searches of slave
lodges, keeping slaves off of roadways, and disassembling meetings organized by groups of slaves.
34
Slave
Section 1 The History of the Police 5
patrols were known for their high level of brutality and ruthlessness as they maintained control over the
slave population. The members of slave patrols were usually White males (occasionally a few women) from
every echelon in the social strata, ranging from very poor individuals to plantation owners that wanted to
ensure control over their slaves.
35
Slave patrols remained in place during the Civil War and were not completely disbanded after slavery
ended.
36
During early Reconstruction, several groups merged with what was formerly known as slave
patrols to maintain control over African American citizens. Groups such as the federal military, the state
militia, and the Ku Klux Klan took over the responsibilities of earlier slave patrols and were known to be
even more violent than their predecessors.
37
Over time, these groups began to resemble and operate similar
to some of the newly established police departments in the United States. In fact, David Barlow and Melissa
Barlow noted that “by 1837, the Charleston Police Department had 100 officers and the primary function
of this organization was slave patrol . . . these officers regulated the movements of slaves and free blacks,
checking documents, enforcing slave codes, guarding against slave revolts and catching runaway slaves.”
38
Scholars and historians assert that the transition from slave patrols to publicly funded police agencies was
seamless in the southern region of the United States.
39
While some regard slave patrol as the first formal attempt at policing in America, others identify
the unification of police departments in several major cities in the early to mid-1800s as the beginning
point in the development of modern policing in the United States.
40
For example, the New York City
Police Department was unified in 1845,
41
the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department in 1846,
42
the
Chicago Police Department in 1854,
43
and the Los Angeles Police Department in 1869,
44
to name a few.
These newly created police agencies adopted three distinct characteristics from their English counter-
parts: (1) limited police authority—the powers of the police are defined by law; (2) local control—local
governments bear the responsibility for providing police service; and (3) fragmented law enforcement
authority—several agencies within a defined area share the responsibility for providing police services,
which ultimately leads to problems with communication, cooperation, and control among these agen-
cies.
45
It is important to point out that these characteristics are still present in modern American police
agencies.
Other issues that caused debate within the newly created
American police departments at this time included whether
police officers should be armed and wear uniforms and to what
extent physical force should be used during interactions with
citizens.
46
Sir Robert Peel’s position on these matters was clear
when he formed the London Metropolitan Police Department.
He wanted his officers to wear distinguishable uniforms so that
citizens could easily identify them. He did not want his officers
armed, and he hired and trained his officers in a way that would
allow them to use the appropriate type of response and force
when interacting with citizens.
47
American police officers felt
that the uniforms would make them the target of mockery
(resulting in less legitimacy with citizens) and that the level of
violence occurring in the United States at that time warranted
them carrying firearms and using force whenever necessary.
48
Despite their objections, police officers in cities were required
to wear uniforms, and shortly after that, they were allowed to
Urban police officers, 1890
6 PART I OVERVIEW OF THE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES
carry clubs and revolvers in the mid-1800s.
49
In contemporary American police agencies, the dispute con-
cerning uniforms and firearms has long been resolved; however, the use of force by the police is still an issue
that incites debate in police agencies today.
y Policing in the United States, 1800–1970
One way to understand the history of American policing beginning in the 19th century through the 21st
century is to dissect it into a series of eras. Depending on which resource you choose, the number and
names of those eras will slightly vary; however, there is a general agreement on the influential people and
important events that took place over the course of the history of American policing. The article written by
George Kelling and Mark Moore included at the end of this section provides three eras as the framework for
an interesting and thorough discussion of the history and progression of policing in the United States. The
remainder of this section will continue to identify important people and events that have shaped and influ-
enced policing up through 1970.
Politics and the Police in America
(1800s–1900s)
A distinct characteristic of policing in the United
States during the 1800s is the direct and powerful
involvement of politics. During this time, policing was
heavily entrenched in local politics. The relationship
between the police and local politicians was reciprocal
in nature: politicians hired and retained police officers
as a means to maintain their political power, and in
return for employment, police officers would help
politicians stay in office by encouraging citizens to
vote for them.
50
The relationship was so close between
politicians and the police that it was common practice
to change the entire personnel of the police depart-
ment when there were changes to the local political
administration.
51
Politicians were able to maintain their control
over police agencies, as they had a direct hand in
choosing the police chiefs that would run the agen-
cies. The appointment to the position of police chief
came with a price. By accepting the position, police
chiefs had little control over decision making that
would impact their employees and agencies.
52
Many police chiefs did not accept the strong political pres-
ence in their agencies, and as a result, the turnover rate for chiefs of police at this time was very high. For
example, “Cincinnati went through seven chiefs between 1878 and 1886; Buffalo (NY) tried eight between
1879 and 1894; Chicago saw nine come and go between 1879 and 1897; and Los Angeles changed heads
thirteen times between 1879 and 1889.”
53
Politics also heavily influenced the hiring and promotion of
patrol officers. In order to secure a position as a patrol officer in New York City, the going rate was $300,
Police officers were viewed as an extension of politicians—1916.
Section 1 The History of the Police 7
while officers in San Francisco were required to pay $400.
54
In regard to promoted positions, the going rate
in New York City for a sergeant’s position was $1,600, and it was $12,000 to $15,000 for a position as cap-
tain.
55
Upon being hired, policemen were also expected to contribute a portion of their salary to support
the dominant political party.
56
Political bosses had control over nearly every position within police agen-
cies during this era.
Due to the extreme political influence during this time, there were virtually no standards for hiring or
training police officers.
57
Essentially, politicians within each ward would hire men that would agree to help
them stay in office and not consider whether they were the most qualified people for the job. August Vollmer
bluntly described the lack of standards during this era:
Under the old system, police officials were appointed through political affiliations and because of
this they were frequently unintelligent and untrained, they were distributed through the area to be
policed according to a hit-or-miss system and without adequate means of communication; they
had little or no record keeping system; their investigation methods were obsolete, and they had no
conception of the preventive possibilities of the service.
58
Mark Haller described the lack of training another way:
New policemen heard a brief speech from a high-ranking officer, received a hickory club, a whistle,
and a key to the callbox, and were sent out on the street to work with an experienced officer. Not
only were the policemen untrained in law, but they operated within a criminal justice system that
generally placed little emphasis upon legal procedure.
59
Police services provided to citizens included a variety of tasks related to health, social welfare, and law
enforcement. Robert Fogelson described police duties during this time as “officers cleaning streets . . .
inspecting boilers . . . distributed supplies to the poor . . . accommodated the homeless . . . investigated veg-
etable markets . . . operated emergency vehicles and attempted to curb crime.”
60
All of these activities were
conducted under the guise that it would keep the citizens (or voters) happy, which in turn would help keep
the political ward boss in office. This was a way to ensure job security for police officers, as they would likely
lose their jobs if their ward boss was voted out of office. In other cities across the United States, police offi-
cers provided limited services to citizens. Police officers spent time in local saloons, bowling alleys, restau-
rants, barbershops, and other business establishments during their shifts. They would spend most of their
time eating, drinking, and socializing with business owners when they were supposed to be patrolling the
streets.
61
There was also limited supervision over patrol officers during this time. Accountability existed only to
the political leaders that had helped the officers acquire their jobs.
62
In an essay, August Vollmer described
the limited supervision over patrol officers during earlier times:
A patrol sergeant escorted him to his post, and at hourly intervals contacted him by means of
voice, baton, or whistle. The sergeant tapped his baton on the sidewalk, or blew a signal with his
whistle, and the patrolman was obliged to respond, thus indicating his position on the post.
63
Sometime in the mid- to late 1800s, call boxes containing telephone lines linked directly to police
headquarters were implemented to help facilitate better communication between patrol officers, police
8 PART I OVERVIEW OF THE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES
supervisors, and central headquarters.
64
The lack of police supervi-
sion coupled with political control of patrol officers opened the door
for police misconduct and corruption.
65
Incidents of police corruption and misconduct were common
during this era of policing. Corrupt activities were often related to
politics, including the rigging of elections and persuading people to
vote a certain way, as well as misconduct stemming from abuse of
authority and misuse of force by officers.
66
Police officers would use
violence as an accepted practice when they believed that citizens
were acting in an unlawful manner. Policemen would physically
discipline juveniles, as they believed that it provided more of a
deterrent effect than arrest or incarceration. Violence would also be
applied to alleged perpetrators in order to extract information from
them or coerce confessions out of them (this was referred to as the
third degree). Violence was also believed to be justified in instances
in which officers felt that they were being disrespected by citizens.
It was acceptable to dole out “street justice” if citizens were noncom-
pliant to officers’ demands or requests. If citizens had a complaint
regarding the actions of police officers, they had very little recourse,
as police supervisors and local courts would usually side with
police officers.
One of the first groups appointed to examine complaints of
police corruption was the Lexow Commission.
67
After issuing 3,000
subpoenas and hearing testimony from 700 witnesses (which pro-
duced more than 10,000 pages of testimony), the report from the
Lexow investigation revealed four main conclusions:
68
First, the police did not act as “guardians of the public
peace” at the election polls; instead they acted as “agents of Tammany Hall.” Second, instead of suppressing
vice activities such as gambling and prostitution, officers allowed these activities to occur with the condition
that they receive a cut of the profits. Third, detectives only looked for stolen property if they would be given a
reward for doing so. And finally, there was evidence that the police often harassed law-abiding citizens and
individuals with less power in the community instead of providing police services to them. After the Lexow
investigation ended, several officers were fired and, in some cases, convicted of criminal offenses. Sometime
later, the courts reversed these decisions, allowing the officers to be rehired.
69
These actions by the courts
demonstrate the strength of political influence in American policing during this time period.
Policing Reform in the United States (1900s–1970s)
Political involvement in American policing was viewed as a problem by both the public and police reformers
in the mid- to late 19th century. Early attempts (in the 19th century) at police reform in the United States
were unsuccessful, as citizens tried to pressure police agencies to make changes.
70
Later on in the early 20th
century (with help from the Progressives), reform efforts began to take hold and made significant changes
to policing in the United States.
71
A goal of police reform included the removal of politics from American policing. This effort included
the creation of standards for recruiting and hiring police officers and administrators instead of allowing
Call boxes were the most common form of
communication used by police officers during the
political era.
Section 1 The History of the Police 9
politicians to appoint these individuals to help them carry out their political agendas. Another goal of police
reform during the early 1900s was to professionalize the police. This could be achieved by setting standards
for the quality of police officers hired, implementing better police training, and adopting various types of
technology to aid police officers in their daily operations (including motorized patrol and the use of two-
way radios).
72
The professionalization movement of the police in America resulted in police agencies
becoming centralized bureaucracies focused primarily on crime control.
73
The importance of the role of
“crime fighter” was highlighted in the Wickersham Commission report (1931), which examined rising
crime rates in the United States and the inability of the police to manage this problem. It was proposed in
this report that police officers could more effectively deal with rising crime by focusing their police duties
primarily on crime control instead of the social services that they had once provided in the political era.
74
In an article published in 1933, August Vollmer outlined some of the significant changes that he
believed had taken place in American policing from 1900 to 1930. The use of the civil service system in the
hiring and promotion of police officers was one way to help remove politics from policing and to set stan-
dards for police recruits. The implementation of effective police training programs was also an important
change during this time. The ability of police administrators to strategically distribute police force accord-
ing to the needs of each area or neighborhood was another change made to move toward a professional
model of policing. There was also an improved means of communication at this time, which included the
adoption of two-way radio systems. Many agencies also began to adopt more reliable record-keeping sys-
tems, improved methods for identifying criminals (including the use of fingerprinting systems), and more
advanced technologies used in criminal investigations (such as lie detectors and science-based crime labs).
Despite the heavy emphasis on crime control that began to emerge in the mid-1930s, some agencies began
to use crime-prevention techniques. And finally, this era saw the emergence of state highway police to aid in
the control of traffic, which had increased after the automobile was introduced in the United States.
75
Vollmer stated that all of these changes contributed to
the professionalization of the police in America.
O. W. Wilson was the protégé of August Vollmer.
His work essentially picked up where Vollmer’s left off
in the late 1930s. He started out as police chief in
Wichita, Kansas, and then moved on to establish the
School of Criminology at the University of California.
76
Wilson’s greatest contribution to American policing
lies within police administration. Specifically, his
vision involved the centralization of police agencies;
this includes both organizational structure and man-
agement of personnel.
77
Wilson is also credited with
creating a strategy for distributing patrol officers
within a community based on reported crimes and
calls for service. His book, Police Administration, pub-
lished in 1950, became the “bible of police manage-
ment” and ultimately defined how professional police
agencies would be managed for many decades that
followed.
78
It is clear that the work of Vollmer and Wilson
helped American policing advance beyond that of the
Radar “speed reader” in patrol car—1954
10 PART I OVERVIEW OF THE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES
political era; however, Harlan Haun and Judson
Jeffries argue that police reforms of the 1950s
and 1960s neglected the relationship between the
police and the public.
79
The relationship deterio-
rated between the two groups because the citi-
zens called for police services that were mostly
noncriminal in nature, and the police responded
with a heavy emphasis on crime control.
80
The
distance between these two groups would
become even greater as the social climate began
to change in the United States.
The 1950s marked the beginning of a social
movement that would bring race relations to the
attention of all Americans. Several events involv-
ing African American citizens ignited a series of
civil rights marches and demonstrations across
the country in the mid-1950s. For example, in
December 1955, Rosa Parks was arrested after
she violated a segregation ordinance by refusing
to move to the back of the bus. Her arrest trig-
gered what is now referred to as the Montgomery
bus boycott.
81
African American citizens car-
pooled instead of using the city bus system to
protest segregation ordinances. Local police
began to ticket Black motorists at an increasing
pace to retaliate against the boycott. In one
instance, Martin Luther King Jr. was arrested for
driving 5 miles per hour over the posted speed
limit.
82
Arrests were made at any type of sit-in or
protest, whether they were peaceful or not.
Research focused on the precipitants and under-
lying conditions that contributed to race riots
during this time period identified police pres-
ence and police actions as the major conditions
that were present prior to most of the race riots in the 1950s and 1960s.
83
In addition, the President’s Com-
mission on Civil Disorder (also known as the Kerner Commission) reported that “almost invariably the
incident that ignites disorder arises from police action.”
84
Social disorder resulting from protests, marches, and rioting in the 1960s resulted in frequent
physical clashes between the police and the public. It was during this time that people across the United
States began to see photographs in newspapers and news reports on television that featured incidents of
violence between these two groups. The level of violence and force being used by police officers was
shocking to some citizens, as they had not been exposed to it through visual news media in the past. One
of the most recognized examples of this type of violence was the clash between police and protesters at
the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August of 1968.
85
Graphic photos of the police hitting,
Police officers focused on order maintenance during war protests—1969.
Police reform resulted in police officers shifting their focus to crime
control—1960.
Section 1 The History of the Police 11
pushing, and arresting protesters were featured on the national news and in many national printed pub-
lications. These types of incidents contributed to the public-relations problem experienced by American
police during the 1960s.
Any police reform efforts taking place in the 1960s were based heavily on a traditional model of polic-
ing. Traditional policing focuses on responding to calls for service and managing crimes in a reactive man-
ner.
86
This approach to policing focuses on serious crime as opposed to issues related to social disorder and
citizens’ quality of life. The traditional policing model places great importance on the number of arrests
police officers make or how fast officers can respond to citizens’ calls for service.
87
In addition, this policing
strategy does not involve a cooperative effort between the police and citizens. Richard Adams and his col-
leagues described it best when they stated that “traditional policing tends to stress the role of police officers
in controlling crime and views citizens’ role in the apprehension of criminals as minor players at best and
as part of the problem at worst.”
88
The use of traditional policing practices coupled with the social unrest
that was taking place during the 1960s contributed to the gulf that was widening between the police and
citizens.
SUMMARY
• American policing was influenced by Sir Robert Peel and the London Metropolitan Police.
• Policing in Colonial America consisted of voluntary watch groups formed by citizens; these groups were
unorganized and considered ineffective.
• Slaves patrols in the southern region of the United States were used to control slave populations and have been
identified by some scholars and historians as the first formal police agencies in this country.
• Politics played a major role in American policing in the 1800s. Political involvement was believed to be at the
core of police corruption present in the agencies at that time.
• Police reform was geared toward making the police more “professional.”
call box
frankpledge system
London Metropolitan Police
political era
reform era
Sir Robert Peel
slave patrols
third degree
tything
KEY TERMS
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Why is Sir Robert Peel important to the development of policing in the United States?
2. Describe some of the duties associated with the early watch groups in the United States in the mid-19th century.
12 PART I OVERVIEW OF THE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES
3. Identify several principles espoused by Sir Robert Peel as he began to assemble the London Metropolitan
Police Department.
4. What was O. W. Wilson’s main contribution to American policing?
5. Explain how the traditional model of policing contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between
police and citizens in the United States during the 1960s.
WEB RESOURCES
• To learn more about Sir Robert Peel, go to http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/peel_sir_robert
.shtml.
• To learn about some important dates in the history of American law enforcement, go to http://www.nleomf
.org/facts/enforcement/impdates.html.
• To learn more about the history of police technology, go to http://www.police-technology.net/id59.html.
How to Read a Research Article 13
Y
ou will likely hear your instructor say, “According to the research . . . ” or “The research tells us . . . ”
several times during class when he or she is presenting material from this book. All of the informa-
tion contained in the authored sections of this text/reader is based on research. In addition, the
journal articles included at the end of every section feature studies conducted by researchers. You might be
asking yourself, “How do I read a journal article?” The following pages provide a brief description of the
information that is typically included in peer-reviewed journal articles. I also provide a set of questions that
you should be able to answer after you have finished reading a journal article. This information is intended
to help you navigate your way through the journal articles included at the end of each section in this book.
Most research articles that are published in peer-reviewed, academic journals will have the following
components: (1) introduction, (2) literature review, (3) methodology, (4) findings/results, and (5) discus-
sion/conclusion section. It is important to note that the components found within journal articles will vary.
Some journal articles may not contain all of the traditional components. In fact, some articles that outline
the tenets of a proposed theory will not have any of the main components. This type of article is purely
descriptive. The articles included at the end of the first section of this text/reader fall into the descriptive
category. There are some articles in which the components are not clearly identified by the traditional sub-
headings (as they may use alternative subheading titles) but are discussed within the text of the article. In
most cases, however, the five traditional components will be easy to identify if the author of the article has
included them.
y Introduction
Journal articles usually begin with an introduction section. The introduction identifies the purpose of the
study. The introduction usually provides a broader context for the research questions or hypotheses being
tested in the study. The reasons the study is important are also usually included in the introduction of a
journal article.
y Literature Review
Most journal articles provide an overview of the published literature related to the topic of the study. Some
authors prefer to combine the literature review with the introduction section. The purpose of the literature
review is to present studies that have already been conducted on the research topic featured in the journal
article. By reviewing the literature, authors can highlight how their research will contribute to the existing
body of research or explain how their study is unique when compared to previous studies.
y Methodology
The methodology section describes how the study was conducted. This section usually includes informa-
tion about who or what was studied, the research site(s), the type of data collected for the study, how long
How to Read a Research Article
14 PART I OVERVIEW OF THE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES
the study lasted, and how the data were analyzed by the researcher(s). The reader will usually be able to
determine whether the study is quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of both after reading this section.
The information included in this section should include enough detail so that the reader can understand
exactly how the study was conducted. In addition, the high level of detail in this section allows other
researchers to replicate the study in other research sites if they choose to do so.
y Findings/Results
The findings/results section explains what the researcher found when he or she analyzed the data. Research
findings are expressed using numbers in a series of tables if the research is quantitative in nature. If the
study utilized qualitative data, the research findings will consist of descriptions of patterns and themes that
were discovered within the textual data. This section is important because the research findings tell the
reader about the outcome of the study.
y Discussion/Conclusion
The discussion/conclusion section usually provides a brief recap of the purpose of the study and a general
description of the main research findings. This part of the journal article explains why the research findings
are important or what policy implications result from the research findings. This is also the point in the
article at which the author points out the limitations of the study. And finally, this section usually contains
several suggestions for future research on the topic featured in the study.
Now that you have an understanding of the parts of a journal article, I will use the article written by
Weisheit, Wells, and Falcone in Section 3 of this text to demonstrate how you can apply the five components
we just discussed above.
y Community Policing in Small Town and Rural America
By Ralph A. Weisheit, L. Edward Wells, and David N. Falcone
1. What is the purpose of the study in this article?
The purpose of the study is mentioned at the end of the third paragraph of the paper—“This
article examines the idea of community policing by considering the fit between the police practices
in rural areas and the philosophy of community policing as an urban phenomenon.” The authors
also hypothesize that “. . . experiences in rural areas provide examples of successful community
policing” and that their comparison “raises questions about the simple applicability of these ideas
to urban settings.”
2. Do the authors present any literature that is directly or indirectly related to their study?
Yes. The authors begin with a section that discusses what community policing is so that the reader
is familiar with this topic. Next, under the subheading “Existing Evidence,” the authors state,
“Although there have been no studies that directly examine the extent to which rural policing
reflects many key elements of community policing, there are many scattered pieces of evidence with
which one can make this case.” In the paragraphs that follow, they present evidence from past stud-
ies that supports the idea that they hypothesized in the beginning of the paper.
How to Read a Research Article 15
3. How was the study conducted? Specifically, how do the authors describe their research
design/methodology and data analysis?
Under the subheading “The Study,” the authors describe the methodology/research design. They
mention that the article is based on interviews that were conducted as part of a larger research
project. Unstructured interviews were conducted with 46 rural sheriffs and 28 police chiefs in small
towns. Some of the interviews were conducted face to face, while others were conducted over the
telephone. The length of the interviews ranged from 20 minutes to 2 hours; the average interview
lasted 40 minutes. The authors describe some of the questions covered during the interviews. The
authors do not specifically explain how they analyzed the interview data; however, it appears as
though they looked for themes in the interview data and compared them to findings from previous
studies on community policing. This is a qualitative, exploratory study in which the authors are
laying the groundwork for future studies on this topic. It is exploratory because no other studies
have been conducted on this specific topic.
4. What are the main research findings?
After examining the interview data, the authors found several ways that rural policing mirrors com-
munity policing (the findings section begins under the heading “Observations”). First, they identify
“community connections” as one of the ways that rural policing mirrors community policing. They
describe how the two are similar and then provide quotes from the interview data to support this
finding. They also identify “general problem solving” and “effectiveness” as two other similarities
between rural policing and community policing. The authors then make a comparison between rural
and urban policing when they interviewed chiefs of police and sheriffs that previously worked in an
urban setting. The individuals with work experience in both settings reported a difference in the way
they policed in both settings (once again this is supported by quotes from the interview data).
5. What does the article include in the conclusion/discussion section?
Under the subheading “Discussion,” the authors provide a brief and general overview of the find-
ings. They also provide further evidence of similarities between rural policing and community
policing through the use of additional quotes. They conclude the article by stating that a more
extensive study on rural policing is needed in order to state conclusively that rural policing and
community policing are similar in operation and outcomes. The authors do not point out the limita-
tions of their study in the conclusion section; instead, they state that this is an exploratory study that
is only a portion of a larger study with a different focus.
As you work your way through this text/reader, you will notice how the journal articles included at the
end of each section vary in their organization and presentation of content. If you do not find all (or any) of
the five main components in some of the articles, keep in mind that the purpose of the article may not be
to present a research study. Several of the articles are descriptive in nature: they present ideas about various
topics in policing. Regardless of the format or presentation of information, the articles will provide valuable
information that will help you further understand policing in the United States.
16 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
READING 1
In this article, Philip Reichel provides a comprehensive overview of slave patrols of the South. Slave patrols
consisted of mostly White citizens who monitored the activities of slaves. Reichel asserts that modern policing
has passed through various developmental stages that can be explained by typologies (i.e., informal, transi-
tional, and modern types of policing).
Southern Slave Patrols as a
Transitional Police Type
Philip L. Reichel
A
ccounts of the developmental history of Amer-
ican policing have tended to concentrate on
happenings in the urban North. While the lit-
erature is replete with accounts of the growth of law
enforcement in places like Boston (Lane, 1967; Savage,
1865), Chicago (Flinn, 1975), Detroit (Schneider, 1980)
and New York City (Richardson, 1970), there has been
minimal attention paid to police development outside
the North. It seems unlikely that other regions of the
country simply mimicked that development regardless
of their own peculiar social, economic, political, and
geographical aspects. In fact, Samuel Walker (1980) has
briefly noted that eighteenth and nineteenth century
Southern cities had developed elaborate police patrol
systems in an effort to control the slave population.
Walker even suggested these slave patrols were precur-
sors to the police (1980: 59). As a forerunner to the
police, it would seem that slave patrols should have
become a well researched example in our attempt to
better understand the development of American law
enforcement. However, the regionalism of many exist-
ing histories has meant that criminal justicians and
practitioners are often unaware of the existence of, and
the role played by, Southern slave patrols. This means
our knowledge of the history of policing is incomplete
and regionally biased. This article responds to that
problem by focusing attention on the development of
law enforcement in the Southern slave states (i.e., Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Car-
olina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia)
during the colonial and antebellum years. The particu-
lar question to be answered is: were Southern slave
patrols precursors to modern policing?
Answering the research question requires clarifi-
cation of the term precursor. The concept of a precur-
sor to police implies there are stages of development
preceding the point at which a modern police force is
achieved. Several authors have looked at specific
factors which influenced the development of police
organizations in particular cities. Fewer have tried to
make generalizations about police growth across the
society. The latter group, which includes Bacon (1939),
Lundman (1980) and Monkkonen (1981), draw on
case studies of certain cities to hypothesize a develop-
mental sequence explaining modernization of police
Author’s Note: Historian Gail Rowe and two anonymous American Journal of Police referees provided me with invaluable assistance and suggestions for which I
am most grateful. This is an extensively revised version of a paper presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences.
READING 1 Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type 17
in America. Lundman (1980), however, presents his
ideas with the help of a typology of police systems.
1
The advantage of a historical typology is that it allows
conceptualization of a developmental sequence and
can therefore be most helpful in determining whether
or not slave patrols can be viewed as a part of that
sequence.
y The Stages of Police
Development
Lundman (1980) has suggested three types or systems
of policing: informal, transitional, and modern. Infor-
mal policing is characterized by community members
sharing responsibility for maintaining order. Such a
system was typical of societies with little division of
labor and a great deal of homogeneity. There existed
among the people, a “collective conscience” which
allowed them willingly to participate in the identifica-
tion and apprehension of rule violators. As society
grew, people had wider-ranging jobs and interests.
Agreement as to what was right and wrong became less
complete and informal police systems became less
effective. Society’s response was the development of
transitional policing which served as a bridge between
the informal and modern types. In that capacity, the
transitional systems included aspects of the informal
networks but also anticipated modern policing in
terms of offices and procedures.
Identification of the point at which a police
department becomes modern has not been agreed
upon. Bacon, for example, cited six factors to be met:
1) city-wide jurisdiction; 2) twenty-four-hour respon-
sibility; 3) a single organization in charge of the
greater part of formal enforcement; 4) a paid person-
nel on a salary basis; 5) a personnel occupied solely
with police duties, and 6) general rather than specific
functions (1939: 6). At the other extreme is Monk-
konen’s (1981) suggestion that the decisive movement
to a modern police department occurs when the police
adopt a uniform. Lundman follows Bacon but identi-
fies only four distinctive characteristics of modern
policing (1980: 17). First, there are persons recognized
as having full-time police responsibilities. Also, there
is 2) continuity in office as well as 3) continuity in
procedure. Finally, for a system to be considered mod-
ern it must have 4) accountability to a central govern-
mental authority.
Those four characteristics incorporate most of
Bacon’s suggestions but ignore Monkkonen’s. Walker,
however, found the use of uniforms as a starting point
for modern policing to be “utter nonsense” (1982: 216),
since the development process was not the same in
every city and the new agencies varied so much in size
and strength.
2
Instead, Lundman’s characteristics seem
appropriately chosen for present needs to identify the
modern police type.
Existing histories of law enforcement provide
significant information about informal (e.g. consta-
bles, day and night watches) and modern (e.g. London,
New York City, Boston) types, but tend to ignore
examples of what Lundman might call transitional.
The implication is that modern policing was the result
of simple formalization of informal systems. This
article offers Southern slave patrols as an example of
policing which went beyond informal but was not yet
modern. Because few people are aware of them, the
patrols will be described before being linked to transi-
tional police types.
y A Description of
Southern Slave Patrols
A number of variables influence the development of
formal mechanisms of social control. Lundman’s review
of the literature (1980: 24) identified four important
factors: 1) an actual or perceived increase in crime; 2)
public riots; 3) public intoxication; and 4) a need
1
Lundman’s typology of police systems is not to be confused with other typologies (e.g., Wilson’s 1968 policing styles) which differentiate contemporary as
opposed to the historical types Lundman addresses.
2
Monkkonen’s reasons for using uniforms as the starting date can be found in his book (1981: 39–45, 53) and in an article (1982: 577).
18 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
to control the “dangerous classes.” Bacon (1939) in a
comprehensive yet infrequently cited work, took a
somewhat different approach. He identified three
factors of social change influencing development of
modern police departments: 1) increased economic
specialization; 2) formation and increasing stratifica-
tion of classes; and 3) increase in population size. As a
result of these social changes Bacon argues there comes
“an increase in fraud, in public disorders, and in legis-
lation limiting personal freedom” which pre-existing
forms of maintaining order (e.g. family, church, neigh-
borhood) are unable to handle (1939: 782). Variations
in enforcement procedures then occur which are
“pointed at specific groups, economic specialists, and
certain times, places, and objects” until eventually there
is a “tendency for specialists to become unified and
organized” (Bacon, 1939: 782–783).
Given the scholarly works identifying such numer-
ous and intertwined variables affecting the develop-
ment of police agencies, it is potentially misleading to
concentrate on just one of those factors. However, his-
torical accounts of social control techniques in the
South seem to suggest that a concern with class strati-
fication (Lundman’s fourth factor and Bacon’s second)
played a primary role in the development of formal
systems of control in that region. Although the conflicts
presented by immigrants and the poor have been
shown to be important in the development of police in
London, New York, and Boston (Lundman, 1980: 29),
the conflicts presented by slaves have received very lit-
tle attention. Bacon compared slaves to Southern whites
and found the folkways and mores of the two castes
were so different that “continual and obvious force was
required if society were to be maintained” (1939: 772).
The continual and obvious force developed by the
South to control its version of the “dangerous classes”
was the slave patrol. Before discussing those patrols it is
necessary to understand why the slaves constituted a
threat.
3
Slaves as a Dangerous Class
The portrayal of slaves as docile, happy, and generally
content with their bondage has been successfully
challenged in recent decades. We can today express
amazement that slaveowners could have been unaware
of their slaves’ unhappiness, yet some whites were
continually surprised that slaves resisted their status.
Such an attitude was not found only among Southern
slaveowners. In a 1731 advertisement for a fugitive
slave, a New England master was dismayed that this
slave had run away “without the least provocation”
(quoted in Foner, 1975: 264). Whether provoked in the
eyes of slaveholders or not, slaves did resist their
bondage. That resistance generally took one of three
forms: running away, criminal acts and conspiracies
or revolts. Any of those actions constituted a danger
to whites.
The number of slaves who ran away is difficult to
determine (Foner, 1975: 264). However, it was certainly
one of the greatest problems of slave government (Pat-
erson, 1968: 20). Resistance by running away was easier
for younger, English-speaking, skilled slaves, but
records indicate slaves of all ages and abilities had
attempted escape in this manner (Foner, 1975: 260).
Criminal acts by slaves have also been linked to resis-
tance. Foner (1975: 265–268) notes instances of theft,
robbery, crop destruction, arson and poison as being
typical. Georgia legislation in 1770 which provided the
death penalty for slaves found guilty of even attempting
to poison whites was said to be necessary because “the
detestable crime of poisoning hath frequently been
committed by slaves.” A 1761 issue of the Charleston
Gazette complained “the Negroes have again begun the
hellish practice of poisoning” (both quoted in Foner,
1975: 267).
Possibly the most fear-invoking resistance how-
ever, were the slave conspiracies and revolts: Such
action occurred as early as 1657, but the largest slave
3
Some may find the explanation of slaves as a danger to be an exercise in the obvious, but Walker’s (1982) comments provide a guiding principle. He suggests
that “constructing a thesis around presumed existence of a dangerous class is…a sloppy bit of historical writing” unless we are told who composed the group,
where they stood in the social structure and in what respect they are a danger (Walker, 1982: 215). While the “who” (slaves) and “where” (at the very bottom)
questions have been addressed above and countless other places, the “what” question is less understood.
READING 1 Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type 19
uprising in colonial America took place on September
9, 1739 near the Stono River several miles from Charles-
ton. Forty Negroes and twenty whites were killed and
the resulting uproar had important impact on slave
regulations. For example, South Carolina patrol legisla-
tion in 1740, noted:
Foreasmuch as many late horrible and bar-
barous massacres have been actually com-
mitted and many more designed, on the
white inhabitants of this Province, by negro
slaves, who are generally prone to such cruel
practices, which makes it highly necessary
that constant patrols should be established
(Cooper, 1938b: 568).
Neighboring Georgians were also concerned
with the actuality and potential for slave revolts. The
preamble of their 1757 law establishing and regulating
slave patrols argues:
it is absolutely necessary for the Security of
his Majesty’s Subjects in this Province, that
Patrols should be established under proper
Regulations in the settled parts thereof, for
the better keeping of Negroes and other Slaves
in Order and prevention of any Cabals, Insur-
rections or other Irregularities amongst them
(Candler, 1910: 225).
Each of the three areas of resistance aided in slaves
being perceived as a dangerous class. There was, how-
ever, another variable with overriding influence. Unlike
the other three factors, this aspect was less direct and
less visible. That latent variable was the number of
slaves in the total population of several colonies. While
Table 1 Colonial, Populations by Race, 1680 to 1780
a
Percentages
South Carolina
b
North Carolina
c
Virginia
d
Georgia
e
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1680 83 17 96 4 96 4 - -
1700 57 43
f
94 4 87 13 - -
1720 30 70 86 14 76 24 (1715) - -
1740 33 67 79 21 68 32 (1743) 80 20 (1750)
1760 36 64 (1763) 79 21 (1764) 50 50 (1763) 63 37
1780 58 42 (1785) 67 33 (1775) 52 43 70 30 (1776)
a
The sources used to gather these are many and varied. The resulting percentages should be viewed as estimates to indicate trends rather than indication of
exact distribution. Slave free blacks and in the early years, Indian slaves, are not included under “black.”
b
1680, 1700, 1720 and 1740 from Simmons (1976: 125); 1763 and 1785 from Greene and Harrington (1966: 172–176).
c
1680, 1700, 1720 and 1740 from Simmons (1976: 125); 1764 from Foner (1975: 208); 1775 from Green and Harrington (19666: 156–160).
d
1680, 1715, 1743, 1763 and 1780 from Greene and Harrington (1966: 134–143); 1700 from Wells (1975: 161).
e
Georgia was not settled until 1733 and although they were illegally imported in the mid-1740 slaves were not legally allowed until 1750 from Wells (1975: 170);
1760 from Foner (1975: 213); 1776 from Greene and Harrington (1968: 180–183).
f
Wood (1974: 143) believes black inhabitants exceeded white inhabitants in South Carolina around 1708.
20 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
an interest in knowing the continuous whereabouts of
slaves was present throughout the colonies, slave con-
trol by formal means (e.g., specialized legislation and
forces) was more often found in those areas where
slaves approached, or in fact were, the numerical
majority. Table 1 provides population percentages for
some of the Southern colonies/states. When consider-
ing the sheer number of persons to be controlled it is
not surprising that whites often felt vulnerable.
The Organization and Operation of
Slave Patrols
4
Consistent with the earliest enforcement techniques
identified in English and American history, the first
means of controlling slaves was informal in nature. In
1686 a South Carolina statute said anyone could appre-
hend, chastise and send home any slave found off his/
her plantation without authorization. In 1690 such
action was made everyone’s duty or be fined forty shil-
lings (Henry, 1968: 31). Enforcement of slavery by the
average citizen was not to be taken lightly. A 1705 act in
Virginia made it legal “for any person or persons what-
soever, to kill or destroy such slaves (i.e. runaways)…
without accusation or impeachment of any crime for
the same” (quoted in Foner, 1975: 195). Eventually,
however, such informal means became inadequate. As
the social changes suggested by Bacon (1939) took
place and the fear of slaves as a dangerous class height-
ened, special enforcement officers developed and pro-
vided a transition to modern police with general
enforcement powers.
In their earliest stages, slave patrols were part of
the colonial militias. Royal charters empowered gover-
nors to defend colonies and that defense took the form
of a militia for coast and frontier defense (Osgood,
1957). All able-bodied males between 16 and 60 were to
be enrolled in the militia and had to provide their
own weapons and equipment (Osgood, 1957; Shy,
1980; Simmons, 1976). Although the militias were
regionally diverse and constantly changing (Shy, 1980),
Anderson’s (1984) comments about the Massachusetts
Bay Colony militia notes an important distinction that
was reflected in other colonies. At the beginning of the
18
th
century, Massachusetts’ militia was defined not so
much as an army but “as an all-purpose military infra-
structure” (Anderson, 1984: 27) from which volunteers
were drawn for the provincial armies. This concept of
the militia as a pool from which persons could be
drawn for special duties was the basis for colonial slave
patrols.
Militias were active at different levels throughout
the colonies. New York and South Carolina militias were
required to be particularly active. New York was men-
aced by the Dutch and French-Iroquois conflicts while
South Carolina had to be defended against the Indians,
Spanish, and pirates. By the middle of the Eighteenth
century the colonies were being less threatened by
external forces and attention was being turned to inter-
nal problems. As early as 1721 South Carolina began
shifting militia duty away from external defense to
internal security. In that year, the entire militia was
made available for the surveillance of slaves (Osgood,
1974). The early South Carolina militia law had enrolled
both Whites and Blacks, and in the Yamassee war of
1715 some four hundred Negroes helped six hundred
white men defeat the Indians (Shy, 1980). Eventually,
however, South Carolinians did not dare to arm Negroes.
With the majority of the population being black (see
Table 1) and the increasing danger of slave revolts, the
South Carolina militia essentially became a “local anti-
slave police force and (was) rarely permitted to partici-
pate in military operations outside its boundaries”
(Simmons, 1976: 127).
Despite their link to militia, slave patrols were a
separate entity. Each slave state had codes of laws for
the regulation of slavery. These slave codes authorized
and outlined the duties of the slave patrols. Some towns
had their own patrols, but they were more frequent in
the rural areas. The presence of constables and a more
equal distribution of whites and blacks made the need
for the town patrols less immediate. In the rural areas,
4
Information about slave patrols is found primarily in the writings of historians as they describe aspects of the slaves’ life in the South. Data for this article were
gathered from those secondary sources but also, for South Carolina and Georgia, from some primary accounts including colonial records, Eighteenth and
Nineteenth century statutes and writings by former slaves.
READING 1 Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type 21
however, the slaves were more easily able to participate
in “dangerous” acts. It is not surprising that the slave
patrols came to be viewed as “rural police” (cf. Henry,
1968: 42). South Carolina Governor Bull described the
role of the patrols in 1740 by writing:
The interior quiet of the Province is provided
for the small Patrols, drawn every two months
from each company, who do duty by riding
along the roads and among the Negro Houses
in small districts in every Parish once a week,
or as occasion requires (quoted in Wood,
1974: 276 note 23).
Documentation of slave patrols is found for nearly
all the Southern colonies and states
5
but South Carolina
seems to have been the oldest, most elaborate, and best
documented. That is not surprising given the impor-
tance of the militia in South Carolina and the presence
of large numbers of Blacks. Georgia’s developed some-
what later and exemplifies patrols in the late 18th and
early 19th centuries. The history and development of
slave patrol legislation in South Carolina and Georgia
provides a historical review from colonial through
antebellum times.
In 1704 the colony of Carolina
6
presented what
appears to be the South’s first patrol act. The patrol was
linked to the militia yet separate from it since patrol
duty was an excuse from militia duty. Under this act,
militia captains were to select ten men from their com-
panies to form these special patrols. The captain was to
muster all the men under his command, and
with them ride from plantation to plantation,
and into any plantation, within the limits or
precincts, as the General shall think fitt and
take up all slaves which they shall meet with-
out their master’s plantation which have not a
permit or ticket from their masters, and the
same punish (Cooper, 1837: 255).
That initial act seemed particularly concerned with
runaway slaves, while an act in 1721 suggests an
increased concern with uprisings. The act ordered the
patrols to try to “prevent all caballings amongst negroes,
by dispersing of them when drumming or playing, and
to search all negro houses for arms or other offensive
weapons” (McCord, 1841: 640). In addition to that con-
cern the new act also responded to complaints that
militia duty was being shirked by the choicest men who
were doing patrol duty instead of militia duty (Bacon,
1939; Henry, 1968; McCord, 1841; Wood, 1974). As a
result, the separate patrols were merged with the colonial
militia and patrol duty was simply rotated among differ-
ent members of the militia. From 1721 to 1734 there
really were no specific slave patrols in South Carolina.
The duty of supervising slaves was simply a militia duty.
In 1734 the Provincial Assembly set up a regular
patrol once again separate from the militia (Cooper
1838a, p. 395). “Beat companies” of five men (Captain
and four regular militia men) received compensation
(captains $50 and privates $25 per year) for patrol duty
and exemption from other militia duty. There was one
patrol for each of 33 districts in the colony. Patrols
obeyed orders from and were appointed by district
commissioners and were given elaborate search and
seizure powers as well as the right to administer up to
twenty lashes (Cooper 1838a: 395–397).
7
Since provincial acts usually expired after three
years, South Carolina’s 1734 Act was revised in 1737
5
See Resc. (1976) for Alabama; O.W. Taylor (1958) for Arkansas; Flanders (1967) for Georgia; Coleman (1940) and McDougle (1970) for Kentucky; Bacon
(1939), J.G. Taylor (1963) and Williams (1972) for Louisiana; Sydnor (1933) for Mississippi; Trexler (1969) for Missouri; Johnson (1937) for North Carolina;
Patterson (1968) and Mooney (1971) for Tennessee; and Ballagh (1968) and Stewart (1976) for Virginia.
6
In 1712 the northern two-thirds of Carolina was divided into two parts (North Carolina and South Carolina) while the southern one third remained unsettled
until 1733 when Oglethorpe founded Georgia.
7
The right to administer a punishment to slaves was given to patrols in other colonies and states as well. Patrols in North Carolina could administer fifteen
lashes (Johnson, 1937: 516) as could those in Tennessee (Patterson, 1968: 39) and Mississippi (Sydnor, 1933: 78) while Georgia (Candler, 1910: 232) and
Arkansas (O.W. Taylor, 1958: 210) followed South Carolina in allowing twenty lashes.
22 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
and again in 1740. Under the 1737 revision, the paid
recruits were replaced with volunteers who were
encouraged to enlist by being excused from militia and
other public duty for one year and were allowed to elect
their own captain (Cooper 1838b; 456–458). The num-
ber of men on patrol was increased from five to fifteen
and they were to make weekly rounds. Henry (1968: 33)
believed these changes were an attempt to dissuade
irresponsible persons who had been attracted to patrol
duty for the pay.
The 1740 revision seems to be the first legislation
specifically including women plantation owners as
answerable for patrol service (Cooper 1838b; 569–570).
The plantation owners (male or female) could, however,
procure any white person between 16 and 60 to ride
patrol for them. In addition, the 1740 act said patrol
duty was not to be required in townships where white
inhabitants were in far superior numbers to the Negroes
(Cooper 1838b; 571). Such an exemption certainly
highlights the role of patrols as being to control what
was perceived as a dangerous class.
At this point we turn to the Georgia slave patrols as
an example of one that developed after South Carolina
set a precedent. Georgia was settled late (1733) com-
pared to the other colonies and despite her proximity to
South Carolina she did not make immediate use of
slaves. In fact while slaves were illegally imported in the
mid 1740s, they were not legally allowed until 1750.
Within seven years Georgians felt a need for control of
the slaves. Her first patrol act (1757) provided for mili-
tia captains to pick up to seven patrollers from a list of
all plantation owners (women and men) and all male
white persons in the patrol district (Candler 1910:
225–235). The patrollers or their substitutes were to
ride patrol at least once every two weeks and examine
each plantation in their district at least once every
month. The patrols were to seek out potential run-
aways, weapons, ammunition, or stolen goods.
The 1757 Act was continued in 1760 (Candler
1910: 462) for a period of five years. The 1765 continu-
ation (Cobb 1851: 965) increased the number of patrollers
to a maximum of ten, but left the duties and structure
of the patrol as it was created in 1757. In the 1768
revision (Candler 1911: 75) the possession and use of
weapons by slaves was tightened and a fine was set for
selling alcohol to slaves. More interesting was the order
relevant to Savannah only which gave patrollers the
power to apprehend and take into custody (until the
next morning) any disorderly white person (Candler
1911: 81). Should such a person be in a “Tippling House
Tavern or Punch House” rather than on the streets the
patrol bad to call a lawful constable to their assistance
before they could enter the “bar.” Such power was
extended in 1778 when patrols were obliged to “take up
all white persons who cannot give a satisfactory account
of themselves and carry them before a Justice of the
Peace to be dealt with as is directed by the Vagrant Act”
(Candler, 1911: 119).
Minor changes occurred between 1778 and 1830
(e.g. females were exempted from patrol duty in 1824)
but the first major structural change did not take place
until 1830. In that year Georgia patrols finally began
moving away from a direct militia link when Justices of
the Peace were authorized and required to appoint and
organize patrols (Cobb, 1851: 1003). In 1854 Justices of
the Interior Courts were to annually appoint three
“patrol commissioners” for each militia district (Ruth-
erford, 1854: 101). Those commissioners were to make
up the patrol list and appoint one person at least 25
years old and of good moral character to be Captain.
The absence of significant changes in Georgia
patrol legislation over the years suggests the South
Carolina experiences had provided an experimental
stage for Georgia and possibly other slave states. Dif-
ferences certainly existed, but Foner’s general descrip-
tion of slave patrols seems accurate for the majority of
colonies and states; patrols had full power and author-
ity to enter any plantation and break open Negro
houses or other places when slaves were suspected of
keeping arms; to punish runaways or slaves found
outside of their masters’ plantations without a pass; to
whip any slave who should affront or abuse them in
the execution of their duties; and to apprehend and
take any slave suspected of stealing or other criminal
offense, and bring him to the nearest magistrate
(1975: 206).
READING 1 Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type 23
The Slaves’ Response to the Patrols
The slave patrols were both feared and resented by the
slaves.
8
Some went so far as to suggest it was “the worse
thing yet about slavery” (quoted in Blassingame, 1977:
156). Former slave Lewis Clarke was most eloquent in
expressing his disgust:
(The patrols are) the offscouring of all things;
the refuse,…the ears and tails of slavery;…
the tooth and tongues of serpents. They are
the very fool’s cap of baboons,…the wallet
and satchel of polecats, the scum of stagnant
pools, the exuvial, the worn-out skins of slave-
holders. (T)hey are the meanest, and lowest,
and worst of all creation. Like starved wharf
rats, they are out nights, creeping into slave
cabins, to see if they have an old bone there;
they drive out husbands from their own beds,
and then take their places (Clarke, 1846: 114).
Despite the harshness and immediacy of punish-
ment as well as the likelihood of discovery, slaves con-
tinued with the same behavior that brought about slave
patrols in the first place. In fact, they added activities of
specific irritation to the patrollers (or, as they were
variously known, padaroe, padarole, or patteroller).
Preventive measures like warning systems, playing
ignorant and innocent when caught and learning when
to expect a patrol were typically used. More assertive
measures included building trap doors for escape from
their cabins, tying ropes across roads to trip approach-
ing horses, and fighting their way out of meeting places
(Genovese, 1972: 618–619; Rose, 1976: 249–289). As
have victims in other terrifying situations, the slaves
occasionally resorted to humor as a source of strength.
One version of a popular song makes that point:
Run, nigger, run; de patter-roller catch you;
Run, nigger, run, its almost day.
Run, nigger, run; de patter-roller catch you;
Run, nigger, run, and try to get far away.
De nigger run, he run his best;
Stuck his hand in a hornet’s nest.
Jumped de fence and run through de pastor;
Marsa run, but nigger run faster.
(Goodman, 1969: 83)
In an ironic sense the resistance by slaves should
have been completely understandable to American patri-
ots. Patrols were allowed search powers that the colonists
later found so objectionable in the hands of British
authorities (Foner, 1975: 221). Add to that the accompa-
nying lack of freedoms to move, assemble, and bear arms,
and the slave resistance seems perfectly appropriate.
Problems with the Slave Patrols
In addition to the difficulties presented by the slaves
themselves, the patrols throughout the South experi-
enced a variety of other problems. Many of these were
similar to problems confronting colonial militia: training
was infrequent; the elites often avoided duty; and those
that did serve were often irresponsible (Anderson, 1984;
Osgood, 1957; Shy, 1980; Simmons, 1976). In addition,
the patrols had some unique concerns.
One of the first problems was the presence of free
Blacks. Understandably, slaves caught by patrollers
would try to pass themselves off as free persons. The
problem was particularly bad in some of the cities
where many free Blacks existed. In 1810, for example,
the Charleston census showed 1,783 free Negroes
(Henry, 1968: 50). Special acts eventually allowed the
patrol to whip even free Negroes away from their home
or employer’s business unless they produced “free
papers.” In all but one of the slave states a Black person
was presumed to be a slave unless she or he could prove
differently. The sole exception to this procedure was
8
Rawick (1972: 61–65) provides interesting recollections of patrols by ex-slaves in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
24 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
Louisiana where “persons of color are presumed to be
free” (Louisiana supreme court quoted in Foner, 1983:
106) until proven otherwise.
Other problems centered on the apparently care-
less enforcement of the patrol laws in some districts.
When all was quiet and orderly the patrol seemed to be
lulled into inactivity (Henry, 1968: 39). But there
seemed always to be individuals having problems with
slaves and those persons often complained about the
lax enforcement of patrol laws. Flanders (1967: 30) cites
several examples from exasperated Georgians who
complained that slaves were not being properly con-
trolled. In 1770 South Carolina Governor Bull noted
that “though human prudence has provided these
Statutory Laws, yet, through human frailty, they are
neglected in these times of general tranquility” (quoted
in Wood, 1974: 276 note 23). Fifty years later the situa-
tion had not improved much as then Governor Geddes
suggested in his annual message:
The patrol duty which is so intimately con-
nected with the good order and police of the
state, is still so greatly neglected in several of
our parishes and districts, that serious incon-
veniences have been felt… (quoted in Henry,
1968: 38).
Even when the patrols were active they did not
avoid criticism. Genovese (1972: 618) quotes a Georgia
planter who complained: “Our patrol laws are seldom
enforced, and even where there is mock observance of
them, it is by a parcel of boys or idle men, the height of
whose ambition is to ‘ketch a nigger’.” Earlier it was
noted that South Carolina in 1721 modified its patrol
law because the “choices and best men” (planters) were
avoiding militia duty by doing patrol duty. As Bacon
(1939: 581) notes, service by such men was something
of a rarity in police work anyway. However, it must have
been a rarity in other slave states as well since the more
typical opinion of the patrollers was that expressed
above by the Georgia planter. As with militia duty in
general, the elite members of the districts often were
able to avoid patrol duty by either paying a fine or find-
ing a substitute.
Where the “ketch a nigger” mentality existed, the
patrols were often accused of inappropriate behavior.
Complaints existed about patrollers drinking too much
liquor before or during duty (Bacon, 1939: 587; Rose,
1976: 276; Wood, 1974: 276), and both South Carolina
(Cooper, 1838b; 573) and Georgia (Candler, 1910:
233–234) had provisions for lining any person found
drunk while on patrol duty.
More serious complaints (possibly linked to the
drinking) concerned the harshness of punishment
administered by some patrols. Ex-slave Ida Henry
offered an example:
De patrollers wouldn’t allow de slaves to hold
night services, and one night dey caught me
mother out praying. Dey stripped her naked
and tied her hands together and wid a rope
tied to de handcuffs and threw one end of de
rope over a limb and tied de other end to de
pummel of a saddle on a horse. As me mother
weighed ‘bout 200, dey pulled her up so dat
her toes could barely touch de ground and
whipped her. Dat same night she ran away and
stayed over a day and returned (quoted in
Foner 1983, p. 103).
Masters as well as slaves often protested the actions
of the patrol—on which the owners had successfully
avoided serving (Genovese, 1972; 618). The slaves were,
after all, an expensive piece of property which owners
did not want damaged. Attempts to preserve orderly
behavior of the patrollers took the form of a fine for
misbehavior and occasionally reimbursement for dam-
ages (Henry, 1968: 37, 40). However, patrollers were
allowed a rather free hand and many unlawful acts
were accepted in attempts to uphold the patrol system.
Henry saw this as the greatest evil of the system since
“it gave unscrupulous persons unfair advantages and
appears not to have encouraged the enforcement of the
law by the better class” (1968: 40).
This review of the slave patrols shows them to have
operated as a specialized enforcement arm. Although
often linked to the militia, they had an autonomy and
unique function which demands they be viewed as
READING 1 Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type 25
something more than an informal police type yet cer-
tainly not an example of a modern police organization.
To identify the historical role and place of slave patrols
we will turn to the concept of transitional police types.
y Discussion
By definition a transitional police type must share
characteristics of both informal and modern systems.
Drawing from his four characteristics of a modern
type, Lundman says transitional systems differ from
modern ones by: 1) reliance upon other than full-time
police officers; 2) frequent elimination and replacement
(i.e. absence of continuity in office and in procedure);
and 3) absence of accountability to a central
governmental authority (1980: 19–20). When slave
patrols are placed against these criteria they can be
shown to have enough in common to warrant
consideration as a transitional police type. First, like
informal systems, the slave patrols relied on the private
citizen to carry out the duties. However, unlike the
constable, watchman and sheriff, the patrollers had
only policing duties rather than accompanying
expectations of fire watch and/or tax collection. The
identification of patrollers as “police” was much closer
to a social status as we know it today. For example,
when South Carolina planter Samuel Porcher was
elected a militia captain he described himself as being
“a sort of chief of police in the parish” (J. K. Williams,
1959: 65). Slave patrols relied upon private citizens for
performance of duties, yet those patrollers came closer
to being fulltime police officers than had citizens under
informal systems.
As noted earlier, slave patrols were not always
active and even when they were they did not always
follow expected procedure. The periodic lapses and
frequent replacement of patrols is expected under Lun-
dman’s idea of a transitional type. Since the patrols
operated under procedures set down in the Slave
Codes they did approximate continuity in procedure.
However, the South Carolina chronology of patrol legis-
lation suggests those procedures changed as often as
every three years.
The final criterion against which slave patrols
might be judged is accountability to a control govern-
mental authority. Lundman says such accountability is
absent in a transitional system (1980: 20). It is at this
point that slave patrols as a transitional police type
might be challenged. The consistent link between slave
patrols and militia units makes it difficult to argue
against accountability to a central government author-
ity. Even when the link to militia was not direct, there
was a central authority controlling patrols. From 1734
to 1737 South Carolina patrols were appointed by dis-
trict commissioners and obeyed orders of the governor,
military commander-in-chief, and district commis-
sioners (Bacon, 1939: 585; Wood, 1974: 275). In 1753,
North Carolina justices of county courts could appoint
three free-holders as “searchers” who took an oath to
disarm slaves
9
(Patterson, 1968: 13). In 1802 the patrols
were placed entirely under the jurisdiction of the coun-
try courts which in 1837 were authorized to appoint a
patrol committee to ensure the patrol functioned
(Johnson, 1937: 516–517). Tennessee, a part of North
Carolina from 1693–1790, also used the “searchers” as
authorized by the 1753 act. In 1806, ten years after
statehood, Tennessee developed an elaborate patrol
system wherein town commissioners appointed patrols
for incorporated and unincorporated towns (Patterson,
1968: 38). Louisiana patrols (originally set up in 1807
by Territorial legislation) went through a period of
confusion between 1813 and 1821 when both the mili-
tia and parish judges had authority over patrols. Finally,
in 1821 parish governmental bodies were given com-
plete authority over the slave patrols (J.G. Taylor, 1963:
170; E.R. Williams, 1972: 400). Slave patrols had first
been introduced in Arkansas in 1825 and were appar-
ently appointed by the county courts until 1853. After
then appointments were made by the justice of the
peace (O.W. Taylor, 1958: 31, 209) as was true in Georgia
beginning in 1830 (Cobb, 1851: 1003). In 1831 the
9
This oath read: “I, A.B., do swear that I will, as searcher for guns, swords and other weapons among the slaves of my district, faithfully, and as privately as I
can, discharge the trust reposed in me, as the law directs, to the best of my power. So help me God” (Quoted in Patterson, 1968: 13 note 23).
26 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
incorporated towns in Mississippi were authorized to
control their own patrol system and in 1833 boards of
county police (i.e. county boards of supervisors) could
appoint patrol leaders (Sydnor, 1933: 78). The Missouri
General Assembly first established patrols in 1825 then
in 1837 the county courts were given powers to appoint
township patrols to serve for one year (Trexler, 1969:
182–183).
That review of patrol accountability in eight states
suggests that slave patrols often came under the same
governmental authority as formal police organizations.
Or, as Sydnor pointed out in reference to the Mississippi
changes: “the system was decentralized and made sub-
ject to the local units of civil government” (1933: 78).
An argument can be made that the basis for a non-
militia government authorized force to undertake
police duties was implemented as early as 1734 when
South Carolina patrols were appointed by district com-
missioners or in 1802 when North Carolina placed
patrols under the jurisdiction of the county courts.
What then does that mean for the placement of slave
patrols as an example of a transitional police type? If
the various governmental bodies mentioned above are
accepted as being examples of “centralized governmen-
tal authority,” it means two positions are possible. First,
slave patrols must not be an example of a transitional
type. This position is rejected on the basis of informa-
tion provided here which shows the patrols to have
been a legitimate entity with specialized law enforce-
ment duties and powers.
The other possible position is that “absence of
accountability to a centralized governmental authority”
is not a necessary feature of transitional policing. This
seems more reasonable given the information pre-
sented here. Since there has not been any specific
example of a transitional police force offered to this
point,
10
Lundman’s characteristics are only hypotheti-
cal. As other examples of transitional police types are
put forward we will have a firmer base for determining
how they differ from modern police.
y Conclusion
As early as 1704 and continuing through the antebellum
period, Southern slave states used local patrols with
specific responsibility for regulating the activity of
slaves. Those slave patrols were comprised of citizens
who did patrol duty as their civic obligation, for pay,
rewards, or for exemption from other duties. The
patrollers had a defined area which they were to ride in
attempts to discover runaway slaves, stolen property,
weapons, or to forestall insurrections. Unlike the
watchmen, constables, and sheriffs who had some non-
policing duties, the slave patrols operated solely for the
enforcement of colonial and state laws. The existence of
these patrols leads to two conclusions about the
development of American law enforcement. First, the
law enforcement nature of slave patrol activities meant
there were important events occurring in the rural
South prior to and concurrently with events in the
urban North which are more typically cited in examples
of the evolution of policing in the United States. Because
of that, it is undesirable to restrict attention to just the
North when trying to understand and appreciate the
growth of American law enforcement. Second, rather
than simply being a formalization of previously
informal activities, modern policing seems to have
passed through developmental stages which can be
explained by such typologies as that offered by
Lundman who described informal, transitional, and
modern types of policing.
While those conclusions are important, focusing
attention on slave patrols and the South is desirable for
reasons which go quite beyond a need to avoid regional
bias in historical accounts or to describe a form of
policing which is neither informal nor modern. For
example, what implication does this analysis have on
the usefulness of typologies in historical research? Fur-
ther, how might typologies and the accompanying
description of those types assist in generating a theory
to explain the development of law enforcement?
10
Lundman (1980: 20) only notes Fielding’s Bow Street Runners, Colquhoun’s River Police and mid-Nineteenth century Denver, as possible examples of
transitional police.
READING 1 Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type 27
If typologies are helpful as a historiographic tech-
nique, is Lundman’s the best available or possible?
Based on the usefulness of the typology for describing
slave patrols and placing them in a specific historical
context, it seems to this author that typologies are an
excellent way to go beyond descriptive accounts and
move toward the development of theoretical explana-
tions. As greater use is made of typologies to conceptu-
alize the development of American law enforcement, it
seems likely that existing formulations will be modi-
fied. For example, slave patrols seem to exemplify what
Lundman called the transitional police type except in
terms of Lundman’s proposed absence of accountabil-
ity to a centralized governmental authority. Recall,
however, that Bacon also suggested a developmental
sequence (without specifying or naming “types”) for
police which described modern police as having gen-
eral rather than specific functions (Bacon, 1939: 6).
Combining the work of Lundman and Bacon, we might
suggest that precursors to modern police are not neces-
sarily without accountability to a centralized govern-
mental authority, but do have specialized rather than
general enforcement powers. In this manner, the char-
acteristics of policing which precede the modern stage
might be: 1) frequent elimination and replacement of
the police type (Lundman); 2) reliance upon persons
other than full-time police officers (Lundman); and 3)
enforcement powers which are specialized rather than
general (Bacon).
In addition to providing organized conceptualiza-
tion, typologies also provide a basis for theoretical
development. For example, there does not as yet appear
to be an identifiable Northern precursor, like slave
patrols, between the constable/watch and modern
stages. Is that because the North skipped that stage,
compressed it to such an extent we cannot find an
example of its occurrence, or passed through the tran-
sitional stage but researchers have not described the
activities in terms of a typology? While each of those
questions is interesting, the first seems to have particu-
larly intriguing implications for if it is correct it means
there may not be a general evolutionary history for
policing. For example, are modern police agencies nec-
essarily preceded by a developmental stage comprised
of a specialized police force? Is the progression in the
developmental history of law enforcement agencies one
of generalized structure with general functions, to a
specific structure with specific functions, and finally a
specific structure with general functions?
As an example of how this type of inquiry can fit
with theoretical developments, we should note recent
work by Robinson and Scaglion (1987). Those authors
present four interdependent propositions which state:
1. The origin of the specialized police function
depends upon the division of society into
dominant and subordinate classes with antago-
nistic interests;
2. Specialized police agencies are generally char-
acteristic only of societies politically organized
as states;
3. In a period of transition, the crucial factor in
delineating the modern specialized police
function is an ongoing attempt at conversion of
the social control (policing) mechanism from
an integral part of the community structure to
an agent of an emerging dominant class; and
4. The police institution is created by the emerg-
ing dominant class as an instrument for the
preservation of its control over restricted access
to basic resources, over the political apparatus
governing this access, and over the labor force
necessary to provide the surplus upon which
the dominant class lives (Robinson and
Scaglion, 1987: 109).
The development of law enforcement structures in
the antebellum South would seem to support each of
the propositions. Slave patrols were created only
because of a master-slave social structure (proposition
1), existing as colonies became increasingly politically
organized as states (proposition 2), and elites were able
to convince community members to “police” the slaves
(proposition 3), because control of those slaves was
necessary to solidify elite positioning (proposition 4).
In order to respond with authority to these ques-
tions and implications, it will be necessary to continue
28 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
research on the history of law enforcement. Detailed
study of slave patrols in specific colonies and states is
necessary as are research endeavors which assess the
applicability of various typologies in different jurisdic-
tions. Hopefully this initial effort will serve to both
inform criminal justicians and practitioners about an
important but little-known aspect of American police
history as well as encourage research on non-Northern
developments in the history of law enforcement. It has
been argued here that most histories of the develop-
ment of police have portrayed a regional bias suggest-
ing that evolution was essentially Northern and urban
in nature. In addition, existing information has covered
the initial organizational stages of policing and the
formation of modern police departments, but we are
left with the impression that little activity of historical
importance occurred between those first developments
and the eventually modern department. Lundman has
called that middle stage “transitional” policing and it is
that concept which has been used here to: 1) debunk
the portrayal of American law enforcement history as
restricted to the urban North, and 2) provide an exam-
ple of a form of policing more advanced than the con-
stable/watch type but one which was not yet modern.
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Why is it important to recognize the existence and purpose of slave patrols in America?
2. Explain how modern policing has evolved through a series of developmental stages.
3. Given the historical presence of slave patrols, how could these impact police–community relationships in the southern
region of the United States?
READING 2
In this article, George Kelling and Mark Moore examine the history of American policing over the course of
three eras: political, reform, and community/problem-solving eras. More specifically, their historical overview
of the police includes a look at the changes to the source of police legitimacy, police function, organizational
design, relationships with citizens, sources of demands for service, tactics and technology, and measurements
of police effectiveness over time.
The Evolving Strategy of Policing
George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore
P
olicing, like all professions, learns from experi-
ence. It follows, then that as modern police
executives search for more effective strategies of
policing, they will be guided by the lessons of police
history. The difficulty is that police history is incoher-
ent, its lessons hard to read. After all, that history was
30 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
produced by thousands of local departments pursuing
their own visions and responding to local conditions.
Although that varied experience is potentially a rich
source of lessons, departments have left few records
that reveal the trends shaping modern policing.
Interpretation is necessary.
y Methodology
This essay presents an interpretation of police history
that may help police executives considering alternative
future strategies of policing. Our reading of police his-
tory has led us to adopt a particular point of view. We
find that a dominant trend guiding today’s police execu-
tives—a trend that encourages the pursuit of indepen-
dent, professional autonomy for police departments—is
carrying the police away from achieving their maximum
potential, especially in effective crime fighting. We are
also convinced that this trend in policing is weakening
public policing relative to private security as the pri-
mary institution providing security to society. We
believe that this has dangerous long-term implications
not only for police departments but also for society. We
think that this trend is shrinking rather than enlarging
police capacity to help create civil communities. Our
judgment is that this trend can be reversed only by
refocusing police attention from the pursuit of profes-
sional autonomy to the establishment of effective prob-
lem-solving partnerships with the communities they
police.
Delving into police history made it apparent that
some assumptions that now operate as axioms in the
field of policing (for example that effectiveness in
policing depends on distancing police departments
from politics; or that the highest priority of police
departments is to deal with serious street crime; or that
the best way to deal with street crime is through
directed patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and
skilled retrospective investigations) are not timeless
truths, but rather choices made by former police lead-
ers and strategists. To be sure, the choices were often
wise and far-seeing as well as appropriate to their
times. But the historical perspective shows them to be
choices nonetheless, and therefore open to reconsidera-
tion in the light of later professional experience and
changing environmental circumstances.
We are interpreting the results of our historical
study through a framework based on the concept of
“corporate strategy.”
1
Using this framework, we can
describe police organizations in terms of seven inter-
related categories:
• The sources from which the police construct
the legitimacy and continuing power to act on
society.
• The definition of the police function or role in
society.
• The organizational design of police departments.
• The relationships the police create with the
external environment.
• The nature of police efforts to market or man-
age the demand for their services.
• The principal activities, programs, and tactics
on which police agencies rely to fulfill their
mission or achieve operational success.
• The concrete measures the police use to define
operational success or failure.
Using this analytic framework, we have found it
useful to divide the history of policing into three differ-
ent eras. These eras are distinguished from one another
by the apparent dominance of a particular strategy of
policing. The political era, so named because of the
close ties between police and politics, dated from the
introduction of police into municipalities during the
1840’s, continued through the Progressive period, and
ended during the early 1900’s. The reform era devel-
oped in reaction to the political. It took hold during the
1930’s, thrived during the 1950’s and 1960’s, began to
erode during the late 1970’s. The reform era now seems
to be giving way to an era emphasizing community
problem solving.
By dividing policing into these three eras domi-
nated by a particular strategy of policing, we do not
mean to imply that there were clear boundaries between
1
Kenneth R. Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1980.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 31
the eras. Nor do we mean that in those eras everyone
policed in the same way. Obviously, the real history is far
more complex than that. Nonetheless, we believe that
there is a certain professional ethos that defines stan-
dards of competence, professionalism, and excellence in
policing; that at any given time, one set of concepts is
more powerful, more widely shared, and better under-
stood than others; and that this ethos changes over time.
Sometimes, this professional ethos has been explicitly
articulated, and those who have articulated the concepts
have been recognized as the leaders of their profession.
O.W. Wilson, for example, was a brilliant expositor of the
central elements of the reform strategy of policing.
Other times, the ethos is implicit—accepted by all as the
tacit assumptions that define the business of policing
and the proper form for a police department to take. Our
task is to help the profession look to the future by repre-
senting its past in these terms and trying to understand
what the past portends for the future.
y The Political Era
Historians have described the characteristics of early
policing in the United States, especially the struggles
between various interest groups to govern the police.
2
Elsewhere, the authors of this paper analyzed a portion
of American police history in terms of its organiza-
tional strategy.
3
The following discussion of elements
of the police organizational strategy during the politi-
cal era expands on that effort.
Legitimacy and Authorization
Early American police were authorized by local munici-
palities. Unlike their English counterparts, American
police departments lacked the powerful, central authority
of the crown to establish a legitimate, unifying man-
date for their enterprise. Instead, American police
derived both their authorization and resources from
local political leaders, often ward politicians. They
were, of course, guided by the law as to what tasks to
undertake and what powers to utilize. But their link to
neighborhoods and local politicians was so tight that
both Jordan
4
and Fogelson
5
refer to the early police as
adjuncts to local political machines. The relationship
was often reciprocal: political machines recruited and
maintained police in office and on the beat, while police
helped ward political leaders maintain their political
offices by encouraging citizens to vote for certain can-
didates, discouraging them from voting for others, and,
at times, by assisting in rigging elections.
The Police Function
Partly because of their close connection to politicians,
police during the political era provided a wide array of
services to citizens. Inevitably police departments were
involved in crime prevention and control and order
maintenance, but they also provided a wide variety of
social services. In the late 19th century, municipal
police departments ran soup lines; provided temporary
lodging for newly arrived immigrant workers in station
houses;
6
and assisted ward leaders in finding work for
immigrants, both in police and other forms of work.
Organizational Design
Although ostensibly organized as a centralized, quasi-
military organization with a unified chain of com-
mand, police departments of the political era were
nevertheless decentralized. Cities were divided into
precincts, and precinct-level managers often, in concert
with the ward leaders, ran precincts as small-scale
2
Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977; Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of
Professionalism, Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1977.
3
Mark H. Moore and George L. Kelling, “To Serve and Protect Learning From Police History,” The Public Interest, 7, Winter 1983.
4
K.E. Jordan, Ideology and the Coming of Professionalism: American Urban Police in the 1920’s and 1930’s, Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1972.
5
Fogelson, Big-City Police.
6
Eric H. Monkkonen Police in Urban America. 1860–1920. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
32 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
departments—hiring, firing, managing, and assigning
personnel as they deemed appropriate. In addition,
decentralization combined with primitive communica-
tions and transportation to give police officers substan-
tial discretion in handling their individual beats. At
best, officer contact with central command was main-
tained through the call box.
External Relationships
During the political era, police departments were inti-
mately connected to the social and political world of
the ward. Police officers often were recruited from the
same ethnic stock as the dominant political groups in
the localities, and continued to live in the neighbor-
hoods they patrolled. Precinct commanders consulted
often with local political representatives about police
priorities and progress.
Demand Management
Demand for police services came primarily from two
sources: ward politicians making demands on the orga-
nization and citizens making demands directly on beat
officers. Decentralization and political authorization
encouraged the first; foot patrol, lack of other means of
transportation, and poor communications produced
the latter. Basically, the demand for police services was
received, interpreted, and responded to at the precinct
and street levels.
Principal Programs and Technologies
The primary tactic of police during the political era
was foot patrol. Most police officers walked beats and
dealt with crime, disorder, and other problems as they
arose, or as they were guided by citizens and precinct
superiors. The technological tools available to police
were limited. However, when call boxes became avail-
able, police administrators used them for supervisory
and managerial purposes; and, when early automobiles
became available, police used them to transport officers
from one beat to another.
7
The new technology thereby
increased the range, but did not change the mode, of
patrol officers.
Detective divisions existed but without their cur-
rent prestige. Operating from a caseload of “persons”
rather than offenses, detectives relied on their caseload
to inform of other criminals.
8
The “third degree” was a
common means of interviewing criminals to solve
crimes. Detectives were often especially valuable to
local politicians for gathering information on individu-
als for political or personal, rather than offense-related,
purposes.
Measured Outcomes
The expected outcomes of police work included crime
and riot control, maintenance of order, and relief from
many of the other problems of an industrializing soci-
ety (hunger and temporary homelessness, for exam-
ple). Consistent with their political mandate, police
emphasized maintaining citizen and political satisfac-
tion with police services as an important goal of police
departments.
In sum, the organizational strategy of the political
era of policing included the following elements:
• Authorization—primarily political.
• Function—crime control, order maintenance,
broad social services.
• Organizational design—decentralized and
geographical.
• Relationship to environment—close and
personal.
• Demand—managed through links between
politicians and precinct commanders, and
face-to-face contacts between citizens and foot
patrol officers.
• Tactics and technology—foot patrol and rudi-
mentary investigations.
• Outcome—political and citizen satisfaction
with social order.
7
The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1981.
8
John Eck, Solving Crimes: The Investigation of Burglary and Robbery, Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1934.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 33
The political strategy of early American policing
had strengths. First, police were integrated into neigh-
borhoods and enjoyed the support of citizens—at least
the support of the dominant and political interests of
an area. Second, and probably as a result of the first, the
strategy provided useful services to communities.
There is evidence that it helped contain riots. Many
citizens believed that police prevented crimes or solved
crimes when they occurred.
9
And the police assisted
immigrants in establishing themselves in communities
and finding jobs.
The political strategy also had weaknesses. First,
intimacy with community, closeness to political lead-
ers, and a decentralized organizational structure, with
its inability to provide supervision of officers, gave rise
to police corruption. Officers were often required to
enforce unpopular laws foisted on immigrant ethnic
neighborhoods by crusading reformers (primarily of
English and Dutch background) who objected to ethnic
values.
10
Because of their intimacy with the commu-
nity, the officers were vulnerable to being bribed in
return for nonenforcement or lax enforcement of laws.
Moreover, police closeness to politicians created such
forms of political corruption as patronage and police
interference in elections.
11
Even those few departments
that managed to avoid serious financial or political cor-
ruption during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
Boston for example, succumbed to large-scale corrup-
tion during and after Prohibition.
12
Second, close identification of police with neigh-
borhoods and neighborhood norms often resulted
in discrimination against strangers and others who
violated those norms, especially minority ethnic and
racial groups. Often ruling their beats with the “ends of
their nightsticks,” police regularly targeted outsiders
and strangers for rousting and “curbstone justice.”
13
Finally, the lack of organizational control over offi-
cers resulting from both decentralization and the polit-
ical nature of many appointments to police positions
caused inefficiencies and disorganization. The image
of Keystone Cops—police as clumsy bunglers—was
widespread and often descriptive of realities in
American policing.
y The Reform Era
Control over police by local politicians, conflict between
urban reformers and local ward leaders over the
enforcement of laws regulating the morality of urban
migrants, and abuses (corruption, for example) that
resulted from the intimacy between police and political
leaders and citizens produced a continuous struggle for
control over police during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.
14
Nineteenth-century attempts by civilians to
reform police organizations by applying external pres-
sures largely failed; 20th-century attempts at reform,
originating from both internal and external forces,
shaped contemporary policing as we knew it through
the 1970’s.
15
Berkeley’s police chief, August Vollmer, first rallied
police executives around the idea of reform during the
1920’s and early 1930’s. Vollmer’s vision of policing was
the trumpet call: police in the post-flapper generation
were to remind American citizens and institutions of
9
Thomas A. Reppetto, The Blue Parade, New York, The Free Press, 1978.
10
Fogelson, Big-City Police.
11
Ibid.
12
George L. Kelling, “Reforming the Reforms: The Boston Police Department,” Occasional Paper, Joint Center For Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard,
Cambridge, 1983.
13
George L. Kelling, “Juveniles and Police: The End of the Nightstick,” in From Children to Citizens, Vol. II: The Role of the Juvenile Court, ed. Francis X. Hartmann,
New York, Springer-Verlag, 1987.
14
Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism.
15
Fogelson, Big-City Police.
34 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
the moral vision that had made America great and of
their responsibilities to maintain that vision.
16
It was
Vollmer’s protege, O.W. Wilson, however, who taking
guidance from J. Edgar Hoover’s shrewd transforma-
tion of the corrupt and discredited Bureau of
Investigation into the honest and prestigious Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), became the principal
administrative architect of the police reform organiza-
tional strategy.
17
Hoover wanted the FBI to represent a new force
for law and order, and saw that such an organization
could capture a permanent constituency that wanted
an agency to take a stand against lawlessness, immo-
rality, and crime. By raising eligibility standards and
changing patterns of recruitment and training,
Hoover gave the FBI agents stature as upstanding
moral crusaders. By committing the organization to
attacks on crimes such as kidnapping, bank robbery,
and espionage—crimes that attracted wide publicity
and required technical sophistication, doggedness,
and a national jurisdiction to solve—Hoover estab-
lished the organization’s reputation for professional
competence and power. By establishing tight central
control over his agents, limiting their use of contro-
versial investigation procedures (such as undercover
operations), and keeping them out of narcotics
enforcement, Hoover was also able to maintain an
unparalleled record of integrity. That, too, fitted the
image of a dogged, incorruptible crime-fighting orga-
nization. Finally, lest anyone fail to notice the impor-
tant developments within the Bureau, Hoover
developed impressive public relations programs that
presented the FBI and its agents in the most favorable
light. (For those of us who remember the 1940’s, for
example, one of the most popular radio phrases was,
“The FBI in peace and war”—the introductory line
in a radio program that portrayed a vigilant FBI
protecting us from foreign enemies as well as villains
on the “10 Most Wanted” list, another Hoover/FBI
invention.)
Struggling as they were with reputations for cor-
ruption, brutality, unfairness, and downright incompe-
tence, municipal police reformers found Hoover’s path
a compelling one. Instructed by O.W. Wilson’s texts on
police administration, they began to shape an organi-
zational strategy for urban police analogous to the one
pursued by the FBI.
Legitimacy and Authorization
Reformers rejected politics as the basis of police legiti-
macy. In their view, politics and political involvement
was the problem in American policing. Police reformers
therefore allied themselves with Progressives. They
moved to end the close ties between local political lead-
ers and police. In some states, control over police was
usurped by state government. Civil service eliminated
patronage and ward influences in hiring and firing
police officers. In some cities (Los Angeles and
Cincinnati, for example), even the position of chief of
police became a civil service position to be attained
through examination. In others (such as Milwaukee),
chiefs were given lifetime tenure by a police commis-
sion, to be removed from office only for cause. In yet
others (Boston, for example), contracts for chiefs were
staggered so as not to coincide with the mayor’s tenure.
Concern for separation of police from politics did not
focus only on chiefs, however. In some cities, such as
Philadelphia, it became illegal for patrol officers to live
in the beats they patrolled. The purpose of all these
changes was to isolate police as completely as possible
from political influences.
Law, especially criminal law, and police profession-
alism were established as the principal bases of police
legitimacy. When police were asked why they per-
formed as they did, the most common answer was that
they enforced the law. When they chose not to enforce
the law—for instance, in a riot when police isolated an
area rather than arrested looters—police justification
for such action was found in their claim to professional
16
Kelling, “Juveniles and Police: The End of the Nightstick.”
17
Orlando W. Wilson, Police Administration, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 35
knowledge, skills, and values which uniquely qualified
them to make such tactical decisions. Even in riot situ-
ations, police rejected the idea that political leaders
should make tactical decisions; that was a police
responsibility.
18
So persuasive was the argument of reformers to
remove political influences from policing, that police
departments became one of the most autonomous
public organizations in urban government.
19
Under
such circumstances, policing a city became a legal and
technical matter left to the discretion of professional
police executives under the guidance of law. Political
influence of any kind on a police department came to
be seen as not merely a failure of police leadership but
as corruption in policing.
The Police Function
Using the focus on criminal law as a basic source of
police legitimacy, police in the reform era moved to
narrow their functioning to crime control and criminal
apprehension. Police agencies became law enforcement
agencies. Their goal was to control crime. Their princi-
pal means was the use of criminal law to apprehend
and deter offenders. Activities that drew the police into
solving other kinds of community problems and relied
on other kinds of responses were identified as “social
work,” and became the object of decision. A common line
in police circles during the 1950’s and 1960’s was, “If only
we didn’t have to do social work, we could really do
something about crime.” Police retreated from providing
emergency medical services as well—ambulance and
emergency medical services were transferred to medi-
cal, private, or firefighting organizations.
20
The 1967
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice ratified this orientation:
heretofore, police had been conceptualized as an agency
of urban government; the President’s Commission
reconceptualized them as part of the criminal justice
system.
Organizational Design
The organization form adopted by police reformers
generally reflected the scientific or classical theory of
administration advocated by Frederick W. Taylor during
the early 20th century. At least two assumptions attended
classical theory. First, workers are inherently uninter-
ested in work and, if left to their own devices, are prone
to avoid it. Second, since workers have little or no inter-
est in the substance of their work, the sole common
interest between workers and management is found in
economic incentives for workers. Thus, both workers
and management benefit economically when manage-
ment arranges work in ways that increase workers’ pro-
ductivity and link productivity to economic rewards.
Two central principles followed from these
assumptions: division of labor and unity of control. The
former posited that if tasks can be broken into compo-
nents, workers can become highly skilled in particular
components and thus more efficient in carrying out
their tasks. The latter posited that the workers’ activi-
ties are best managed by a pyramid of control, with all
authority finally resting in one central office.
Using this classical theory, police leaders moved to
routinize and standardize police work, especially patrol
work. Police work became a form of crimefighting in
which police enforced the law and arrested criminals if
the opportunity presented itself. Attempts were made
to limit discretion in patrol work: a generation of police
officers was raised with the idea that they merely
enforced the law.
If special problems arose, the typical response was
to create special units (e.g., vice, juvenile, drugs,
tactical) rather than to assign them to patrol. The cre-
ation of these special units, under central rather than
18
“Police Guidelines,” John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program #C14-75-24, 1975.
19
Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ballinger, 1977.
20
Kelling, “Reforming The Reforms: The Boston Police Department.”
36 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
precinct command, served to further centralize com-
mand and control and weaken precinct commanders.
21
Moreover, police organizations emphasized con-
trol over workers through bureaucratic means of
control: supervision, limited span of control, flow of
instructions downward and information upward in the
organization, establishment of elaborate record-
keeping systems requiring additional layers of middle
managers, and coordination of activities between vari-
ous production units (e.g., patrol and detectives),
which also required additional middle managers.
External Relationships
Police leaders in the reform era redefined the nature of
a proper relationship between police officers and citi-
zens. Heretofore, police had been intimately linked to
citizens. During the era of reform policing, the new
model demanded an impartial law enforcer who related
to citizens in professionally neutral and distant terms.
No better characterization of this model can be found
than television’s Sergeant Friday, whose response, “Just
the facts, ma’am,” typified the idea: impersonal and
oriented toward crime solving rather than responsive
to the emotional crisis of a victim.
The professional model also shaped the police view
of the role of citizens in crime control. Police redefined
the citizen role during an era when there was heady con-
fidence about the ability of professionals to manage
physical and social problems. Physicians would care for
health problems, dentists for dental problems, teachers
for educational problems, social workers for social
adjustment problems, and police for crime problems.
The proper role of citizens in crime control was to be
relatively passive recipients of professional crime control
services. Citizens’ actions on their own behalf to defend
themselves or their communities came to be seen as
inappropriate, smacking of vigilantism. Citizens met
their responsibilities when a crime occurred by calling
police, deferring to police actions, and being good wit-
nesses if called upon to give evidence. The metaphor that
expressed this orientation to the community was that of
the police as the “thin blue line.” It connotes the existence
of dangerous external threats to communities, portrays
police as standing between that danger and good citi-
zens, and implies both police heroism and loneliness.
Demand Management
Learning from Hoover, police reformers vigorously set
out to sell their brand of urban policing.
22
They, too,
performed on radio talk shows, consulted with media
representatives about how to present police, engaged in
public relations campaigns, and in other ways presented
this image of police as crime fighters. In a sense, they
began with an organizational capacity—anticrime
police tactics—and intensively promoted it. This
approach was more like selling than marketing.
Marketing refers to the process of carefully identifying
consumer needs and then developing goods and ser-
vices that meet those needs. Selling refers to having a
stock of products or goods on hand irrespective of need
and selling them. The reform strategy had as its starting
point a set of police tactics (services) that police promul-
gated as much for the purpose of establishing internal
control of police officers and enhancing the status of
urban police as for responding to community needs or
market demands.
23
The community “need” for rapid
response to calls for service, for instance, was largely the
consequence of police selling the service as efficacious in
crime control rather than a direct demand from citizens.
Consistent with this attempt to sell particular tac-
tics, police worked to shape and control demand for
police services. Foot patrol, when demanded by citi-
zens, was rejected as an outmoded, expensive frill.
Social and emergency services were terminated or
given to other agencies. Receipt of demand for police
services was centralized. No longer were citizens
21
Fogelson, Big-City Police.
22
William H. Parker, “The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities,” The Annals 29 (January 1954): 5–13.
23
For a detailed discussion of the differences between selling and marketing, see John L. Crompton and Charles W. Lamb, Marketing Government and Social
Services, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1986.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 37
encouraged to go to “their” neighborhood police offi-
cers or districts; all calls went to a central communica-
tions facility. When 911 systems were installed, police
aggressively sold 911 and rapid response to calls for
service as effective police service. If citizens continued
to use district, or precinct, telephone numbers, some
police departments disconnected those telephones or
got new telephone numbers.
24
Principal Programs and Technologies
The principal programs and tactics of the reform strat-
egy were preventive patrol by automobile and rapid
response to calls for service. Foot patrol, characterized
as outmoded and inefficient, was abandoned as rapidly
as police administrators could obtain cars.
25
The initial
tactical reasons for putting police in cars had been to
increase the size of the areas police officers could patrol
and to take the advantage away from criminals who
began to use automobiles. Under reform policing, a
new theory about how to make the best tactical use of
automobiles appeared.
O.W. Wilson developed the theory of preventive
patrol by automobile as an anticrime tactic.
26
He theo-
rized that if police drove conspicuously marked cars
randomly through city streets and gave special attention
to certain “hazards” (bars and schools, for example), a
feeling of police omnipresence would be developed. In
turn, that sense of omnipresence would both deter
criminals and reassure good citizens. Moreover, it was
hypothesized that vigilant patrol officers moving rap-
idly through city streets would happen upon criminals
in action and be able to apprehend them.
As telephones and radios became ubiquitous, the
availability of cruising police came to be seen as even
more valuable: if citizens could be encouraged to call
the police via telephone as soon as problems developed,
police could respond rapidly to calls and establish
control over situations, identify wrong-doers, and make
arrests. To this end, 911 systems and computer-aided
dispatch were developed throughout the country.
Detective units continued, although with some modifi-
cations. The “person” approach ended and was replaced
by the case approach. In addition, forensic techniques
were upgraded and began to replace the old “third
degree” or reliance on informants for the solution of
crimes. Like other special units, most investigative
units were controlled by central headquarters.
Measured Outcomes
The primary desired outcomes of the reform strategy
were crime control and criminal apprehension.
27
To measure achievement of these outcomes, August
Vollmer, working through the newly vitalized
International Association of Chiefs of Police, developed
and implemented a uniform system of crime classifica-
tion and reporting. Later, the system was taken over and
administered by the FBI and the Uniform Crime Reports
became the primary standard by which police organiza-
tions measured their effectiveness. Additionally, indi-
vidual officers’ effectiveness in dealing with crime was
judged by the number of arrests they made; other
measures of police effectiveness included response
time (the time it takes for a police car to arrive at the
location of a call for service) and “number of passings”
(the number of times a police car passes a given point
on a city street). Regardless of all other indicators, how-
ever, the primary measure of police effectiveness was
the crime rate as measured by the Uniform Crime
Reports.
In sum, the reform organizational strategy con-
tained the following elements:
• Authorization—law and professionalism.
• Function—crime control.
24
Commissioner Francis “Mickey” Roache of Boston has said that when the 911 system was instituted there, citizens persisted in calling “their” police—the
district station. To circumvent this preference, district telephone numbers were changed so that citizens would be inconvenienced if they dialed the old number.
25
The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment.
26
O.W. Wilson, Police Administration.
27
A.E. Leonard, “Crime Reporting as a Police Management Foot,” The Annals 29 (January 1954).
38 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
• Organizational design—centralized, classical.
• Relationship to environment—professionally
remote.
• Demand—channeled through central dis-
patching activities.
• Tactics and technology—preventive patrol and
rapid response to calls for service.
• Outcome—crime control.
In retrospect, the reform strategy was impressive.
It successfully integrated its strategic elements into a
coherent paradigm that was internally consistent and
logically appealing. Narrowing police functions to
crime fighting made sense. If police could concentrate
their efforts on prevention of crime and apprehension
of criminals, it followed that they could be more effec-
tive than if they dissipated their efforts on other prob-
lems. The model of police as impartial, professional law
enforcers was attractive because it minimized the dis-
cretionary excesses which developed during the politi-
cal era. Preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for
service were intuitively appealing tactics, as well as
means to control officers and shape and control citizen
demands for service. Further, the strategy provided a
comprehensive, yet simple, vision of policing around
which police leaders could rally.
The metaphor of the thin blue line reinforced their
need to create isolated independence and autonomy in
terms that were acceptable to the public. The patrol car
became the symbol of policing during the 1930’s and
1940’s; when equipped with a radio, it was at the limits
of technology. It represented mobility, power, conspicu-
ous presence, control of officers, and professional dis-
tance from citizens.
During the late 1960’s and 1970’s, however, the
reform strategy ran into difficulty. First, regardless of
how police effectiveness in dealing with crime was mea-
sured, police failed to substantially improve their record.
During the 1960’s, crime began to rise. Despite large
increases in the size of police departments and in expen-
ditures for new forms of equipment (911 systems, com-
puter-aided dispatch, etc.), police failed to meet their
own or public expectations about their capacity to con-
trol crime or prevent its increase. Moreover, research
conducted during the 1970’s on preventive patrol and
rapid response to calls for service suggested that neither
was an effective crime control or apprehension tactic.
28
Second, fear rose rapidly during this era. The con-
sequences of this fear were dramatic for cities. Citizens
abandoned parks, public transportation, neighborhood
shopping centers, churches, as well as entire neighbor-
hoods. What puzzled police and researchers was that
levels of fear and crime did not always correspond:
crime levels were low in some areas, but fear high.
Conversely, in other areas levels of crime were high, but
fear low. Not until the early 1980’s did researchers dis-
cover that fear is more closely correlated with disorder
than with crime.
29
Ironically, order maintenance was
one of those functions that police had been downplay-
ing over the years. They collected no data on it, pro-
vided no training to officers in order maintenance
activities, and did not reward officers for successfully
conducting order maintenance tasks.
Third, despite attempts by police departments to
create equitable police allocation systems and to pro-
vide impartial policing to all citizens, many minority
citizens, especially blacks during the 1960’s and 1970’s,
did not perceive their treatment as equitable or ade-
quate. They protested not only police mistreatment,
but lack of treatment—inadequate or insufficient
services—as well.
Fourth, the civil rights and antiwar movements
challenged police. This challenge took several forms.
The legitimacy of police was questioned: students
resisted police, minorities rioted against them, and the
public, observing police via live television for the first
time, questioned their tactics. Moreover, despite police
attempts to upgrade personnel through improved
28
George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report, Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1974; William, Spelman and
Dale K. Brown, Calling the Police, Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1982.
29
The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment; Wesley G. Skogan and Michael G. Maxfield, Coping With Crime, Beverly Hills, California, Sage, 1981; Robert Trojanowicz,
An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Programs in Flint, Michigan, East Lansing, Michigan State University, 1982.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 39
recruitment, training, and supervision, minorities and
then women insisted that they had to be adequately
represented in policing if police were to be legitimate.
Fifth, some of the myths that undergirded the
reform strategy—police officers use little or no discretion
and the primary activity of police is law enforcement—
simply proved to be too far from reality to be sustained.
Over and over again research showed that use of discre-
tion characterized policing at all levels and that law
enforcement comprised but a small portion of police
officers’ activities.
30
Sixth, although the reform ideology could rally
police chiefs and executives, it failed to rally line police
officers. During the reform era, police executives had
moved to professionalize their ranks. Line officers,
however, were managed in ways that were antithetical
to professionalization. Despite pious testimony from
police executives that “patrol is the backbone of polic-
ing,” police executives behaved in ways that were con-
sistent with classical organizational theory—patrol
officers continued to have low status; their work was
treated as if it were routinized and standardized; and
petty rules governed issues such as hair length and off-
duty behavior. Meanwhile, line officers received little
guidance in use of discretion and were given few, if any,
opportunities to make suggestions about their work.
Under such circumstances, the increasing “grumpi-
ness” of officers in many cities is not surprising, nor is
the rise of militant unionism.
Seventh, police lost a significant portion of their
financial support, which had been increasing or at least
constant over the years, as cities found themselves in
fiscal difficulties. In city after city, police departments
were reduced in size. In some cities, New York for
example, financial cutbacks resulted in losses of up to
one-third of departmental personnel. Some, noting that
crime did not increase more rapidly or arrests decrease
during the cutbacks, suggested that New York City had
been overpoliced when at maximum strength. For those
concerned about levels of disorder and fear in New York
City, not to mention other problems, that came as a dis-
maying conclusion. Yet it emphasizes the erosion of
confidence that citizens, politicians, and academicians
had in urban police—an erosion that was translated
into lack of political and financial support.
Finally, urban police departments began to acquire
competition; private security and the community
crime control movement. Despite the inherent value of
these developments, the fact that businesses, indus-
tries, and private citizens began to search for alterna-
tive means of protecting their property and persons
suggests a decreasing confidence in either the capabil-
ity or the intent of the police to provide the services that
citizens want.
In retrospect, the police reform strategy has char-
acteristics similar to those that Miles and Snow
31
ascribe to a defensive strategy in the private sector.
Some of the characteristics of an organization with a
defensive strategy are (with specific characteristics of
reform policing added in parentheses):
• Its market is stable and narrow (crime victims).
• Its success is dependent on maintaining domi-
nance in a narrow, chosen market (crime control).
• It tends to ignore developments outside its
domain (isolation).
• It tends to establish a single core technology
(patrol).
• New technology is used to improve its current
product or service rather than to expand its
product or service line (use of computers to
enhance patrol).
• Its management is centralized (command and
control).
• Promotions generally are from within (with the
exception of chiefs, virtually all promotions are
from within).
• There is a tendency toward a functional struc-
ture with high degrees of specialization and
formalization.
30
Mary Ann Wycoff, The Role of Municipal Police Research as a Prelude to Changing It, Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1982; Goldstein, Policing a Free
Society.
31
Raymond E. Miles and Charles C. Snow, Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978.
40 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
A defensive strategy is successful for an organiza-
tion when market conditions remain stable and few
competitors enter the field. Such strategies are vulner-
able, however, in unstable market conditions and when
competitors are aggressive.
The reform strategy was a successful strategy for
police during the relatively stable period of the 1940’s
and 1950’s. Police were able to sell a relatively narrow
service line and maintain dominance in the crime con-
trol market. The social changes of the 1960’s and 1970’s,
however, created unstable conditions. Some of the more
significant changes included: the civil rights move-
ment; migration of minorities into cities; the changing
age of the population (more youths and teenagers);
increases in crime and fear, increased oversight of
police actions by courts; and the decriminalization and
deinstitutionalization movements. Whether or not the
private sector defensive strategy properly applies to
police, it is clear that the reform strategy was unable to
adjust to the changing social circumstances of the
1960’s and 1970’s.
y The Community
Problem-Solving Era
All was not negative for police during the late 1970’s
and early 1980’s, however. Police began to score victo-
ries which they barely noticed. Foot patrol remained
popular, and in many cities citizen and political
demands for it intensified. In New Jersey, the state
funded the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program,
which funded foot patrol in cities, often over the oppo-
sition of local chiefs of police.
32
In Boston, foot patrol
was so popular with citizens that when neighborhoods
were selected for foot patrol, politicians often made the
announcements, especially during election years. Flint,
Michigan, became the first city in memory to return to
foot patrol on a citywide basis. It proved so popular
there that citizens twice voted to increase their taxes to
fund foot patrol—most recently by a two-thirds major-
ity. Political and citizen demands for foot patrol contin-
ued to expand in cities throughout the United States.
Research into foot patrol suggested it was more than
just politically popular, it contributed to city life: it
reduced fear, increased citizen satisfaction with police,
improved police attitudes toward citizens, and increased
the morale and job satisfaction of police.
33
Additionally, research conducted during the 1970’s
suggested that one factor could help police improve
their record in dealing with crime: information. If
information about crimes and criminals could be
obtained from citizens by police, primarily patrol offi-
cers, and could be properly managed by police depart-
ments, investigative and other units could significantly
increase their effect on crime.
34
Moreover, research into foot patrol suggested that
at least part of the fear reduction potential was linked
to the order maintenance activities of foot patrol offi-
cers.
35
Subsequent work in Houston and Newark indi-
cated that tactics other than foot patrol that, like foot
patrol, emphasized increasing the quantity and
improving the quality of police-citizen interactions
had outcomes similar to those of foot patrol (fear
reduction, etc.).
36
Meanwhile, many other cities were
developing programs, though not evaluated, similar to
those in the foot patrol, Flint, and fear reduction
experiments.
37
32
The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment.
33
The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment; Trojanowicz, An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan.
34
Tony Pate et al., Three Approaches to Criminal Apprehension in Kansas City: An Evaluation Report, Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1976; Eck, Solving
Crimes: The Investigation of Burglary and Robbery.
35
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” Atlantic Monthly, March 1982: 29–38.
36
Tony Pate et. al., Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report, Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1986.
37
Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley, The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American Cities, New York, The Free Press, 1986; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Policing
a City’s Central District: The Oakland Story, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, March 1985.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 41
The findings of foot patrol and fear reduction
experiments, when coupled with the research on the
relationship between fear and disorder, created new
opportunities for police to understand the increasing
concerns of citizens’ groups about disorder (gangs,
prostitutes, etc.) and to work with citizens to do some-
thing about it. Police discovered that when they asked
citizens about their priorities, citizens appreciated the
inquiry and also provided useful information—often
about problems that beat officers might have been
aware of, but about which departments had little or no
official data (e.g., disorder). Moreover, given the ambi-
guities that surround both the definitions of disorder
and the authority of police to do something about it,
police learned that they had to seek authorization from
local citizens to intervene in disorderly situations.
38
Simultaneously, Goldstein’s problem-oriented
approach to policing
39
was being tested in several com-
munities: Madison, Wisconsin; Baltimore County,
Maryland; and Newport News, Virginia. Problem-
oriented policing rejects the fragmented approach in
which police deal with each incident, whether citizen- or
police-initiated, as an isolated event with neither history
nor future. Pierce’s findings about calls for service illus-
trate Goldstein’s point: 60 percent of the calls for service
in any given year in Boston originated from 10 percent
of the households calling the police.
40
Furthermore,
Goldstein and his colleagues in Madison, Newport
News, and Baltimore County discovered the following:
police officers enjoy operating with a holistic approach
to their work; they have the capacity to do it success-
fully; they can work with citizens and other agencies to
solve problems; and citizens seem to appreciate working
with police—findings similar to those of the foot patrol
experiments (Newark and Flint)
41
and the fear reduc-
tion experiments (Houston and Newark).
42
The problem confronting police, policymakers,
and academicians is that these trends and findings
seem to contradict many of the tenets that dominated
police thinking for a generation. Foot patrol creates
new intimacy between citizens and police. Problem
solving is hardly the routinized and standardized
patrol modality that reformers thought was necessary
to maintain control of police and limit their discre-
tion. Indeed, use of discretion is the sine qua non of
problem-solving policing. Relying on citizen endorse-
ment of order maintenance activities to justify police
action acknowledges a continued or new reliance on
political authorization for police work in general. And,
accepting the quality of urban life as an outcome of
good police service emphasizes a wider definition
of the police function and the desired effects of police
work.
These changes in policing are not merely new
police tactics, however. Rather, they represent a new
organizational approach, properly called a community
strategy. The elements of that strategy are:
Legitimacy and Authorization
There is renewed emphasis on community, or political,
authorization for many police tasks, along with law and
professionalism. Law continues to be the major legiti-
mating basis of the police function. It defines basic
police powers, but it does not fully direct police activi-
ties in efforts to maintain order, negotiate conflicts, or
solve community problems. It becomes one tool among
many others. Neighborhood, or community, support
and involvement are required to accomplish those
tasks. Professional and bureaucratic authority, espe-
cially that which tends to isolate police and insulate
them from neighborhood influences, is lessened as
38
Wilson and Kelling, “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows.”
39
Herman Goldstein, “Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach,” Crime and Delinquency, April 1979, 236–258.
40
Glenn Pierce et. al., “Evaluation of an Experiment in Proactive Police Intervention in the Field of Domestic Violence Using Repeat Call Analysis,” Boston,
Massachusetts, The Boston Fenway Project, Inc., May 13, 1987.
41
The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment: Trojanowicz, An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan.
42
Pate et. al., Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report.
42 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
citizens contribute more to definitions of problems and
identification of solutions. Although in some respects
similar to the authorization of policing’s political era,
community authorization exists in a different political
context. The civil service movement, the political cen-
tralization that grew out of the Progressive era, and the
bureaucratization, professionalization, and unioniza-
tion of police stand as counterbalances to the possible
recurrence of the corrupting influences of ward politics
that existed prior to the reform movement.
The Police Function
As indicated above, the definition of police function
broadens in the community strategy. It includes order
maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving
through the organization, and provision of services, as
well as other activities. Crime control remains an
important function, with an important difference, how-
ever. The reform strategy attempts to control crime
directly through preventive patrol and rapid response
to calls for service. The community strategy empha-
sizes crime control and prevention as an indirect result
of, or an equal partner to, the other activities.
Organizational Design
Community policing operates from organizational
assumptions different from those of reform policing.
The idea that workers have no legitimate, substantive
interest in their work is untenable when programs such
as those in Flint, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City,
Baltimore County, Newport News, and others are exam-
ined. Consulting with community groups, problem solv-
ing, maintaining order, and other such activities are
antithetical to the reform ideal of eliminating officer
discretion through routinization and standardization of
police activities. Moreover, organizational decentraliza-
tion is inherent in community policing: the involvement
of police officers in diagnosing and responding to
neighborhood and community problems necessarily
pushes operational and tactical decisionmaking to the
lower levels of the organization. The creation of neigh-
borhood police stations (storefronts, for example),
reopening of precinct stations, and establishment of
beat offices (in schools, churches, etc.) are concrete
examples of such decentralization.
Decentralization of tactical decisionmaking to pre-
cinct or beat level does not imply abdication of execu-
tive obligations and functions, however. Developing,
articulating, and monitoring organizational strategy
remain the responsibility of management. Within this
strategy, operational and tactical decisionmaking is
decentralized. This implies what may at first appear to
be a paradox: while the number of managerial levels
may decrease, the number of managers may increase.
Sergeants in a decentralized regime, for example, have
managerial responsibilities that exceed those they
would have in a centralized organization.
At least two other elements attend this decentral-
ization: increased participative management and
increased involvement of top police executives in plan-
ning and implementation. Chiefs have discovered that
programs are easier to conceive and implement if offi-
cers themselves are involved in their development
through task forces, temporary matrix-like organiza-
tional units, and other organizational innovations that
tap the wisdom and experience of sergeants and patrol
officers. Additionally, police executives have learned
that good ideas do not translate themselves into suc-
cessful programs without extensive involvement of the
chief executive and his close agents in every stage of
planning and implementation, a lesson learned in the
private sector as well.
43
One consequence of decentralized decisionmaking,
participative planning and management, and executive
involvement in planning is that fewer levels of authority
are required to administer police organizations. Some
police organizations, including the London Metropolitan
Police (Scotland Yard), have begun to reduce the number
of middle-management layers, while others are contem-
plating doing so. Moreover, as in the private sector,
as computerized information gathering systems reach
their potential in police departments, the need for
43
James R. Gardner, Robert Rachlin, and H.W. Allen Sweeny, eds., Handbook of Strategic Planning, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1986.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 43
middle managers whose primary function is data col-
lection will be further reduced.
External Relationships
Community policing relies on an intimate relationship
between police and citizens. This is accomplished in a
variety of ways: relatively long-term assignment of
officers to beats, programs that emphasize familiarity
between citizens and police (police knocking on doors,
consultations, crime control meetings for police and
citizens, assignment to officers of “caseloads” of house-
holds with ongoing problems, problem solving, etc.),
revitalization or development of Police Athletic League
programs, educational programs in grade and high
schools, and other programs. Moreover, police are
encouraged to respond to the feelings and fears of citi-
zens that result from a variety of social problems or
from victimization.
Further, the police are restructuring their relation-
ship with neighborhood groups and institutions.
Earlier, during the reform era, police had claimed a
monopolistic responsibility for crime control in cities,
communities, and neighborhoods; now they recognize
serious competitors in the “industry” of crime control,
especially private security and the community crime
control movement. Whereas in the past police had dis-
missed these sources of competition or, as in the case of
community crime control, had attempted to coopt the
movement for their own purposes,
44
now police in
many cities (Boston, New York, Houston, and Los
Angeles, to name a few) are moving to structure work-
ing relationships or strategic alliances with neighbor-
hood and community crime control groups. Although
there is less evidence of attempts to develop alliances
with the private security industry, a recent proposal to
the National Institute of Justice envisioned an experi-
mental alliance between the Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
Police Department and the Wackenhut Corporation in
which the two organizations would share responses to
calls for service.
Demand Management
In the community problem-solving strategy, a major por-
tion of demand is decentralized, with citizens encouraged
to bring problems directly to beat officers or precinct
offices. Use of 911 is discouraged, except for dire emer-
gencies. Whether tactics include aggressive foot patrol as
in Flint or problem solving as in Newport News, the
emphasis is on police officers’ interacting with citizens to
determine the types of problems they are confronting and
to devise solutions to those problems. In contrast to
reform policing with its selling orientation, this approach
is more like marketing: customer preferences are sought,
and satisfying customer needs and wants, rather than
selling a previously packaged product or service, is
emphasized. In the case of police, they gather information
about citizens’ wants, diagnose the nature of the problem,
devise possible solutions, and then determine which seg-
ments of the community they can best serve and which
can be best served by other agencies and institutions that
provide services, including crime control.
Additionally, many cities are involved in the devel-
opment of demarketing programs.
45
The most note-
worthy example of demarketing is in the area of rapid
response to calls for service. Whether through the
development of alternatives to calls for service, educa-
tional programs designed to discourage citizens from
using the 911 system, or, as in a few cities, simply not
responding to many calls for service, police actively
attempt to demarket a program that had been actively
sold earlier. Often demarketing 911 is thought of as a
negative process. It need not be so, however. It is an
attempt by police to change social, political, and fiscal
circumstances to bring consumers’ wants in line with
police resources and to accumulate evidence about the
value of particular police tactics.
Tactics and Technology
Community policing tactics include foot patrol, prob-
lem solving, information gathering, victim counseling
44
Kelling, “Juveniles and Police: The End of the Nightstick.”
45
Crompton and Lamb, Marketing Government and Social Services.
44 SECTION 1 THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE
and services, community organizing and consultation,
education, walk-and-ride and knock-on-door pro-
grams, as well as regular patrol, specialized forms of
patrol, and rapid response to emergency calls for ser-
vice. Emphasis is placed on information sharing
between patrol and detectives to increase the possibil-
ity of crime solution and clearance.
Measured Outcomes
The measures of success in the community strategy are
broad: quality of life in neighborhoods, problem solu-
tion, reduction of fear, increased order, citizen satisfac-
tion with police services, as well as crime control. In
sum, the elements of the community strategy include:
• Authorization—commonly support (political),
law, professionalism.
• Function—crime control, crime prevention,
problem solving.
• Organizational design—decentralized, task
forces, matrices.
• Relationship to environment—consultative,
police defend values of law and professional-
ism, but listen to community concerns.
• Demand—channelled through analysis of
underlying problems.
• Tactics and technology—foot patrol, problem
solving, etc.
• Outcomes—quality of life and citizen satisfaction.
y Conclusion
We have argued that there were two stages of policing
in the past, political and reform, and that we are now
moving into a third, the community era. To carefully
examine the dimensions of policing during each of
these eras, we have used the concept of organizational
strategy. We believe that this concept can be used not
only to describe the different styles of policing in the
past and the present, but also to sharpen the under-
standing of police policymakers of the future.
For example, the concept helps explain policing’s
perplexing experience with team policing during the
1960’s and 1970’s. Despite the popularity of team polic-
ing with officers involved in it and with citizens, it gener-
ally did not remain in police departments for very long.
It was usually planned and implemented with enthusi-
asm and maintained for several years. Then, with little
fanfare, it would vanish—with everyone associated with
it saying regretfully that for some reason it just did not
work as a police tactic. However, a close examination of
team policing reveals that it was a strategy that innova-
tors mistakenly approached as a tactic. It had implica-
tions for authorization (police turned to neighborhoods
for support), organizational design (tactical decisions
were made at lower levels of the organization), definition
of function (police broadened their service role), rela-
tionship to environment (permanent team members
responded to the needs of small geographical areas),
demand (wants and needs came to team members
directly from citizens), tactics (consultation with citi-
zens, etc.), and outcomes (citizen satisfaction, etc.). What
becomes clear, though, is that team policing was a com-
peting strategy with different assumptions about every
element of police business. It was no wonder that it
expired under such circumstances. Team and reform
policing were strategically incompatible—one did not fit
into the other. A police department could have a small
team policing unit or conduct a team policing experi-
ment, but business as usual was reform policing.
Likewise, although foot patrol symbolizes the new
strategy for many citizens, it is a mistake to equate the
two. Foot patrol is a tactic, a way of delivering police
services. In Flint, its inauguration has been accompa-
nied by implementation of most of the elements of a
community strategy, which has become business as
usual. In most places, foot patrol is not accompanied by
the other elements. It is outside the mainstream of
“real” policing and often provided only as a sop to citi-
zens and politicians who are demanding the develop-
ment of different policing styles. This certainly was the
case in New Jersey when foot patrol was evaluated by
the Police Foundation.
46
Another example is in
46
The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment.
READING 2 The Evolving Strategy of Policing 45
Milwaukee, where two police budgets are passed: the
first is the police budget; the second, a supplementary
budget for modest levels of foot patrol. In both cases,
foot patrol is outside the mainstream of police activi-
ties and conducted primarily as a result of external
pressures placed on departments.
It is also a mistake to equate problem solving or
increased order maintenance activities with the new
strategy. Both are tactics. They can be implemented
either as part of a new organizational strategy, as foot
patrol was in Flint, or as an “add-on,” as foot patrol was
in most of the cities in New Jersey. Drawing a distinc-
tion between organizational add-ons and a change in
strategy is not an academic quibble; it gets to the heart
of the current situation in policing. We are arguing that
policing is in a period of transition from a reform
strategy to what we call a community strategy. The
change involves move than making tactical or organi-
zational adjustments and accommodations. Just as
policing went through a basic change when it moved
from the political to the reform strategy, it is going
through a similar change now. If elements of the
emerging organizational strategy are identified and
the policing institution is guided through the change
rather than left blindly thrashing about, we expect that
the public will be better served, policymakers and
police administrators more effective, and the profes-
sion of policing revitalized.
A final point: the classical theory of organiza-
tion that continues to dominate police administra-
tion in most American cities is alien to most of the
elements of the new strategy. The new strategy will
not accommodate to the classical theory: the latter
denies too much of the real nature of police work,
promulgates unsustainable myths about the nature
and quality of police supervision, and creates too
much cynicism in officers attempting to do creative
problem solving. Its assumptions about workers are
simply wrong.
Organizational theory has developed well beyond
the stage it was at during the early 1900’s, and policing
does have organizational options that are consistent
with the newly developing organizational strategy.
Arguably, policing, which was moribund during the
1970’s, is beginning a resurgence. It is overthrowing a
strategy that was remarkable in its time, but which
could not adjust to the changes of recent decades. Risks
attend the new strategy and its implementation. The
risks, however, for the community and the profession of
policing, are not as great as attempting to maintain a
strategy that faltered on its own terms during the
1960’s and 1970’s.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. According to this article, how has the legitimacy of the police changed over time?
2. How have the demands for police service changed over the course of the three eras?
3. Explain how the relationship between the police and public has changed, and identify some of the factors that influ-
enced this change.
