1
Marubeni Washington Report
Marubeni America Corporation Washington Oce
Senior Manager (Macroeconomics, Trade and Industry) Kensuke Abe
abe-k@marubeni.com
The Trump administration's China policy in its rst term had two drivers: ideological and
trade. Although the boundary between economy and security has become blurred in
recent years, it is necessary to distinguish between these two drivers when analyzing the
Trump administration.
Former President Trump himself has tended to place emphasis on trade drivers. On the
other hand, ideological drivers, which have a large structural impact, were formulated by
the diplomatic and security experts he appointed and were implemented within the limits
of former President Trump's tolerance. This structure is unlikely to change even if there is
a second Trump administration.
Experts who handled China policy in Trump's rst term and maintained a good relationship
with him might be reappointed in a potential second term. If this includes aides involved
in China policy from the early days of his administration who resigned after the January
6th attack on the U.S. Capitol, the ideological conict between the U.S. and China could
deepen further. Conversely, if individuals with little experience in China policy but high
loyalty to Trump are appointed to key foreign aairs or security positions, trade drivers
are likely to gain more prominence.
There are already less than six months until the US presidential election, but the key
independent voters are said to decide on their voting candidates around the end of summer,
and no candidate has gained a signicant lead. Therefore, there is still a 50-50 chance of re-
election between current Democratic President Joe Biden and former Republican President
Donald Trump, so there is no need to exaggerate the possibility of Trump's reelection more
than necessary. However, if President Biden is re-elected, it is easy to predict because the
current policies will basically be continued, while if former President Trump is re-elected, as
seen in his rst term, his policies are unconventional and highly uncertain, making it dicult
to predict. That is why it is important to conduct a thorough analysis now and understand
what risks there are. In this report, we will analyze possible China policy in the second Trump
administration. However, as will be described later, trade policies such as taris on China will
be covered in the next report.
1. Looking back at the rst term of the Trump administration
The former Trump administration's China policy had two major drivers. The rst was a
trade driver, such as the increase in import taris, which escalated into a trade war with
The World After Trump’s Reelection (2)
What is it’s China policy? Aides who craft the ideological driver
May 31, 2024
2
China. To achieve his campaign promise of reducing the trade decit with China, former
President Trump invoked Section 301 of the Trade Act and imposed additional taris of up to
25% on items worth more than $350 billion in total. President Trump has advocated
protectionist policies since the 1980s, and they were even mentioned in his campaign
platform, "Agenda 47."
1
Trade policies centered on China will likely continue to be a major
driver in the Trump administration's second term.
2
However, from the perspective of geopolitical risk, another driver that will likely have a
greater impact than trade policy and inuence long-term U.S.-China relations is ideological.
As exemplied by the National Security Strategy published in December 2017 and the speech
given by former Vice President Pence at the Hudson Institute in October 2018, these drivers
position U.S.-China relations as a "great power competition" and recognized that China was
attempting to eliminate U.S. inuence from the Western Pacic in terms of security and to
surpass U.S. inuence globally in terms of ideology. The sense of threat from China has been
gradually increasing in the U.S. since the 2000s, and although the Obama administration
also tried to address China's rise through its Asia rebalance policy, it was the Trump
administration's China policy that determined that China was the most important strategic
competitor.
As the term "economic security" has become more and more common recently, the two
issues mentioned above are closely linked. China's economic rise has enabled the
modernization of the People's Liberation Army and increased its global inuence, which has
ultimately led to an ideological conict. However, in the former Trump administration, the
trade policy toward China and the ideological policy toward China were made by dierent
policymakers. In other words, the former was led by former President Trump, who was very
keen to reduce the trade decit, former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, and
then-Chairman of the National Trade Council Peter Navarro, and they began preparing to
impose taris on China immediately after the inauguration of the administration. Former
President Trump signed a memorandum instructing the USTR to investigate the situation of
intellectual property rights infringement by China and determine whether Section 301 of the
Trade Act should be applied in August 2017, just seven months after the inauguration of the
1
For a list of "Agenda 47," please refer to the Marubeni Washington report, " The World after Trump's
Reelection (1) What Will Happen to the Ination Reduction Act (IRA)? "
( https://www.marubeni.com/jp/research/report/data/MWR_2024_04_Trump_IRA20240313.pdf ).
2
In this report, I will conveniently refer to a possible second term of the Trump administration as a
"second term of the Trump administration," but this does not in any way imply that Trump will be elected
as president this year.
3
administration, and only three months after Lighthizer took oce as USTR.
On the other hand, the ideological driver was relatively slow to take eect. Even though
the Section 301 investigation had already begun in 2017, the leaders of the United States
and China visited each other in a honeymoon period. The assistant secretaries for East Asia
or Indo-Pacic, who were supposed to be responsible for China policy, were appointed in
January 2018 at the Department of Defense and in June 2019 at the Department of State,
much later after the inauguration of the administration (Figure 1). In the National Security
Strategy published at the end of 2017, China, along with Russia, was positioned as a
competitor that challenges the national power, inuence, and interests of the United States
and seeks to undermine its security and prosperity, but no concrete actions were taken
against China, and the central diplomatic issues in the early days of the Trump administration
were Iran and North Korea. However, in the second half of 2018, the National Defense
Authorization Act excluded ZTE and Huawei from federal government facilities, and former
Vice President Pence's speech on China in October clearly pushed the ideological driver
forward.
Figure 1: Changes in China policy and policy makers during the Trump administration's rst term
Date
trade
February
2017
April
May
Robert Lighthizer became USTR
August
Presidential Memorandum on the
Investigation of China's Intellectual Property
Violations
November
December
January
2018
Safeguards implemented for solar panels and
washing machines
March
Article 232 steel and aluminum tariffs
imposed
April
July
First round of tariffs on China imposed
August
Second round of tariffs on China imposed
4
September
Third round of tariffs on China imposed
October
December
February
2019
May
Third round of tariff hikes on China
June
September
Fourth round of tariffs on China imposed
January
2020
US-China Phase 1 Agreement
March
May
June
July
August
November
December
Source: Compiled by Marubeni Washington Oce based on U.S. government agency pages and various reports
Former President Trump himself placed more importance on trade drivers, as several
former senior administration ocials said in closed events. There was also speculation in his
rst term that the former president would weaken ideological drivers in order to strengthen
trade drivers, and the situation will likely be the same in his second term. Despite this, the
conict between the United States and China became more strongly recognized throughout
the previous administration because the ideological dierences between the two countries
were at the root of various problems, ideological drivers were needed to complement trade
drivers, and there were aides and Congress who supported such policies. Trade drivers aect
the macroeconomy and business environment in the form of taris, trade, and investment
restrictions. Although these eects are by no means small, the magnitude of the geopolitical
shock that ideological drivers could cause is even greater and is far more serious in terms of
5
structure and duration. Therefore, I analyze the two drivers separately, and this repot will
look at the policies and their architects that inuence the ideological drivers.
2. People who could lead the Trump administration's China policy
First, let's look at the people who were in charge of China policy in the rst Trump
administration and are likely to join the administration in the second term (Figure 2). Elbridge
Corby, whose name is listed as National Security Advisor (NSA) in the Trump second term,
the most important post related to security in the White House, served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from May 2017 to July 2018. Corby,
who has experience working in the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies, was
also involved in the formulation of the National Defense Strategy published at the end of
2017 as a representative of the Department of Defense, and it is possible that his arguments
were reected in the background to positioning China as a strategic competitor. In his later
book, The Strategy of Denial (2021), Corby argues that the United States needs a "denial
strategy" to form an anti-hegemonic coalition and refuse China from gaining regional
hegemony. He is a commentator with a strong sense of rivalry against China, to the point
that he recently sounded the alarm about the reduction of resources to counter China due
to support for Ukraine. If Corby rejoins the Trump administration as an NSA or Department
of Defense key gure, he will militarily contain China within the rst island chain and, above
all, strengthen the US military and shift its overseas military presence to defeat the People's
Army in the event of a military conict between the US and China over Taiwan. Former high-
ranking ocials in the Trump rst administration have unanimously said that the most
important factor when deciding who to appoint as his aide is "loyalty." The exact reason why
Corby left the administration in mid-2018 is unknown, but it does not appear that he had a
falling out with Trump or was red by him, so he would likely pass the loyalty test.
Randy Schriver, who served as chief of sta to former Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage, became Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Indo-Pacic region in January 2018.
Schriver was involved in formulating the Department of Defense's Indo-Pacic strategy and
was one of the Trump administration's senior ocials who publicly criticized China from an
early stage in response to its human rights crackdown in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region. Like Corby, he placed importance on the defense of Taiwan and was particularly
enthusiastic about managing relationships with allies in the Indo-Pacic region. At this point,
there is not much public speculation that Schriver will join the administration in Trump's
second term. At rst glance, his views seem to dier from those of Trump in that he places
6
importance on alliances. However, no matter what kind of alliances the second Trump
administration aim for, they will need a conduit between these countries, and one former
senior government ocial once told me, "There are few people who can manage such
alliances and are not disliked by Trump. Schriver is one candidate." To realize the anti-
hegemonic coalition advocated by Colby, they need someone like Shriver who has already
earned a certain degree of trust from the countries involved. As chairman of Project 2049, a
think tank specializing in security in the Asian region, Shriver continues to actively
disseminate information. It has been publicly said that Shriver left the administration to
prioritize time with his family. Reports also say that the reason was a dierence of opinion
with the then Deputy Secretary of State, but the Deputy Secretary was later replaced at
Trump's request, so it does not seem that Shriver had a bad relationship with former
President Trump.
Axios has named four people who may be in charge of Trump's second term's China policy
in January 2024 (the same four people were mentioned by a certain diplomatic sources).
Colby is one of them, but another is Kiron Skinner, who served as Director of the Oce of
Policy Planning at the State Department in the Trump administration for about a year from
September 2018. Skinner's name was not often heard during her term as she avoided the
media as a policy, but she has experience in the past as an assistant to former Secretaries
of State such as George Shultz and Condoleezza Rice. The Oce of Policy Planning at the
State Department was established after World War II, and its rst director was George
Kennan, who designed the containment policy against the Soviet Union at the time. Although
it is a behind-the-scenes department, it is an important department in charge of strategic
planning within the State Department. During her term, Skinner said that the great power
competition between the United States and China is dierent from the conict between the
United States and the Soviet Union, which is “ght within the Western family”, and is “a ght
with a really dierent civilization and a dierent ideology and the United States hasn’t had
that before.”, “It’s the rst time that we will have a great power competitor that is not
Caucasian.” She positioned China as a competitor with a dierent culture and system from
the United States. Although her inuence on China policy during her term in oce does not
seem to be large, Axios has listed her as a candidate for China policy maker for the second
term of the Trump administration, likely due to her policy recommendations for the next
Republican administration. The Heritage Foundation, which promotes conservative policies,
published “2025 Mandate for Leadership”, a collection of policy recommendations for each
ministry and agency in 2023 as part of "Project 2025," which it is promoting for the next
Republican administration. Skinner wrote the part for the State Department. Although these
7
are not ocial pledges of the Trump campaign, many former senior Trump administration
ocials are involved. Skinner argues that the Biden administration's strategy of competing
where we compete and cooperating where we can has failed, and that the Chinese
Communist Party's strategy has led to aggressive behavior, which must be countered with
external pressure, in other words, a "X Article" on China is needed, similar to George
Kennan's "X Article" (a paper on containment of the Soviet Union that he submitted to
Foreign Aairs magazine under the name Author X at the time). Skinner is said to have left
the State Department due to overbearing management and personal inappropriate behavior.
It does not seem that she had any conict with former President Trump himself, though she
might leave the administration on good terms. Skinner has also served as an advisor to
Republican presidential candidate campaigns, and served as a foreign aairs advisor to the
Trump campaign in 2016, after which he was in charge of the State Department and the
National Security Council (NSC) on the transition team. In other words, it seems more likely
that he will be given the role of advisor rather than governing an organization as a senior
administration ocial.
Like Skinner, Miles Yu, who was a policy planning sta member at the State Department
and a special assistant to former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on China policy, is also
included in the Axios list. According to reports, Yu and Skinner were close consultants for
Pompeo in formulating his China strategy. In particular, Pompeo described Yu, who was born
and raised in China and has been a professor of Chinese military history at the U.S. Naval
Academy for many years, as "a central part of my team advising me with respect on how to
ensure that we protect Americans and secure our freedoms in the face of challenges from
the [Chinese Communist Party]." and Yu is believed to have had a signicant inuence on
Pompeo's view of China. China targeted Yu for sanctions at the end of 2022, likely because
CCP disliked his inuence and hardline ideology toward China. Yu continues to make hardline
arguments toward China at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank. Recently, in
response to the debate over the article in the Foreign Aairs written by Matt Pottinger and
Michael Gallagher, which will be discussed later, he said, "If the Communist regime is not
changed, the regime will change all of us. The Chinese regime is conducting a robust
campaign, regime change in America!” Yu had remained at the State Department until the
end of the Trump administration, so there seems to be no problem with his loyalty.
Another person mentioned by Axios is Steve Yates. Yates, who served as an advisor to
former Vice President Dick Cheney, served as president of Radio Free Asia, a media outlet
promoting liberal democracy in Asia, during the nal days of the Trump administration. He
currently leads the China Policy Initiative at the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), a
8
conservative think tank that is considered close to the Trump campaign and is headed by
Linda McMahon, who served as Administrator of Small Business Administration in the Trump
administration. Like Skinner, Yates' name was not often heard in the China policy of the rst
term of the Trump administration, but the reason he is currently being nominated is probably
because he is disseminating China policy from a position close to the Trump camp. AFPI
published "An America First Approach to US National Security" in May 2024, and Yates was
in charge of writing the China policy in it, positioning the Chinese Communist Party as a
"Singular Threat." The specic proposals include the same assertions made by current
hardliners on the issue of China, but also include more radical statements such as
"accelerating strategic decoupling" and "defending Taiwan's independence."
From the perspective of security in general, it is expected that Robert O'Brien, who was
the last of the four NSA in the rst term of the Trump administration, will also probably take
up a key position in the second term. O'Brien took up the NSA and led the NSC in the White
House in September 2019, which was the latter half of the administration, but during his
term he implemented a hardline policy against China, such as imposing sanctions on Chinese
ocials over Hong Kong. Even recently, he has advocated "peace through strength," a term
favored by former President Reagan and used by former President Trump in diplomacy with
North Korea, and supports a hardline foreign policy against China. Alex Gray, who served as
O'Brien's chief of sta in the nal days of the Trump administration, is also attracting
attention in terms of security policy, and is one of the people whose name has been
mentioned in informal meetings by former administration ocials. He had participated in the
Trump transition team and is said to have attended the Abe-Trump meeting in 2016. O'Brien
and Gray have jointly established a strategic consulting rm called American Global
Strategies, where Colby is also listed as a senior advisor. O'Brien is the chair of the US-Taiwan
Relations Task Force organized by the Global Taiwan Institute, the only Taiwan-focused think
tank in Washington DC, and compiled a proposal to strengthen the US-Taiwan relation. Gray
is a senior fellow at the think tank and the American Foreign Policy Council, a conservative
non-prot organization specializing in foreign aairs. Similarly, Millicent Hennessey, who is
currently in charge of supply chain policy at GlobalFoundries, a US semiconductor company,
has also been mentioned as a young aide who was in charge of China policy in the Trump
administration. She also joined the NSC early in the Trump administration and was in charge
of China policy. She continued to work at the NSC until 2022 even after the Biden
administration took oce. Hennessey also serves as the Asia director for the Vandenberg
National Security Council, which was launched in the fall of 2023 by the Vandenberg Coalition,
a group of traditional American conservative foreign policy experts, and is emerging as a
9
next-generation talent who will be responsible for America's conservative foreign and
security policies.
In addition, there are people who have not been deeply involved in China policy in the rst
Trump administration, but whose names have been mentioned in key positions in foreign
aairs and security. Richard Grenell, who served as ambassador to Germany in the Trump
administration, is attracting attention in the foreign aairs and security elds because Trump
referred to him as "my envoy"
3
even after his rst term. After the Trump administration
ended, Grenell maintains close ties with the Trump family and meets mainly with leaders of
right-wing governments around the world as a representative of former President Trump. He
has been described in the media as a "shadow secretary of state," and there are also voices
calling him the NSA, along with Corby. Although Grenell has experience working as an
assistant to the United Nations representative during the George H. Bush administration, his
China policy is unclear. On the other hand, Matt Pottinger, who served as director of the
NSC's Asia department and deputy assistant to the president, was involved in China policy
for a long time during the rst term of the Trump administration, but resigned the day after
the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. Leaving the administration following the
January 6 attack is seen as the least loyal act of the former president. Therefore, the U.S.
media believes that Pottinger is unlikely to be selected for a second term. Other heavyweight
names that have been mentioned as candidates for Secretary of Defense and Secretary of
State include former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Senators Bill Hagerty, Marco Rubio,
and Lindsey Graham, all so-called hawks.
Figure 2: People who may be in charge of China policy in the Trump administration's second term
Name
YOB
Positions in the First
Administration
Main Achievements
Other positions etc.
Reasons for
leaving the
government
Current job etc.
Elbridge Colby
1979
Deputy Assistant
Secretary of
Defense (May 2017-
Jul 2018)
Formulating national
security strategies,
national defense
strategies, defense
operational policies,
guidelines.
He has worked in the
Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and
intelligence agencies; his
grandfather was former CIA
Director William Colby.
N/A
the nonprofit research
organization Marathon
Initiative and a senior
fellow at a consulting firm
founded by O'Brien.
Randall Schriver
1967
Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Jan
2018-Dec 2019)
Defense Department's
Indo-Pacific strategy,
draws up criticism of
Uyghur human rights
violations as senior
administration official
Marines (Gulf War veteran),
Department of State staff
(including Chief of Staff to
Deputy Secretary
Armitage), military attaché
in Beijing and Ulaanbaatar.
A difference of
opinion with
the then Under
Secretary of
Defense? (The
Under
Secretary of
Project 2049, a think tank
specializing in East Asia.
3
In September 2020, Serbia and Kosovo agreed to normalize economic relations through the mediation of
the United States. In November 2021, former President Trump sent Rick Grenell, who served as the
special envoy for the agreement, to the border area of the two countries and issued a statement
emphasizing the importance of the agreement. At that time, he referred to Grenell as "my Envoy
Ambassador Ric Grenell."
10
Defense was
later asked to
resign by
President
Trump.)
Kiron Skinner
1961
Director, Policy
Planning Division,
Department of State
(Sept 2018-Aug
2019)
Formulating China
policy
She has taught at several
universities and served as a
research associate at the
Hoover Institution.
Inappropriate
management
and
interpersonal
relationships
Professor at Pepperdine
University and visiting
scholar at the Heritage
Foundation. Author of
recommendations for the
State Department for
Project 2025.
Miles Yu
1962
Senior Advisor,
Office of Policy
Planning,
Department of State
(Feb 2019-)
Secretary Pompeo's
China Policy Planning,
Chinese Government
Sanctions
He taught at the Naval
Academy for many years.
Not resign
Director of the China
Center at the Hudson
Institute
Steve Yates
1968 or
69
President of Radio
Free Asia (Dec
2020-)
After working for the federal
government and intelligence
agencies, he became
Deputy National Security
Advisor to former Vice
President Dick Cheney, and
later served as a lobbyist,
consultant, and Republican
Party chairman for Idaho.
Not resign
China Policy Initiative
Leader at America First
Policy Institute
Robert O'Brien
1966
Special Envoy for
Hostage Affairs
(May 2018-Oct
2019), NSA (Sep
2019-)
Led the Trump
administration's
sanctions against
China and a series of
speeches against
China by senior
officials in the latter
stages of the
administration.
UN agencies, private sector
work, foreign affairs advisor
to presidential candidates,
etc.
Not resign
Founded consultancy
American Global
Strategies
Alex Gray
unknown
Assistant to the
President for
Defense Industry
Affairs (Jan 2017-
Nov 2018), Director
for Oceania and
Indo-Pacific Affairs
(Nov 2018-Sep
2019),
Deputy Assistant to
the President and
Chief of staff to NSA
(Sep 2019-)
Joined the NSC early
in the Trump
administration
Senior advisor to
Congressman. After the
Trump administration, he
briefly participated in
Colby's Marathon Initiative.
Not resign
CEO, American Global
Strategies. He also serves
as a senior fellow at
Global Taiwan Institute
and American Foreign
Policy Council.
Millicent
Hennessey
unknown
NSC Asian Affairs
and Chief of Staff to
the Deputy NSA
NSC staff early in the
Trump administration
and served as an aide
to Pottinger.
After working at a
university, he joined NSC in
April 2017. He worked at
Samsung Semiconductor for
about a year from June
2022.
not resign
(remained NSC
under Biden
administration)
Deputy Director for Policy
in Aerospace & Defense
at GlobalFoundries, Asia
Director for the
Vandenberg Federation.
Richard
Grenell
1966
Ambassador to
Germany (May
2018-Jun 2020),
Special Presidential
Envoy for
Serbia and Kosovo
Peace Negotiations
(Oct 2019-),
Deputy Director of
National Intelligence
(Feb-May 2020)
During his time as
ambassador, he was
criticized for his right-
wing remarks.
Nations spokesman for the
George W. Bush
administration. He also
works as a consultant and
media commentator. He is
a gay.
Not resign
Senior Advisor to the
American Center for Law
and Justice, a
conservative legal
nonprofit organization
Matthew
Pottinger
1973
NSC Asia Division,
Deputy NSA (Sep
2019-Jan 2021)
NSC staff early in the
Trump administration
and is responsible for
China policy in the
administration.
Before joining the
administration, he was a
journalist in China and
served in Marines.
the January 6
Capitol attack
Chairman of the China
Program at the
conservative research
organization Fund for
Defense of Democracies,
an advisory board
member for the
Vandenberg League, and
11
a senior adviser to the
Marathon Initiative.
Source: Compiled by Marubeni Washington Oce based on various agency websites, various reports, LinkedIn, etc.
3. Trump 2.0's China policy will be revealed depending on who is appointed
As mentioned at the beginning, even though former President Trump placed more
importance on trade drivers, great power competition or strategic competition between the
United States and China became clear during his rst term. Since the end of the Trump
administration, Russia, which has an "no-limit partnership " with China, has invaded Ukraine.
While Iran, which has been able to mitigate the damage caused by US sanctions by China's
purchase of crude oil, has not only harassed Israel, an ally of the United States, through
proxies, but has nally launched a direct attack from Iranian territory. Geopolitical risks
surrounding the United States and China have increased more than ever, and whether former
President Trump himself wants it or not, attention will inevitably be focused on how he
controls the ideological drivers. Therefore, if former President Trump does not have a clear
idea or strategy, the Trump administration's China strategy will be revealed to some extent
depending on who is appointed as aide in charge of China policy.
For example, if Colby or Schriver are selected for the NSA or Secretary of Defense, the
deployment of US forces in the Western Pacic and cooperation with related countries in the
Indo-Pacic region would be further promoted to strengthen deterrence against China. In
particular, Colby's "denial strategy" would focus more on strengthening the defense of Taiwan,
which is the number one target of the People's Liberation Army of China and is positioned as
the most vulnerable in the US-led anti-hegemonic coalition against China. If O'Brien, Gray,
or Hennessy were to take senior positions, they would concretely work to strengthen the
defense industry and supply chain foundation, including cooperation with related countries.
If Skinner or Yu were to become key gures in foreign policy at the State Department or
elsewhere, the US would likely take stronger measures to curb Chinese inuence in the US
and to impose sanctions and pursue human rights violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.
In addition, if someone like Pottinger, who once gave up on former President Trump but
has extensive knowledge of China policy, is appointed, it could be said that the Trump
administration's second term prioritized winning the strategic competition with China over
loyalty. In April 2024, Pottinger co-authored an article in Foreign Aairs magazine titled "No
Substitute for Victory" with former House of Representatives Mike Gallagher, who had served
12
as chairman of the House Select Committee on China until recently
4
but suddenly retired
from Congress. They argue that the important thing in U.S. China policy is to win the great
power competition between the United States and China, not to manage the competition, as
the Biden administration is currently aiming to do it through high-level dialogue. The
contributions of both authors succinctly document the dierence between the current
Democratic Biden administration's perception of China and traditional conservative ideas on
foreign aairs and security. The former believes that management through dialogue is
necessary to avoid any contingencies between the two superpowers, but the latter
conservative viewpoint is that while the United States is managing the situation, China will
steadily gain the national power to defeat the United States, and by the time the United
States realizes it, it will not be able to take action. Furthermore, the Biden administration
tends to say that the current competition between the United States and China is dierent
from the Cold War, but the latter group is more inclined to see the US and China as a new
Cold War. Although both share the ultimate goal of absolutely avoiding an escalating hot war
between the two countries, their views are very dierent as to whether to manage the
competition, including communication through dialogue, as a deterrent to that end, or to
activate strong restraints with overwhelming military power and execution power. If Pottinger
is appointed, the latter strategy will become even more prominent.
On the other hand, if a person is appointed based on his close relationship with the former
president and its loyalty, as in the case of Mr. Grenell, ideological drivers will be weakened,
and US policy towards China will be inuenced more by the trade drivers of the former
president. For example, according to Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin's 2021 book on
the inside of the Trump administration, Chaos Under Heaven, Trump received a
congratulatory phone call from former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on his election
victory, which later became an obstacle to holding the rst summit meeting with Chinese
President Xi Jinping in Florida. Since then, Trump has become indierent to Taiwan and was
furious that a senior administration ocial visited Taiwan without his knowledge. According
to former NSA John Bolton's memoir The Room Where It Happened, the former president is
said to have likened the economic size of China and Taiwan to his Resolute desk and the tip
of a pen, and said that Taiwan was not big enough for the United States to look after. It is
4
Its ocial name is the "Special Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the
Chinese Communist Party." For more information on the committee, please refer to our previous report
(Japanese only), " Is the U.S. policy toward China "bipartisan" or is the conict between the U.S. and
China a "new Cold War? " - Focusing on the observations of the special committee in the 118th House of
Representatives.
13
unlikely that the former president's thinking will signicantly change the entire nation's
security strategy, but its impact on China and its allies as they calculate their future strategies
will be no small thing. For China in particular, former President Trump, who placed
importance on reducing the trade decit and neglected alliances, will likely result in another
trade war in the short term, but in the medium to long term, it will be an opportunity to
reduce America's inuence in the Asian region. Given that this is the last Trump
administration, China will likely want to fully utilize this rare four years.
4. Summary
This report is a scenario analysis that examines the thinking and policies that could be
adopted by people who are being mentioned as possible candidates for formulating China
policy if former President Trump is re-elected. It is a kind of mental exercise, so to speak,
and cannot be called a precise analysis, but I think it is very important to consider what
thoughts the currently out-of-oce China experts have about the strategic and ideological
competition with China in the event of a change of administration, and to rearm the
uncertainty of the former president, who places importance on trade drivers that could
overturn all of that. In the next report, I would like to consider the scenario of a second act
of the US-China trade war that could be triggered by those trade drivers.
Marubeni America Corporation Washington Oce
1717 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 375, Washington, DC 20006
https://www.marubeni.com/jp/research/
(Disclaimer)
• This document has been prepared based on publicly available information, but we do not guarantee its validity, adequacy, or completeness.
• Any gains or losses arising from decisions made in accordance with the information are the sole responsibility of the person making the decision, and the
Company does not bear any responsibility whatsoever.
• The contents of this document are subject to change without notice.
• The individual text, photographs, illustrations, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "information") contained in this document are copyrighted works of our
company and are protected by copyright under Japanese copyright law and international treaties such as the Berne Convention. Except for cases permitted by
copyright law, such as personal use and citations by individuals, copying, distributing, modifying, translating, adapting, publicly transmitting, or making
available for transmission of the information contained in this document without the permission of the copyright holder is a violation of copyright law.